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INTRODUCTION
Founded  on  the  European  Communities,  and  supplemented  by  other  forms  of 
cooperation and policies,1 the European Union is endowed by its Member States with 
the task of asserting its identity on the international stage.2 Given the differentiated 
constitutional order of the EU, attaining this objective depends on the cooperation 
between the  Union acting  on  the  basis  of  Title  V and Title  VI  of  the  TEU,  the 
Community acting on the basis of the EC Treaty and their Member States. The web of 
interactions  underpinning  this  tripartite  cooperation  constitutes  the  system  of  EU 
external relations. 
The present study aims at decrypting the evolution of this system, by focusing on the 
development of the EU Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine. These two case studies 
epitomise the development of the system which a mere analysis of the law would only 
partially capture. 
The Partnerships involve the whole spectrum of EU external dimensions. Based on 
mixed agreements negotiated in the aftermath of the establishment of the Union, they 
encompass areas relating to the non-Community sub-orders of the EU. In other words, 
they  exemplify the presence  of  the  triangle  EU/EC/Member States  at  the external 
level, and bring to light the rules governing this tripartite cooperation. Finally, the 
Partnerships typify the pivotal role of institutional practice in upholding and adjusting 
such rules.  
EU relations  with  Russia  and  Ukraine  are  however  more  than  mere  examples of 
current trends in the system of EU external relations. They themselves influence the 
development  of  this  system.  Their  geographical  proximity  and  high  political 
1 Art. 1 TEU. In the reminder of this study, reference will be made to the most recent numbering of 
Treaty articles (introduced by the Treaty of  Amsterdam, and consolidated by the Nice Treaty),  in 
combination with earlier number references (based on the Treaty of Rome as regards the EC Treaty, 
and complemented by the Treaty of Maastricht as regards the TEU) where relevant for the argument. 
2 Art. 2 TEU.
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significance have made Russia and Ukraine focal points for the development of the 
Union’s external action. Indeed, the Partnerships have systematically been used as 
testing grounds for applying new devices of EU external relations, thus contributing 
to  assessing  innovative  formulas  resulting  from  the  cooperation  EU/EC/Member 
States. In that, institutional practices taking place in the context of the Partnerships 
with Russia and Ukraine have tended to anticipate developments later codified in the 
constitutional charter of the Union. 
Through the case studies of the Partnerships, it will be seen that the fulfilment of the 
EU objective of asserting its identity on the international stage is a function of the 
cooperation between the EU, the EC and their Member States, which is determined by 
a combination of four interlinked elements. 
First,  the  tripartite  cooperation  is  governed  by  EU  constitutional  law.  The  latter 
establishes an institutional architecture divided in sub-orders, but also encompasses 
fundamental  principles  which  underpin  the  system of  EU  external  relations.  The 
principles fall into two main categories. A first category comprises devices aimed at 
guaranteeing the division of competences in the EU constitutional order. A second 
category  consists  of  principles  aimed at  promoting  the coherent  exercise  of  these 
competences. In view of the overlapping powers of the EC, the EU acting on the 
bases of Titles V and VI of the TEU, and the Member States in the field of external 
relations, there is a tension between the aims of the two sets of principles, which is not 
tackled by the Treaty itself. While providing that the European Court of Justice should 
guarantee the division of powers between the EC/EU/Member States, it leaves it to 
the other institutions, particularly the Council of the EU and the Commission of the 
European Communities to ensure the coherence of the EU external action.
Secondly and consequently,  the system of EU external relations is  fleshed-out  by 
institutional practice. It will be seen that the tension enshrined in the Treaty between 
the division of competence and the quest for coherence becomes apparent through 
frictions between the Council and the Commission, incarnating the strain between the 
EU and the EC institutional logics. Circumscribing this “pillar politics” inherent in the 
EU constitutional order, new forms of interactions between these institutions have 
developed, outside of the treaty framework thanks to the political endorsement of the 
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European Council. In effect, these ad hoc arrangements have fostered the coherence 
of the external action of the EU. 
Thirdly, the system has been articulated by the case law of the European Court of 
Justice, endowed by the Treaty with the task of ensuring the division of competence 
enshrined in the EU constitutional order. In the first place, the Court has extensively 
adjudicated upon the distribution of powers between the Community and the Member 
States,  particularly  by  refining  the  doctrines  of  mixity  and  implied  Community 
external competence. It has also policed the boundaries between the EU sub-orders. 
The case law has thereby contributed to entrench further the logic of competence in 
the system of EU external relations. At the same time, the Court has established an 
obligation of  cooperation between the Member States and the Community,  in  the 
conduct of EU external action. 
Finally, the configuration of cooperation EU/EC/Member States varies depending on 
the  third party in question. It is also affected by the evolving  objectives of the EU 
towards  the  partner  concerned.  The  system  therefore  encompasses  a  degree  of 
flexibility, if not unpredictability, in order to adapt itself to political realities.
In  view  of  these  elements,  the  present  study  of  the  system  as  evidenced  in  the 
Partnerships is articulated as follows. Part I explores the implications of the TEU on 
the  methodology  of  EC  external  relations,  and  the  emergence  of  the  tripartite 
cooperation to establish and conduct the external action of the EU. Part II examines 
the constitutional principles that underpin the system of EU external relations with a 
view to decrypting their contribution to the development of interactions between the 
EC/EU and the Member States. Part  III purports to establish how the institutional 
practice within the Partnerships has developed and adjusted these interactions, and 
eventually contributed to changes in the EU constitutional charter. 
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PART I
THE PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE: A NEW FORMULA OF MIXITY
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Russia and Ukraine represent an 
innovative formula of EC external relations. The content of the Agreements has been 
highly influenced by the emerging constitutional order encapsulated in the Treaty on 
European  Union,  and  articulated  in  the  jurisprudence  of  the  European  Court  of 
Justice, particularly as regards the distribution of powers between the Member States 
and the Community. Moreover, the PCAs were negotiated and concluded as part of an 
emerging network of relations between the newly established EU and its European 
neighbours. In particular, they were sketched out after the first Europe Agreements 
had been concluded with the countries from central and eastern Europe. In substantive 
terms, it appears that the PCAs were, to a large extent, defined by default as neither an 
association nor a trade and cooperation agreement (chapter 1). They were concluded 
by the Community and the Member States, “acting in the framework of the European 
Union” (chapter 2). In that, this new formula of mixity highlights the emergence of 
the tripartite cooperation between the EU, the EC and the Member States. 
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CHAPTER 1
MIXED AGREEMENTS DEFINED BY DEFAULT 
Partnership  and  Cooperation  Agreements  were  crafted  as  specific  contractual 
frameworks for the EU to develop partnerships with each of the Newly Independent 
States (NIS),  following the disintegration of the Soviet  Union.3 They replaced the 
Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement  (TCA)  concluded  by  the  Community  and  the 
Soviet Union in 1989, and laid the grounds for establishing elaborate and ambitious 
links between new actors.4
The  nature  of  the  PCAs  was  influenced  by  the  EC/EU  constitutional  evolution, 
characterised  by  clarified  principles  governing  Community  competence,  and  the 
development of alternative formulas of cooperation between Member States in the 
form of “intergovernmental” cooperations in Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP, Title V) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA, Title VI). Going beyond the 
sphere  of  Community  competence  refined  by  the  new  constitutional  order,  the 
Agreements constitute a new model of mixed agreements,  embodying the restated 
doctrine of mixity defined by the European Court of Justice in its famous Opinion 
3 PCA between the EC and their Member States, of the one part, and the Russian Federation, of the 
other part (OJ 1997 L327/1); PCA between the EC and their Member States, of the one part,  and 
Ukraine, of the other part (OJ 1998 L49/1); PCA between the EC and their Member States, of the one 
part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (OJ 1998 L181/1); PCA between the EC and their 
Member States, of the one part, and Armenia, of the other part (OJ 1999 L239/1); PCA between the EC 
and their Member States, of the one part, and Azerbaijan, of the other part (OJ 1999 L246/1); PCA 
between the EC and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part (OJ 1999 
L205/1);  PCA  between  the  EC  and  their  Member  States,  of  the  one  part,  and  the  Republic  of 
Kazakhstan, of the other part (OJ 1999 L196/1); PCA between the EC and their Member States, of the 
one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (OJ 1999 L196/46); PCA between the EC and their 
Member States,  of  the one  part,  and Uzbekistan,  of  the  other  part  (OJ 1999 L229/);  see  also the 
proposal for a PCA between the EC and its Member States, on the one hand, and Belarus, on the other 
hand (COM(95)44); the proposal for a PCA between the EC and its Member States, on the one hand, 
and Turkmenistan, on the other hand (COM (1997)693).
4 EU/Russia (1993), para. 8.
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1/94.5 Moreover, the PCAs were designed in the context of the reorganisation of the 
intra-European relationships. More precisely, the Community and its Member States 
envisaged  the  PCAs  as  an  alternative to  the  Europe  (association)  Agreements 
concluded with the countries from central and eastern Europe (CEECs). 
This chapter scrutinizes the PCAs from the point of view of the evolving law of EC 
external  relations,  as  stimulated  by  the  developing  jurisprudence  of  the  European 
Court of Justice. It will also situate these agreements in relation to the other main 
Community external agreements constituting the EU  Ostpolitik at the dawn of the 
nineties, thereby attempting to clarify their position in the typology of EC agreements. 
It will be seen that, to a great extent, the PCAs, as new model of agreement, were 
defined by default: neither a TCA like the Community Agreement with the Soviet 
Union (1.1), nor an association agreement like the Europe Agreement with the CEECs 
(1.2).
1.1. More comprehensive than the Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
between the Community and the Soviet Union
The  PCAs  resemble  the  classic  trade  and  cooperation  agreements  (TCAs).  They 
nonetheless  find  their  place  above the  TCAs  in  the  typology  of  EC  external 
agreements. This holds particularly true if one takes the TCA concluded between the 
EC and the USSR in 1989, as a point of reference.6 Compared to the 1989 TCA, the 
PCAs  have  more  ambitious  objectives  (1.1.1),  and  contain  broader  reciprocal 
commitments (1.1.2). These features explain the subtle distinctions between the legal 
bases of the two types of agreements (1.1.3). 
5 Opinion  1/94  Competence  of  the  Community  to  conclude  international  agreements  concerning  
services and the protection of intellectual property.
6 OJ 1990 L68/1.  This  holds  true  also in  respect  of  the  TCAs concluded  with  the  former  Soviet 
satellites, e.g. Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the Community and the People’s Republic of 
Poland (OJ 1989 L339/2) and Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation with the Hungarian 
People’s Republic (OJ 1988 L327/1). See further Maresceau (1992:94ff), and Horovitz (1990:259).
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1.1.1. The PCAs: more ambitious political aims than the 1989 TCA
While  the  political  significance  of  the  1989  TCA  with  the  Soviet  Union  is 
undisputable,7 its objectives however remained modest, particularly if compared to 
those of the PCAs.8 The latter surpass the TCA’s aim of normalising the relationship 
between the Community and the Soviet Union (1.1.1.1), and contain a more elaborate 
list of objectives (1.1.1.2).
1.1.1.1. Beyond normalisation: the EU ambition to support the 
transformation in the Partner countries
The essential ambition of the TCA was to normalise the relations between Parties that 
had only recently established their  first  official  contacts, after  a protracted mutual 
ignorance.9 The Agreement was also shaped in consideration of the partners’ distinct 
political and economic features.10 
Article 1 of the TCA stipulated that, “in the framework of their respective laws and 
regulations”, the Contracting Parties “shall use their best endeavours to facilitate and 
promote” first,  the harmonious development and diversification of their trade; and 
second, the development of various types of commercial and economic cooperation. 
To that end, they confirmed their resolve to consider favourably, each for its own part, 
suggestions made by the other Party with a view to attaining these objectives. The 
TCA  thus  represented  an  “entry-level”  agreement,11 which  was  to  be  built  upon 
7 For  Edvard  Shevardnadzé  (1991:  238),  then  Soviet  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  this  agreement 
constituted a great leap towards relations of good neighbours between Eastern and Western Europe, the 
elimination of obstacles that separated them, and the creation of the European economic area. See also 
Yakemtchouk (1997: 445).
8 Shemiatenkov (1998: 163); Maresceau (1992: 109-112, 2001: 20).
9 The “Joint Declaration on the establishment of official  relations between the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance and the European Economic Community” is recalled in the Preamble of the TCA. 
See OJ 1988 L157/34. See also Shemiatenkov (1998: 163), Maresceau (1991: 158ff), and Shishkov 
(2002: 71-72).
10 De Laet (1995).
11 The expression is borrowed from Steve Peers (1995: 845, 2000a: 165).
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thereafter.12 Indeed,  negotiations for  elaborating this  initial  agreement  had already 
started when the Soviet Union disintegrated.13 
The  PCAs are  built  upon  these  initial  foundations,  but  introduce  more  ambitious 
objectives  in  the  relationship,  which  indeed  involves  new partners,  following  the 
break-up of the Soviet  Union, on the one hand, and the creation of the European 
Union,  on  the  other  hand.14 The  Preambles  of  the  Agreements  with  Russia  and 
Ukraine, respectively, emphasise the Parties’ wish to strengthen their “historical links 
and to establish a partnership and cooperation agreement which would  deepen and 
widen the  relations  established  between  them  in  the  past  in  particular  by  the 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the European Atomic 
Energy Community and the [USSR]” (emphasis added).15 
12 The Preamble of the TCA (OJ 1990 L68/1) stated in its first indent that the Parties recognised “that 
the Community and the USSR desire[d] to establish direct contractual relations with one another which 
[would] permit further development at a later stage”. 
13 European Commission (1992a: 19).
14 In its Communication on the relations between the Community and the Independent States of the 
former Soviet Union, the Commission identified two reasons making it indispensable to replace the 
TCA. First, the change of identity of the Community’s partner required in itself the negotiation of a 
new agreement. Secondly, the TCA had to be upgraded to take account of the new independent States’ 
commitment to economic and political  reform (European Commission, 1992b).  See also European 
Commission  (1992c).  In  para.  8  of  the  “Common  Political  Declaration  on  the  Partnership  and 
Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union” the Parties (i.e. President of the 
Russian Federation, Heads of States or Government of the Member States of the EU, and the President 
of the European Commission) pointed out that: “les parties estiment nécessaire de donner  une base 
qualitativement nouvelle à  leurs  relations économiques fondées  sur  les principes  de l’économie de 
marché”  (emphasis  added)  (EU/Russia,  1993).  See  also  in  this  sense the  Report  of  the  European 
Parliament  Committee  for  Economic  External  Relations  on  the  future  agreements  between  the 
Community and the  Newly Independent  States  of  the former Soviet  Union (European Parliament, 
1993a), and the ensuing EP Resolution of 12 March 1993 (European Parliament, 1993b) as well as the 
opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on relations between the EU, Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus (Economic and Social Committee, 1995); and de Laet (1995).
15 Second indent of the Preamble of the PCA with Russia and third indent of the Preamble of the PCA 
with Ukraine; also the preambles of the Council and Commission decisions on the conclusion of the 
PCA with  Russia  (OJ  1997  L327/1)  and  Ukraine  (OJ  1998  L49/1),  respectively;  and  EU/Russia 
(1993).  
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1.1.1.2. Furthering rapprochement between the EU and its Partners
Article 1 of each PCA sets  out a long list  of  ambitious objectives that  ostensibly 
overtake the modest, albeit significant aims of the 1989 TCA, and which ought to be 
mentioned in extenso. In the case of the PCA with Russia, the Partnership aims:
− To provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the 
Parties allowing the development of close relations between them in this field,
− To promote trade and investment and harmonious economic relations between 
the  Parties  based  on  the  principles  of  market  economy  and  so  to  foster 
sustainable development in the Parties,
− To strengthen political and economic freedoms,
− To support  Russian efforts to consolidate its democracy and to develop its 
economy and to complete the transition to market economy,
− To provide a basis for economic, social, financial, and cultural cooperation 
founded  on  the  principles  of  mutual  advantage,  mutual  responsibility  and 
mutual support, 
− To promote activities of joint interest,
− To  provide  an  appropriate  framework  for  the  gradual  integration  between 
Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe,
− To create the necessary conditions for the future establishment of a free trade 
area between the Community and Russia covering substantially all trade in 
goods  between them,  as  well  as  conditions  for  bringing  about  freedom of 
establishment of companies, of cross-border trade in services and of capital 
movement.16
The above ambitions clearly surpass the entry-level objectives of the 1989 TCA. They 
upgrade the relationship in consideration of the global transformation undertaken by 
the partners of the Community and its Member States. 
Summarising these objectives, the Commission underlined in 1994 that the PCA aims 
at  raising  the  standard  of  the  Community  links  with  the  NIS to  that  of  “a  close 
16 Art. 1 of the PCA with Ukraine provides that “[t]he objectives of this partnership are:
- to provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the Parties allowing the 
development of close political relations,
- to promote trade and investment and harmonious economic relations between the Parties and so to 
foster their sustainable development,
- to provide a basis for mutually advantageous economic, social, financial, civil scientific technological 
and cultural cooperation,
- to support Ukrainian efforts to consolidate its democracy and to develop its economy and to complete 
the transition into a market economy.
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political and economic relationship” which would favour “a gradual rapprochement 
between  the  NIS  and  a  wider  area  of  cooperation  in  Europe  and  neighbouring 
regions”.17 On the occasion of the conclusion of the PCA with Ukraine, following the 
ratification by all Member States, the Council pointed out that: “[t]he Agreement… 
constitutes a new step towards the establishment of a close and mutually profitable  
partnership between  the  EU  and  Ukraine.  The  Agreement  will  introduce  a  new 
dimension to the parties' relations. It is intended to govern political, economic and 
trade  relations  between  the  EU  and  Ukraine  and  establish  the  basis  for  social, 
financial, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation” (emphasis added).18 This 
ambition was further articulated in the operative parts of the PCAs.
1.1.2. The PCAs: broader commitments than in the TCA
As a preliminary point, it is noticeable that, while the TCA contained only 26 articles, 
the PCA with Ukraine comprises 109 Articles, and the PCA with Russia adds up to 
112 Articles. Although the lower number of articles of the TCA is not, in itself, a 
measure of the quality or intensity of the relationship, it is nonetheless suggestive of 
its more restricted scope,19 as illustrated by the following comparison with the PCAs’ 
provisions on trade (1.1.2.1), cooperation (1.1.2.2) and on the institutional framework 
they establish (1.1.2.3).
1.1.2.1. The wide scope of the PCAs’ trade regime 
The trade regime established by the PCAs differs in scope from the one envisaged by 
the TCA. The latter provided for the MFN treatment with respect to all goods, except 
textiles, coal and steel products.20 It also contained a prudent “best endeavours” clause 
for  the  progressive  elimination  of  “specific”  quantitative  restrictions  that  Member 
17 European Commission (1994c). Further: Raux (1998: 163).
18 General Affairs Council (1998a). 
19 Assemblée Nationale (1996).
20 Art. 3 TCA. Further: Shemiatenkov (1998: 40), Peers (1995: 831) and Maresceau (1992: 109-112). 
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States had maintained with respect to Soviet products.21 While confirming the GATT 
inspired MFN treatment, the PCAs refer more systematically to the GATT principles. 
For instance, the Parties must guarantee the freedom of transit for goods (Article V(2-
5) GATT), and they should also observe the GATT principle of non-discrimination in 
internal taxes, charges or regulations (Article III(2)).22 Furthermore, the Agreements 
consolidate the abolition by the Community of “specific quantitative restrictions”.23 
These provisions must be read in the light of the Preamble of both Agreements, which 
underline  the  Parties’  aim  to  encouraging  progressive  integration  of  Russia  and 
Ukraine into the open international trading system. In this perspective, the references 
of  the PCAs to  GATT norms suggest  that  the  Agreements  prepare  their  eventual 
accession to the World Trade Organisation.24 
Moreover, the PCAs contain an “evolution clause” whereby the Parties undertake to 
discuss the establishment of a free trade zone at a later stage.25 While it falls short of 
obliging the Parties to establish such an FTA, it nonetheless introduces it as a long-
term objective. Such an objective was absent in the TCA.
21 According to Art. 8 TCA, the Community “undertakes to make efforts to ensure progress towards the 
progressive  abolition  of  ‘specific  quantitative  restrictions’  namely  those  quantitative  restrictions 
applied to imports originating in the USSR under Regulation No 3420/83…”. See OJ 1990 L138/1 for 
the application of this phasing-out of QRs. Further on specific QRs, see Maresceau (1989: 14), and on 
other trade defence mechanisms, e.g. antidumping, see Jacobs (1989: 291).
22 In addition to the GATT key principles, the PCAs also make references to the various derogations to 
these principles, as allowed under GATT, e.g. Art. XXIV on free trade areas and customs union.
23 Joint Declaration to Art. 12 of the PCA with Russia. 
24 Applying  several  GATT  norms  by  anticipation,  the  PCAs  thereby  represent  a  “pre-accession 
strategy” to the WTO. Further: Lebullenger (1998: 199), Maresceau and Montaguti (1995: 1327) and 
Hillion (1998a: 409ff).
25 Art. 3 PCA Russia and Art. 4 PCA Ukraine. Russia in particular was adamant that it should get a 
trade  regime  as  similar  as  possible  to  that  provided  in  the  Europe  Agreements.  However,  the 
Community  and  its  Member  States  were  not  ready  to  commit  themselves  to  establish  an  FTA 
immediately. The evolution clause thus represents a compromise between these two opposite positions. 
Ukraine then asked to be treated the same way as Russia. See Maresceau and Montaguti (1995: 1339); 
also, European Commission (1994b), “Short Guide to the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation 
between the European Union and its Member States and the Russian Federation” (hereinafter “Short 
Guide to the PCA with Russia”).
20
Finally, as opposed to the TCA, the trade provisions of the PCAs include services and 
movement of capital, as well as provisions on the protection of intellectual property 
rights. They also stipulate the conditions affecting the establishment of companies,26 
and contain a section on the movement of workers. On many accounts therefore, the 
PCAs envisage a trade dimension which, in terms of  scope, is wider than the TCA. 
Section 1.2.  below will  come back to some of  these substantive points  in  further 
detail. 
1.1.2.2. The broader scale of cooperation under the PCAs
Like the PCA trade regime, the title on “economic cooperation” inserted in each PCA 
overtakes the TCA provisions on the matter, both in terms of scope and objectives. 
Title  IV  of  the  TCA  provided  that  the  Parties  should  “encourage”  economic 
cooperation in areas of mutual interest,  such as customs, standardisation, industry, 
statistics, energy, agriculture and transport.27 Such cooperation was intended inter alia 
to strengthen and diversify existing economic links between the Parties. It also aimed 
at  underpinning  the  “development  of  their  economies  and  respective  living 
standards”. 
By contrast, the PCAs envisage a broader, multidimensional type of cooperation28 that 
covers  not  only  the  economic  field  stricto  sensu,29 but  which  equally  refers to 
environment, as well as to education and training, tourism, culture, money laundering 
and  drugs.30 The  inclusion  of  some  of  these  additional  dimensions  finds  its 
justification in the fact that the said policy areas were expressly introduced by the 
TEU  (Maastricht  version)  in  the  Community  sphere  of  competence,  albeit  in  a 
measured fashion.31 The broadening of the scope of cooperation under the PCAs also 
26 Titles IV and V in the PCA with Russia, Titles IV and V in the PCA with Ukraine.
27 Art. 20 TCA. 
28 Raux (1998: 163).
29 For  instance,  industrial  cooperation,  investment  promotion,  public  procurement,  standards  and 
conformity assessment.
30  Title VII of each of the two PCAs.
31 Title VII EC introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. It should be noted that while the TEU established 
new Community powers, these powers were conceived as complementary to those of Member States, 
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corresponds to the ambition of the Parties to widen and upgrade their relationship. 
Indeed with Ukraine, the cooperation foreseen is geared towards the promotion of 
economic  and  social  transformation,32 while  it  is  envisaged  as  a  means  to  the 
Partner’s  “integration”  in  a  wider  area  of  cooperation  in  Europe,  in  the  case  of 
Russia.33 Such references to “economic and social transformation” and “integration in 
a wider area of cooperation” hint at the Community’s conversion into being a key 
player in the re-organisation of the continent in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
Eastern bloc.34 Judging from the list of subject matters covered by the PCAs, this 
transformation requires more than development of trade in goods and basic economic 
cooperation. The Agreements encompass the full range of economic activities of the 
Community:  namely  competition,  state  aids,  and  approximation  of  laws  which 
accompany the trade and economic dimensions of the Agreement.35 At first  sight, 
these provisions indicate the Community and Member States’ ambition to influence 
the Partner’s transformation by reference to their own regulatory model, and, as it 
shall be seen below, in accordance with the political objectives of the then newly 
established European Union.36
Furthermore, compared to the TCA, the multi-dimensional cooperation envisaged by 
the PCAs appears to use, to some extent, a more mandatory language. For instance, 
the provisions on cooperation in the field of education and training provide that the 
Parties “shall cooperate with the aim of raising the level of general education and 
professional qualifications, both in the public and private sectors”.37 Also in the field 
of transport, the Parties “shall develop and strengthen their cooperation”, with the aim 
inter alia to restructure and modernise transports systems and networks.38 It should 
in the sense that they could not lead to harmonisation, which precludes Member States’ action in the 
field covered. This prudent allocation of new powers to the Community is characteristic of the Member 
States’ changing disposition towards the European integration process. Further: Dehousse and Ghemar 
(1994: 151), Flaesch-Mougin (1993: 351) and Dashwood (2004b: 360).
32 Art. 52 PCA Russia.
33 Art. 56 PCA Ukraine.
34 Pelkmans and Murphy (1991).
35  Title VI of both agreements.
36 See further in chapter 2.
37 Art. 63(1) PCA Russia, equivalent provisions can be found in Art. 59 (1) PCA Ukraine.
38 Art. 70 PCA Russia, Art. 64 PCA Ukraine.
22
nevertheless be noted that the PCAs fall short of establishing specific obligations in 
those fields.39
1.1.2.3. The sophisticated institutional framework of the PCAs
Last,  but  not  least,  each  PCA  establishes  an  institutional  framework  that  is 
significantly more elaborate and systematic than the one based on the TCA. While the 
latter foresaw the establishment of a “mixed commission” meeting once a year to 
ensure  the  proper  functioning  of  the  agreement,40 the  PCAs  set  up  a  three-level 
institutional  structure,  involving  the  highest  political  authorities  of  each  Party, 
parliamentarians  and senior  civil  servants.41 This  institutional  framework  not  only 
supervises the implementation and development of the PCAs, but it is also used to 
support and develop the political dialogue established by each of the two Agreements, 
and which had no equivalent in the context of the TCA.42 
The foregoing cursory comparison between the TCA and the PCAs reveals that on 
many accounts the latter encompass more areas of cooperation and include increased 
commitments  from the  Parties,  than  the  former.  The  objectives  of  the  PCAs and 
notably that of supporting the transformation of the two partner countries, explain the 
breadth  of  their  scope  and  the  nature  of  the  obligations  foreseen  in  the  new 
Agreements.  The  wider  scope  of  the  PCAs  is  indeed  epitomised  by  their  mixed 
nature, as their scope exceeds the limits of Community exclusive external powers, and 
covers notably fields where Member States and the Community share competence.43 
Unlike the TCA, which was concluded by the Community only, the PCAs had to be 
39 Concrete actions have rather been dealt with on the EC technical assistance programme towards the 
NIS, the so-called TACIS programme (e.g. OJ 1991 L 201/2; OJ 1993 L187/1).
40 Art. 22 TCA.
41  Title IX PCA Russia, Title X PCA Ukraine.
42 Title II in each PCA. The only TCA provisions of a “political” nature can be found in its Preamble, 
which  indicates  that  the  Agreement  should  help  fulfilling  the  objectives  of  the  Final  Act  of  the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. See also Maresceau and Montaguti (1995: 1327).
43 In  view of  the  case  law of  the  Court  of  Justice,  particularly  Opinion  1/94  Competence  of  the 
Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual  
property, see further below. 
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ratified by both the  Community and its  Member States.  The inflation of  areas of 
cooperation as well as the apparent deepening of mutual commitments, notably as 
regards trade, have implied the progressive elaboration of the PCAs’ legal bases.
1.1.3. The extended legal bases of the PCAs
Initially, the PCAs and the TCA were based on the same legal foundations, viz. the 
combination of Articles 133 and 308 EC (ex Articles 113 and 235 EC).44 However, 
the legal bases of the PCA were revisited by the Commission, in view of the European 
Court of Justice’s evolving case law regarding the extent and nature of Community 
external powers (1.1.3.2). Moreover, the  procedural legal bases of the PCAs differ 
from that of the TCA thereby involving the European Parliament to a greater extent 
(1.1.3.1). 
1.1.3.1. Different procedural legal bases implying an enhanced role for  
the European Parliament
The legal  bases  of  the  PCAs include,  in  addition  to  Articles  133 and 308 EC,  a 
reference to Article 300 (2) and (3) sub-paragraph 2 (ex Article 228 (2) and (3) sub-
paragraph 2) of the EC Treaty, introduced by the TEU. This reference relates to the 
procedure  used by the  Community institutions  to  negotiate  and conclude  external 
agreements.  In  particular,  sub-paragraph 2 of  Article  300(3)  EC provides  that  the 
Council concludes the agreement after the assent of the European Parliament has been 
obtained.45 
The  requirement  of  the  Parliament’s  assent  derogates  from the  usual  consultation 
procedure set out in Article 300(3) EC,46 which was used in the case of the TCA.47 
Such  a  derogatory  procedure  always  applies  to  the  conclusion  of  association 
44 This legal basis was traditionally used by the Community for establishing so-called “second” and 
“third generation agreements”, up to the entry into force of the TEU. Peers (2000a: 163), Raux (1990: 
7).
45 Assent of the EP to conclusion of the PCA-Russia (European Parliament, 1995b); Assent of the EP to 
conclusion of the PCA-Ukraine (European Parliament, 1995a). Further, see Delcourt (1998: 85). 
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agreements. In certain situations however, it is also brought into play in relation to 
non-association agreements. Assent is required first, where the agreement in question 
establishes “a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation procedures”, 
secondly,  when  the  agreement  has  “important  budgetary  implications  for  the 
Community”, and thirdly, in case the agreement entails “amendment of an act adopted 
under the [co-decision] procedure”.48
It  has  been  argued  that  the  PCAs  do  not  easily  correspond  to  any  of  the  three 
categories,49 and that it is essentially their  political significance which justified the 
need for an EP assent.50 The institutional frameworks set up by the PCAs may also 
explain the requirement to obtain the EP’s assent, even if such frameworks are not 
endowed  with  any  decision-making  power.51 Indeed,  Article  300  EC  does  not 
expressly  limit  the  requirement  to  obtain  the  Parliament’s  assent  to  agreements 
establishing  institutional  frameworks  endowed  with  power  to  adopt  binding 
decisions.52
Be it as it may, the fact that the Parliament’s assent had to be obtained before the 
PCAs could be concluded, gives these Agreements a particular significance in the 
typology of EC external agreements. It assimilates them, from a procedural point of 
view, to association agreements which, as pointed out above, always require the EP 
assent. The PCAs are thus ranked at a higher level than the 1989 TCA.53 The stronger 
involvement of the Parliament in the conclusion of the PCA also reflects an internal 
46 The Parliament’s right to be consulted should not be underestimated. As recalled by the Court of 
Justice in Case 138/79 Roquette Frères v Council and Case 139/79 Maïzena v Council, consultation of 
the EP is an essential procedural requirement. An act adopted in violation of this requirement can be 
held unlawful on the basis of Art. 230 EC. On the role of the European Parliament in external relations, 
see e.g. Weiler (1980: 151).
47 European Parliament (1990). 
48 Art. 300(3), sub-para. 2 (ex Art. 228(3), second sub-para) EC.
49 Delcourt (1998: 85).
50 Report of H. Carrère-d’Encausse MEP on the proposal for a Council and Commission decision on 
the conclusion of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the Russian Federation (European 
Parliament, 1995c).   
51 This is also suggested by Lenaerts and van Nuffel (1999: 700), as well as by de Walsche (1999: 69). 
On the institutional framework of the PCA, see section 2.3 below.
52 Further on old Art. 228 EC: Schmitter (1995: 726), Flaesch-Mougin (1993: 351).
25
evolution whereby it  has occupied an increasingly significant  role in the EC law- 
making process,54 particularly after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty.55 
1.1.3.2. Amplified legal bases ratione materiae following Opinion 1/94
The  substantive  differences  between  the  TCA  and  the  PCAs  highlighted  above 
explain  the  distinction  between  the  legal  bases  of  the  two  types  of  Agreements, 
especially  in  view of  the  Court  of  Justice’s  evolving case  law regarding external 
competence of the Community. In its famous Opinion 1/94, the Court clarified the 
concept of common commercial policy (CCP), and shed further light on the doctrine 
of Community implied powers and on the use of Article 308 (ex 235) EC in external 
relations.  This  Opinion  had  profound  repercussions  on  the  law  of  EC  external 
relations in general, and on the choice of legal bases of the PCAs, in particular. The 
following will recall the main conclusions of the Court in Opinion 1/94 and examine 
their implications for the conclusion of the PCAs.56 
On the basis of Article 300(6) EC, the Commission requested an Opinion from the 
Court of Justice on whether the Community was competent to conclude, on its own, 
all parts of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation,57 a position that 
53 It should be pointed out that the TCA was adopted before the TEU was signed. Pre-TEU Art. 228 
EEC  only  provided  for  assent  of  the  EP  in  two  situations,  namely  before  the  conclusion  of  an 
association agreement (Art. 238 EEC), and before accession of new states (Art. 237 EEC). One could 
however doubt whether the EP would have been asked to give its assent before the conclusion of the 
TCA, had the latter  been negotiated and concluded under Art.  228 EC, Maastricht  version. While 
politically  significant,  the  content  of  the  TCA  would  not  have  warranted  the  use  of  the  assent 
procedure, particular given its remaining exceptional character.
54 Further Louis and Walbroeck (1988). On the limits to this evolution, see e.g. Gaudissart (1999a: 
28ff).
55 Indeed, it corresponds to the Parliament’s long-standing request to be more involved in Community 
external relations. Quintin (1975: 211), Jacobs et al (1992). 
56 Opinion 1/94.
57 The  WTO  Agreement  establishes  a  common  institutional  framework  for  the  conduct  of  trade 
relations among its members in matters related to the agreements and legal instruments annexed to it 
(Art. II(1) WTO). Among those agreements, one may recall the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in 
Goods, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) and the Agreement on Trade Related 
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was much disputed by the Council and a majority of Member States. In Opinion 1/94, 
the  Court  held  that  the  Agreement  had  to  be  concluded  by  the  Community  and 
Member States acting jointly.58
First,  the  Luxembourg  judges  considered  that  the  WTO Agreement  could  not  be 
concluded by the Community solely on the basis of Article 133 EC for its provisions 
on trade in services (GATS) and trade-related aspects of intellectual property (TRIPS) 
partly fell outside the ambit of the CCP.59 Only the Multilateral Agreements on Trade 
in Goods (still referred to as GATT), including ECSC and agricultural products, could 
be  concluded on  the  basis  of  ex-Article  113 EC,  for  they  were  considered  to  be 
covered by the CCP.60 
Secondly, the Court opined that the WTO Agreement could not be concluded by the 
Community alone on the basis of implied external powers as a result of an “ERTA 
effect”.61 The latter was indeed restated in Opinion 1/94 as involving the  effective 
exercise of the Community internal competence with regard to the matter concerned 
through the adoption of common rules, as a prerequisite for the Community to acquire 
exclusive external power on this matter.62 In casu, the Court found that fields enclosed 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”) (World Trade Organization (1994).
58 For  commentaries,  see  e.g.  Burnside  (2000:  152),  Tridimas (2000:  48),  Tridimas  and Eeckhout 
(1994: 143), Bourgeois (1994: 11; 1995: 763), Dutheil de la Rochère (1995: 461), Raux (1997: 34ff), 
Simon (1994: 1). 
59 As regards services, the Court found that with the exception of cross-frontier supply services, the 
modes of supply of services referred to by GATS as “consumption abroad”, “commercial presence” 
and the “presence of natural persons” (Art. I(2) GATS) are not covered by the CCP (para. 47). With 
respect to TRIPs, the Court held that apart from those of its provisions that concern the prohibition of 
the release into free circulation of counterfeit goods, TRIPs does not fall within the scope of the CCP 
(para. 71). 
60 Arnull (1996: 3). Further on the complex definition of the CCP, Maresceau (1993: 3). 
61 Case 22/70  Commission v Council (ERTA). Further on the  ERTA case, Dashwood and Heliskoski 
(2000: 3), Temple Lang (1986: 183), Scannell (2001: 343).
62 At para. 77, the Court held that the Community’s exclusive competence does not automatically flow 
from its power to lay down rules at internal level. Referring to the ERTA judgment, the Court added 
that the Member States, whether acting individually or collectively, only lose their right to assume 
obligations with non-member countries as and when common rules which could be affected by those 
obligations come into being. Only in so far as common rules have been established at internal level 
does the external competence of the Community become exclusive. To be sure, the Court also said in 
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in the WTO Agreement that partly fell outside the CCP, namely GATS and TRIPs, 
were not fully covered by common rules. The Community could not therefore claim 
to have exclusive competence by relying on the “ERTA effect”  to  conclude these 
agreements.63 In addition, the Court found that the Community could not successfully 
invoke  the  argument  of  necessity,  acknowledged  in  Opinion  1/76  to  justify 
exclusivity.64 So far  as GATS is  concerned,  the Court  held that  the attainment  of 
freedom of  establishment  and  freedom to  provide  services  was  not  “inextricably 
linked” to the treatment to be afforded in the Community to nationals of non-member 
countries  or  in  non-member  countries  to  nationals  of  Member  States  of  the 
Community.65 With respect to TRIPs, it was found that unification and harmonisation 
of intellectual property rights in the Community context does not necessarily have to 
be accompanied by agreements with non-member countries in order to be effective.66
Thirdly, the Court found that the subsidiary legal basis of Article 308 EC (ex-Article 
235)  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  allow  the  Community  to  conclude  the  WTO 
Agreement on its own. It recalled that this provision enables the Community to cope 
with any insufficiency in the powers conferred on it, expressly or by implication, for 
the  achievement  of  its  objectives,  but  then  held  that  it  could  not,  in  itself,  vest 
exclusive competence in the Community at international level.67
In  view of  all  these  elements,  the  Court  concluded  that  the  Community  was  not 
competent  to  sign  the  WTO Agreement  on  its  own.  While  it  could  conclude  the 
Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods on the basis of ex-Article 113 EC, it had to 
act together with the Member States in relation to GATS and TRIPs. The Court’s 
Opinion,  consolidated  thereafter,68 had  considerable  constitutional  implications,69 
especially with respect to the conduct of Community external relations. 
para. 88 in relation to Art. 95 (ex 100a) EC that an internal power to harmonise which has not been 
exercised in a specific field cannot confer exclusive competence in that field on the Community.
63 Para. 97 as regards services, para. 103 with respect to areas covered by TRIPS.
64 Opinion 1/76 Draft Agreement Establishing a Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterways Vessels.
65 Para. 86.
66 Para. 100.
67 Para. 89.
68  E.g. Opinion 2/92 Third Revised Decision of the OECD on National Treatment. 
69 See Appella (1996: 440) and Baquero Cruz (1997: 257).
28
First,  it  clarified  the  concept  of  CCP  which,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  involved 
exclusive  Community  competence.  By  limiting  the  extent  of  the  CCP,  the  Court 
limited the scope of a priori or “pre-emptive exclusivity”.70 
Secondly, it shed further light on the doctrine of implied powers. In particular, the 
Court clarified the conditions whereby the Community may acquire exclusive external 
competence following the  ERTA doctrine.  By emphasising the requirement  of full 
harmonisation before the Community can become externally exclusively competent in 
the field concerned, the Court insisted on the Member States’ political choice to keep 
their  competence externally for as long as internal Community competence is  not 
exercised.  Thirdly,  it  refined  and  partly  restricted  the  recourse  to  the  subsidiary 
powers provided by Article  308 EC,  suggesting that  it  cannot  serve to grant  new 
powers to the Community.71 
The Court therefore emphasised the principle that the Community and the Member 
States share competence at the external level, including in the field of external trade.72 
As a corollary,  it  confirmed the prime importance of mixity in the system of EC 
external relations.73 As suggested by Alan Dashwood, Opinion 1/94 did not result 
from  alleged  doctrinal  or  idiosyncratic  policy  considerations.  The  Treaty  of 
Maastricht had altered the balance between the Community’s powers and those of the 
Member States, and the Court was “loyally giving effect to the Treaties as they must 
[henceforth] be interpreted”.74 Also, the Luxembourg judges did not want to bring 
about judicially what the Commission had failed to achieve politically a few years 
before in the run-up to the Maastricht Treaty.75 The jurisprudence of Opinion 1/94 
70 Dashwood and Heliskoski (2000: 3).
71 This  was  later  confirmed  and  further  articulated  in  Opinion  2/94  Accession  to  the  European 
Convention of Human Rights.
72 Louis (1994: 8).
73 See, in this regard, AG Tesauro’s Opinion in Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing 
Choice BV,  and comments by Heliskoski (2001: 47), Dashwood (1998d: 95), and Garzón Clariana 
(1998: 17). 
74 Dashwood (1996b: 113).
75 Cremona (1999a: 157) recalls that the Commission wanted to re-draw the Community’s external 
powers, including an extended “external economic policy” that would have included not only matters 
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thus finds its roots in the new constitutional order set out by the Treaty on European 
Union. 
This  new  configuration  of  Community  and  Member  States’  role  in  EC  external 
relations had a direct influence on the conclusion of the PCAs.76 In particular, the 
Court’s clarification of the scope of the CCP entailed a reappraisal of the nature of 
several  provisions  included  in  the  Agreements.  The  provisions  of  a  CCP  nature 
became more limited than initially conceived by the Commission. Conversely, several 
obligations foreseen in the PCAs involved instead either implied external powers or 
subsidiary powers of the Community, as understood in Opinion 1/94. In other words 
they did not necessarily entailed exclusive powers of the Community, e.g. in the field 
of establishment or services. 
Following Opinion 1/94, the Commission revisited the legal bases of the PCAs, and 
proposed to conclude them by reference to Community implied external powers in 
several areas, in addition to the initial combination of ex-Articles 113, 235 and 228 
(2) and (3) (now Articles 133, 308 and 300 (2) and (3)).77 The Council followed the 
Commission’s adjusted proposal and concluded the PCAs on additional legal bases. 
First, the Preambles of the decisions to conclude the PCAs with Russia and Ukraine, 
respectively, refer to the EC Treaty and “in particular” to Articles 44(2), 47(2), 55 (ex 
Articles 54(2), 57(2) and 66) EC on establishment and services and Articles 71 and 
80(2) (ex Articles 75 and 84 (2)) EC on transport,78 as well as to Articles 57(2) (ex 
within the existing CCP, but also services, establishment, capital, intellectual property, competition, 
and for which the Community would have had exclusive competence. See also Maresceau (1993: 5).
76 Flaesch-Mougin (1998: 57). 
77 Proposal  for  a  Council  and  Commission  Decision  on  the  conclusion  of  the  Partnership  and 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine (European Commission, 1995d) (it 
also covers the decision on the conclusion of the PCAs with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghistan, Moldova 
respectively).  Therein,  the  Commission  underlined  that  the  new  legal  basis  represented  “une 
amplification considérable de celle prévue dans l’accord de 1989”. At first, the Commission did not 
propose any amended legal  basis for  the PCA with Russia.  It  was revised on the occasion of  the 
proposals  for  the signature of  a  Protocol  to  the  PCA following accession of  Austria,  Finland and 
Sweden to the Union (European Commission, 1996b) and eventually in the decision on the conclusion 
of the PCA (OJ 1997 L327/1). Further: Flaesch-Mougin (1998: 66) and Peers (2000a: 164-165).  
78 The Preambles of the Council and Commission’s decisions to conclude the Agreements add further 
explanation to the adjustment of the PCAs legal basis. They state that certain provisions impose on the 
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Article 73c (2)) on movement of capitals and payments.79 Furthermore, a reference to 
Articles 93 and 94 (ex Articles 99 & 100) EC was added to the PCAs legal bases in 
view  of  the  fiscal  provisions  of  the  Agreements.80 All  these  provisions  relate  to 
implied external powers of the Community. 
Secondly,  the Preambles state  that,  with regard to certain provisions of the PCAs 
which  are  to  be  implemented  by  the  Community,  “the  Treaty  establishing  the 
European  Community  makes  no  provision  for  specific  powers,  it  is  therefore 
necessary to resort to [ex] Article 235 [new Article 308] EC”. In view of Opinion 
1/94, Article 308 is of limited use however.81 Arguably, it is included in the PCAs 
legal  bases  essentially  to  support  the  provisions  falling  outside  trade  matters 
altogether, particularly the provisions on economic cooperation.82
The  updated  legal  basis  of  the  PCAs  shed  further  light  on  the  nature  of  the 
Community  and  Member  States’  competence  in  the  context  of  the  Agreements.83 
Opinion  1/94  limited  the  scope  of  the  CCP and clarified  the  doctrine  of  implied 
powers. It appears that one of its effects was that of consolidating Member States’ 
involvement  in  external  relations  in  general,  and  in  the  context  of  the  PCAs  in 
Community obligations in the field on the provision of services which go beyond the cross-border 
framework. They also mention that various PCAs obligations, falling outside the scope of Community 
trade policy, affect or are likely to affect the arrangements laid down by Community acts adopted in the 
areas of the right of establishment, transport and the treatment of enterprises, which incidentally looks 
like a broad formulation of the ERTA doctrine.
79 The Preambles point out that  the PCAs impose on the European Community certain obligations 
regarding capital movements and payments between Community and Russia, and Ukraine respectively.
80 In this regard, the Preambles indicate that insofar as the PCAs affect Council Directive 90/434/EEC 
of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets 
and exchanges of  shares concerning companies of different  Member States,  and Council Directive 
90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the  common system of  taxation applicable  in  the  case  of  parent 
companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, which are based on ex Art. 100 (Art. 94) EC, 
that Article should thus be used as a legal basis of the PCAs.
81 It was confirmed thereafter e.g. in Opinion 2/94 Accession to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. See further above section 2.2.
82 Further: Flaesch-Mougin (1998: 69). See further below.
83 The PCA was the first bilateral agreement to be concluded on this new complex legal basis, the only 
previous external  instrument which had used this  type of  “post-Opinion 1/94” legal  basis  was the 
European Energy Charter Treaty (European Commission, 1994a).  
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particular. Not only did the Member States become more influential at the levels of 
negotiation, and conclusion considering the requirement for national ratification, but 
they  also  got  a  key  role  in  the  implementation  and  further  development  of  the 
Agreements.84 
For the sake of exhaustiveness, it should be added that, in contrast to the TCA, the 
decisions  on  the  conclusion  of  the  PCAs  refer  also  to  Article  95  of  the  Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),85 which suggests that 
the Agreements involve non-trade aspects of the ECSC.86 Similarly, the reference in 
the  PCAs to  Article  101 of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European Atomic  Energy 
Community (“Euratom”) implies that the Agreement involves non-trade aspects of the 
Euratom  Treaty.87 Both  ECSC  and  EAEC  legal  bases  carry  with  them  a 
supplementary layer of procedural arrangements for the conclusion of the PCA, on the 
Community side.88 
The foregoing comparison of the PCAs objectives, provisions and legal bases with 
those of the 1989 TCA, shows that the former Agreements establish a broader, deeper 
84 Art. 2(1) of each decision to conclude the PCA provides that “[t]he position to be adopted by the 
Community in the Cooperation Council and the Cooperation Committee shall be determined by the 
Council, on a proposal from the Commission, or, where appropriate, by the Commission, in each case 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Community, the 
European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community.”
85 The ECSC being concluded for a duration of 50 years, it ceased formally to exist on 23 July 2002. 
Art. 95 provided in its paragraph 1 that: “[i]n all cases not provided for in this Treaty where it becomes 
apparent that a decision or recommendation of the High Authority is necessary to attain, within the 
common  market  in  coal  and  steel  and  in  accordance  with  Art.  5,  one  of  the  objectives  of  the 
Community set out in Arts 2, 3 and 4, the decision may be taken or the recommendation made with the 
unanimous assent of the Council and after the Consultative Committee has been consulted.” Art. 95 
ECSC was equivalent to Art. 308 in the EC Treaty.
86 Indeed, trade in ECSC products could be supported by ex Art. 113 EEC, as suggested by the Court in 
Opinion 1/94. It  was held that the Community has exclusive competence under ex-Art. 113 EC to 
conclude agreements of a general  nature covering all  goods,  even if  they extend to coal and steel 
products. See paras 25-27, Opinion 1/94.
87 In  Opinion  1/94,  para.  24,  the  Court  considered  that  “(s)ince  the  Euratom Treaty  contains  no 
provisions relating to external  trade,  there is  nothing to prevent agreements concluded pursuant to 
Article 113 of the EC Treaty from extending to international trade in Euratom products”. 
88 On these complications, see the speaking notes of Kuijper (2002: 15).
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and more complex relationship than the latter. Going beyond normalisation, the PCAs 
aim at fostering the rapprochement between new partners based on the widening of 
trade relations, the development of cooperation and the establishment of a political 
dialogue. The more elaborate character of the relationship established by the PCAs 
entails  an  enhanced participation  of  the  Member  States,  particularly  post-Opinion 
1/94 context. As such, the PCAs embody an updated formula of mixed agreements.
The PCAs have also been crafted in consideration of the policy being established by 
the Community and its  Member States towards the CEECs. The next section will 
situate the PCAs in relation to this policy and will explore the rationale behind the 
differentiation between the EU relationships with Russia  and Ukraine,  on the one 
hand, and the links established between the EU and the CEECs, on the other hand.
1.2. Less ambitious than the Europe Agreements concluded with the central 
and eastern European countries 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Community and its Member States 
decided to approach the former satellites of central and eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet republics in a differentiated fashion.89 This differentiation, encapsulated in the 
semantic distinction between the “CEECs” label and the “NIS” label, was epitomised 
by the choice of contractual relations.90 While PCAs were concluded with the NIS, the 
EU established bilateral “Europe Agreements” (EAs) with the CEECs. Although the 
EAs  and  PCAs  share  some  common  features  (1.2.1),  the  distinction  between 
Association and Partnership is nonetheless more than semantic, with the former being 
89 The Baltic States, which emerged from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, were initially granted 
an intermediate status by the EC. They first concluded free trade agreements with the Community, 
based on ex Art. 113 EC, but were progressively assimilated to the “CEECs”, and entered the Europe 
Agreement network. The free trade agreements can be found at OJ 1994 L 373/1 (Estonia); OJ 1994 
L374/1 (Latvia)  and OJ 1994 L375/1 (Lithuania).  Further  on the  Baltic  States,  see van Elsuwege 
(2002b: 171).  For Jacques Delors (1994: 269), “La grande Europe s’arrête aux frontières de la CEI, 
mais prendre les pays baltes de notre côté, c’est indiscutable historiquement”. 
90 It  was underscored by the establishment of two distinct Community assistance programmes: the 
PHARE programme towards the CEECs (OJ 1989 L375/11), and the TACIS programme towards the 
NIS (OJ 1991 L201/2; OJ 1993 L187/1), each programme being based on specific regulations and 
involving specific objectives.
33
more ambitious than the latter. A comparison between the objectives, content, and 
legal foundations of the respective agreements shed light on the different types of 
relationship they establish (1.2.2).91 It will become apparent that the differentiation 
underpins the complex policy of the EU towards the countries emerging from the 
dissolution of the Eastern bloc, a policy which will be referred to, in the following 
section, as the EU “Ostpolitik”.92 It is based on a core of fundamental principles, but 
involves different degrees of cooperation and rapprochement.
1.2.1. PCAs and EAs as components of the EU Ostpolitik
On various accounts the PCAs and the EAs are inspired by a core of principles which 
the EU seeks to promote, notably by reference to various international documents 
(1.2.1.1).  Moreover,  both  types  of  agreements  involve  similar  procedural 
arrangements for their conclusion (1.2.1.2). 
1.2.1.1. A common inspiration: promoting an emerging set of “values”  
towards countries in transformation
The preambles of both the EAs and the PCAs refer to the “common values” that the 
Parties share.93 They also highlight the latter’s common ambition to strengthen the 
political and economic freedoms, defined as the basis of both the association and the 
partnership,94 and stress in particular the firm commitment of the Parties to the full 
implementation of principles and provisions contained in various documents of the 
Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE).95 Both  types  of 
91 The Court has emphasised on various occasions, the importance of the context and objectives of 
external agreements in interpreting their provisions: Case C-312/91 Metalsa Srl.
92 Lippert (1995: 63), Smith (1996), Weidenfeld (1996), de la Serre (1994: 11), Kramer (1993). On the 
concept of Ostpolitik, see Garton Ash (1993), esp. chapter 2.
93 For instance the first indent of the Preambles of EA Poland (OJ 1993 L348/2) and EA Bulgaria (OJ 
1994 L358/3), respectively; first indent of Preamble of PCA Russia and second indent of Preamble of 
PCA Ukraine.
94 Third indent of the Preamble of EA Poland; Fourth indent of Preamble of EA Bulgaria; third indent 
of the Preamble of PCA Russia, fourth indent of Preamble of PCA Ukraine.
34
agreements thus rely on the same political  foundations,  and aim at promoting the 
same principles and “values”. 
This aspect is made more tangible through additional elements common to the two 
types of agreements. First, both the EAs and the PCAs establish political dialogues. 
The first indent of Article 2 of the Europe Agreement with Poland provided that: 
A  regular  political  dialogue  shall  be  established  between  the  Parties.  It  shall 
accompany  and  consolidate  the  rapprochement  between  the  Community  and 
Poland, support the political and economic changes underway in that country and 
contribute to the establishment of new links of solidarity.96 
Similarly Article 6, first indent, of the PCA with Russia states: 
A regular political dialogue shall be established between the Parties which they 
intend  to  develop  and  intensify.  It  shall  accompany  and  consolidate  the 
rapprochement between the European Union and Russia, support the political and 
economic changes underway in Russia and contribute to the establishment of new 
forms of cooperation.97 
95 The CSCE was later  transformed into the Organisation for  Security  and Cooperation in  Europe 
(OSCE).
96 Art. 2 EA Poland then reads as follows: 
The political dialogue and cooperation:
- will facilitate Poland's full integration into the community of democratic nations and progressive 
rapprochement with the Community. The economic rapprochement provided for in this Agreement will 
lead to greater political convergence,
-  will  bring  about  better  mutual  understanding  and  an  increasing  convergence  of  positions  on 
international issues, and in particular on those issues likely to have substantial effects on one or the 
other Party,
- will enable each Party to consider the position and interests of the other in their respective decision-
making processes,
- will enhance security and stability in the whole of Europe. 
97 Art. 6 PCA Russia then reads as follows: 
The political dialogue:
- shall strengthen the links between Russia and the European Union. The economic convergence 
achieved through this Agreement will lead to more intense political relations,
- shall bring about an increasing convergence of positions on international issues of mutual concern 
thus increasing security and stability,
- shall foresee that the Parties endeavour to cooperate on matters pertaining to the observance of the 
principles of democracy and human rights, and hold consultations, if necessary, on matters related to 
their due implementation.
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While drafted in slightly different terms, particularly with respect to their ultimate 
aims (“new links of solidarity” v. “new forms of cooperation”), the political dialogues 
nonetheless stem from the same ambition to accompany and consolidate the partners’ 
rapprochement with the Union, and support the political and economic changes in 
these  countries.98 Furthermore,  both  dialogues  are  destined  to  take  place  within 
institutional  frameworks  established  by  the  respective  agreements,  at  presidential, 
ministerial and parliamentary levels.99
Secondly, each agreement includes a political conditionality which further articulates 
the common foundations of  the PCAs and EAs,  as  well  as  their  common aim to 
promote a set of values. Both agreements contain a “human rights clause” according 
to which respect for the democratic principles and human rights established by the 
Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe100 inspires the domestic 
and  external  policies  of  the  Parties,  and  constitutes  an  essential  element  of  the 
agreement.101 The establishment and the development of the relationship between the 
contracting  parties  are  subject  to  the  respect  of  these  principles.  The  basis  for 
including this specific clause in the two types of agreements is the same, namely the 
Declaration of the Council of 11 May 1992. This Declaration establishes a regional 
policy of the EU towards all its CSCE partners and requires specifically the inclusion 
of such a clause in agreements concluded with these countries.102
More generally, conditionality is a common methodological feature of the two types 
of  agreements.  Both  EAs  and  PCAs  establish  a  correlation  between  their  full 
See also Art. 6 PCA Ukraine.
98 See in this regard the conclusions of the 1990 Rome and Dublin European Councils, respectively 
(European Council, 1990b; 1990a).  Further: Mayhew (1998: 19ff), Calleo (1994).  
99 The presidential level of dialogue involves the President of the Commission, President of the Council 
of the European Union and the President of the other Party. While the PCA with Ukraine does not 
explicitly provide for meetings at such a Summit level, meetings have nonetheless taken place. 
100 CSCE (1975); CSCE (1990).
101 Art. 6 EA Bulgaria; Art. 2 PCA Russia. Art. 2 PCA Ukraine also refers to the principles of market  
economy. An analysis of the human rights clause is included in section 2.2 of this study.
102 Council (1992). The fact that the Declaration was made in 1992 explains the absence of the clause in 
earlier  Europe  Agreements  with  Poland  and  Hungary,  which  had  been  signed  in  1991.  Further: 
Maresceau (1996: 125). 
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implementation and the continuation and accomplishment of the reforms undertaken 
by  the  partner/associated  countries.  For  instance,  the  Preamble  of  the  PCA with 
Ukraine emphasises the “necessary connection” between full implementation of the 
Partnership on the one hand, and the “continuation of the actual accomplishment of 
[the partner]’s political, economic and legal reforms on the other hand”.103 Similarly, 
the  EA  with  Poland  underlines  that  “a  link  should  be  made”  between  full 
implementation of the association on the one hand, “and the actual rapprochement 
between the Parties’ systems, notably in the light of the conclusions of the CSCE 
Bonn  Conference”.104 This  common  approach  is  further  articulated  through  the 
inclusion, in both types of agreements, of a clause on approximation of legislation, 
whereby for instance,
[t]he  Parties  recognize  that  an  important  condition  for  Bulgaria's  economic 
integration into the Community is the approximation of Bulgaria's existing and 
future legislation to that of the Community. Bulgaria shall endeavour to ensure 
that  its  legislation  will  be  gradually  made  compatible  with  that  of  the 
Community.105
Follows a non-exhaustive list of areas on which such approximation should focus. 
The PCAs with Russia and Ukraine contain the same provisions, although they link 
approximation of legislation to the aim of “strengthening of economic links” with the 
Community,  rather  than  to  the  objective  of  economic  integration  into  the 
Community,106 foreseen on the basis of the EAs.
The two categories of  agreement thus rely  on the same political  foundations,  and 
involve a similar twofold methodology of dialogue and conditionality, to foster the 
strengthening of relations. These common features can be regarded as constituting the 
embryonic Ostpolitik of the Union towards its neighbours, in the early nineties.
1.2.1.2. Agreements  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  European  and 
national parliaments 
103 Preamble of the PCA Ukraine, 9th indent.
104 Preamble of the EA with Poland, 7th indent, in fine.
105 Art. 69 EA Bulgaria.
106 Art. 55 PCA Russia; Art. 51 PCA Ukraine.
37
The EU Ostpolitik was elaborated along the same procedural lines with the political 
involvement and necessary support of the Parties’ parliaments. First, the PCAs and 
the EAs were concluded according to the same procedural arrangements at the EU 
level. The legal bases of the EAs and PCAs refer to the provisions of Article 300(3) 
second sub-paragraph, which provide that the European Parliament’s assent should be 
obtained before the Council finally concludes the agreement.107 As suggested above, 
subordinating  the  conclusion  of  the  PCAs  to  the  European  Parliament’s  assent 
assimilates them to association agreements in procedural terms. Secondly, given their 
mixed  character,  both  types  of  Agreements  had  to  be  concluded  and  ratified  by 
Member States as well by the Community institutions, which explains their protracted 
entry into force.
1.2.2. A  differentiated  Ostpolitik:  distinguishing  Partnership  and 
Association
While  the  two  agreements  share  common  political  foundations,  procedural  and 
methodological features, they remain, in essence, radically different. The distinctions 
between  the  two  contractual  frameworks  are  at  least  threefold:  they  concern  the 
degree of rapprochement with the EU foreseen by each agreement (1.2.2.1), the level 
of  mutual  commitments  that  should  materialise  this  rapprochement  (1.2.2.2)  and 
consequently the legal bases of the two types of agreements (1.2.2.3). Arguably, the 
justification for  differentiating the two categories  of  country stems from political, 
rather than legal considerations (1.2.2.4).
1.2.2.1. Different  aims  as  regards  the  rapprochement  with  the  
European Union
PCAs and EAs differ as regards their ultimate objectives of rapprochement with the 
EU,  notwithstanding  suggestions  that  both  agreements  should  be  as  similar  as 
possible,108 and despite Russian and Ukrainian attempts to obtain an agreement as 
107 European Parliament (1992a). 
108 See for instance Willy de Clercq’s proposal for a resolution on the development of future contractual 
trade  and  economic  relations  between  the  Community  and  the  Republics  of  the  CIS  (European 
Parliament, 1992b).    
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close as possible to that signed with the CEECs.109 The PCAs conspicuously contrast 
with the EAs insofar as they do not evoke Union membership at all.110 Instead, the 
PCAs  refer  to  “a  gradual  rapprochement  between  the  NIS  and  a  wider  area  of  
cooperation in Europe and neighbouring regions” (emphasis added).111
This essential distinction between the “wider area of cooperation” on the one hand, 
and  the  perspective  of  membership,  on  the  other,  is  echoed  by  Article  1  of  the 
respective agreements. For instance, Article 1 of the EA with Poland provided inter 
alia that the association establishes “an appropriate framework for Poland’s gradual 
integration into the Community” (emphasis added).112 By contrast, the first Article of 
the PCA with Russia, which appears to be the most ambitious PCA in terms of its 
objectives, refers more modestly to a “gradual integration between Russia and a wider 
area of cooperation in Europe.” With respect to Ukraine, the PCA merely refers to the 
development of “close political relations”, the promotion of trade and investment and 
“harmonious  economic  relations  between  the  Parties… to  foster  their  sustainable 
development”. The objectives of the Partnership also include the support to Ukraine’s 
efforts to consolidate its democracy, develop its economy and complete the transition 
into  a  market  economy,  but  the  concept  of  “integration”  into  the  Community  is 
absent. 
The foregoing  comparison  suggests  that  there  is  a  clear  difference  as  regards  the 
ultimate goals of the relationships envisaged by the PCAs and EAs, respectively.113 
Such difference, later accentuated by the eventual acknowledgment, by the EU, that 
109 “Commission proposes free trade area with Russia”; East West No 545, 5.  
110 The reference to membership on the EA was however ambiguous. The last indent of the Preamble of 
the EA with Poland read as follows: “[r]ecognizing the fact that the final objective of Poland is to 
become a member of the Community and that this association, in the view of the Parties, will help to 
achieve this objective”. Indeed, the initial proposal of the Commission concerning the establishment of 
EAs  with  CEECs,  emphasised  that  the  question  of  membership  should  be  dealt  with  separately 
(European Commission, 1990). Further: Maresceau (1997a: 9), Müller-Graff (1997: 34). See also the 
Court’s understanding of the EAs reference to membership in Case C-63/99 Głoszczuk, Case C-235/99 
Kondova; Case C-257/99 Barkoci and Malik; Case C-268/99 Jany and Others; and case note: Hillion 
(2003: 489ff).   
111 One could see in this formulation the premises of the “Wider Europe” policy of the EU towards the 
neighbours of the enlarged Union. See further section 6.1 of this study.
112 See in this regard, Opinion of Jacobs AG in Case C-162/00 Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer.
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associated countries in central and eastern Europe were eligible for membership,114 is 
underscored by the differentiation in  the level  of commitments undertaken by the 
Parties to the EAs and PCAs, respectively. 
1.2.2.2. Differentiated  commitments  undertaken  by  the  Partners  and 
Associated countries 
Both the PCAs and the EAs cover trade in goods and services, and contain provisions 
on establishment and movement of workers. However, they differ significantly when 
it comes to the Parties’ rights and obligations listed under these headings. It would be 
beyond  the  scope  of  the  present  discussion  to  examine  in  detail  each  and  every 
substantive distinction between the two types of agreements. Rather, the following 
will highlight some of the key differences in a limited number of sectors, related to 
the  external  projection  of  the  internal  market  with  a  view  to  supporting  the 
proposition that the relationships established by the EAs and PCAs, respectively, do 
not entail the same degree of rapprochement with the Union.
First,  the  EAs  provide  in  their  Title  III  on  “Free  movement  of  goods”  for  the 
progressive establishment of a free trade area covering “all industrial goods”.115 The 
EAs thus establish a preferential trade regime, which contrasts with that of the PCAs. 
While  the  latter  do  not  exclude  the  potential  establishment  of  FTAs between the 
Community, and Russia and Ukraine, respectively, it is merely envisaged as a long 
term-objective. According to Article 3 of the PCA with Russia:
The  Parties  undertake  to  consider  development  of  the  relevant  titles  of  this 
Agreement,  in  particular  Title  III  [“Trade  in  goods”]  and  Article  53 
[“competition”], as circumstances allow, with a view to the establishment of a free 
trade area between them… Such development shall  only be put  into effect  by 
113 It was indeed emphasised during the negotiations of the PCAs, by the representative of the Council 
before the European Parliament, see the response to Written Question E-2997/93 to the Council on the 
relations  between  the  Community,  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States 
(Council, 1993).  
114 European Council (1993a), see further chapter 6. 
115 See for instance Art. 7 EA Poland; Art. 8 EA Bulgaria; a specific regime concerns textiles, ECSC 
and agricultural products. Maresceau (1996: 125, 1997b: 67), Maresceau and Montaguti (1995: 1327), 
Cremona (1993: 345), Norberg (1997: 75), Mayhew (1998: 60ff).
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virtue of an agreement between the Parties in accordance with their respective 
procedures.116 
The feasibility of the FTA is closely linked to the evolution of the economic situation 
of the two countries,117 and implicitly to their accession to the WTO.118 Under the 
current circumstances, Title III of the PCAs simply re-affirms the application of the 
basic MFN treatment,119 by reference to Article I of GATT.120 It may be added that the 
PCA regime is all the less preferential that, at the time of the signature of the PCAs, 
Russia and Ukraine were not regarded as market economies, but as “economies in 
transition”,121 a  concept  which  does  not  correspond  to  any  particular  Community 
commercial  policy  regime.122 Rather,  as  non-market  economies,  they  remained 
116 Similar provisions are included in Art. 4 PCA Ukraine.
117 The  PCAs’  reference  to  the  establishment  of  FTAs with  Russia  and  Ukraine  results  from the 
insistence of the Community’s partners to have a regime as closely as possible to that of the EAs. The 
European Parliament had unsuccessfully insisted on the establishment of free trade area between the 
Community and the NIS notably in its Resolution of 17 Sept. 1992 (European Parliament, 1992c). It 
criticised  the  restrictive  trade  regime  envisaged  by  the  Community  towards  the  NIS  on  several 
occasions,  see  Report  of  the  EP Committee on external  economic relations  (European Parliament, 
1993a), also Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the relations between the European 
Union and Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (Economic and Social Committee, 1995). 
118  Short Guide to the PCA with Russia (European Commission, 1994b). Also, the unpublished draft 
Commission position regarding a possible FTA with Ukraine (European Commission, 2000a). 
119 As already envisaged in Art. 3 of the TCA.  Further: Vahl (2003).  
120 The draft agreement did not contain the reference to GATT, which appeared in the course of the 
negotiations (European Commission, 1994b). The inclusion of GATT entails that the relevant GATT 
practice is directly taken into account in the interpretation of the PCA provisions concerned, as indeed 
confirmed by Art. 94 PCA Russia and Art. 89 PCA Ukraine. They state that “[w]hen examining an 
issue arising within the framework of the [PCA] in relation to a provision referring to an Article of 
GATT,  the  Cooperation  Council  shall  take  into  account,  to  the  greatest  extent  possible,  the 
interpretation that is generally given tot the Article of the GATT in question by the Contracting Parties 
to the GATT”. The Parties thus have to take account of the “GATT acquis”. Maresceau and Montaguti 
(1995: 1327). 
121 The Community finally recognised Russia as a market economy in November 2002, although under 
certain  conditions.  A market  economy treatment  was  granted  earlier  to  Russian  companies  on  an 
individual basis since 2000. The same case by case treatment has applied to Ukrainian companies since 
2000.
122 De Laet (1995). 
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covered by specific Community rules on trade defence mechanisms, and particularly 
anti-dumping regulations,123 much to their displeasure.
 
Secondly,  the  two  agreements  appear  to  set  out  distinct  regimes  as  far  as  the 
movement of workers is concerned. For example, the EA with Bulgaria contains a 
title on “movement of workers” which stipulates that “subject to the conditions and 
modalities applicable in each Member State”, a Bulgarian national legally employed 
in the territory of a Member State must not be discriminated on the basis of his/her 
nationality as regards working conditions, remuneration or dismissal, as compared to 
the nationals of that Member State.124 The EA thereby establishes a principle of non-
discrimination for EA nationals legally employed in a EU Member State.125 The Court 
of  Justice  has  recognised  that  this  principle  could  be  invoked  before  a  national 
Court,126 including  against  private  employers.127 In  addition,  the  said  title  on 
movement of workers ensures access to the labour market of the host Member State 
for  the spouse and children of the legally employed worker,  during the period of 
his/her employment, provided the spouse and children legally reside with him/her on 
the territory of the host Member State. Finally, the EAs contain several requirements 
with a view to coordinating the social security systems for EA workers. The latter 
requirements had to be further implemented by the Association Council established 
by the Agreement.128 
Compared to the EAs, the provisions regarding “labour conditions” included in the 
PCAs appear much more limited in terms commitments. The PCAs do not cover the 
situation of the spouse or children of the legally employed worker, and they do not 
include provisions on the coordination of social security, save a requirement for the 
123 Further: Jacobs (1989: 291).  
124 Art. 38 EA.
125 This principle is reciprocal.
126 Case C-162/00 Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer. 
127 Case 438/00  Deutscher Handballbund.  These provisions have also been granted horizontal direct 
effect by several Member States courts, e.g. the decision of the French Conseil d’Etat, 30 Dec. 2002, 
Fédération Française de Basket-Ball  c/.  Malaja,  summarised and annotated by Auneau (2004) 40 
RTDE 423.
128 Further on this point: Cremona (1997: 198).
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Parties to conclude further agreements on the matter.129 With respect to the situation 
of workers themselves, the Agreement with Russia and the Agreement with Ukraine 
differ. The latter provides in its Article 24 that:
“[s]ubject  to  the  laws,  conditions  and  procedures  applicable  in  each  Member 
States, the Community and its Member States shall endeavour to ensure that the 
treatment accorded to Ukrainian nationals, legally employed in the territory of a 
Member  State  shall  be  free  from any  discrimination  based  on  nationality,  as 
regards working conditions,  remuneration or dismissal as compared to its own 
nationals (emphasis added). 
The  PCA  with  Ukraine  thus  establishes  an  obligation  of conduct rather  than  an 
obligation of result.  Although it  follows the same wording and contains the same 
caveat,  Article  23  of  the  PCA  with  Russia  nonetheless  encloses  a  significant 
difference.  It  provides  that  the  Community and its  Member  States  “shall  ensure” 
(instead of “shall endeavour to ensure” as in the PCA with Ukraine) that the treatment 
accorded  to  Russian  nationals  legally  employed  in  a  EU  Member  State  is  not 
discriminatory.130 The Agreement thus establishes an  obligation of result, similar to 
the one contained in the EAs,131 which, as pointed out above, was interpreted by the 
European Court of Justice as having full direct effect.132 It could thus be suggested 
that the non-discrimination principle foreseen in the PCA with Russia could also be 
invoked by  a  legally  employed Russian  national  on  the  ground that  he  or  she  is 
discriminated  on  the basis  of  his/her  nationality,  both against  the  authorities  of  a 
Member State and private employer.
In this respect, it should however be noted that both PCAs include a caveat (“Subject 
to the laws, conditions and procedures applicable in each Member State”) which is 
drafted differently from the proviso contained in the EAs (“Subject to the conditions 
and  modalities  applicable  in  each  Member  State”).133 In  its  Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer 
ruling, the Court considered that the latter proviso “may not be interpreted in such a 
129 Art. 24 PCA Russia, Art. 25 PCA Ukraine.
130 At the beginning of negotiations, only a “best endeavours” clause was foreseen by the Community 
side (European Commission, 1994b: 9).
131 As  indeed  suggested  by  Stix-Hackl  AG in  her  Opinion  in  Case  C-265/03  Igor  Sumitenkov  v 
Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol, 11 January 2005.
132 Case C-162/00 Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, para. 30. See also Case 438/00 Deutscher Handballbund.
133 Further Cremona (1997a).
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way as to allow the Member States to subject the principle of non-discrimination… to 
conditions or discretionary limitations. Such an interpretation, said the Court, would 
render  that  provision  meaningless  and  deprive  it  of  any  practical  effect.134 This 
approach, which was by no means evident,135 could be applied also to the PCAs’ 
caveat, insofar as it seems to have the same function as the one enclosed in the EAs. 
In the PCA with Russia, it does not appear to make the application of the principle 
dependent  on  Member  States’  intervention.136 On  the  other  hand,  the  Court’s 
interpretation of the purpose and nature of the PCA would play an important role in 
examining  the  potential  direct  effect  of  the  provision.  It  thus  remains  to  be  seen 
whether  the Court  would  consider  that the “conclusion that  the  principle  of  non-
discrimination laid down [in the PCA with Russia] is capable of directly governing 
the situation of individuals, [is] invalidated [or not] by an examination of the purpose 
and nature of that agreement, of which that provision forms part”.137
Thirdly, with regard to the provisions on establishment, the EAs foresee the national 
treatment both on the establishment and operation of companies and nationals from 
the other Party.138 Indeed, for companies, the EA right of establishment means setting 
up and managing subsidiaries, branches and agencies, and the right to take up and 
134 Case C-162/00 Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, para. 24. See also Opinion of Jacobs AG, paras 32-44. On the 
Member States residual powers as regards immigration rules, see also the judgment of the Court of 
Justice  in  case  C-327/02  Panayotova  et  al.  v  Minister  voor  Vreemdelingenzaken  en  Integratie, 
judgment of 16 Nov. 2004, and the Opinion of Maduro AG of 19 Feb. 2004; Case C-63/99 Głoszczuk, 
Case C-235/99 Kondova; Case C-257/99 Barkoci and Malik; Case C-268/99 Jany and Others.
135 Guild (1999: 129-130).
136 See Opinion of  Advocate-General  Stix-Hackl,  Case  C-265/03  Igor Sumitenkov v Ministerio  de 
Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol, 11 January 2005. It could be recalled 
that a Spanish Court allowed a Russian football player, Valery Karpin, to invoke the principle of non-
discrimination of the PCA with Russia against his club (Juzgado de lo social No 15 de Madrid, Valeri  
Karpin / Liga nacional de Fútbol Profesional, Sentencia 478/2000). In Italy, measures were taken by 
the football federation to ensure non-discrimination in relation to Ukrainian players, particularly in 
relation to Shevchenko. Incidentally, this decision suggests that the difference in the wording of the 
labour provisions of the two agreements is not taken account of.
137 Case  C-162/00  Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer,  para.  25.  Also:  Case  C-312/91  Metalsa;  Case  C-63/99 
Głoszczuk, Case C-235/99 Kondova; Case C-257/99 Barkoci and Malik. Further on this point, Petrov 
(1999: 235). 
138 E.g. Art. 45 EA Bulgaria. Further: Guild (1996)
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pursue economic activities as self-employed persons.139 These provisions have been 
interpreted widely by the Court of Justice, in various cases dealing particularly with 
self-employed  persons.140 It  notably  gave  a  wide  scope  to  the  EA  right  of 
establishment by acknowledging that rights of entry and residence are conferred, as 
“corollaries”,  to  self-employed  persons.  It  also  interpreted  the  EA  notion  of 
“economic activities as self-employed persons” in terms that are similar to the EC 
notion of “activities of self-employed persons” (Article 43 EC).141 
In contrast to the right of establishment foreseen in the EAs, the PCAs make several 
distinctions between establishment of companies on the one hand, and operation of 
subsidiaries and branches, on the other hand. Indeed the different PCAs vary in the 
regime they establish. More precisely, with respect to the  establishment of Russian 
and Ukrainian companies in the EU Member States, the PCAs only provide for the 
application of the MFN treatment.142 The  operation of Community  subsidiaries of 
Russian companies is however governed by the national treatment or MFN treatment 
“whichever is better”, while the operation of subsidiaries of Ukrainian companies is 
governed  by  the  national  treatment.143 Furthermore,  the  operation  of  branches of 
Russian and Ukrainian companies is subject to the MFN principle.144 In comparison to 
the EAs, the PCAs thus establish a complex legal regime for Russian and Ukrainian 
business operations in the Community.145 
139 Art. 45(5) EA Bulgaria.
140 Case  C-63/99  Głoszczuk,  Case  C-235/99  Kondova;  Case  C-257/99  Barkoci  and  Malik;  Hillion 
(2003).
141 Case C-268/99 Jany and Others.
142 Art. 28(1) PCA Russia; Art. 30(1)(a) PCA Ukraine. The establishment of Community companies in 
Russia  is  also  governed  by  the  MFN treatment  (Art.  28(1));  whereas  they  shall  benefit  from the 
national or MFN treatment, whichever is better, for establishing themselves in Ukraine (Art. 30(2)(a)).
143 Art.  28(2)  PCA  Russia;  Art.  30(1)(b)  PCA  Ukraine.  The  operation  of  Russian  or  Ukrainian 
subsidiaries of Community companies enjoys the national or MFN treatment, whichever is better (Art. 
28(3) PCA Russia; Art. 30(2)(b)).
144 Art.  28(4)  PCA  Russia;  Art.  30(1)(c)  PCA  Ukraine.  The  operation  of  Russian  branches  of 
Community companies is governed by the MFN treatment (Art. 28(4)); whereas the operation of their 
Ukrainian branches is covered by the national or MFN treatment, whichever is the better (Art. 30(2)(b). 
145 It could be added that the Community made a number of reservations concerning the operation of 
subsidiaries of Russian and Ukrainian companies (Annex 3 of the PCA Russia and Annex IV of the 
PCA Ukraine,  respectively).  Russia  did  the  same  with  respect  to  the  operation  of  subsidiaries  of 
45
Indeed, the distinction between establishment and operation provided for in the PCAs 
is  at  odds  with  the  notion of  “establishment” in  the EA and EC contexts.146 The 
difference is accentuated by the fact that PCAs exclude self-employed persons from 
the ambit of establishment.147 Natural persons do not have the right of establishment 
of their own and the right of entry and residence is limited to “key personnel”.148 
Clearly,  the  Community  and  the  Member  States  wanted  strictly  to  control  the 
movement  of  persons  coming from Russia  and  Ukraine,  which  in  turn  limits  the 
rapprochement between the Parties.
Fourthly, as far as trade in services is concerned, the EAs do not provide for a specific 
regime  given  that  the  negotiations  of  GATS  were  still  underway  when  the 
Agreements  were being negotiated with CEECs.149 They therefore contain a  “best 
endeavours” clause.150 The PCA with Ukraine follows the same approach. The Parties 
only undertake to take the necessary steps to allow progressively the cross-border 
supply of services by Community or Ukrainian companies. In other words, it is only 
an  obligation  of  conduct.151 By  contrast,  the  PCA  with  Russia  provides  for  the 
application  of  the  MFN  treatment  with  regards  to  an  exhaustive  list  of  services 
Community companies (Annex 4 PCA Russia). In addition, the PCA with Russia contains various 
exceptions to the application of the MFN principle on establishment and national  treatment in the 
sectors  of  Russian  banking  and  insurance  services  (Art.  29  and  Annexes  6  and  7,  PCA Russia). 
Ukrainian reservations also apply to these sectors (Annex V, PCA Ukraine. One may add that various 
sectors  are  not  covered  by  the  PCAs establishment  provisions,  namely  air,  inland  waterways  and 
maritime transports (Art. 35(1) PCA Russia and Art. 31(1) PCA Ukraine), although an exception to the 
exception concerns shipping agencies involved in international maritime transport (Art. 35(2&3) PCA 
Russia).
146 Art. 43 EC. As regards the EA context, see Case C-268/99 Jany and Others. 
147 European Commission (1994b: 12). 
148 Art. 32 PCA Russia. See also Joint Declaration in relation to Arts 26, 32 and 37; Art. 35 PCA 
Ukraine.
149 Further Cremona (1993: 345, 1997b: 204-207), Guild (1999: 127).  
150 For  instance,  Art.  56(1)  EA  Bulgaria  reads:  “[t]he  Parties  undertake  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions of this chapter to take the necessary steps to allow progressively the supply of services by 
Community or Bulgarian companies or nationals who are established in a Party other than that of the 
person for whom the services are intended taking into account the development of the services sectors 
in the Parties.”
151 Art. 37(1) PCA Ukraine.
46
annexed to the Agreement.152 However, specific rules apply to sectors not mentioned 
therein, such as transport, space launches and mobile satellite communications.153
Last  but  not  least,  the two types  of  agreements  differ  as  regards  the institutional 
frameworks they set out. While both the EAs and the PCAs establish a similar multi-
level system, the former agreements specifically provide for the possibility for the 
highest  organ,  namely  the  Association  Council,  to  take  binding  decisions.154 For 
instance, the Association Council can develop the provisions of the EA on movement 
of  workers,  without  involving  the  conclusion  of  a  new  agreement  between  the 
Parties.155 By contrast, the Cooperation Council set out by the PCAs only has a power 
to make recommendations, without binding character. Hence, any improvement in the 
PCA regime related to workers is subject to a new agreement between the Parties with 
the long ratification process that  this  may entail.  In other  words,  the EAs have a 
dynamic feature that the PCAs do not have, and which from the outset, permitted to 
deepen the gap between the two contractual frameworks.
A cursory comparison of some of the essential substantive provisions of the EAs and 
PCAs demonstrates that to a large extent, the former establish a closer, stronger and 
more dynamic relationship between the Parties.156 While the EAs are closely inspired 
by  internal  market  law,  the  PCAs  are  influenced  by  the  basic  principles  of 
international trade law, which are much less ambitious. Such differentiation is further 
underscored by the distinct choice of legal bases of the respective agreements.
152 Art. 36 (PCA Russia), and Annex 5. The initial draft only foresaw a “best endeavours” clause; see 
European Commission (1994b: 14). 
153 Arts. 39-43 PCA Russia.
154 For instance Art. 102 EA Poland.
155 Art. 105, EA Bulgaria.
156 One could have also mentioned the provisions on competition. While the EAs mirror EC rules (e.g. 
Art. 64 EA Bulgaria), the PCAs only foresee that the “Parties agree to work to remedy or remove 
through  the  application  of  their  competition  laws  or  otherwise,  restrictions  on  competition  by 
enterprises or caused by State intervention in so far as they may affect trade between the [Parties]” 
(Art. 53 PCA Russia, Art. 49 PCA Ukraine). Further on EA competition and state aids rules, A.-M. van 
den Bossche (1997: 84) and Slot (1997). 
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1.2.2.3. Distinct legal foundations
Although  their  conclusion  follows  the  same  procedure  (Article  300(2)  and  (3), 
subparagraph 2 EC), the EAs and the PCAs rely on two clearly different legal bases. 
The  EAs  are  association agreements,  specifically  provided  for  in  the  EC Treaty. 
Article 310 EC, (ex Article 238) stipulate that:
The  Community  may  conclude  with  a  third  State,  a  union  of  States  or  an 
international  organization,  agreements  establishing  an  association  involving 
reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions and special procedures.
In  the  seminal  Demirel  case,157 the  European  Court  of  Justice  interpreted  the 
association agreement concluded with Turkey on the basis of old Article 238 EEC as 
involving  a  “privileged link”  (emphasis  added)  between  the  Community  and  the 
associated country. Such a privileged link involves the possibility for the latter to take 
part, at least to a certain extent, in the Community legal system.158  
As suggested by Marc Maresceau, the impact of not using Article 310 EC as a basis 
for the PCA should not be underestimated,159 as indeed indicated by the above brief 
comparison of the agreements. Because it is not an association agreement, the PCAs 
do not, by definition, establish such a “privileged link”, thus depriving the partner 
concerned from the possibility  to participate in  the Community legal  system. The 
choice of different legal basis thus encapsulates a political decision not to extend the 
bundle of privileged links to the NIS.
 
1.2.2.4. A tentative explanation of the choice of agreements 
Neither Article 310 EC nor old Article 238 EEC include any indication as to which 
criteria determine the Community/Member States’ choice to establish an association 
157 Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, para. 9.
158 Further on association agreements: Gaudissart (1999), Raux (1999, 2001, 2002), Flaesch-Mougin 
(1979, 2001), Peers (2000a),  McLeod et al (1995: 367), Pescatore (1961), Tavernier (1992).  
159 Maresceau (1992: 102). 
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with a third State or international organisation. One has to look at the institutional 
practice to establish such conditions.
Traditionally, association agreements have tended to be open to two categories of 
state.160 First,  the  Community  and  its  Member  States  have  concluded  association 
agreements with non-European states with which some Member States already had 
strong and close relationships when the agreements were signed. These associated 
states tend to be often former colonies of one Member State which wanted, through 
the Community mechanisms, to keep a close relationship with that country, allegedly 
with a view to promoting its development. This is for instance the case with the so-
called  Africa-Caribbean-Pacific  (ACP)  countries,  which  had  close  connections 
notably with either France or the United Kingdom. The development of an association 
with  the  South-Mediterranean  countries  is  another  example  of  such  a  close 
relationship with one or several Member States.
Secondly,  association agreements have often been concluded with third  European 
states, which can be divided in three groups. A first group consists of countries that 
are  candidates  for  membership  but  which  are  not  ready  as  yet  to  assume  the 
obligations  entailed  by  such  membership.  For  instance,  the  Community  and  its 
Member  States  concluded  association  agreements  with  Greece  and  Turkey in  the 
1960s, with a clear ambition of preparing the eventual accession of these countries to 
the  Community.161 A  second  group  comprises  European  states  which,  although 
eligible,  prefer  to stay outside the Community.  They however  have an interest  in 
taking part in the integration process, albeit under a less integrationist arrangement.162 
This was notably the case for some countries of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), with which association was officially conceived as a  chosen alternative to 
accession  for  the  countries  concerned.163 The  connection  between  accession  and 
160 Gaudissart (1999; 7-15). 
161 Association  agreement  with  Turkey  (so-called  “Ankara  Agreement”)  (OJ  1964  L27/3685)  and 
Association  Agreement  with  Greece  (OJ  1963  L26/96).  See,  in  this  regard,  the  judgment  of  the 
European Court of Justice in case 17/81 Pabst & Richard v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg.
162 As pointed out by Colombo (1970), “Association is not accession”. 
163 The initial agreements signed with EFTA countries were free trade agreements based on old Art. 
113  EEC,  as  some  of  the  countries  were  reluctant  to  be  even  associated  with  the  Community, 
particularly for reasons of their neutrality. The Agreement establishing the European Economic Area 
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association, the latter being considered either as an alternative to or as a preparation 
for the former, is reflected in the system of the Treaty, and particularly by the place of 
old Article 238 in the EEC Treaty. In the original Treaty of Rome, the provisions on 
association with the Community were placed just after the provisions of Article 237 
EEC that set out the modalities of accession to the EEC. In between, a third group of 
European countries, e.g. Cyprus and Malta,164 have concluded association agreements 
with  the  Community.  The  rationale  behind  these  agreements  was  not  that  the 
countries concerned preferred to stay outside of the Community nor that they were not 
ready to enter. Rather, it was simply a means to establishing a closer relationship than 
a mere trade agreement. 
The CEECs clearly fall under the second main category, namely European associated 
states. In hindsight, one may say that the Europe Agreements concluded with these 
countries establish a “pre-accession association”, even if they were initially meant to 
be an alternative to accession.165 Indeed, it was not a chosen alternative as in the case 
of the association agreement concluded with the EFTA states (the EEA Agreement). 
Rather, it was an alternative because the Member States were not ready to recognise 
the CEECs as candidates. In other words, Europe Agreements initially constituted a 
fourth group of association agreements with European third states. More specifically, 
one  could  recall  that  the  Europe  Agreements  did  not  refer  to  accession  of  the 
associated states as a goal shared by the Community and its Member States. Instead, 
the reference to accession was inserted as the ultimate objective of the associated 
countries  only.166 The  Member  States  simply  agreed  to  acknowledge,  using 
was however based on old Art. 238 EC (OJ 1994 L1/3).  
164 OJ 1971 L61 (Malta); OJ 1973 L133 (Cyprus).
165 The  Stabilisation  and  Association  Agreements  (SAAs)  negotiated  by  the  Community  and  its 
Member States with the south-eastern European countries (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  Serbia  &  Montenegro)  also  belong  to  the  category  of 
association agreements aimed at preparing the associated countries to enter the EU. The Preamble of 
the SAAs is more explicit in this regard than that of the EAs, see for instance SAA with Croatia 
(European Commission, 2001), in force on 1st Feb. 2005. Indeed, Croatia and FYROM have officially 
applied for membership (21 Feb. 2003 for Croatia, 22nd March 2004 for FYROM). The Commission 
already  gave  a  favourable  opinion  as  regards  Croatia’s  application  on  18th June  2004  (European 
Commission, 2004e). 
166 Maresceau (1997b: 72ff). 
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constructive ambiguity in the drafting, that the Agreement would “help achieve [the 
associated countries’] objective” of accession.167 Such ambiguity suggests that there 
was  disagreement  among  the  Member  States  with  regard  to  the  expediency  of 
recognising the CEECs as candidates. Indeed, the wording used in the Preamble partly 
departs from the Commission’s proposal to conclude association agreements with the 
CEECs, in so far as this clearly distinguished it from the question of membership,168 
very much like the new European Neighbourhood Policy does today.169 It is only later, 
following the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, and at the insistence of the third 
countries  concerned,  that  such  association  agreements  became fully  fledged “pre-
accession” association agreements.170
It remains that at the time the first Europe Agreements were signed, the CEECs were 
not  officially  regarded  as  eligible  for  membership  by the  Member States  and the 
Community.  A  compromise  had  to  be  found  between  first,  the  Community’s 
reluctance to  consider  the CEECs as full-fledged candidates and the latter’s  clear 
ambition to “return to Europe”, and secondly, between the different opinions within 
the Community itself. One way for the Community side to match, at least to a certain 
extent, the expectations of the CEECs was to accentuate the specificity of the Europe 
Agreements, particularly by making them as exclusive as possible.171 It is perhaps in 
167 For  instance,  the  Preamble  of  the  Europe  Agreement  with  Poland  was  drafted  as  follows: 
“(r)ecognizing the fact that the final objective of Poland is to become a member of the Community and 
that this association, in the view of the Parties, will help achieve this objective” (OJ 1993 L 348/3). 
Alternative formula to association were envisaged, see e.g. Peers (1995a).
168 European  Commission  (1990).  While  acknowledging  the  fact  that  “several  governments  have 
referred  to  their  interest  in  eventual  membership  for  their  countries  in  the  Community”,  the 
Commission considered that “(t)his however, is not among the objectives of the association agreements 
discussed in this Communication. These agreements… have a special value in themselves and should 
be distinguished from the possibility of accession to the Community as provided in Article 237 of the 
EEC Treaty”. 
169 Communication from the Commission on the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper’ 
(European Commission, 2004c: 3). This Communication follows an earlier Communication entitled 
‘Wider  Europe  –  Neighbourhood:  a  new framework  for  relations  with  our  Eastern  and  Southern 
Neighbours’ (European Commission, 2003b); see section 6.1 of this study.
170 European Council (1997b). Further: Maresceau (1997a: 3), Inglis (2000: 1173), Mayhew (1998: 
161ff).  
171 On the importance of “exclusivity v. global approach”, see Balázs (1997: 358).  
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this perspective that one can understand the initial signature of TCAs with the Baltic 
States and former Yugoslav states such as Slovenia, before their eventual replacement 
by  EAs.  But  more  importantly,  it  is  in  this  light  that  the  differentiated  approach 
towards the NIS, epitomised by the PCAs, might partly be explained.172
The idiosyncrasy of the EAs would have been less evident had the Community and its 
Member States extended the same kind of agreement to the ex-Soviet Republics. The 
Commission considered that the Europe Agreements were founded on political and 
economic  considerations  that  the NIS were unable  to  live up to  at  that  particular 
stage.173 Furthermore, the overall approach of the Community and its Member States 
towards the former Soviet Union seems to have been determined by the hope, if not 
the  ambition,  to  maintain  the  post-Soviet  region  as  integrated  as  possible.174 
Concluding  PCAs with  all  the  NIS  underscores  a  EU specific  regional approach 
towards  the  post-Soviet  area  that  is  distinct,  although  not  disconnected,  from its 
approach towards the CEECs region. This “NIS approach” is illustrated inter alia by 
the  provisions  of  the  PCA  with  Ukraine  that  insist  on  the  maintenance  and 
development of cooperation among the NIS, as an essential factor of future prosperity 
and stability in the region.175 
172 In its Communication on the Community relationship with the Independent States of the former 
Soviet  Union,  the  Commission  emphasised  that  “les  accords  européens  déjà  signés  font  mention 
explicite de l’intention du pays partenaire d’adhérer en fin de compte à la Communauté… C’est pour 
ces raisons qu’il faut adopter une nouvelle approche des relations futures avec les Etats indépendants” 
(emphasis added) (European Commission, 1992b). 
173 European Commission (1992c: 2). The Commission had also pointed out in its 1990 Communication 
on the EAs that the USSR raised specific questions concerning domestic reform, relations with the 
Community and integration into the international economic order (European Commission (1990). See 
the comments of Maresceau (2001: 21).  
174 Raux (1991: 41). The Community and its Member States initially foresaw the establishment of a 
new relationship with the Commonwealth of Independent States (Vahl, 2003; Leshukov, 1998). 
175 Art. 3 PCA Ukraine. Indeed, PCAs allowed a five-year derogation to the MFN treatment in relation 
to the advantages granted by the Partner concerned to other countries of the former Soviet Union (for 
instance, Art. 5 PCA with Russia). Further on the changing geography of the  Ostpolitik, see Lippert 
(1995). Indeed, a comparison of all the PCAs reveals a differentiation within the “NIS approach” itself. 
In simple terms, the PCAs with Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are more ambitious than the 
PCAs with e.g. Kazakhstan (OJ 1999 L196) or Azerbaijan (OJ 1999 L246), notably as regards the long 
term prospect of establishing an FTA, absent in the latter agreements; Hillion (1998a: 405ff).  
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Summing  up,  the  provisions  of  Article  310  EC  do  not  stipulate  any  particular 
conditions  to  which  the  establishment  of  an  association  is  subject.  In  practice, 
however, association has been linked to accession, or used as a means to fostering the 
development of countries with which various Member States have close relations. 
This traditional approach was temporarily altered at the beginning of the nineties. 
Gradually,  association  of  third  European  states  became  an  alternative  to  their 
accession,  either  because they did not  want  to  accede,  or  conversely because the 
Union did not consider them as eligible.
Having  deepened  the  integration  process  in  Maastricht,  the  Member  States  were 
probably less inclined,  at  the start  of  the nineties,  to regard the CEECs as future 
Members. They therefore proposed an association agreement of a special kind, the 
“Europe Agreement”, envisaged as an alternative to accession rather than as a means 
to  preparing  it.  This  approach  towards  the  CEECs  clearly  influenced,  or  even 
determined, the Union’s policy towards the NIS in general, and Russia and Ukraine in 
particular. In order to ensure the sustainability of their approach towards the CEECs, 
the Community and the Member States found that they had to limit the availability of 
Europe Agreements to a restricted number of states.176 Consequently, the NIS were, 
from the outset, excluded from the network of associated countries. 
1.3. Conclusion
The PCAs replace the old 1989 TCA concluded between the Community and the 
Soviet Union. They upgrade the previous relationship in terms of objectives, scope 
and mutual commitments, thus underscoring closer links between new Partners. At 
the same time, the PCAs establish a less ambitious relationship than the one envisaged 
by  the  EAs  concluded  with  the  CEECs.  Thus,  in  the  typology  of  EC  external 
agreements, the PCAs find their place above the TCAs, but below the Association 
Agreements.
176 Note in this regard the Commission’s 1992 Report “The Challenge of Enlargement”, where it is 
pointed out that, through the Europe Agreements, the Community policy towards Central and Eastern 
Europe  should  be  moving  towards  the  establishment  of  a  “European  political  area”  (European 
Commission, 1992e).   
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The decision to offer Russia and Ukraine, a new type of agreement defined by default, 
somewhere  between  a  traditional  TCA  and  the  EAs,  did  not  rely  on  a  legal 
argumentation. Rather, it corresponded to a political choice not to include the NIS in 
the  network  of  associated  countries.  The  differentiation  between the  NIS and the 
CEECs was further entrenched by the subsequent decision of the 1993 Copenhagen 
European Council to acknowledge the associated countries from central and eastern 
Europe as eligible for membership.
The PCAs were also shaped by the new constitutional order brought about by the 
Treaty on European Union, and by the case law of the Court of Justice regarding in 
particular the definition and delimitation of the Community’s external competence. 
Thus  the  PCAs  embody  a  restatement  of  the  rules  of  interaction  between  the 
Community and the Member States in the sphere of EC external relations.
More generally, the PCAs were conceived in view of the external objectives of the 
newly established European Union, in particular that of asserting its identity on the 
international scene (Article 3 TEU, ex B). Not only are the PCAs inspired by the 
CFSP objectives set out in the TEU, they also include areas of cooperation that, prima 
facie, fall outside the Community powers, but which are nevertheless related to the 
EU activities. To a certain extent, the PCAs are among the first agreements alongside 
the Europe Agreements, to reveal the latent “instrumentalisation” of the Community’s 
external relations to pursue the broader aims of the embryonic EU foreign policy, as it 
shall be further examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
PROTO CROSS-PILLAR INSTRUMENTS OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS
The previous chapter gleaned some insight into the nature of the PCAs from the point 
of view of EC external relations. It was shown that the Agreements were formed in 
the  context  of  a  jurisprudential  evolution  as  regards  the  contours  and  nature  of 
external competence of the Community. This evolution can itself be related to the 
establishment  of  a  new  constitutional  order  on  the  basis  of  the  TEU.  Also,  the 
geopolitical context of transformation in central and eastern Europe required from the 
Community and its Member States responses beyond the mere development of trade 
and economic cooperation. 
Both  elements  converge  in  strengthening  the  role  of  the  Member  States  in  the 
evolution of EC external relations in general and in the development of the PCAs in 
particular.  The  enhanced  role  of  Member  States  in  the  context  of  the  PCAs  is 
consolidated by the inclusion in the Agreements of provisions that fall outside the 
scope  of  Community  powers  altogether.  While  they  seem  to  belong  to  Member 
States’ competences only,177 it will become apparent, in this chapter, that such “non-
community dimensions”  of  the  PCAs are  nonetheless  related  to  provisions  of  the 
TEU.  They  correspond  in  particular  to  the  “policies  and  forms  of  cooperation” 
established by the Treaty of Maastricht, namely the CFSP and the JHA, also known as 
the second and third “pillars”. 
Given that, at the time of the signature of the PCAs, the TEU provided neither for an 
express  legal  personality  of  the  Union,  nor  for  a  procedure  to  conclude  external 
agreements dealing with non-Community matters, the Union itself could not be party 
to  the  PCAs.  The  Agreements  were  thus  concluded  by  the  Community  and  its 
Member States “acting in the framework” and, as this chapter argues, on behalf of the 
Union.  Legally  speaking,  the  Agreements  rely  on  the  EC  Treaty  and  use  well-
established EC external relations actors and methods (including mixity) to fulfil the 
objectives of the EU. 
177 Flaesch-Mougin (1998: 60).
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Hence  from  the  outset,  the  PCAs  have  been  characterised  by  a  “cross-pillar” 
dimension,  and  as  such  epitomised  the  emergence  of  “external  activities”  of  the 
Union, resulting from the interaction between the EC, the Member States and the EU 
acting on the basis of Title V and Title VI. In hindsight, it may be suggested that the 
PCAs are not only mixed agreements in the classical sense examined in the previous 
chapter,  they also anticipate another form of mixity,  namely a  cross-pillar mixity, 
inasmuch as they relate to the different sub-orders of the Union. As such, they not 
only reflect the evolution of the law of EC external relations, they also reveal the 
emerging system of EU external relations, encompassing and projecting externally the 
different facets of the Union. 
This chapter will focus on specific elements of the PCAs that exemplify the presence 
of the Union, the Community and its Member States, in the Partnerships established 
with Russia and Ukraine, respectively. The first section argues that CFSP and JHA 
objectives are an integral  part  of the aims of the PCAs (2.1).  The second section 
shows that the application and further development of the Agreements are conditional 
upon the observance of various political standards as advocated by the Union (2.2). 
Finally, it is argued that the political dialogue established by each PCA epitomises the 
interactions between the CFSP and EC provisions in EU external relations (2.3). 
2.1. Agreements in line with the aims of the Treaty on European Union 
Each PCA contributes to fulfilling the aims of the European Union. In particular, they 
are inspired by the objectives of the common foreign and security policy (2.1.1), and 
they include areas of cooperation that correspond to the external dimension of the 
cooperation in justice and home affairs (2.1.2).
2.1.1. Agreements inspired by CFSP objectives 
The Preambles of the PCAs refer to principles stated in several political documents 
elaborated in the framework of international fora (2.1.1.1). The principles contained 
therein inspire the Partnerships established by the Agreements, and, as will be shown, 
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echo CFSP objectives (2.1.1.2). The inclusion of such provisions reveals a degree of 
interpenetration of EC and CFSP in the framework of the PCAs. 
2.1.1.1. The foreign policy foundations and aims of the PCAs
The  Preambles  of  the  PCAs  with  Russia  and  Ukraine,  respectively,  refer  to  the 
Parties’  “firm  commitment  to  the  full  implementation  of  all  the  principles  and 
provisions contained in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE), the concluding documents of the Madrid and Vienna follow-up 
meetings, the document of the CSCE Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation, the 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the Helsinki document 1992, ‘the Challenges 
of Change’”. In addition, the Parties undertake to promote international peace and 
security as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes and co-operate to this end in the 
framework of the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE, ex-Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe - CSCE).178 
In the PCA with Ukraine, mention is also made of the Parties’ will to encourage the 
process  of  regional  integration  in  the  areas  covered  by  the  Agreement,  with  the 
neighbouring countries in order to promote prosperity and stability of the region. At 
first sight therefore, the PCAs can be regarded as instruments of EC external relations 
which include a strong foreign policy component. They aim at promoting peace and 
stability, particularly in the post-Soviet area. 
In legal terms, the fact that the PCAs have significant foreign policy objectives does 
not in itself require that the Agreements should be mixed. It is well–established in the 
case-law  of  the  European  Court  of  Justice  that  the  foreign  policy  aims  of  an 
agreement  can  be  achieved through pure  Community  instruments,  including  trade 
agreements  based  on  Article  133  EC  and  involving  Community  exclusive 
competence. Authority for such a proposition can be found in the Werner judgment,179 
where the Court held that a measure restricting the export of products potentially used 
for military purposes could be based on Article 133 EC in spite of its foreign and 
178 For an overview of these documents, see Dhommeaux (1998).
179 Case C-70/94, Fritz Werner Industrie – Ausrustungen GmbH v Germany. 
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security policy objectives.180 Indeed, several Community agreements (i.e. non-mixed 
agreements),  refer  to  political  principles  enshrined  either  in  documents  of  global 
international  organisations  such  as  the  United  Nations,  or  regional  fora  like  the 
CSCE/OSCE,181 the TCA concluded with the Soviet Union, examined above, being a 
case in point.182
2.1.1.2. The  correspondence  between  the  foreign  policy  aims  of  the  
PCAs and CFSP objectives 
It is noticeable that the PCAs political aims, including their reference to the activities 
of international fora, replicate the terminology used in Article 11 TEU which lists the 
CFSP objectives. The latter Article (which was Article J.1 TEU when the PCAs were 
negotiated) provides in its paragraph 2 that the objectives of the CFSP are, inter alia, 
to “safeguard common values” and “to preserve peace and strengthen international 
security,  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  the  United  Nations  as  well  as  the 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter”.183 This 
similarity indicates that there is a connection between the PCAs and the CFSP. By 
comprising a CFSP dimension, the PCAs are aimed at fulfilling the foreign policy 
objectives of the EU. 
That being said, the PCAs are not CFSP instruments as such. The Agreements do not 
refer to Title V of the TEU in their legal basis. Of course, this may be explained by 
the fact that, at the time, the TEU did not contain any particular provision endowing 
the Union with the power to conclude external  agreements on CFSP matters.184 It 
could also be that, had this mechanism existed then, the CFSP objectives of the PCAs 
180 See also Case C-124/95 Centro-Com, Case 367/89 Criminal proceedings against Aimé Richardt and 
les accessoires scientifiques SNC. Further: Cremona (1999a: 161ff), Koutrakos (2001: 119ff), Raux 
(1997, pt 34).  
181 Further: Rosas (2001), Kuijper (1993) and Dhommeaux (1998). On the relationship between the EU 
and the OSCE, see Cameron (1995).  
182 Although the Court has consistently held that a mere practice of the Council cannot derogate from 
the rules laid down in the Treaty and cannot, therefore, create a precedent binding on Community 
institutions with regard to the correct legal basis; e.g. Case 68/86 United Kingdom v Council, para. 24; 
Opinion 1/94 WTO, para. 52.  
183 CSCE (1975, 1990). 
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would not have necessitated its use. Indeed, as recalled earlier, the case law of the 
Court of Justice makes it clear that political objectives such as those of the PCAs 
could,  in  principle,  be  included  in  an  agreement  exclusively  based  on  the  EC 
Treaty.185 
Rather, it appears that the CFSP objectives inspire the political aims of the PCAs. As 
provisions of the TEU which is an international agreement, the provisions of Title V 
bind  the  Member  States.186 The  latter  could  not  therefore  ignore  them  when 
establishing and developing the Partnerships.187 CFSP objectives and provisions have 
to be taken into account by the institutions and the Member States as required by the 
Common  Provisions  of  the  TEU,  and  in  view  of  the  general  objectives  of  the 
European Union. Article 2 TEU stipulates that the Union shall assert its “identity on 
the international  scene”.188  While  the  implementation of  the  CFSP is  one  of  the 
means to achieving this general objective, the EC external relations equally contribute 
to this aim, given that the EU is, according to the third indent of Article 1 (ex A) 
TEU, founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms 
of cooperation established by the TEU. 
The PCAs, as mixed external agreements, have to be seen in this general perspective 
of EU external relations. Indeed, the Preamble of the PCA concluded with Russia 
emphasises this  unitary character of the Union by pointing out the “commitment of 
the  Community  and  its  Member  States  acting  in  the  framework  of  the  European  
Union  by  the  Treaty  on  European  Union of  7  February  1992  and  of  Russia  to 
strengthening the political and economic freedoms which constitute the very basis of 
the  Partnership”  (emphasis  added).189 The  PCAs  can,  if  not  should project  the 
184 Like Articles 24 and 38 TEU do since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, see section 
5.2.1.1.
185 Case C-70/94, Fritz Werner Industrie – Ausrustungen GmbH v Germany; Case C-83/94 Leifer and 
others; Case C-124/95 Centro-Com.
186 Denza (2002: 55), Koskenniemi (1998: 27), Weiler (1993: 53), Wessel (1999), McLeod et al. (1996: 
412), Timmermans (1996: 66).  
187 The Council is indeed required to take these principles into account, as suggested by Art. 3 TEU 
(ex-C), and Art. 11 TEU (ex J.1). See further below, section 4.2.
188 Art. B TEU when the PCAs were concluded.
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different facets of the  Union, which include not only the CFSP objectives, but also 
JHA cooperation.
2.1.2. Agreements incorporating a JHA dimension 
Alongside provisions inspired by the Union’s CFSP objectives, the PCAs also contain 
provisions which can equally be related to the other non-Community sub-order of the 
EU, namely Title VI on Justice and Home Affairs, as originally established by of the 
Treaty  on  European  Union  signed  in  Maastricht.190 In  particular,  the  Agreements 
contain provisions on cooperation to combat drugs (2.1.2.1). Moreover, the PCA with 
Russia specifically includes a title on cooperation on prevention of illegal activities 
(2.1.2.2). 
2.1.2.1. The provisions on cooperation to combat drugs
Both PCAs foresee the establishment of cooperation between the Parties to combat 
illicit production, supply and traffic of drugs. The relevant provisions are placed under 
the  heading  “economic  cooperation”  in  the  respective  agreements.191 The  main 
purpose of such economic cooperation in the case of Ukraine is to contribute “to the 
process  of  economic  reform  and  recovery  and  sustainable  development  [and  to] 
strengthen and develop economic links between the Parties”. In the PCA with Russia, 
economic  cooperation  contributes  to  “the  expansion  of  the  [Parties]  respective 
189 The expression “acting in the framework of the European Union” was also used in the Memorandum 
of Understanding (“MOU”) on the EU administration of Mostar, signed in Geneva on 5 July 1995. 
According to Alan Dashwood (1998a: 1038), the expression was invented to “avoid the impression that 
the Member States were acting on their own individual account”. See also in this sense, Wessel (1997: 
127, 1999: 269ff).  Eileen Denza (2002: 119 and 121-122) has a  different  position:  the MOU was 
concluded  by  the  Presidency  on  behalf  of  the  Union  and  any  obligation  thereby  created  were 
obligations of the Member States. See also Monar (1997b) and Pagani (1996).  
190 Title VI was partly communitarised by the Treaty of Amsterdam which renamed it  “Police and 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters” (hereinafter “PJCCM”). Further: e.g. O’Keeffe (1999) and 
van Raepenbusch (1999).
191  Art. 82 PCA Russia; Art. 79 PCA Ukraine. 
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economies, to the creation of a supportive international economic environment and to 
the integration between Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe”.192 
With regard to drugs cooperation more specifically, the PCA with Russia stipulates 
that:
The  Parties  shall  cooperate  in  increasing  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of 
policies  and  measures  to  counter  the  illicit  production,  supply  and  traffic  of 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including the prevention of diversion 
of  precursor  chemicals,  as  well  as  in  promoting  drug-demand  prevention  and 
reduction. The cooperation in this area shall be based on mutual consultation and 
close coordination between the Parties over the objectives and measures on the 
various drug-related fields, and shall, inter alia, provide for exchange of training 
programmes  and  include,  where  available,  technical  assistance  from  the 
Community.193
 
The areas dealt with in this provision partly relate to the Maastricht version of Title 
VI  of  the  TEU  on  JHA.  Article  K.1  TEU  then  provided  that  combating  drug 
addiction, as well as police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating 
inter alia unlawful drug trafficking and other forms of international crime constitute 
matters of “common interest” for the Member States,194 could thus be the subject of 
Council joint positions or joint actions. As with CFSP principles therefore, the PCAs 
echo the Union’s objectives in the field of JHA.
In legal terms, the inclusion of such cooperation in an external agreement does not 
lead to mixity any more than do foreign policy objectives. Nor does it necessarily 
require reference to a specific legal basis. This proposition is further supported by the 
192 Art. 56 PCA Russia.
193 Art. 79 of the PCA Ukraine provides that: 
[w]ithin  the  framework  of  their  respective  powers  and competences  the  Parties  shall  cooperate  in 
increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of policies and measures to counter the illicit production, 
supply and traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including the prevention of diversion 
of  precursor  chemicals,  as  well  as  in  promoting  drug-demand  prevention  and  reduction.  The 
cooperation in this area shall  be based on mutual  consultation and close coordination between the 
Parties over the objectives and measures on the various drug-related fields.
194 Further on external dimensions of the “third pillar”: Denza (2002: 63ff), Monar (2004), McGoldrick 
(1997: 174-178). More generally: Bieber and Monar (1995), O'Keeffe (1995), Müller-Graff (1994), 
Peers (2000b) and Kuijper (2004: 610). 
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Court’s  decision  in  the  Portugal  v  Council  case.195 The  Court  was  asked  by  the 
Portuguese  government  to  review the  Council  Decision  to  conclude  an  EC-India 
Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development. This Agreement is based 
on Article 133 and 181 EC, together with the first sentence of Article 300(2) and the 
first paragraph of Article 300(3) EC.196 The applicant argued that in view of several 
specific cooperation matters, such as energy, tourism and culture, the Council should 
have concluded the Agreement by reference to other legal bases, particularly Article 
308 EC. In addition, and more importantly for present purposes, Portugal considered 
that the Agreement’s provisions relating to drug abuse control belonged to the sphere 
of cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs as envisaged in Article 29 TEU 
(particularly  ex  Article  K.1(4)  and  (9)  TEU before  its  revision  by  the  Treaty  of 
Amsterdam), which fell within the purview of the Member States, and thus required 
the conclusion of a mixed agreement.
As regards the specific cooperation matters, the Court held that:
the fact that a development cooperation agreement contains clauses concerning 
various specific matters cannot alter the characterisation of the agreement which 
must  be  determined  having  regard  to  its  essential  object  and  not  in  terms  of 
individual  clauses,  provided  that  those  clauses  do  not  impose  such  extensive 
obligations concerning the specific matters referred to that those obligations in 
fact constitute objectives distinct from those of development cooperation.197
…
The mere  inclusion  of  provisions  for  cooperation  in  a  specific  field  does  not 
therefore necessarily imply a general power such as to lay down the basis of a 
competence to undertake any kind of cooperation action in that field. It does not, 
therefore,  predetermine  the  allocation  of  spheres  of  competence  between  the 
Community and the  Member  States  or  the  legal  basis  of  Community acts  for 
implementing cooperation in such a field.198
Having examined the  scope  of  the contentious provisions on energy,  tourism and 
culture, the Court found that the commitments provided therein were obligations to 
take action “which do not constitute objectives distinct from those of development 
195 Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council.
196 OJ 1994 L 223/23.
197 Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council, para. 39
198 Para. 47.
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cooperation”. Contrary to the allegations of the Portuguese government, they could 
lawfully be included in a Community agreement based on Article 181 EC.199
With regard to drug abuse control, the Court reasoned in two steps. To begin with, it 
stated that “drug abuse control cannot, as such, be excluded from measures necessary 
for  the  pursuit  of  the  objectives  referred  to  in  Article  [177  on  development 
cooperation]  since  production  of  narcotics,  drug  abuse  and  related  activities  can 
constitute serious impediments to economic and social development”.200 It then turned 
to the question whether the provision in question remained “within the limits which 
do not necessitate recourse to a competence and to a legal basis specific to the sphere 
of drug abuse control”. 
The Cooperation Agreement  with India  foresees  cooperation in  the field  of  drugs 
along the following lines:
The contracting parties affirm their resolve, in conformity with their respective 
competences, to increase the efficiency of policies and measures, to counter the 
supply  and  distribution  of  narcotic  and  psychotropic  substances  as  well  as 
preventing  and  reducing  drug  abuse,  taking  into  account  work  done  in  this 
connection by international bodies…201
This provision was found to contain nothing more than a “declaration of intent to 
cooperate in drug abuse control” (emphasis added).202 The Court also referred to the 
proviso  whereby  the  Contracting  Parties  should  act  in  “conformity  with  their 
respective  competences”,  understood  as  a  reminder  of  the  limited  powers  of  the 
Community  in  this  area.  Turning  to  the  specific  actions  comprised  in  the  drug 
cooperation  established  by  the  Agreement,203 the  Court  held  that  they  constituted 
199 Para. 55.
200 Para. 60.
201 Art. 19(1).
202 Para. 62.
203 Art. 19(2) of the Agreement with India contains a list of actions that the cooperation comprises:
(a) training, education, health, promotion and rehabilitation of addicts…; 
(b) measures to encourage alternative economic opportunities; 
(c) technical, financial and administrative assistance in the monitoring of precursors’ trade, prevention, 
treatment and reduction of drug abuse; 
(d) exchange of all relevant information, including that relating to money laundering.
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measures  falling  within  the  sphere  of  the  development  cooperation  objectives.204 
Given the scope of the provision on drug abuse control, its inclusion in the Agreement 
therefore “did not require the participation of the Member States in the conclusion of 
the Agreement”.205 
Coming back to the relevant provisions of the PCAs, it can be wondered whether the 
Court’s Portugal approach could be applied mutatis mutandis to assess whether these 
provisions could be a source of mixity. One needs first to compare the provisions of 
the EC-India Agreement with those of the PCAs, taking into account the different 
nature and objectives of the respective Agreements.206
Prima facie,  compared to the EC-India Agreement,  the PCAs seem to establish a 
cooperation to combat drugs that involves a more stringent obligation to cooperate. In 
particular,  the  Agreements  foresee  that  the  Parties  “shall cooperate”  (emphasis 
added),  an expression  which contrasts  with the EC-India  Agreement  whereby the 
Parties “affirm their resolve… to increase the efficiency of policies and measures”, 
and interpreted by the Court as a “declaration of intent to cooperate in drug abuse 
control”.  Moreover,  the  PCA  with  Russia  does  not  contain  the  “respective 
competences” proviso included in the EC-India Agreement. Such proviso was also 
singled  out  by  the  Court,  in  its  decision  in  the  Portugal case,  to  support  the 
proposition that the provision on drugs abuse control “remains within limits which do 
not necessitate recourse to a competence and to a legal basis specific to the sphere of 
drug abuse control”.207
However, while establishing an obligation to cooperate, the PCAs do not set out any 
specific obligations under this cooperation. They merely involve mutual consultation 
and close coordination as regards the objectives and measures on the various drug-
204 Even as regards the action mentioned in (d) but only in so far as that exchange of information makes 
a contribution that is intimately linked to other measures provided for in Art. 19. It was emphasised that 
“that restrictive interpretation” was confirmed by the reference to “relevant” information in (d).
205 Para. 68.
206 Similar provisions may not necessarily have the same meaning. As the Court pointed out, the nature 
and the objectives of the Agreement in which the provisions under scrutiny are included, are of great 
significance;  e.g. case 270/80 Polydor v. Harlequin Records Shops.
207 Para. 62
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related fields. The provision of the PCAs does not contain anything that prescribes in 
concrete terms the manner in which cooperation in each specific area envisaged is to 
be  implemented.  Indeed,  the  PCAs  are  even  less  detailed  than  the  EC-India 
Agreement. The latter stipulates specific actions, which were nevertheless found not 
to be specific enough to warrant recourse to a specific competence and legal basis. 
The cooperation in combating drugs provided for  in the PCAs does not  therefore 
constitute objectives distinct from those of the Agreement. 
Of course, the cooperation concerned in the PCAs cannot be regarded as ancillary to 
any  development  objective,  for  the  PCAs  are  not  development  cooperation 
agreements. This cooperation can nevertheless be considered as ancillary to the broad 
economic cooperation set out by the Agreements, and based on Article 308 EC. One 
could argue, following the Court’s approach in the Portugal case, that production of 
narcotics, drug abuse and related activities can constitute serious impediments to the 
process of economic reform and recovery, and sustainable development that the PCAs 
seek to achieve through economic cooperation. Indeed, as pointed out by Advocate 
General La Pergola in his Opinion in the Portugal case, Article 152 (1) EC on public 
health requires that a high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the 
definition and implementation of all Community policies and activities. In particular, 
Community action, which complements that of Member States, is directed, inter alia, 
towards reducing drugs-related health damage, including information and prevention 
(subparagraph  3  of  Article  152(1)  EC).208 It  thus  suggests  that  drug-related 
cooperation should also be envisaged in other external agreements.
Furthermore, unlike Article 82 of the PCA with Russia, Article 79 of the PCA with 
Ukraine does include the expression “within the framework of their respective powers 
and  competences  of  the  Parties”.  It  is  implausible  that  the  absence  of  the  said 
expression in the PCA with Russia should in itself mean that the cooperation which 
the Agreement foresees, implies “a general power such as to lay down the basis of a 
competence to undertake any kind of cooperation action in that field”. It does not, 
therefore,  predetermine  the  allocation  of  spheres  of  competence  between  the 
208 Opinion of AG La Pergola, para. 51.
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Community  and  the  Member  States  or  the  legal  basis  of  Community  acts  for 
implementing cooperation in such a field.209 
It thus becomes apparent, particularly in the light of the Court’s case law, that the 
provisions on drugs cooperation included in the PCAs are not in themselves a case for 
mixity.  The  participation  of  the  Member  States  would  only  be  justified  if  the 
provisions  were  considered  to  establish  a  specific  field  of  cooperation,210 going 
beyond the limited powers of the Community in the field.211 
2.1.2.2. Cooperation on prevention of illegal activities under the PCA 
with Russia
Alongside  cooperation to  combat  drugs,  the  PCA with Russia  also contains other 
provisions arguably related to JHA. Article 84 provides that:
[t]he Parties shall establish cooperation aimed at preventing illegal activities such 
as:
- illegal immigration and illegal presence of physical persons of their nationality 
on the respective territories, taking into account the principle and practice of 
readmission,
- illegal activities in the sphere of economics, including corruption,
209 This conclusion would not be affected by the fact that the PCA Russia provides that the cooperation 
“shall, inter alia, provide for exchange of training programmes and include where available, technical 
assistance from the Community.” This type of measure was explicitly provided in the Agreement with 
India, without changing the ancillary nature of the cooperation. 
210 Flaesch-Mougin (1998 : 69).
211 Indeed the Community has powers in the field as recalled by the Council in the Portugal  case. It 
mentioned various Community measures which regulate several aspects of drug abuse and which are 
based on Arts. 308, 133 and 95 EC (Opinion La Pergola AG, Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council, at 
para  50).  As  pointed  out  by  Eileen  Denza  (2002:  214-215),  measures  to  combat  the  use  of  and 
trafficking in drugs straddle a number of legal bases which include bases in the first pillar where such 
measures are relevant to the free movement of both goods and persons, to the common agricultural 
policy, or to the CCP. Yet a number of instruments covering the same grounds as the cooperation 
envisaged by the PCA were adopted on the basis of Title VI. She also mentions Simone White who 
wrote  that  “regulation  in  the  first  pillar  is  diffuse,  with  drug  control  measures  found  in  diverse 
instruments, ranging from specific precursor control measures to punitive clauses in tariff preference 
agreements and measures to prevent money laundering” (White, 1999: 32). See also Peers (2000c: 
107).
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- illegal transactions of various goods, including industrial waste,
- counterfeiting,
- the illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
In  contrast  to  the  drugs  related  provisions,  cooperation  on  prevention  of  illegal 
activities  is  not  included  in  the  PCA’s  title  on  economic  cooperation.  Instead,  it 
constitutes itself a specific title (Title VIII),  and represents therefore an important 
field of cooperation in the context  of the PCA. Like the provisions on drugs,  the 
cooperation on the prevention of illegal activities, whose formulation is wide, partly 
relates to areas covered by the provisions of Title VI TEU, in its Maastricht version. 
Among the “matters of common interests” envisaged in old Article K.1 (now Article 
29) TEU one finds rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of 
the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon, the immigration policy and 
policy regarding nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States, and 
combating  unauthorised  immigration,  residence  and  work  by  national  of  third 
countries on the territory of Member States.212 As pointed out above, Article K.1 TEU 
also mentioned combating drug addiction, as well as fraud on an international scale. 
Both these items could be related to the illegal activities envisaged by the cooperation 
set out in the PCA with Russia. As in the case of the other JHA-inspired provisions of 
the PCA, however, it may be submitted that the cooperation thus foreseen is ancillary 
to the main objectives of the Agreement. 
With  respect  to  its  scope,  Title  VIII  of  the  PCA  with  Russia  provides  that  the 
cooperation in the areas mentioned therein “will be based on mutual consultations and 
close interactions and will provide technical and administrative assistance including:
- drafting of national legislation in the sphere of preventing illegal activities,
- creation of information centres,
- increasing the efficiency of institutions engaged in preventing illegal activities,
- training of personnel and development of research infrastructures,
- elaboration of mutually acceptable measures impeding illegal activities.
212 While this is an area which has been partly communitarised by the Treaty of Amsterdam, it related 
at the time of the signature of the Agreement to the external dimension of the third pillar. It could also 
be  linked to  the  Tampere European  Council  which  expressed its  support  for  regional  cooperation 
against  organised crime involving the  Member  States  and  third  countries  bordering on  the Union 
(European Council, 1999b). Further: Denza (2002: 307) and Monar (2004).
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Actions such as mutual consultations and “close interactions”, although ambiguous in 
the case of the latter, cannot be considered, to use the terminology used by the Court 
in Portugal, as imposing “such extensive obligations concerning the specific matters 
referred to that those obligations in fact constitute objectives distinct from those of the 
[Agreement]”, and thus alter its characterisation.213 
To recapitulate, while the PCAs do not establish any specific obligations in the field 
of JHA, they nonetheless include a JHA dimension in the Partnerships, be it in general 
terms.214 Practice has indeed shown how this dimension has become critical in the 
subsequent development of the Partnerships.215 More generally, this section has shown 
that the PCAs relate to the non-EC sub-orders of the TEU as well. The different facets 
of the Union are thus incorporated in the framework of the Agreements, either as 
general objectives, or as elements ancillary to the main purpose of the Agreements. 
The presence of non-EC dimensions in the Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine is 
further confirmed by the political conditionality they involve.
213 Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council, para. 39
214 The PCAs provisions establishing cooperation on money laundering could also be mentioned as an 
additional example. Both Art. 81 PCA Russia, and Art. 68 PCA Ukraine, provide that (1) The Parties 
agree on the necessity of making efforts and cooperating in order to prevent the use of their financial 
systems for laundering of proceeds from criminal activities in general and drug offences in particular. 
(2) Cooperation in this area shall include administrative and technical assistance with the purpose of 
establishing  suitable  standards  against  money  laundering  equivalent  to  those  adopted  by  the 
Community and international forums in this field, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 
Money laundering partly relates to Title VI TEU.  
215 This is notably exemplified by the first meeting of the EU-Russia Cooperation Council. It adopted 
the “Joint  Work programme for  1998”, which included the item “Justice and Home Affairs”.  The 
document states in its pt. 17 that “[on the basis of Article 84 PCA] both sides will seek to give new 
impetus to cooperation in tackling organised crime including drug trafficking and illegal activities in 
the sphere of economics. They will explore in particular the possibilities for enhancing practical law 
enforcement  cooperation”  (EU/Russia  Cooperation  Council,  1998a).  Further:  Potemkina  (2002).  It 
should also be noted that a specific forum for discussion has been established within the institutional 
framework of the PCA. Not only have the Parties set out a specific PCA sub-committee on JHA, they 
have also decided to organised sectorial  meetings of the JHA Troika with the Interior Minister  of 
Ukraine and Russia respectively; see for instance EU Troika/Ukraine (2004b).
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2.2. Agreements subject to political conditions advocated by the EU
The PCAs are not only  inspired by the broad objectives set out in the TEU, their 
establishment,  implementation  and  further  development  are  also  subject to  the 
observance  of  various  political  principles  promoted  by  the  Union,  particularly 
regarding the respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. 
After  having  outlined  the  main  elements  of  the  complex  political  conditionality 
regime incorporated in the PCAs (2.2.1), this section will shed light on its dual nature 
(2.2.2), and argue that it is based on the combination of Community competence and 
the participation of Member States acting in the framework of the Union.
2.2.1. The regime of political conditionality envisaged by the PCAs
The  conditionality  regime  foreseen  in  the  PCAs  relies  on  several  provisions 
(2.2.1.1),216 and involves a complex suspension procedure (2.2.1.2).
2.2.1.1. The foundations of the conditionality regime
The preamble of each PCA mentions the “paramount importance of the rule of law 
and respect for human rights, particularly those of minorities, [and] the establishment 
of a multi-party system with free and democratic elections”.217 It  also refers to the 
Parties’ commitment “to  strengthening the political and economic freedoms” which 
constitute the basis of the Partnerships.218 
This  commitment  is  replicated  in  the  operative  part  of  the  Agreements.219 In 
particular,  Article  2  of  the  PCA  with  Russia  stipulates  that  “[r]espect  for  the 
216 For a more conceptual analysis of political conditionality, see Smith (1998, 1999).
217 Indeed, as stated above, the Preamble also refers to the “common values” that the Parties share, 
although without specifying what such values are. 
218 These  provisions  echo the  Member  States’  Declaration  of  16 December  1991,  establishing  the 
“guidelines on the recognition of new States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union”. The text is 
reproduced in Annex I of Türk (1993). See also de la Serre et. al (1994: 144).  
219  Art. 1 in each of the two PCAs.
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democratic principles and human rights as defined in the Helsinki Final Act and the 
Charter of Paris for the New Europe, underpins the internal and external policies of 
the Parties and constitutes an essential element of partnership and of the Agreement” 
(emphasis  added).  The  PCA  with  Ukraine  includes  an  equivalent  “human  rights 
clause”.220 
The PCAs thus include more than a mere statement of principle whereby respect for 
economic and political freedoms is the  basis of the Partnership, as was the case in 
several  Community  agreements  at  the time.221 The conditionality  contained in  the 
PCAs takes a “strong form”222 insofar as respect for human rights and for democratic 
principles  constitutes  an  “essential  element”  of  the  Agreements.  In  addition,  the 
human rights clauses of the PCAs relate to a “non-execution clause”223 according to 
which violation of the “essential element” by any of the Parties represents a “material 
breach of the Agreement”.224 As such,  it  is a “case of special  urgency” which,  in 
derogation from the rules attached to the dispute settlement mechanism established by 
the PCAs, allows the Party affected to suspend unilaterally the implementation of the 
Agreement.225 This  is  an exceptional  procedure both in  the context  of  the dispute 
220 The clause in the PCA with Ukraine refers,  in addition, to the “principles of market  economy, 
including those enunciated in  the documents of  the CSCE Bonn Conference” as underpinning the 
internal and external policies of the Parties and as constituting an “essential element” of partnership 
and of  [the] Agreement”.  This distinction might be explained by the different  negotiating strength 
between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations - see in this regard the remarks of the Economic and 
Social Committee (1995), in its “Avis” on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus. The Commission (1995b) has argued against references to the market economy as 
an essential element, on the ground that “the reference to market economy in agreements with OSCE 
members creates a different perspective having no direct connection with human rights, a fact that 
could be prejudicial to the aim of consistency.  
221 E.g. Riebel and Will (1999: 726).  
222 Cremona (1996: 62).  
223 Further: Horng (2003), Fierro (2001: 42), Kuijper (1993).  
224 A Joint Declaration to Art. 107, annexed to the PCA with Russia (the same Declaration exists in the 
PCA with Ukraine, concerning Art. 102), defines the expression “material breach” by reference to Art. 
60(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) as either a repudiation of the Agreement 
not sanctioned by the general rules of international law or a violation of the essential elements of the 
Agreement.
225 This dispute settlement is set out in Art. 107 (2) of the PCA with Russia, and Art. 102(2) in the PCA 
with Ukraine. These provisions read as follows: “If either Party considers that the other party has failed 
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settlement mechanisms established by the PCAs,226 and in view of public international 
law.227 Such  a  clause  has  been  referred  to  as  the  “Bulgarian  clause”  for  it  first 
appeared in the Europe Agreement with Bulgaria.228
2.2.1.2. The intricate suspension procedure
As seen above, the human rights clause provided in the PCAs allows the Community 
and its Member States to react immediately to violation of the principles and rights 
promoted through the Agreements. To date, suspension of the application of the PCAs 
has never taken place. Instead, it has occurred at the level of ratification and signature. 
A case in point was the delaying of the entry into force of the Community Interim 
Agreement (IA) implementing the trade and trade-related aspects of the PCA with 
Russia.229 In view of the brutal interventions of the Russian forces in Chechnya in the 
mid-1990s, the entry into force of the IA was suspended until a cease-fire could be 
to fulfil an obligation under the agreement, it may take appropriate measures. Before so doing, except 
in  cases  of  special  urgency,  it  shall  supply the Cooperation Council  with all  relevant  information 
required for a thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the 
Parties.”
226 The PCA dispute settlement mechanism normally requires that before a Party retaliates in response 
to the other Party’s non compliance with its obligations, the former supplies the Cooperation Council 
with all the relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation with a view to 
seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties. Hence dialogue is sought until the last moment. 
227 Art.  61(1)  of  the  1969 Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law of  Treaties  provides  that  the  “material 
breach” by one Party allows the other Party to terminate the Agreement or suspend, partly or wholly its 
implementation, in observance of the procedure set out in Art. 65 which requires three months between 
the  notification  and  the  suspension.  (International  Law Commission,  1969).  The  “case  of  special 
urgency” allows derogation from the obligations set out in Art. 65 of the Vienna Convention. Further: 
e.g. Riebel and Will (1999: 723).  
228  Articles 6 and 118(2) EA Bulgaria, OJ 1994 L358/3. This expression was used by the Commission 
in  its  Communication  on  the  inclusion  of  respect  for  democratic  principles  and  human  rights  in 
agreements  between  the  Community  and  third  countries  (European  Commission,  1995b).  The 
“Bulgarian clause” contrasts with the “Baltic clause” which refers to a specific suspension provision 
according to which: “the parties reserve the right to suspend this agreement in whole or in part with 
immediate effect if a serious violation occurs in the essential provisions of the present agreement”. See 
e.g. Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation Agreement with Estonia (OJ 1992 L 403/1). 
229 OJ 1995 L247/1.
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established.230 Other  EC  agreements  with  Russia  have  also  been  postponed.  For 
instance, in reaction to the second Russian campaign in Chechnya, the signature of the 
Scientific  and  Technological  Agreement,  aimed  at  elaborating  the  cooperation 
provisions of the PCA was delayed in 2000.231 It is noticeable that the PCA itself, 
which had entered into force in the meantime, was not suspended. Indeed, such a 
consistent absence of suspension of the PCAs is not necessarily a sign of success of 
the system of political conditionality established by the Agreement. 
As  argued  by  Barbara  Brandtner  and  Allan  Rosas,  the  decision  to  suspend  the 
Agreements generally entails an intricate procedure that can be dissuasive.232 Indeed, 
views have long diverged as to what  exactly  the procedure for  suspension of the 
Agreements  should  be  in  case  of  violation  of  an  essential  element  of  mixed 
agreements.233 Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, suspension of an external agreement is 
expressly provided and governed by the provisions of Article 300 EC. The second 
subparagraph of its paragraph 2 stipulates that suspension is decided by the Council 
acting by qualified majority, on the basis of a Commission proposal.234 Unanimity is 
however required when the suspension concerns an area for which unanimity applies 
for the adoption of internal rules, and for association agreements based on Article 310 
EC. The European Parliament is only informed a posteriori.235 
230 e.g. Declaration of the EU on Chechnya, 17 January 1995 (Council 19995a). Further: e.g. Riebel and 
Will  (1999:  741)  and  Hillion  (1998a:  417).  Another  application  of  conditionality  ex-ante  is  the 
suspension of the ratification process of the PCA with Belarus due to the political situation therein, see 
Hillion (2001).  Further on the political situation of Belarus and the EU reactions, see Guicherd (2002).
231 General  Affairs  Council  (2000a).  This  decision  follows  the  Declaration  of  the  1999  Helsinki 
European Council on Chechnya condemning the intense bombardments of various Chechen cities. The 
European Council recommended “to draw the consequences from [the] situation for the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, some of the provisions of which should be suspended” (European Council, 
1999f).  
232 Brandtner and Rosas (1999: 708). See also Brandtner and Rosas (1998), Pollet (1997 at 298) and 
Riebel and Will (1999: 746).  
233 Lenaerts and de Smijter (1996: 46) have pointed out that it  is not clear how the clause is to be 
applied in practice.  
234 The TEU under Maastricht  was silent  on the procedure to follow in order  to  suspend external 
agreements. It was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Further: Dashwood (1998a, 1999: 205) and 
de Walsche (1999 : 67).  
235 Art. 300(2) subparagraph 3, EC.
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If it is accepted that the suspension procedure of Article 300(2) EC applies also in 
relation  to  mixed  agreements  following  a  breach  of  an  essential  element,236 an 
ambiguity nevertheless remains. One is unsure as to who in the EU context should 
establish the third Party’s failure to respect human rights and democratic principles 
promoted through the human rights clause. In view of Article 300 EC, it appears that 
in  the  specific  context  of  the  EC  Treaty,  the  Commission  has  to  propose  the 
suspension. Yet, one may wonder about the criteria which should be applied by the 
Commission to make such a highly political assessment. In this context, it should be 
recalled that outside contractual frameworks, EC economic sanctions against a third 
state require a prior decision of the Council on the basis of Title V on CFSP.237 The 
political assessment is thus left to the Council. Given that suspension is a form of 
sanction against  the partner state,  the same arrangement could operate also in the 
more specific context of contractual relations, unless the agreement itself provides 
otherwise, as in the case of the Partnership Agreement with the ACP countries.238 In 
other words, while it is established that suspending an Agreement based on Article 
300  EC  requires  a  Commission  proposal,  a  prior  Council  or  European  Council 
position  establishing  the  violation  of  human  rights  could  be  envisaged,  if  not 
required.239 Indeed, in the case of reactions against Russia evoked earlier, action was 
taken  at  the  level  of  the  Community  after  the  Helsinki  meeting  of  the  European 
Council had asked the institutions to take actions.240 In any event, the Commission 
236 It has been suggested that if suspension affects the whole of the agreement of those parts of it which 
belong to Member States competences,  the participation of the latter becomes an issue.  See Rosas 
(1998: 135).  
237 Art. 301 EC.
238 See e.g. Internal Agreement between the representatives of the governments of the Member States 
meeting  within  the  Council,  on  measures  to  be  taken  and  procedures  to  be  followed  for  the 
implementation of the EC-ACP Partnership Agreement (OJ 2000 L317/376); Council decision on the 
procedure for implementing  Art. 366a of the fourth ACP-EC Convention (OJ 1999 L75/32). Further: 
Fierro (2003).  
239 Des Nerviens (1997: 804) points out that several Member States had proposed this option. It could 
also be suggested that the Commission shares its initiative with the Member States, as in the case of the 
ACP procedure, or indeed with the Member States and the Parliament as in the context of Art. 7 TEU. 
It  will  be  seen  in  section  6.2  that  the  Treaty  establishing  a  Constitution  for  Europe  revisits  this 
procedure. 
73
would not make a proposal to suspend an agreement without being certain that it 
would get the support of the Council.241
Arguably,  the  ambiguity  and the  complexity  of  the procedure  has  to  do with  the 
limited  Community  powers  with  respect  to  the  protection  of  human  rights,242 as 
indeed emphasised by the Court of Justice, as will be seen below. 
2.2.2. A human rights dimension with dual origins
The  human  rights  clause  included  in  the  PCAs  is  symptomatic  of  the  growing 
importance  of  the  human  rights  dimension  of  Community  external  relations, 
particularly since the beginning of the 1990s.243 When the PCAs were negotiated with 
Russia and Ukraine, an equivalent clause was also included in a growing number of 
bilateral  trade  and  cooperation  agreements,  particularly  development  cooperation 
agreements,244 as well as in association agreements, viz. the Europe Agreements.245 
Agreements  with  e.g.  the  countries  of  the  Andean  Pact,246 the  Baltic  States  and 
Albania equally contained such a clause.247 
240 The  General  Affairs  Council  of  24  Jan.  2000 adopted  sanctions,  without  suspending  the  PCA 
(General Affairs Council, 2000a). Further: Fierro (2001: 53).  
241 In his speech at the 56th Session of the Human Rights Commission 27 March 2000, Chris Patten 
(2000) made the following remarks: “it is for the fifteen EU governments to decide whether or not the 
EU can  agree  a  united  view on  the  human  rights  record  of  an  individual  country,  and  to  do  so 
preferably in concert with other like-minded countries. The European Commission is not, of course, a 
government… We can make our voice heard, but the member states are in the driving seat”.
242 Further: Eeckhout (2004: 470), Liñán Nogueras and Hinojosa Martínez (2001: 313ff). 
243 European Commission (1995b). Further: Cremona (1996), Smith (1998) and Ward (1998). 
244 Communication from the Commission on human rights, democracy and development cooperation 
(European Commission, 1991), endorsed in a Resolution of the Council and of the Member States 
meeting in the Council on human rights, democracy and development (Council, 1991).  
245 It may be recalled that such clause was absent from the first three Europe Agreements concluded 
with the then Czech and Slovak Federation, Hungary and Poland, but were inserted in the following 
EAs, including those with the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic. On the conditionality included in 
the EAs: Maresceau (1997: 3), Cremona (1996; 68), Pollet (1997), King (1996), Lannon et al (2001), 
Rideau (1999).   
246 OJ 1998 L 127/11.
247 European Commission (1995b: 3).
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Arguably, the importance of human rights was catalysed by the establishment of the 
European Union by the Treaty of Maastricht which enhanced the political dimension 
of the EC external relations by assembling in a single Treaty framework the renamed 
EC and the CFSP (replacing the EPC), as both constituent and interconnected parts of 
the  Union.248 Indeed,  the  “Common Provisions”  of  the  TEU comprise  an  explicit 
reference  to  the  Union’s  obligation  to  respect  fundamental  rights,249 without 
distinguishing between the different sub-orders or between its internal and external 
activities. With regard to the latter, the importance of human rights was made more 
explicit,  first,  in Title V on CFSP, particularly in what was then Article J.1 (now 
Article 11) TEU which sets out the objectives of the “Union and Member States”’ 
common foreign and security policy. Secondly, it was expressly introduced in the EC 
Treaty specifically  in  relation to  “Development  Cooperation”  (Title  XVII),  whose 
aims  are,  inter  alia,  to  “contribute  to  the  general  objective  of  developing  and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights 
and fundamental  freedoms.”250 Human rights  were also mentioned in  the  Title  on 
Justice and Home Affairs.251 In other words, the protection of human rights became on 
integral  part  of  the  Union’s  policies  in  general,  and  of  its  external  activities  in 
particular.
Unlike the EC provisions on development cooperation, the legal bases of other EC 
external agreements did not, until the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice, explicitly 
refer to the objective of respecting human rights.252 In the case of the PCAs, a Joint 
248  European Commission (1995e). Further: Edwards (1993, 1994) and Nuttall (1987).  
249 Art. F(2) TEU, see further below.
250 Art. 130u(2) EC.
251  Art. K.2 TEU. Further: Peers (1999).  
252 The  Treaty  of  Nice  introduced  a  specific  legal  basis  for  “Economic,  financial  and  technical 
cooperation with third countries”, namely Art. 181A EC, which like Article 181 EC on development 
cooperation, refers to the objective of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. It stipulates 
in its para. 1. 
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty, and in particular those of Title XX, the 
Community shall carry out, within its spheres of competence, economic, financial and technical 
cooperation measures with third countries. Such measures shall be complementary to those carried 
out by the Member States and consistent with the development policy of the Community.
Community  policy  in  this  area  shall  contribute  to  the  general  objective  of  developing  and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to the objective of respecting human rights and 
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Declaration to the Agreement with Russia253 suggests that the “Community’s policy in 
the  area  of  human  rights”  in  the  PCA  context  conforms  to  the  1992  Council 
Declaration.254 The latter requires the “inclusion… of the reference to the respect for 
human rights  constituting  an  essential  element  of  the  Agreement  and  to  cases  of 
special urgency” in cooperation or association agreements between the Community 
and CSCE partners.255 The Declaration also points out that such inclusion flows from 
“the attachment of both Parties to the relevant obligations, arising in particular from 
the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe.” 
By  mentioning  the  1992  Council  Declaration,  the  EU-Russia  Joint  Declaration 
implicitly recalls that there is no express legal basis in the EC Treaty to support the 
inclusion of the human rights clause in the PCAs. Instead, this inclusion is based on 
the Council Declaration that sets out a regional policy of the Union towards CSCE 
countries,  drawing on the principles  promoted in  the CSCE/OSCE context,256 and 
referred to  in the CFSP objectives.  Legally  speaking,  such a  Declaration remains 
essentially a political document. At most, it is a soft law instrument.257 At the same 
time, by referring to the “Community’s policy in the area of human rights” (emphasis 
added), the Declaration gives the impression that this field is a matter of Community 
powers. While there might be arguments in this sense,258 other elements could support 
the opposite view, particularly in the light of the European Court of Justice’s case law 
fundamental freedoms.
The  EC  Treaty  thereby  provides  an  express  legal  basis  for  introducing  human  rights  clauses  in 
cooperation agreements, other than development agreements. It should be recalled that the Commission 
has already suggested the use of Art. 181A for concluded new PCAs with the remaining NIS, see 
European Commission, 2003a).
253 Joint Declaration on Arts. 2 and 107, PCA with Russia.
254 Council (1992).  
255 The fact that the Declaration was issued in 1992 explains why the first EAs did not include a human 
right clause, as pointed out above. 
256 Cremona (1996: 69).
257 Other instruments relating to human rights in the Community seem to belong to the same category 
of soft law instruments: e.g. Declaration on Human Rights of the Luxembourg European Council of 
June  1991  (European  Council,  1991)  and  Council  Resolution  on  Human  rights,  democracy  and 
development of 28 November 1991 (Council, 1991). Further: Clapham (1990: 345ff), Rideau (1997) 
and Fierro (2001: 43). On the use of soft law instruments, see Snyder (1993). 
258 Further: Rosas (1998, 2000).  
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concerning, first, the legality of the inclusion of human rights clauses in EC external 
agreements based on Article 177 EC, and secondly, Community powers, or absence 
of powers to conclude human rights agreements based on Article 308 EC. In the light 
of this case law, it is argued that the human rights dimension of the PCAs is partly 
founded on the EC Treaty (2.2.2.1), but, straddling the pillars, it relates more globally 
to the Union (2.2.2.2), thereby consolidating the proposition that the PCA is a proto 
cross-pillar instrument.
2.2.2.1.  A human rights clause with an EC dimension
The legality of human rights clauses in Community external agreements has so far 
been  acknowledged  by  the  European  Court  of  Justice  in  relation  to  development 
cooperation agreements. In the Portugal v Council case,259 the Court held that the EC-
India Development Cooperation Agreement based on Article 181 (old Article 130y) 
EC could lawfully include a human rights clause. Such inclusion did not require the 
recourse to Article 308 EC.260 The Court’s approach has two strands.
First, it relied on the wording of Article 177 (ex 130u(2)) EC according to which, the 
Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation “shall contribute to the 
general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and 
to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms”. That “very wording”, 
added the Court, “demonstrates the importance to be attached to respect for human 
rights  and  democratic  principles,  so  that,  amongst  other  things,  development 
cooperation policy must be adapted to the requirement of respect for those rights and 
principles”.261 Article  177  EC  is  thus  an  express  constitutional  duty  for  the 
Community to adapt its development cooperation to those principles, in the sense of 
subordinating it to their observance.262 The Court added that, in this perspective, the 
259 Case C-286/94 Portuguese Republic v Council; see section 2.1.2.1 for the factual background of the 
case.
260 The Court recalled that Art. 308 should only be used if no other provision of the Treaty endows the 
Community with the necessary powers, citing Case 45/86 Commission v Council (GSP).
261 Case C-286/94, Portuguese Republic v Council, para. 24.
262 The  Advocate  General  even  suggested  in  his  conclusions  that  the  legality  of  development 
cooperation agreements would depend on the inclusion of such clause (Case C-268/94  Portugal v.  
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clause is “an important factor for the exercise of the right to suspend or terminate the 
development  cooperation  agreement  in  case  the  country  concerned  has  violated 
human rights”. While the conditionality inherent in the clause relates  prima facie to 
the provisions of Article 177 EC, the judges also pointed out that “the importance of 
human rights in the context of development cooperation was emphasised in various 
declarations and documents of the Member States and the Community institutions 
which had already been drawn up, before the TEU, and in consequence Title XVII of 
the EC Treaty, entered into force”. They thereby suggested that the recognition of 
human rights’  importance in  development  policy agreements  is  nothing new.  The 
wording of Article 177 EC is thus a consolidation of that recognition, but reinforces it 
by requiring development policy to be adapted to the requirement of respect for those 
rights and principles. 
Secondly, the Court found that the question of human rights and democratic principles 
did  not  constitute  a  specific  field  of  cooperation  provided  for  in  the  Agreement. 
Considering that the human rights clause was included in Article 1 headed “basis and 
objectives”, and in view of its wording, it did not involve specific obligations on the 
Community,263 and thus did not require recourse to another legal basis.264 It thereby 
indicated  that  the  Community  competence  to  insert  human  rights  clauses  in 
development cooperation agreements on the basis of Article 177 EC is limited.
In the light of this approach, the following discussion focuses on the nature of the 
human rights clause incorporated in the PCAs, and seeks to determine whether it is a 
factor of mixity. Such discussion has an academic flavour, given that the PCAs may 
contain whatever provisions the Member States agree to include therein, considering 
that they are mixed agreements.265 However, establishing the nature of the clause will 
bring additional light on the nature of the PCAs themselves.
Council, para. 29). Further: annotation by Kokott and Hoffmeister (1998), Peers (2000c: 203). 
263 Para. 28.
264 The Court said that “Article 1 of the Agreement headed ‘basis and objectives’ and the wording of 
the first paragraph of that provision, provide confirmation that the question of respect for human rights 
and democratic principles is not a specific field of cooperation provided for by the Agreement” (para. 
28).
265 Indeed, as pointed out above, the Treaty of Nice introduced a new Art. 181A which solves the 
problem. 
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As a preliminary point, it appears that the  recognition of the importance of human 
rights in the context of the PCAs does not require a specific legal basis. It can follow 
“declarations  and  documents  of  the  Member  States  and  Community  institutions” 
which emphasise the importance of those rights, such as the 1992 Council Declaration 
does, in the case of the PCAs (and the Europe Agreements).266
The  next  point  is  to  establish  whether,  the  human  rights  clause  itself,  and  the 
conditionality it involves could be inserted in the PCAs without the participation of 
the Member States. In its Portugal judgment, the Court seemed to suggest that it is the 
wording of Article 177 EC which required that development cooperation be adapted 
to the requirement of respect for human rights and democratic principles.267 Some 
observers, like Angela Ward, have indeed argued that the Court upheld the legality of 
the  inclusion  of  the  “essential  element”  clause  in  the  cooperation  agreement  on 
“extremely narrow grounds”. She suggests that the Community’s authority to include 
human rights  as  an  “essential  element”  in  external  agreements  should  thereby be 
restricted to accords concerning development cooperation.268 The question is therefore 
whether the PCAs human rights clause can nevertheless be supported by the legal 
bases of the PCAs, and particularly Articles 133 and 308 EC. 
While not mentioning the objective of respect for human rights, it may be recalled 
that  Article  133  EC  has  been  used  in  practice  as  a  single  basis  for  Community 
commercial  agreements  including  human  rights  clauses.  For  instance,  the  interim 
agreement with Russia, concluded by the Community alone on the basis of Article 
266 One could equally refer to the documents relied on by AG La Pergola in para. 27 of his Opinion in 
Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council, in particular, the European Council of 26 and 27 June 1992 which 
reaffirmed that “the respect, promotion and safeguarding of human rights is an essential element in 
international  relations  and  therefore  one  of  the  cornerstones  of  cooperation”,  attaching  “special 
importance  to  positive  initiatives  designed  to  ensure  active  support  to  those  countries  which  are 
instituting democracy, improving human rights performance as well as promoting good governance” 
(European Council, 1992). 
267  Para. 24. 
268 Ward (1998: 531). She indeed refers to a Council Legal Service Opinion to support this restrictive 
interpretation. This Opinion was issued following the Commission’s Communication for a Regulation 
on Human Rights (European Commission, 1997c). Further: Weiler and Fries (1999). 
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133 EC, contained a human rights clause drafted in terms that were similar to those of 
the PCAs. As a matter of fact, the conclusion of the interim agreement with Russia by 
the Community was delayed because of the second Russian campaign in Chechnya, 
and the violation of human rights recorded.269 The clause was not therefore a clause 
de style. Practice is even more elaborate with respect to Article 308 EC. In particular, 
it  was  used  prior  to  the  introduction  of  Article  181 EC,  to  support  human rights 
clauses in development cooperation agreements.270
However,  such  practices  are  not  entirely  irrefutable.  For  one  thing,  a  mere 
institutional practice cannot create precedent binding on Community institutions with 
respect to the correct legal basis of Community acts.271 In this regard, the practice of 
inserting human rights clauses in pure commercial agreements based on Article 133 
EC is  controversial  and has been criticised.272 Without  entering the debate,  it  will 
become apparent, in the light of the following developments, that the inclusion of 
such  a  clause  in  the  interim  agreement  with  Russia  might  not  be  legally  sound 
considering particularly the wording of the clause concerned. 
With respect to Article 308 EC,273 the Court of Justice has on several occasions shed 
light on its limits.274 In Opinion 2/94 on accession of the Community to the European 
Convention of Human Rights, the Court held that Article 308 EC “cannot serve as a 
basis for widening the scope of Community powers beyond the general framework 
created by the provisions that define the tasks and the activities of the Community”.275 
269 Declarations of the European Union on Chechnya (Council, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c).  
270 As recalled inter alia by the Portuguese government itself, human rights clauses were included in 
development cooperation agreements before the TEU on the basis of old Art. 235 EC; see para. 15 of 
the Court’s decision. Further: Peers’ annotation on the Portugal case (Peers, 1998a) and Brandtner and 
Rosas (1998).  
271 Case 68/86 United Kingdom v Council, para. 24; Opinion 1/94 WTO, para. 52. 
272 See in this respect the criticism by Bulterman (2001). For a different view, see Fierro (2001: 51ff) 
and Eeckhout (2004: 472).  
273 Further: Dashwood (1998b).
274 Case 242/87 ERASMUS. Further: Dashwood (1996b), who accurately points that the “Community 
[cannot] continue practising the trick of self-levitation through pulling on its own boot straps”.
275 Para. 30. See also in this regard, Case C-106/96 United Kingdom v Commission: which suggests that 
many projects on human rights lacked a satisfactory legal basis. Further, Eeckhout (2004: 469), Weiler 
and Fries (1999: 147) and Fierro (2001).  
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In particular, it cannot support the conclusion of an agreement  specifically aimed at 
ensuring respect for human rights and democratic principles.276 Incidentally, the Court 
found that no Treaty provision confers upon the Community institutions any general  
power to enact rules on human rights or to conclude international conventions in this 
field.277 Examining the scope of the human rights dimension incorporated in the PCAs 
thus becomes critical. The Court’s approach in the Portugal case can be useful in this 
regard. 
As in the EC-India Agreement, the PCAs human rights clause is situated in the first 
Title  headed  “general  principles”.  As  such,  it  does  not,  prima  facie, establish  a 
specific field of cooperation. However, the wording of the human rights clause in the 
respective agreements differs slightly. Article 1(1) of the EC-India Agreement states 
that: “respect for human rights and democratic principles is the basis for cooperation 
between the  Contracting  Parties  and  for  the  provisions  of  this  Agreement,  and  it 
constitutes an essential element of the Agreement”. This provision is silent notably on 
the principle that the respect of those rights and principles equally “underpins the 
internal and external policies of the Parties”, as stated in the PCAs with Russia and 
Ukraine. At first sight it is doubtful that this additional element means that the human 
rights clause included in the PCAs has a scope that is different from the clause in the 
EC-India Agreement. For one thing, other development cooperation agreements based 
276 Dashwood (1996a) and Arnull (2000). Interestingly, in the  Portugal  case, Denmark argued that if 
protection of human rights was the  main field of cooperation, then the agreement would need to be 
adopted on the basis of old Art. 235 EC. 
277 Opinion 2/94, para. 30. For Steve Peers (2000c), Opinion 2/94 suggests that the Community is free 
to  subordinate  any  treaty  it  wishes  to  human  rights  clauses  without  any  risk  of  exceeding  its 
competence unless it wishes to agree a treaty solely about the protection of human rights.  
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on Articles 133, 177 and 300 EC278 have included a similar expression.279 It may be 
suggested that the expression could have been inserted in the EC-India clause without 
the Court’s view on the latter’s scope being altered. That said, it still does not mean 
that the clauses of the PCAs would necessarily have the same meaning and scope. The 
Court has always held that the extension of the interpretation of a provision “to a 
comparably, similarly or even identically worded provision… depends, inter alia, on 
the aim pursued by each provision in its own particular context.”280 
An examination of the objectives, the context, as well as the provisions of the PCAs, 
suggests that the clauses that these Agreements contain differ from the one included 
in the EC Agreement with India.  First,  the Preamble of each PCA underlines the 
“paramount importance of the rule of law and respect for human rights”, and refers to 
the commitment of the Parties “to strengthening the political and economic freedoms 
which constitute the very basis of the partnership[s]” (emphasis added). Moreover, it 
makes  it  clear  that  the “full  implementation of  the  partnership[s]  presupposes  the 
continuation and accomplishment of [each partner’s] political and economic reforms.” 
The PCAs’ objectives to strengthen political and economic freedoms, and to support 
the Partner’s  efforts to  consolidate its  democracy are echoed in Article  1 of each 
PCA. Article 2 then contains the essential element clause, and Article 107 (Russia) / 
Article 102 (Ukraine) includes the suspension clause,  to be activated in case of a 
material breach of the Agreements. Compared to the EC-India Agreement scrutinised 
278 E.g. the EC-South Africa Cooperation Agreement (OJ 1994 L341/61) in its Art. 1 provides that 
“Relations between the Community… and South Africa… shall be based on respect of human rights 
and democratic principles which guide the internal and international policy of the Contracting Parties 
and constitute an essential element of this Agreement”. Also the agreement between the EC and the 
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka on Partnership and Development (OJ 1995 L85/32) says in 
its Art. 1: “cooperation ties between the Community and Sri Lanka and this Agreement in its entirety 
are  based  on  respect  for  democratic  principles  and  human  rights  which  inspire  the  domestic  and 
external policies of both the Community and Sri Lanka and which constitute an essential element of the 
Agreement.”  Various agreements with Latin American countries also contain this formula, although 
not the “essential element” clause, i.a. Cooperation Agreements with Argentina (OJ 1990 L295/67), 
Chile (OJ 1991 L79/2), Paraguay (OJ 1992 L313/72) and Uruguay (OJ 1992 L94/2). 
279 With the caveat that mere practice of the Council cannot derogate from the rules laid down in the 
Treaty and cannot, therefore, create a precedent binding on the Community institutions, with regard to 
the correct legal basis; see e.g. Opinion 1/94 WTO, para. 52.
280 Case C-312/91 Metalsa.
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by the Court in the Portugal case, the PCAs thus appear to have more ambitious aims 
as regards respect for human rights and democratic principles, including a formulation 
suggesting a more pro-active role for the Parties in promoting respect for these rights 
and principles.
Secondly, as pointed out above, the wording of the human rights clauses in the PCAs 
and the EC-India Agreement, respectively, differ. The “human rights and democratic 
principles” included in clause of the PCAs’ refers to principles and rights “as defined 
in particular in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe”, 
whereas the EC-India clause is silent on this point. It is suggested that this difference 
has  significant  implications  inasmuch  as  the  references  to  external  documents 
contained  in  the  PCAs  human  rights  clauses  warrant  specific  obligations  for  the 
Community in the field of human rights. In the light of the  Portugal  jurisprudence, 
such specific obligations presupposes a relevant competence, founded on a relevant 
legal basis, which arguably is lacking in the field of human rights as emphasised by 
the Court in its Opinion 2/94. Absent such Community competence, the inclusion of 
the particular human rights dimension in the PCAs implied Member States’ support.281 
The following will show that the PCAs human rights clause defines the human rights 
to be respected and establishes positive obligations for the Parties.
The Charter of Paris to which the PCAs human rights clause relates contains a section 
headed “Human rights, Democracy and Rule of Law”. Human rights included therein 
comprise notably the freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief, freedom 
of  expression,  freedom  of  association  and  peaceful  assembly  and  freedom  of 
movement. The text also foresees that everyone has the right “to enjoy his economic, 
social and cultural rights, to own a property alone or in association and to exercise 
individual  enterprise”.  The  Helsinki  Final  Act  equally  contains  a  chapter  entitled 
“Respect  for  human rights  and  fundamental  freedoms…”.  It  stipulates  in  its  first 
sentence  that  “the  participating  States  will  respect  human rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, for all 
281 Indeed, the Paris Charter for a new Europe and the Helsinki Final Act could not be considered as 
part of  ius cogens,  which binds the Community. See in this regard the Court’s decision in case C-
162/96  Racke.  Rosas (1998: 144),  Timmermans (1999), Lowe (1998) and Lenaerts and de Smijter 
(1999-2000: 122ff).  
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without discrimination as to race, sex, language or religion.” So far as democratic 
principles are concerned, the Charter states that democracy, “with its representative 
pluralist  character,  entails accountability to the electorate,  the obligation of public 
authorities  to  comply  with  the  law  and  justice  administered  impartially.  Indeed, 
“[d]emocratic  government  is  based on the will  of  the  people,  expressed regularly 
through free and fair elections….” 282 
The  human  rights  clauses  included  in  the  PCAs  require  respect  for  democratic 
principles  and  human  rights  “as  defined”  in  particular  in  those  regional  political 
documents.283 The principles and rights to be respected are thus defined in substance. 
Moreover, such respect being an essential element of the Agreement, the human rights 
and democratic principles thus referred to, have more than a guiding function, they 
are bestowed with a legal value for the Parties and they imply positive obligations for 
the latter.284 Indeed, non-compliance with those obligations potentially activates the 
282 The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 is more restrictive, on state institutions and political system and 
rather  focuses  on  Respect  for  human rights  and  fundamental  freedoms,  including  the  freedom of  
thought, conscience, religion or belief (part 1.VII) (CSCE, 1975).
283 Neither of these documents is legally binding. The Final Act of Helsinki Summit reads : “… the 
undersigned High Representatives of the participating States, mindful of the high political significance 
which  they  attach  to  the  results  of  the  Conference,  and declaring  their  determination  to  act in 
accordance with the provisions contained in the above texts, have subscribed their signatures below” 
(italics  added);  the  Charter  of  Paris  follows  the  same  line:  “…we,  the  undersigned  High 
Representatives of the participating States, mindful of the high political significance we attach to the 
results  of  the  Summit  Meeting,  and  declaring  our  determination  to  act  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions we have adopted, have subscribed our signatures below” (CSCE, 1975).
284 Echoing Article 2 of the PCA with Russia, the Joint Declaration attached to the Agreement indicates 
that “the inclusion in the agreement of the reference to the respect for human rights constituting an 
essential element of the Agreement… flows from… the  attachment of both Parties to the relevant 
obligations, arising in particular from the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris on a new Europe” 
(emphasis added). While the terms of this Declaration are not unambiguous, it is noteworthy that the 
Parties foresee the respect of human rights and democratic principles not only as they are defined in 
those  international  documents,  but  also  as  flowing  from  their  “attachment…  to  the  relevant 
obligations,  arising  in  particular  from”  these  documents  (emphasis  added).  The  Charter  of  Paris 
includes an Annex I that sets out several obligations to be fulfilled by the “participating States”. For 
instance,  they  undertake  “to  build,  consolidate  and  strengthen  democracy  as  the  only  system  of 
government”. This type of obligations could be considered as constituting the “relevant obligations” to 
which the Parties  are attached.  It  should be recalled that,  while  declarations  are not  binding, they 
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suspension  mechanism.  The  interpretation  thus  proposed  suggests  that  the  PCAs 
potentially entails more than just “an important factor for the exercise of the right to 
have an agreement suspended or terminated where the partner has violated human 
rights”, as put by the Court in the Portugal case.285 It also has a substantive aspect,286 
and could imply specific commitments for the Parties. 
It should be added that the PCAs’ human rights clause stipulates that respect for those 
rights  and  principles  should  “underpin  the  internal  and  external  policies”  of  the 
Parties.  However  ambiguous  the  expression  “underpin”  may  be,  the  PCAs  thus 
provide that the Parties to the Agreements are  bound by these principles287 in the 
context of their relationship, but also internally.288 Through the PCAs, the Community 
is thereby subject to external scrutiny as regard respect for human rights.289 
To summarize, it may be argued that the human rights clause included in the PCAs 
entails  specific obligations for the Parties.290 Given the case law on the Community 
competence in the field of human rights, and on the meaning and scope of Article 308 
EC,291 it may be doubted that the Community itself could include such potentially far-
reaching human rights provisions.292
should nevertheless be taken into account to interpret the Agreement (e.g. Case C-192/99 Kaur). The 
human rights clause should thus be understood in the light of the Joint declaration.
285 Para. 27. Indeed, the Court seemingly left the door open for this other meaning of human rights 
clauses  when mentioning that  the clause was “amongst  other  things” this  important  factor  for  the 
exercise of the suspension/termination right.
286 Fierro (2001).  
287 It should be pointed out that the Commission’s Communication on the “inclusion of respect for 
democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries” 
mentions in its annexes that in the context of the “regional European framework”, the provisions and 
principles  of  e.  g.  CSCE, Helsinki  Final  Act,  the Charter  of  Paris  “should be fully  implemented” 
(European Commission, 1995b: 21).
288 Riedel and Will (1999: 728).  
289 Bulterman (2001).  
290 Kokott and Hoffmeister (1996 : 668). For an opposite view, see Flaesch-Mougin (1998 : 62).  
291  Weiler and Lockhart (1995). This proposition can be further supported by a proper application of 
Art. 308 EC whose recourse is subordinate to the demonstration that the action is “necessary to attain, 
in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the Community objectives”; see in this 
sense, Dashwood (1996b). 
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2.2.2.2. A human rights clause with an EU dimension 
If  it  is  accepted  that  the  human  rights  components  of  the  PCAs  goes  beyond 
Community powers, it consequently entails the participation of the Member States to 
support it. As pointed out above, the Community concluded the Agreements jointly 
with  the  Member  States  “acting  in  the  framework  of  the  Union”.  The  latter’s 
objectives should thus be taken into account.293 
First,  Article  11  TEU  (ex-J.1)  emphasises  that  the  Union  shall  define  but  also 
implement a common foreign and security policy, the objectives of which are  inter 
alia “to safeguard the common values… of the Union, and to develop and consolidate 
democracy  and  the  rule  of  law”.  Seemingly,  the  terminology  of  Article  11  TEU 
establishes an obligation of conduct on the part of the Union.294 
Secondly,  Article  6  (ex Article  F) TEU provides in  its  second paragraph that  the 
Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention on 
Human rights and as they result  from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, as general principles of Community law.295 The third paragraph of the 
same Article stipulates that the Union “shall provide itself with the means necessary 
to attain its objectives and carry through its policies”. The combination of the two 
paragraphs suggests that Article 6 TEU establishes an obligation of result.296 
292 It should be pointed out that, although represented, the Community did not formally take part as “a 
participating State” in the international fora within which the documents referred to in the PCAs were 
elaborated. Arguably, the restricted participation of the Community in these organisations confirms the 
limits, to say the least, to its ability to include itself a reference to the documents in the operative parts 
of the Agreements. On the problem of legitimacy that this state of affairs creates with respect to the 
conditionality, see Liñán Nogueras and Hinojosa Martínez (2001: 331ff).  
293 See section 2.1.1.2.
294 As pointed out by Wessel (1999: 69), CFSP objectives are not static but imply positive actions. In 
particular, being an objective, development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms brings an active element to the external relations of 
the Union in this area.  
295 Cf. Dewost (1993: 64),  who considers that Art. 6 (ex Art. F) TEU encapsulates what the Court held 
in Case 44/79 Hauer.  
296 In that respect: Fouwels (1997: 294).  
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Given  that  the  Union  itself  could  not  formally  take  part  in  the  PCAs,  both 
Community, within its competence, and Member States “acting in the framework of 
the Union” are involved in pursuing the general EU human rights objective. 
The  foregoing  suggests  that  the  conditionality  envisaged  by  PCAs  stems  from a 
combination of the EC developing and yet limited “competence” in the field of human 
rights and the CFSP objective to consolidate democracy, the rule of law, respect for 
human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms.  They  both  contribute  to  achieving  the 
general objectives of the European Union, set out in the “Common Provisions” of the 
TEU.297 
While the PCAs contribute to the observance of political principles advocated by the 
EU  through  conditionality,  the  Agreements  also  establish  a  political  dialogue  to 
further the political partnership between the Parties, which accentuates the cross pillar 
character of the Agreements and consolidate the thesis that the PCAs is concluded and 
implemented on behalf of the EU.
2.3. Agreements including a systematic political dialogue 
Alongside the human rights dimension of the PCAs, the inclusion in the Agreements 
of a political dialogue gives further evidence of the interconnection of the different 
sub-orders  of  the  Union  within  the  Partnerships.  Political  dialogues  relate  to  the 
competences of Member States and thus require their participation. At the same time, 
the inclusion of political dialogues is intimately connected to the objectives of the 
European Union (2.3.1), and involves its institutions (2.3.2).
2.3.1. A political dialogue straddling the pillars
297 As  pointed  out  by  Dominic  McGoldrick  (1999:  249),  “evolution  of  the  broader  human  rights 
dimensions  of  the  EU  now  requires  that  the  whole  of  the  post-TEU  constitutional  structure  be 
considered, and in particular the relationship between different pillars”. See also Eeckhout (2004: 472).
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The  establishment  of  a  political  dialogue  is  one  of  the  objectives  of  each  PCA. 
According  to  Article  1  of  both  Agreements,  the  Partnership  is  to  provide  an 
appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the Parties “allowing the 
development of close relations between them in this field”.  The political dialogue 
constitutes an entire title (Title II) placed at the very beginning of the Agreement, 
following the Title on “General Principles” and preceding that on “Trade in Goods”. 
It therefore has a prominent place in the system of the Agreements, an indication of 
the significant role it plays in the Partnerships.
The objective of this dialogue, which the Parties intend to develop and intensify, is to 
accompany  and  consolidate  the  rapprochement between  the  European  Union  and 
Russia/Ukraine respectively. More particularly, it seeks to support the political and 
economic  changes  underway in  Russia  and Ukraine,  and should contribute  to  the 
establishment of new forms of cooperation with the partner concerned. Moreover, it 
aims  at  bringing  about  increasing  convergence  of  the  Parties’  positions  on 
international  issues  of  mutual  concern,  thereby  enhancing  security  and  stability. 
Finally, it shall “foresee that the Parties endeavour to cooperate on matters pertaining 
to  the  observance  of  the  principle  of  democracy  and  human  rights,  and  hold 
consultations, if necessary, on matters related to their due implementation”.298 In other 
words, the political dialogue is all-encompassing. It aims at strengthening the links 
between the Parties, in all their dimensions.299  
 
Like  human  rights  clauses,  political  dialogues  have  become  common  features  of 
external  agreements  to  which  the  Community  is  Party,  despite  the  fact  that  their 
presence entails mixity. They touch upon diplomacy and security issues for which the 
Community does not have powers.300 Indeed, Member States could have adopted a 
joint political declaration to establish political dialogues with the partners concerned 
outside the framework of  the  PCAs.  This  has  been  done  on several  occasions  in 
relation to  other  third  countries in  the pre-Maastricht  period,301 particularly  in  the 
context  of  the  EPC.302 Externalising  the  political  dialogue  would  possibly  mean 
298 Art. 6 PCA Russia; Art. 6 PCA Ukraine. 
299 Further on the objectives of the PCA, see Raux (1998 : 171).
300 Case 124/95 Centro-com, paras 24-25.
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avoiding recourse to mixed agreements.303 Arguably, the Member States’ decision to 
include  a  political  dialogue  in  the  framework  of  mixed  agreements  provides  yet 
another illustration of the will to integrate the various facets of an external relation 
with a particular country in one single and qualitatively richer framework. 
At the same time, it has to do with the fact that they act “in the framework of the EU”. 
Indeed, political dialogues represent an instrument of “EU foreign policy”,304 insofar 
as  it  corresponds to  the  CFSP objectives.305 Particularly,  the  aims of  the  political 
dialogue are seen as attaining the objectives set out in Article 11 TEU,306 inter alia, to 
“strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways”; “to preserve 
peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the 
objectives of the Paris Charter; to promote international cooperation; to develop and 
consolidate  democracy  and  the  rule  of  law,  and  respect  for  human  rights  and 
fundamental freedoms”. 
There  is  therefore  a  connection  between  the  objectives  of  the  political  dialogue 
established by the PCAs and those of the CFSP, and consequently, of the European 
301 E.g. in relation to the United States of America (Transatlantic Declaration of November 1990, which 
provides for a biannual meeting) and Japan (EU/Japan Summit,  1991).  Member States also signed 
common declarations on political dialogue with the ASEAN countries back in the 70s, the Andean Pact 
countries, with countries from Central America. Further: Monar (1997a), McGoldrick (1997: 198ff), 
Redmond (1992).  
302 See the EPC London Report of 1981, reproduced in de Schoutheete (1986).  
303 Allan  Rosas  (1998:  145)  explains  that  the  inclusion  of  a  political  dialogue  “which  could  be 
considered a ‘II pillar’… issue” is also a “‘legal compromise’ for the Commission to accept mixity. He 
adds that “in such a situation of ‘mixity at all cost’, the Commission [finds] itself in the strange role of 
insisting on a clause making mixity legally necessary”. This view has been confirmed by official of the 
cabinet of the Commissioner on external relations.
304 Fouwels (1997: 301).  
305 It should be noted that the remit of political dialogues were designed by the Political Committee in a 
document of 7 June 1996, for approval by the Council; see Document 8255/96. Political dialogue were 
meant to cover: an exchange of views and information on political questions of mutual interest; the 
identification of areas suitable for an enlarged cooperation on the basis of a greater confidence between 
the different actors on the international scene; and the adoption of joint positions and actions in relation 
to existing international problems.
306 Wessel (1999: 114). 
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Union. The inclusion of provisions on political dialogue in the Agreements further 
illustrates the presence of EU sub-orders in the Unions’ relations with Russia and 
Ukraine.307 
Although the political dialogue consolidates the integration of the different EU facets 
within the same framework, it does not however entail a complete fusion of the EU 
external dimensions within the Partnerships. It is noteworthy that although included in 
the provisions of the PCAs, the political dialogue is presented as “accompanying” the 
rapprochement between the EU and Russia/Ukraine. Indeed, in the Joint Statement of 
the EU-Russia  Summit  in  May 2000 mentioned that  “[the]  Partnership  and [the] 
reinforced political dialogue aim at promoting a stable and prosperous Europe, and 
are founded on the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law 
and  on  the  market  economy”  (emphasis  added).308 It  is  symptomatic  that  the 
Partnership and the political dialogue are distinguished by the actors involved, even if 
such dialogue is formally part of the PCAs as stipulated in Article 1 of each PCA.
Similarly, at the first meeting of the Cooperation Council  with Russia, the Parties 
pointed out that “implementing the PCA would ensure greater coherence between the 
various  aspects  of  their  relations,  such as  the political  dialogue on foreign policy 
issues  of  mutual  interest;  cooperation  in  the  fight  against  organised  crime;  trade 
relations and economic cooperation”.309 Having pointed out the constituting aspects of 
the Partnership, which indeed correspond to the different policy areas of the EU, the 
Cooperation Council nevertheless endorsed the “Joint Work Programme for 1998” on 
the one hand, and “Conclusions on foreign policy subjects” on the other hand. In other 
words, the Parties deal with CFSP matters and other PCA affairs differently, although 
307 It  is  noticeable that  the agreement with Russia refers more to the European Union than to  the 
Community, as does the Agreement with Ukraine. For instance, while Art. 6 of the PCA with Russia 
mentions the establishment of a political dialogue to accompany and consolidate the rapprochement 
between “the European Union and Russia (sic)”, Art. 6 of the PCA with Ukraine rather talks of a 
political  dialogue  to  accompany  and  consolidate  the  rapprochement  between  the  Community  and 
Ukraine. 
308 This  statement  was  reiterated  at  the  sixth  EU-Russia  Summit  in  Paris  on  30  October  2000 
(EU/Russia, 2000b).
309 Press  Release  of  the  first  Cooperation  Council  between  the  EU  and  the  Russian  Federation 
(EU/Russia Cooperation Council, 1998b). The theme of coherence was equally prominent at the first 
meeting of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (EU/Ukraine Cooperation Council, 1998).  
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meeting  in  the  same  framework.  This  substantive  distinction  is  replicated  by  an 
institutional distinction.
2.3.2. A political dialogue involving the EU institutional framework 
The political dialogue is systematic and institutionalised. First of all, the Agreements 
provide for consultations at the highest political level. The PCA with Russia foresees 
regular meetings between the President of the Council of the EU and the President of 
the Commission on one side,  and the President of the Russian Federation,  on the 
other. The practice of presidential meetings has also developed in the context of the 
EU-Ukraine  Partnership,  although  not  explicitly  provided  for  in  the  PCA.310 This 
formula has become the so-called “EU-Russia [or Ukraine] Summits”. 
Secondly, the political dialogue takes place at ministerial level within the Cooperation 
Council,  set  out  in the Title “Institutional,  General  and Final  Provisions” of each 
PCA. This body assembles once a year the members of the Council of the EU and 
members  of  the  Commission  on  the  one  hand,  and  members  of  the  Partner’s 
Government, on the other, but can meet more often when circumstances require.311 A 
Cooperation  Committee,  made  of  representatives  of  EU  Member  States  and 
Commission on the EU side and representatives of the Partner’s Government on the 
other, assists the Cooperation Council in performing its duties at senior civil servant 
level.312 The  Cooperation  Council  essentially  monitors  the  implementation  of  the 
Agreement, and “examine[s] any major issues arising within the framework of the 
Agreement and any other bilateral or international issues of mutual interest for the 
purpose of attaining the objectives of the Agreement”.313 
310 EU/Ukraine Summit (1998).  
311 In practice, the Cooperation Council has met in Troïka formations; see EU-Russia Summit (2003a).
312 In addition, sub-committees and working parties operating under its  aegis assist  the Committee 
(Arts. 92-93, PCA Russia; Arts. 87-88, PCA Ukraine).
313  Art.  90  PCA  Russia;  Art.  85  PCA  Ukraine.  The  President  of  the  Cooperation  Council  is 
alternatively a “representative of the Community” and a member of the Government of the Partner. The 
PCAs are ambiguous as regards the “Community side”. One has to look at the provisions of the two 
Council and Commission Decisions on the Conclusion of the Agreements to understand the expression 
“representative of the Community”. Art. 2(2) of the two Decisions provides that the President of the 
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The remit of the Cooperation Council is potentially very wide and yet its powers are 
legally limited. Each PCA endows it with the power to make  recommendations on 
further developments and interpretation of the Agreement, or indeed to settle disputes. 
In contrast to decisions adopted by the Association Councils set up by e.g. the Europe 
Agreements, such recommendations do not in principle have binding effect on the 
Parties.  In  other  words,  the  Cooperation  Council  cannot  legally  develop  the 
Partnership  in  the  same  manner  as  the  Association  Council  may  develop  the 
Association.  Indeed,  while  the PCAs clearly  provide  that  the Parties  undertake  to 
consider the development of the relevant titles of the Agreements, as circumstances 
allow, any such development can only be put in effect by virtue of another agreement 
between them in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.314 
As regard the determination of the common positions on the Union side, one has to 
look at the two Decisions on the Conclusion of the Agreements.315 Article 2(1) of each 
Decision  provides  that  the  position  to  be  adopted  “by  the  Community”  in  the 
Cooperation Council and the Cooperation Committee has to be “determined by the 
Council,  on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission,  or  where  appropriate,  by  the 
Commission,  in  each  case  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  provisions  [of  the 
EC/ECSC/EAEC Treaties]”. 
Considering that the political dialogue falls outside the Community remit, the position 
of  “the  Community”  has  to  be  supplemented  by  a  Union’s  position  on  the  non-
Community issues.  In accordance with Article 27 TEU, this  additional  position is 
established by the EU Presidency,  and the Commission is  fully  associated.316 The 
General  Affairs  Council  plays  a  crucial  role  in  ensuring  consistency  of  the 
Council  shall  chair  the  Cooperation  Council  and  shall  present  the  Community’s  position.  A 
representative of the Commission shall have a similar role in the Cooperation Committee. 
314 Art. 3 PCA Russia; Art. 4 PCA Ukraine
315 Art. 300(2) second subpara. (introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam) concerning the procedure to 
establish the positions to be adopted on behalf of the Community in a body set up by an agreement do 
not in principle apply here, for they apply only to bodies that are called upon to adopt decisions having 
legal effects. Further: Dashwood (1998a: 1025). 
316 In practice, it may even propose a common position under the non-Community aspects of the PCAs. 
Its involvement depends on the political sensitivity of the issue (interview, EU official).  
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Community position and the  position to  be  defended under  the  political  dialogue 
heading.317 The combination of both positions constitutes the overall Union position, 
which  is  then  presented  by  the  Presidency  of  the  Council  in  the  Cooperation 
Council.318 
Thirdly,  the  political  dialogue  involves  parliamentarians.319 The  Parliamentary 
Cooperation Committee, consisting of members of the European Parliament on the 
one  hand,  and  of  members  of  the  Partner’s  parliament  on the  other,  may require 
information on the Agreement’s implementation. It has the right to be informed of the 
recommendations formulated by the Cooperation Council, which is free to publish 
them.  The  Parliamentary  Committee  can  itself  make  recommendations  to  the 
Cooperation Council. 
This  systematic  and  institutionalised  political  dialogue  involves  each  political 
institution of the EU mentioned in Article 3 TEU. For instance, the Summits involve 
not only the President of the Council (Member State holding the Presidency of the 
Union)  and  the  President  of  the  Partner  country,  but  also  the  President  of  the 
Commission. Together, they deal with all  matters covered by the PCAs, including 
sometimes  bitter  trade  disputes.320 Moreover,  since  the  Amsterdam  Treaty,  the 
Secretary General of the Council/High Representative (HR) for CFSP has taken part 
in  the  meetings  of  both  the  Cooperation  Council  and  the  Summits.  The  HR’s 
participation indeed conforms to Article 26 of the TEU (Amsterdam version), which 
317 Art. 13(3) TEU (ex Art. J.8(2)) TEU. See, for instance, the conclusions of the GAC 19 July 1999, 
which with  respect  to  the  EU-relations  with  Ukraine,  “took note  of  the  information  given by the 
Presidency on the preparation of the Ukraine Summit to be held in Kiev on 23 July 1999… the Council 
also established the position of the EU for the Second Cooperation Committee meeting to be held in 
Kiev on 28 July 1999” (General Affairs Council, 1999b). 
318 An equivalent process takes place for preparing the position to be presented at the Summit level. In 
cases  where no common position has  been established in  the context  of the political  dialogue,  no 
position is presented at all, and Member States are not supposed to voice their individual position in 
this context (interview, EU official).
319 The Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, consisting of members of the European Parliament on 
the one hand and of members of the partner’s parliamentary body, may require information on the 
Agreement’s implementation. It shall be informed of the recommendations adopted by the Cooperation 
Council, who is free to publish them, and can itself make recommendations to the latter.
320 E.g. the Daewoo case in the context of EU-Ukraine relations. Hillion (1998c). 
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provides  that  the  HR shall  lead  the  political  dialogues.321 His/her  presence  at  the 
Cooperation Councils incidentally confirms the connection between the PCAs and the 
CFSP as suggested above. 
In other words, the institutional framework of the PCAs appears to materialise the 
different facets of the Union on the international stage. This is typified by the way the 
meetings in the context of the Partnerships are usually referred to in official Press 
Releases,  namely  as  EU-Russia/Ukraine  Summits  and  EU-Russia/Ukraine 
Cooperation Councils.322 At the same time, the plurality of external dimensions of the 
Union  (CFSP,  EC,  and  Member  States)  has  ramifications  in  the  institutionalised 
dialogue of the Partnerships.323
2.4. Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the PCAs represent instruments of EU external activities. 
They are inspired by the Union’s multifarious objectives and include provisions that 
relate to all its sub-orders. The Agreements notably echo the CFSP objectives and 
321 The  PCAs institutional  framework follows intimately the institutional  evolution of  the  EU, see 
further chapter 5.
322 The first meeting of the cooperation council established by the PCA with Russia was referred to as 
“meeting of the EU/Russia cooperation council” (EU/Russia Cooperation Council, 1998b). That was 
the same with the first  meeting of  the Cooperation Council  established by the PCA with Ukraine 
(EU/Ukraine Cooperation Council, 1998). 
323 The PCA also foresees a potential role for the Union Troika, by mutual agreement (Art. 7(2) PCA 
Russia;  Art.  7,  PCA  Ukraine).  In  addition,  it  envisages  the  setting  up  of  other  procedures  and 
mechanisms for political dialogue. On this point, the two agreements slightly differ. The PCA with 
Russia envisages particularly biannual meetings at senior official level between the EU Troika and 
officials of the partner country. It also invites the Parties to take full advantage of diplomatic channels, 
and to set up any other means including the possibility of expert meetings that could contribute to 
consolidating and developing the dialogue (Art.  8  PCA Russia).  The PCA with Ukraine does  not 
mention the biannual meetings of the Troika but refers to “regular meetings” at the level of senior 
official between representatives of Ukraine and “the Community” respectively. It is more elaborate on 
the diplomatic channels by mentioning contacts in the bilateral and multilateral field for instance in the 
United Nations and CSCE meetings. In contrast to the PCA with Russia, it also envisages exchange of 
information on matters of  mutual  interest  concerning political  cooperation in  Europe (Art.  8  PCA 
Ukraine).
94
encompass external dimensions of the JHA cooperation. Moreover, they incorporate a 
strong political conditionality which straddles the pillars and contributes to fulfilling 
the objectives, if not obligations, of the European Union. Finally, the PCAs establish a 
political dialogue which enhances the foreign policy dimension of the Partnership and 
involves the Union’s institutional framework, to develop the relationship in all  its 
dimensions. The PCAs thus bring together the different facets of the Union within the 
same framework.
The Union lacking treaty-making capacity at the time of concluding the Agreements, 
it could not itself be party to the PCAs, which are thus proto cross pillar agreements. 
Instead,  it  is  through  the  participation  of  the  Member  States  alongside  the 
Community, and thus through the mixity of the Agreement, that the objectives of the 
Union could be fulfilled. Mixity is used by default to project the Union externally, in 
its  different  facets.  This  functional  view  of  mixity  is  illustrated  by  the  phrase 
“Community and Member States acting in the framework of the European Union” 
which was referred to in the Preamble of the PCA with Russia. 
The PCAs therefore represent a new formula of mixed agreements, involving a two-
dimensional  mixity.  The  first  dimension  of  mixity  in  the  PCAs  relates  to  the 
distribution of powers between the Community and its Member States, as clarified by 
the Court. Various areas of the PCAs deal with shared competences, such as trade in 
services  and  establishment  and  thus  require  the  Member  States’  participation 
alongside the Community, as discussed in chapter 1. An emerging second dimension 
of mixity, explored in this chapter, flows from the new constitutional architecture of 
the Union, and particularly the distribution of decision-making powers between the 
EU sub-orders, enshrined in the TEU. In this context, the Member States take part in 
the PCAs acting in the framework of the Union and thus bound by the principles and 
provisions of the non-EC sub-orders. The twofold dimensions of mixity illustrated by 
the PCAs, thus involves complex interactions between the sub-orders and the Member 
States which are characteristic of the emerging system of EU external relations. The 
next part will examine the principles that organise these interactions, to ensure their 
overall coherence.
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PART II
A MIXITY GOVERNED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
UNDERPINNING THE SYSTEM OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Mixity carries the potential for developing EU external relations, as exemplified by 
the PCAs. It also entails a number of procedural complications which have to do with 
the simultaneous presence  of  the  Community,  the  Member  States  and  the  Union, 
acting on the basis of Titles V and VI TEU. Organising the interactions between the 
sub-orders and the Member States is critical to ensure a coherent EU action through 
instruments such as the PCAs. 
This part posits that, in law, two categories of complementary principles govern the 
interactions between the Community, the Member States and the EU. They have been 
formulated, by the Court of Justice and by the pouvoir constituant. The first category 
consists  of  the  “duty  of  cooperation”  which  governs  the  interplay  between  the 
Community and the Member States,  on the international  stage,  particularly  in  the 
context  of  mixed agreements  such as  the PCAs (chapter  3).  The second category 
comprises principles that notably organise the interactions between the different sub-
orders of the Union, namely the duty to maintain the acquis communautaire, and the 
principle  of  consistency  of  EU  external  activities,  backed  by  the  EU’s  single 
institutional framework (chapter 4). These devices will be examined in turn to shed 
light on the organising principles of the system of EU external relations.  
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CHAPTER 3
PRINCIPLES ORGANISING THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN UNION 
SUB-ORDERS AND MEMBER STATES
The Treaty on European Union is not generous in principles governing the interaction 
between  the  EU sub-orders  and  Member  States  on  the  international  plane,324 and 
particularly not as regards the management of mixed agreements, such as the PCAs. 
The European Court of Justice has partly filled the gap.325 It has notably established 
and developed a  duty  of  cooperation as  a  device  to  guide  this  interaction  in  the 
context of mixed agreements. Described as the “overarching legal principle governing 
mixity”,326 the significance of this device can hardly be overestimated. Indeed, given 
the significance and function of mixity highlighted in the previous chapters, the duty 
is  an  essential  element  of  the  system of  EU external  relations.  This  chapter  will 
establish the judicial nature of the duty of cooperation (3.1), and shed light on its wide 
scope of application (3.2). 
3.1. The judicial nature of the duty of cooperation
The Court of Justice established the duty of cooperation in Ruling 1/78 in the context 
of the Euratom Treaty,327 which, in contrast to the EC Treaty, explicitly envisages the 
possibility of mixed external agreements.328 Relying on the provisions of Article 192 
EAEC,  which  are  similar  to  those  of  Article  10  EC  on  the  principle  of  loyal 
324 Weiler (1991). 
325 Heliskoski (1999: 64). As he points out in footnote 22, any proposal designed to incorporate the 
requirement of unity and duty of cooperation into the EC Treaty were rejected at the 1996-97 IGC. 
Further: Torrent (2000: 231ff).  
326 Eeckhout (2004: 209).
327 Ruling 1/78 Draft Convention of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the physical protection  
of nuclear materials, facilities and transports. It has however been suggested that the Court had already 
hinted at the need for the Community and the Member States to cooperate in the conduct of external 
relations in two previous judgments in Case 22/70 Commission v Council (ERTA) and Joined Cases 3, 
4 & 6/76 Kramer, paras 34-35. Further: Eeckhout (2004: 193), Heliskoski (2001: 62) and Temple Lang 
(1986). 
328 Art. 102 EAEC.
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cooperation between the Member States and the institutions,329 the Court emphasised 
the need for “close association between the institutions of the Community and the 
Member States both in the process of negotiation and conclusion, and in fulfilment of 
obligations entered into” on the basis of the mixed agreement in question. 
In  its  Opinion  2/91  concerning  Convention  170  of  the  International  Labour 
Organisation, the Court held that such “duty of cooperation… must also apply in the 
context of the EEC Treaty”.330 This principle was thereafter confirmed, particularly in 
Opinion 1/94 on the WTO Agreement, in the FAO judgment,331 and lately in Opinion 
2/00 on the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.332  The duty of cooperation is a well-
established device whose purpose is to ensure a harmonious interaction between the 
Community  institutions  and  Member  States  in  establishing  and  implementing 
agreements  whose  subject  matter  falls  partly  within  the  competence  of  the 
Community and partly within that of the Member States.
Having established  this  duty of  cooperation,  the  Court  has  remained elliptic  with 
respect to the nature and scope of application of such a duty.333 It is noteworthy that, 
in contrast to Ruling 1/78, Opinion 2/91 did not explicitly relate such a duty to the 
general principle of loyal cooperation, articulated in Article 10 in the EC context. The 
Luxembourg judges instead considered that it “results from the requirement of unity 
in the international representation of the Community”. It is however submitted that 
the duty of cooperation is intimately linked to the constitutional principle of loyal 
329 According to Art. 192 EAEC, Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action 
taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community’s 
tasks. They shall abstain from any measures which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of 
this Treaty. 
330 Opinion 2/91 Convention 170 of the International Labour Organisation concerning safety in the use  
of chemicals at work (“ILO”).
331 Case C-25/94 Commission v Council. 
332 Opinion 2/00 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, para. 18. Dashwood (2002b), Koutrakos (2004), AG 
Tesauro’s Opinion in Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing, and the Court’s judgment 
in Case C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior v Tuk Consultancy.
333 Heliskoski (1996: 126-127), Common Market Law Review (1995), Neuwahl (1996). 
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cooperation, articulated in Article 10 EC, and should be envisaged in this general 
perspective. 
3.1.1. A duty derived from the Community principle of loyal cooperation 
On the  basis  of  the  principle  of  loyal  cooperation,  articulated  in  Article  10  EC, 
Member States  are  expected to  take all  appropriate  measures,  whether  general  or 
particular,  to  ensure  the fulfilment  of  obligations arising out  of  the EC Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate 
the achievement of the Community’s tasks and, they shall abstain from any measure 
which would jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.334 While the 
Court  has  consistently  refrained  from  mentioning  it  in  relation  to  the  duty  of 
cooperation, it may be argued that this principle of loyalty is nonetheless intrinsic to 
the latter, as supported by the doctrine (3.1.1.1), and confirmed by legal arguments 
(3.1.1.2).
3.1.1.1. A connection acknowledged by the doctrine
The proposition that the duty of cooperation is derived from the general principle of 
loyal cooperation has been supported by the legal doctrine on various occasions. It has 
been suggested that the duty of cooperation is a specific application of the principle of 
loyal  cooperation,  or  at  least  that  there  is  a  connection  between  the  two.335 For 
instance, Marise Cremona considers that the loyalty obligation enshrined in Article 10 
EC “has evolved in the context of external policy” into “a duty of close cooperation” 
arising  whenever  external  competence  is  shared  between  the  Community  and  its 
Member States. Similarly, McLeod et al consider that the duty of close cooperation 
may be traced back to the Treaties themselves, and in particular to the duty of loyal 
cooperation derived by the Court from inter alia, Articles 192 EAEC and Article 10 
334 Further on Art. 10 EC and the duty of loyal cooperation, see e.g. Mortelmans (1998), Temple Lang 
(1990), Constantinesco (1987: 97) and Blanquet (1994 : 417-426).  
335 Cremona (1999a: 170).  
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EC.336 Joni Heliskoski also finds the origins of the duty of cooperation in the Treaties 
in general, and in Article 10 EC and Article 3 TEU, in particular,337 and Rachel Frid 
even considers that “the [duty of cooperation] can be legally based on Article [10] 
EC, and complementary on Article [3] Union Treaty”.338 
Elaborating on this connection,  Christiaan Timmermans suggests that the duty (of 
Member States) to cooperate is “more specific” than the general principle of loyalty 
or bundestreue, under Article 10 EC. It is more specific in that it is directly linked by 
the  Court  to  the  “requirement  of  unity  in  the  international  representation  of  the 
Community”.339 In addition, he points out that the duty of cooperation is a Community 
law obligation which also governs the co-ordination of  national competences. As a 
consequence, the infringement procedure of Article 226 EC should be available where 
Member States breach their duty of cooperation, for instance by breaking Community 
solidarity  and  acting  single-handedly  in  the  negotiation  or  conclusion  stage.340 
Recently,  Piet  Eeckhout  related  the  duty  of  cooperation  to  the  principle  of  loyal 
cooperation, suggesting that the principle of loyalty and the requirement of unity in 
the international representation of the Community can be seen as the twin foundations 
of this duty.341 
336 They also refer, in this context, to the Court’s emphasis on the need for Community solidarity in 
asserting the Community’s exclusive competence; on this last point they refer to the Court’s Opinion 
1/75  OECD Local Costs Standard, and Opinion 1/76  Draft Agreement on a laying up fund for the  
Rhine. See McLeod et al (1996: 145).
337 Heliskoski  (2001: 64).  
338 Frid (1995: 149).
339 Timmermans (2000: 241). On this link, see also Koutrakos (2002: 49), who writes that the principle 
of cooperation was articulated by the Court to ensure that mixity would not undermine the unity in the 
international representation of the Community.
340 He also relates the duty of cooperation to old Article 116 EEC, which was repealed by the Treaty of 
Maastricht. This Article provided that from the end of the transitional period onwards, Member States 
were, in respect of all  matters of  particular interest to the common market,  to proceed within the 
framework of international organisations of an economic character only by common action. Consider 
also the Editorial Comments of the Common Market Law Review (1995). Takis Tridimas (2000: 59) 
considers that the duty of cooperation however goes further than old Article 116 EEC. The duty of 
cooperation seeks to exploit the collective bargaining power of the Community and the Member States 
in international relations in general. See also P.L.H. Van den Bossche (1997: 62) and the views of 
Heliskoski (1998: 276-77) and Leal-Arcas (2001).
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3.1.1.2. A connection implied by the case law 
More specifically, it may be argued that the duty of cooperation is derived from the 
principle of loyal cooperation. Indeed, the Court’s initial formulation of the duty of 
cooperation,  in  Ruling  1/78,  included  a  direct  reference  to  the  principle  of  loyal 
cooperation.342 In Opinion 2/91, the Court imported this very duty in the context of the 
EEC  Treaty  although,  arguably,  without  changing  its  nature  and  ultimate  legal 
foundation. 
The terms of the Opinion suggest that it is the same duty that applies. In particular, the 
Court explicitly says: “[t]his duty of cooperation, to which attention was drawn in the 
context of the EAEC, must also apply in the context of the EEC Treaty since it results 
from  the  requirement  of  unity  in  the  international  representation  of  the 
Community”.343 The expression “to which attention was drawn in the context of the 
EAEC” suggests that the duty of cooperation is not specific to the EAEC context; 
rather, “attention was drawn” in Ruling 1/78 to a general principle that transcends the 
boundaries  of  the  different  Community  Treaties,  and  which  belongs  to  the 
Community legal order as a whole.344 
It  is  indeed in this  perspective that the other expression “since it  results from the 
requirement of unity in the international representation of the Community” may be 
understood. The latter expression is, arguably, first and foremost a justification of the 
fact that the duty of cooperation must  also apply in the context of the EEC Treaty. 
The term “unity” in “requirement of unity in the international representation of the 
Community”  (emphasis  added)  appears  to  refer  to  the  single  international 
representation  of  the  Community  legal  order,  which  involves  a  single  set  of 
foundations and principles, and a single set of fundamental duties for both Member 
341 The author adds that, by insisting on unity, loyalty and cooperation the Court expresses a particular 
conception  of  mixed  external  action  where  competences  are  truly  shared  or  joint,  necessitating  a 
common approach maintaining unity (Eeckhout, 2004: 215).
342 The general principle of loyal cooperation is articulated in Article 192 in the context of the EAEC 
Treaty. 
343 Para. 36, Opinion 2/91. 
344 Dashwood (2004b: 377).
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States  and  Communities,  despite  the  existence  of  distinct  treaties  establishing  the 
Communities.345 In  that  sense,  it  is  only  at  a  later  stage  that  the  expression 
“requirement of unity in the international representation of the Community” has been 
extracted from this initial context. It has been progressively associated with, and used 
as a justification for the duty of cooperation as such. It is in this perspective that it has 
henceforth  been  understood  and  applied,  as  a  mechanism  to  administer  “joint 
competence”. The duty of cooperation is however a principle of the Community legal 
order which remains ultimately based on the principle of loyal cooperation, either 
explicitly in the context of the EAEC, or implicitly in the context of the EC. 
If, as it is asserted, the duty of cooperation derives in effect from the constitutional 
principle of loyal cooperation, its application should consequently be envisaged in the 
light  of  the  latter.  In  particular,  the  duty  of  cooperation  involves,  in  the  specific 
context  of  mixed  agreements,  the  negative  and  positive  obligations  imposed  on 
Member States and institutions that derive from the principle of loyal cooperation.346 
It  means that  Member  States  and Community institutions  shall  both  facilitate  the 
achievement of the Community’s external tasks, as well as abstain from any measure 
which would jeopardise the attainment  of the objectives of Community’s external 
relations  as  derived  from  the  EC  Treaty.347 Both  the  general  principle  of  loyal 
cooperation and the duty of cooperation are expressions of Community solidarity, 
345 In this regard, see Opinion 1/91 Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area, where the Court refers 
to the Community Treaties that established  a new legal order for the benefit of which the Member 
States have limited their sovereign rights. Further: Schermers (1992) and Burrows (1992). Another 
authority  to  support  this  proposition is:  C-221/88  European Coal  and Steel  Community  v  Faillite  
Acciaierie  e  ferriere  Busseni SpA,  where  the  Court  insists  on  the  cohesion  and  coherence  of  the 
Community Treaties, see paras 10-17.
346 Temple Lang (1990), Mortelmans (1998) and Wessel (1997:  120-121), citing O. Due, “Artikel 5 
van het EEG-Verdag. Een bepaling met een federal karakter” (1992) SEW 82.
347 As summarised by Wessel  (1997: 120),  it  includes more specifically:  the obligation to take all 
appropriate  measures  necessary  for  the  effective  application  of  Community  law;  the  obligation  to 
ensure the protection of rights resulting from primary and secondary Community law; the obligation to 
act in such a way as to achieve the objectives of the Treaty, in particular when Community actions fail 
to appear; the obligation not to take measures which could harm the effet utile of Community law; the 
obligation not to take measures which could hamper the internal functioning of the institutions; and the 
obligation not to undertake actions which could hamper the development of the integration process of 
the Community.  
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which,  as  the Court  has already suggested,  is  the basis  of  the whole Community 
system.348
The duty of cooperation, as a specific application of the principle of loyal cooperation 
therefore represents, as indeed suggested by various authors,349 a key legal principle 
that governs and organises the interactions between the Community and the Member 
States  externally,  in  the  particular  context  of  mixed  agreements.  The  various 
implications of the general principle of loyal cooperation have to be kept in mind in 
establishing the nature of the duty of cooperation and in envisaging its application, 
particularly its potential enforcement.350
With respect to the nature of the duty of cooperation, a key question is whether it 
constitutes a political principle or a legal obligation. The answer to this question will 
shed further light on the rules governing the interactions between the Community and 
Member States in the context of the PCAs. Two judgments of the Court of Justice, in 
the FAO case (3.1.2) and in the Dior case (3.1.3), reveal that the duty of cooperation 
has indeed a legal nature. These cases concern the duty of cooperation in the context 
of two mixed agreements involving the Community’s participation in international 
organisations.  The  Court’s  pronouncements  are  valid  also  to  decrypt  the  duty  of 
cooperation in the context of bilateral mixed agreements, such as the PCAs.
3.1.2. A duty involving legal obligations: the FAO case
348 Case 6 & 11/69 Commission v France, para. 16: the Court refers to “[t]he solidarity which is at the 
basis of… the whole of the Community system in accordance with the undertaking provided for in [ex] 
Article 5 of the Treaty”.
349 While Eeckhout (2004: 205) presents it as the “overarching legal principle governing mixity”, it is 
envisaged as “one of  the fundamental  principles  of  the external  relations of  the Communities” by 
McLeod et al (1996: 145).
350 See in this regard, C-374/89 Commission v Belgium; Case C-35/88 Commission v Greece; Case C-
48/89 Commission v Italy; Case 272/88 Commission v Greece. It should be pointed out that the Article 
10 is not a free-standing obligation. The obligations it involves are to be established in conjunction 
with other provisions of the EC Treaty; Case 78/70 Deutsch Grammophon.
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The question of whether the duty of cooperation involves legal obligations for the 
Member States and the Community institutions was partly addressed by the Court of 
Justice in its  FAO judgment.351 Without dwelling too much on the factual details of 
the case,352 suffice to say that in the context of the Community’s participation to the 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organisation,353 an  Arrangement  was  agreed  by  the 
Commission and the Council to decide who, of the Community or the Member States, 
should exercise the responsibilities at FAO meetings.354 In particular, Section 2.3 of 
the Arrangement provides that, when an agenda item deals with matters containing 
elements of national and of Community competence, the Commission shall express 
the common position achieved by consensus when the thrust of the issue lies in an 
area  within  the exclusive competence of the Community.  The Commission should 
then vote in accordance with this common position. By contrast, when the thrust of 
the issue lies in an area  outside the exclusive competence of the Community,  the 
Presidency expresses the common position, and Member States vote in accordance 
with that position.
In the FAO case, the Commission challenged a Council decision, based on a previous 
decision of the COREPER, which gave the voting rights to the Member States for an 
agreement to promote compliance with international conservation and management 
measures by vessels fishing on the high seas. The Commission contended that,  in 
view of the Community competence on fisheries,  the thrust  of the agreement laid 
within Community powers. Consequently, in accordance with the Arrangement, the 
Commission should have voted. The Court indeed found that the thrust of the issue 
was in an area of exclusive Community competence, and held that by giving the right 
to  vote  to  the  Member  States,  the  Council  had  breached  the  Arrangement,  and 
particularly Section 2.3. Consequently, it annulled the Council decision. 
The significant contribution of the case to the present discussion is that the Court 
considered that the Arrangement constituted a legal instrument involving obligations 
351 Case C-25/94 Commission v Council.
352 Further, see Heliskoski (2000: 79). 
353 The Community is a Member of the FAO. Further: e.g. Schwob (1993).
354 Arrangement between the Council and the Commission regarding the preparation for FAO meetings 
and statements and voting, reproduced in Frid (1995: 398-402).
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for  its  signatories.355 Indeed,  the  Court  underlined  that  “Section  2.3  represents  a 
fulfilment of [the] duty of cooperation”.356 It  thereby recognised that it  is possible, 
even informally, to conclude some form of inter-institutional agreement materialising 
and specifying the duty of cooperation in case of mixed external action, and that such 
an agreement binds the institutions.357
Moreover,  while  the  Arrangement  was  concluded  by  the  Commission  and  the 
Council, it has been suggested that it also binds the Member States on the grounds 
that  it  defines clear  obligations for them for the purpose of  ensuring unity  in  the 
international  representation  of  the  Community.358 Indeed,  the  terms  of  the 
Arrangement  suggests  that  it  directly  concerns  the  Member  States,  and  that  the 
Council  signed  the  Arrangement  on  their  behalf.359 Furthermore,  the  Court  itself 
pointed out that the Arrangement represented a “fulfilment of the duty of cooperation 
between the Community and the Member States within the FAO” (emphasis added). 
Arguably, it would not be a fulfilment of that duty had the Arrangement not bound the 
Member States as well. 
Having established that the duty of cooperation can be enforced, the next question is 
whether such enforceability is conditional upon its prior “fulfilment” through an inter-
institutional agreement such as the FAO Arrangement, or whether it could be relied 
upon  as  such,  either  against  an  institution,  or  a  Member  State.  Since  the  Court 
underlined that the Arrangement represented fulfilment of the duty of cooperation 
“within the FAO”,360 it is submitted that the duty of cooperation may be, or even has 
355 Contrary to what was suggested by AG Jacobs who considered this arrangement as “pragmatic” 
(para. 61), [1996] ECR I-1469. Sack (1995), Tridimas (2000: 59).
356 Emphasis added; “fulfilment” is translated as “mise en oeuvre” in the French version of the Court 
decision.
357 Eeckhout (2004: 214).
358 Timmermans (2000: 244).
359 Section 5 of  the Arrangement provides that  at  the request  of  a  Member State  the coordination 
procedure will be reviewed, taking account of experience gained from its operation.
360 Annex II of the Arrangement indeed contains a statement by the Council and the Commission which 
states that “this arrangement reflects the special circumstances of Community participation in the FAO 
and has  no  implications  regarding other  international  organizations,  including those  of  the  United 
Nations system”.
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to  be  fulfilled  also  in  other  frameworks.  It  can  either  take  the  form  of  specific 
arrangements,361 or apply and be enforced as such, without being conditional upon the 
adoption of further instruments, as will be demonstrated below.  
3.1.3. A directly applicable duty: the Dior case 
In the  Dior  case,362 the Court of Justice seemed to support the proposition that the 
duty of cooperation applies notwithstanding the absence of specific inter-institutional 
arrangements. In this case, the Court was asked to give a preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation of Article 50 of TRIPs which, following Opinion 1/94 on the WTO 
Agreement,  was  concluded by the  Community and its  Member States  under  joint 
competence.363 
Article  50  TRIPs  concerns  provisional  measures  for  the  protection  of  intellectual 
property rights. Although the Court had already had an opportunity to establish its 
jurisdiction  on  this  provision  in  a  previous  ruling  in  the  Hermès  case,364 this 
jurisdiction was nonetheless disputed in the present instance on the ground that the 
national court’s reference concerned the application of Article 50 TRIPs to an area 
(industrial  design) where the Community had not yet legislated, in contrast to the 
situation at issue in Hermès (trade marks). Allegedly therefore, the national court was 
asking the Court of Justice to interpret a provision of a mixed agreement which, in 
this particular instance, applied to a situation falling outside the scope of Community 
law.
Relying on the fact that TRIPs was concluded by the Community and the Member 
States under joined competences, the Court held that where a case is brought before it 
in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty,  it  has  jurisdiction  to  define  the 
361 E.g.  Arrangement  between  the  Council  and  the  Commission  concerning  participation  in 
international  negotiations  on  raw  materials  (so-called  “Proba  20”),  reproduced  in  Völker  and 
Steenbergen (1985: 48). Further: Neuwahl (1996: 678ff).
362 Joined Cases C-300/98 Parfums Christian Dior SA v Tuk Consultancy and C-392/98 Assco Gerüste 
GmbH, Rob van Dijk and Wilhelm Layher GmbH Co. KG, Layer BV.
363 OJ 1994 L336/1. 
364 Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV.
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obligations  which  the  Community  has  thereby  assumed  and,  for  that  purpose,  to 
interpret TRIPs. It added that, in particular, it has jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of 
TRIPs in order to meet the needs of Member States’ courts when they are called upon 
to apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional measures for the protection 
of rights arising under Community legislation falling within the scope of TRIPs. 
Elaborating on what it had already held in  Hermès, the Court opined that “where a 
provision such as Article 50 TRIPS can apply both to situations falling within the 
scope of national law and to situations falling within that of Community law, as is the 
case in the field of trade marks, [it] has jurisdiction to interpret such provision in order 
to forestall future differences of interpretation”.365 It added that “[i]n that regard, the 
Member  States  and  the  Community  institutions  have  an  obligation of  close 
cooperation in  fulfilling  the  commitments  undertaken  by  them  under  joint 
competence when they concluded the WTO agreement, including TRIPs” (emphasis 
added).366 Such an “obligation of close cooperation” requires the judicial bodies of the 
Member  States  and  the  Community,  “for  practical  and  legal  reasons”,  to  give  a 
uniform interpretation to Article 50 TRIPs, for it constitutes “a procedural provision 
which should be applied in the same way in every situation falling within its scope 
and is capable of applying both to situations covered by national law and to situation 
covered by Community law.” 
For the purposes of the present analysis, the Dior ruling is significant for at least two 
reasons. First, the Court’s pronouncement suggests that the duty of cooperation need 
not be formalised in an inter-institutional agreement such as the FAO Arrangement to 
apply  and  generate  legal  consequences.  The Dior  formulation  of the  duty  of 
cooperation suggests that it binds, in itself, both Community institutions and Member 
States,  without  being conditional upon further “mise en oeuvre”.367 It  thus applies 
directly.  In casu,  the  Court  considered  that  it  concerns  and  indeed  binds  the 
jurisdictions of  the  Member  States  and  Community,  respectively.  Both  levels  of 
jurisdiction are, together with the  political authorities of the Member States and the 
Community,  respectively,  equally  involved  in  ensuring  the  fulfilment  of  the 
365 Para. 35, which refers to Hermès, particularly paras 28-29 and 32-33. 
366 Para. 38. 
367 See the French version of the FAO judgment.
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“commitments  undertaken  by  the  Member  States  and  the  Community  under  joint 
competence”.368 As such they are bound by the same obligation of cooperation.369 In 
this regard, the Court’s verdict echoes Advocate General Tesauro’s Opinion in the 
Hermès  case. He suggested that the interpretation the Court is called upon to give 
represents  its  contribution  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  duty  of  cooperation  between 
institutions and Member States.370 
Secondly, and following the previous point, the duty of cooperation is used by the 
Court in Dior to validate its jurisdiction to interpret a provision of a mixed agreement, 
regardless of the fact that this provision applies  outside the context of Community 
law.371 As already suggested in Hermès, the Court considers that such a provision falls 
under its jurisdiction insofar as it is “capable of applying both to situations covered 
by national  law and to  situations  covered by Community law” (emphasis  added). 
Because  of  this  potential,  this  provision  should  be  interpreted  uniformly,372 and 
368 Koutrakos (2002: 38-39 and 49) argues that the Court seeks to articulate the principle of cooperation 
between the Community judicature and national  courts  “as an essential  adjunct  to the cooperation 
between the Member States and the Community institutions”. 
369 Consider in this regard the Court’s judgment in case C-224/01  Gerhard Köbler of 30 September 
2003, which puts additional pressure on the national courts to fulfil their Community law obligation as 
one  of  the  authorities  of  a  Member  State.  Non-fulfilment  by  a  national  court  of  its  Community 
obligations could lead to the liability of the Member State to which the national court belongs.
370 Tesauro AG had already made this connection in para. 21 of his Opinion in Hermès (Case C-53/96). 
He also pointed out that “the absence of centralised interpretation could completely undo the results 
achieved  by  the  obligation  to  cooperate  in  the  negotiations  and  conclusion  of  the  provisions  in 
question”. The AG therefore implicitly considers that the effet utile of the duty of cooperation at the 
negotiation and conclusion levels may require centralised interpretation by the Court of Justice at the 
level of implementation.
371 In principle, the Court’s jurisdiction under Art. 234 EC is limited to questions of interpretation and 
validity of Community law; see e.g. Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der  
Belastingen; Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL.
372 The Court had already developed a similar approach in relation to preliminary references involving 
domestic  rules  referring  to  or  incorporated  provisions  of  Community  law:  Case  C-222/01  British 
American  Tobacco Manufacturing  BV and Hauptzollamt  Krefeld,  Case  C-300/01  Doris  Salzmann, 
Case C-130/95 Giloy v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost, Case C-28/95 Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur 
der Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen Amsterdam 2,  Case C-297/88  Dzodzi v Belgium, Case C-231/89 
Gmurzynska-bscher v Oberfinanzdirektion Köln,  Case 166/84 Thomasdunger, Case 384/89  Tomatis  
and Fulchiron.  For reservations on this analogy, see AG Tesauro in his Opinion in Case C-53/96 
Hermès, p. 3620, footnote 29. Further: Lefevre (2004), de la Marre (1999: 219) and Heliskoski (2001: 
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“[o]nly the Court of Justice acting in cooperation with the courts and tribunals of the 
Member States pursuant to Article [234] of the Treaty is in a position to ensure such 
uniform interpretation” (emphasis added).373 
As  suggested  above,  the  Court’s  interpretation  represents  its  self-established 
contribution to the fulfilment of the duty of cooperation. The Court thereby proposes a 
wide  understanding  of  such  duty.  It  is  envisaged  as  the  duty  to  forestall  any 
differences  of  interpretation  of  the  provision  concerned,  and  as  a  subsequent 
obligation for the national court  to ensure such uniform interpretation, even when 
dealing  with  a  purely  national  situation.  According  to  this  line  of  reasoning,  the 
outcome of the duty of cooperation is to ensure  unity in the implementation of the 
provision  at  stake.  The  Court’s  pre-emptive interpretation  thus  limits,374 if  not 
annihilates  the  margin  of  manoeuvre  of  the  national  court,  also  where,  as  in  the 
present  instance,  the  provision  is  to  be  applied  in  the  context  of  national  law.375 
Indeed, such an authoritative interpretation has consequences in other Member States 
as well.376 The duty of cooperation can therefore be envisaged as ensuring uniformity 
in the application of a provision of a mixed agreement, as soon as this provision is 
capable of applying at national and Community level.
66).
373 Para. 38. Further: Dashwood (2000b: 173-174).
374 On the idea of pre-emptive jurisdiction, although in the context of another procedure, see Plender 
(2000: 203).
375 The  Court  thus  seems  to  confirm  the  connection  between  the  duty  of  cooperation  and  the 
constitutional  principle  of  loyal  cooperation,  discussed  above.  It  builds  upon the  well  established 
judicial cooperation based on Article 10 EC and aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of Community law 
and  the  integrity  of  the  EC legal  order  (Case  14/83  Van Colson  and  Kaman v  Land Nordhrein-
Westfalen,  Case  79/83  Dorit  Harz  v  Deutsch Tradax GmbH,  Case  C-106/89  Marleasing SA v  La 
Comercial Internacionale de Alimentacion SA, Case C-213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex 
parte Factortame Ltd and others, Case 811/79 Ariete SpA v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato) and 
based on uniform application (Case C-99/00 Kenny Roland Lyckeskog). For a thorough analysis on the 
role of the Court of Justice influence on the national judicial systems, see Dougan (2002, 2004).
376 Cases 28-30/62 Da Costa en Schaake NV, Jacob Meijer NV and Hoechst-Holland NV v Nederlandse  
Belastingadministratie, Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health. 
Further: Trabucchi (1974) and Rasmussen (1984). 
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Given  the  far-reaching  implications  of  the  Court’s  interpretation  for  the  Member 
States’  judicial  authorities,  the distinction between provisions  that  are  “capable of 
applying  both  to  situations  covered  by  national  law and to  situations  covered  by 
Community  law”377 and  those  which  are  not capable  of  this  double  application 
becomes  crucial.378 The  word  “capable”  suggests  that  the  dual  application  of  the 
provision is not necessary in actual terms, but needs only be potential for the Court to 
require and give a uniform interpretation.379 Uniform application of the provisions of a 
mixed agreement is  not  necessarily  connected to the exclusive competence of  the 
Community. A provision falling under non–exclusive Community competence may 
also have to be applied uniformly, irrespective of the fact that it relates to an area 
which is not actually, but only potentially covered by Community law. It however 
leaves  open  the  question  of  whether  the  Court  has  jurisdiction  to  interpret  the 
provisions  of  the  agreement  that  do  not fall  under  the  category  of  Community 
potential competence. 
Furthermore, the  Dior conception of the duty of cooperation, applied at the judicial 
level, might have an impact on how this duty is to be envisaged more generally.380 
The Court considers that in certain instances, the provisions of a mixed agreement 
shall apply uniformly throughout the Community even where they concern an area not 
yet covered by Community rules. It could be argued that as a result, other national 
authorities  might  also  be  expected  to  ensure  the  same  level  of  harmony  in  the 
implementation of the provisions of a mixed agreement meeting the same conditions, 
377 The French version of the ruling uses an expression that seems more open than the English phrase 
“capable of applying”: “lorsqu’une disposition… peut trouver à s’appliquer aussi bien à des situations 
relevant  du  droit  national  qu’à  des  situations  relevant  du  droit  communautaire…  la  Cour  est 
compétente pour l’interpréter afin d'éviter des divergences d'interprétation futures” (emphasis added).
378 In this regard, see the Opinion of Tizzano AG of 29 June 2004 in case C-245/02 Anheuser – Bush 
Inc.  v  Budejovický  Budvar,  narodní  podnik (paras  110-115),  and  judgment  of  the  Court  of  16 
November 2004 (para. 41).
379 This scenario had already been envisaged by Dashwood (2000b: 173-174). Indeed, AG Tesauro in 
Hermès talks of “potential competences”, namely areas where the Community has competence but the 
latter has not yet been exercised, meaning that it remains vested on the Member States. 
380 The duty of cooperation binds all the Member State’s authorities. There is no reason why the duty 
should  have  a  different  application  depending  on  the  national  authority  involved,  i.e.  judicial, 
legislative or executive.
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e.g. provisions “capable of applying both to situations covered by national law and to 
situations covered by Community law”. 
More generally,  the  Dior  formula of  the duty of  cooperation further  supports  the 
proposition  that  such  a  duty  involves  obligations  of  a  legal  nature.  Indeed,  it  is 
noticeable that the Court does not use the word “duty” at all in the  Dior  case, but 
refers  to  “obligation”,  thereby  consolidating  the  legally  binding  character  of 
cooperation already hinted at in the case law.381 Arguably, the duty of cooperation is 
also strengthened by the Court’s use of the expression “close cooperation”, in contrast 
to cooperation tout court. 
To sum up, it  appears that the duty of cooperation potentially entails far–reaching 
legal obligations for the institutions of the Community and for the Member States 
authorities, above all the courts. This duty can be articulated in various ways, being 
for instance specified in an inter-institutional arrangement, or be relied upon as such 
to  ensure  harmonious  fulfilment  of  the  commitments  undertaken  under  joint 
competences. It can even involve uniform interpretation of these commitments by the 
courts, if they are capable of having national and Community applications.382 Having 
determined the legal nature of the duty of cooperation, its scope of application should 
be examined. The next section will argue that it is potentially wide.
 
3.2. The wide scope of application of the duty of cooperation
In its various pronouncements, the Court has repeatedly held that first, the duty to 
cooperate is triggered “where it is apparent that the subject matter of an agreement or 
convention falls in part within the competence of the Community and in part within 
that  of  the Member States.”383 Secondly,  the duty operates  “between the  Member 
States  and  the  Community  institutions,  both  in  the  process  of  negotiation  and 
381 The Court had already used the word “obligation” before, particularly in Opinion 1/94, para. 108.
382 For the national courts, the duty of cooperation thus means that they do not distinguish between 
acting qua national courts and acting qua judge of Community law. 
383 E.g. Opinion 1/94, para. 108.
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conclusion, and in the fulfilment of the commitments entered into”.384 Thirdly, it is 
“for  the  Member  States  and  the  Community  institutions  to  take  all  the  measures 
necessary so as best to ensure such cooperation”.385 
Thus, the duty of cooperation potentially has a wide scope of application. From the 
point of view of the present analysis on management of mixed agreements such as the 
PCAs, and in the light of the above discussion, one needs to examine, first, how far 
the Member States’ actions are affected by this duty. Although it has been argued 
after  Dior  that the duty of cooperation concerns Member States while acting in an 
area where the Community is competent there is a need to establish whether it also 
applies when they act in areas where the Community has no competence at all, not 
even potential  (e.g.  when they  act  in  their  own right  or  in  the  framework  of  the 
Union). Also more needs to be said about the type of “cooperation” that is expected 
from both the Member States and the Community institutions.
A distinction has been made, notably in the literature, with regard to the intensity of 
the application of the duty. First, in the case of agreements which contain provisions 
involving  inextricably  interlinked  exercise  of  Member  States  and  Community 
competences, the case law suggests a strong application of the duty of cooperation 
(3.2.1).  Second,  the  duty  of  cooperation  does  not  apply  as  strongly,  but  applies 
nonetheless in situations where both Member States and Community exercise their 
own competences (3.2.2). In the later case, the duty of cooperation may have to be 
envisaged in the context of the TEU (3.2.3).
3.2.1. The application of the duty of cooperation in the context of mixed 
agreements  involving  “inextricably  interlinked”  exercise  of 
Member States and Community competences
Where the exercise of Community and national competences is “inextricably linked”, 
Christiaan Timmermans proposes a stronger application of the duty of cooperation. 
For this author, the expression “inextricably linked” refers to a situation “where the 
action  in  a  particular  case  cannot  be  reserved  either  to  the Community or  to  the 
384 E.g. Opinion 1/94, para. 108; Opinion 2/91, para. 36.
385 Para. 38, Opinion 2/91. 
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Member States”, but “where they are condemned to act together”.386 In this case of 
mixity, Member States, when acting together with the Community, “should present a 
common,  coherent  approach”,  and  Community  action  should  not  be  hampered  or 
undermined by countervailing action by Member States. 
According to Timmermans, the duty of cooperation is indeed “directly linked by the 
Court  to  the  requirement  of  unity  in  the  international  representation  of  the 
Community”.387 In practical terms, if Member States fail to co-ordinate their positions 
and/or to ensure coordination of their common position with that of the Community, 
there should be no action. Allowing Member States to go their own way where shared 
competences  at  issue  are  inextricably  linked  would  be  incompatible  with  the 
requirement  of  unity  in  the  international  representation  of  the  Community. 
Timmermans  concludes  that,  in  this  type  of  situation,  the principle  is  either  joint 
action  or  no  action  at  all,  be  it  at  the  level  of  negotiation  or  conclusion, 
implementation  being  governed  by  the  division  of  internal  powers  between  the 
Community and the Member States.388 In other words, when “the competences are 
inextricably linked”, the duty of cooperation implies that the Member States and the 
institutions have an obligation of result.
The potentially strong application of the duty of cooperation in certain types of mixed 
agreements (or within one subject area of a mixed agreement) partly finds support in 
the Court of Justice’s case law. In particular, the Court has insisted on the duty being 
“more necessary” when Member States have to act on behalf of the Community when 
the latter cannot be represented in an international organisation.389 The duty is also 
“more imperative” when the mixed agreement is constituted by sub-agreements which 
are “inextricably interlinked”.390 
386 Timmermans (2000). It has also been said that “[t]hey are prisoners of one another”, see Common 
Market Law Review (1995: 385).
387 See discussion above under 3.1.1.
388 Timmermans (2000: 241-243).
389 In Opinion 2/91, the Court emphasises, in para. 37 that “cooperation between the Community and 
the Member States is all the more necessary in view of the fact that the former cannot, as international 
law stands at present, itself conclude an ILO conventions and must do so through the medium of the 
Member States”.
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On the basis of this case law, McLeod et al however point out that a duty to reach a 
common position is always equally “imperative”. Only a duty to strive to reach a 
common  position  can  be  “more  imperative”  in  some  cases  than  in  others.391 Put 
differently,  unlike  what  Timmermans  suggests,  they  consider  that  the  duty  of 
cooperation remains, in any event, an obligation of conduct rather than an obligation 
of  result.  It  is  only  in  matters  falling  under  the  exclusive  competence  of  the 
Community that failure to agree a position within the Council entails no action at all, 
because by definition, there is no position taken. Indeed, Member States do not in 
principle have competence to act on their own in these matters, for the very exclusive 
nature of the Community competence excludes them from the field.392 By contrast, as 
regards matters  in respect of which the Community and the Member States share 
competence, the duty of cooperation does not entail an obligation to reach a common 
position. Member States are only bound by an obligation to use their best endeavours  
to reach a common position,393 but if no such common position is reachable, it will be 
for each Member State to defend its own interests as seems best to it.394 The duty of 
cooperation cannot prevent this, all the less that, as pointed out by Hyett, 395 the duty 
of cooperation involves  mutual obligations for the Community institutions and the 
Member States, and not only for the latter, as Article 10 EC seems to provide.396 It 
means that on the one hand, Member States should use their best efforts to come to a 
common  position,  but  on  the  other  hand,  Community  institutions  should  also 
recognise  and  give  full  force  to  the  competence  of  the  Member  States  when 
competence is shared. 
390 In para. 109 of Opinion 1/94, the duty of cooperation is held to be “all the more imperative in the 
case of agreements such as those annexed to the WTO Agreement, which are inextricably interlinked, 
an in view of the cross retaliation measures established by the Dispute Settlement Understanding”
391 McLeod et al (1996: 149).
392 This principle applies both in case of a priori exclusivity, and exclusivity resulting from the ERTA 
effect. For an illustration of Member States prevented to act internationally on their own in an area 
covered by internal rules, see the Hushkits dispute between the EU and the USA in the context of the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation. Further: Rosas (2003: 312-313).
393 In this regard, see Opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-53/96 Hermès, para. 21, and footnote 33.
394 McLeod et al (1996: 149).
395 Hyett (2000: 250).
396 The principle of loyal cooperation as embodied in particular in Article 10 EC is a principle of 
mutual  cooperation  which  may bind  institutions  as  well:  Case  C-230/81  Luxembourg  v  European 
Parliament, para. 37, Case C-65/93 European Parliament v Council, para. 23. 
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Further support for this understanding of the duty of cooperation as an obligation of 
conduct rather than obligation of result, can be found in the Court’s pronouncement in 
Opinion 2/91. Here, the Luxembourg judges held that the Community institutions and 
the Member States have to take “all  the  necessary measures so as best to ensure 
cooperation” (emphasis added). The italicised expression indicates that it  is not an 
obligation of result but that it implies efforts to ensure such cooperation. In addition, 
while it held that the duty of cooperation stems from the requirement of unity in the 
international representation of the Community on the international stage, the Court 
did  not  say  that  the  Member  States  and  the  Community  must  take  all  measures 
necessary so as best to ensure such “unity”. To refer to Hyett  again, the unity of 
representation  of  the  Community  and  the  duty  of  cooperation  are  two  different 
concepts. The former is not an obligation as such when competence is shared, it is the 
cooperation that  involves  an  obligation  between  the  institutions  and  the  Member 
States.397 It could be added that the FAO Arrangement which the Court interpreted as 
“fulfilment of the duty of cooperation” confirms this understanding of the duty of 
cooperation as an obligation of conduct rather than obligation of result. 
The view of McLeod et al should be partly qualified however, particularly as regards 
the application of the duty of cooperation at the level of implementation. In the light 
of the Court’s formulation of the duty of cooperation in the Dior judgment, it appears 
that in certain circumstances, cooperation may indeed entail an obligation of  result, 
namely the  uniform application of  a  provision of  a  mixed agreement.  As already 
pointed out, the Court said that in case the provision of a mixed agreement is “capable 
of applying both to situations covered by national law and to situations covered by 
Community law” it has to be interpreted uniformly throughout the Community, such 
uniform  interpretation  being  a  fulfilment  of  the  duty  of  cooperation.  Here,  the 
cooperation does  not  seem to  involve  any margin  of  manoeuvre  for  the  national 
authorities in the application of the provision concerned, despite the fact that the latter 
does  not  relate  to  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  Community,  but  only  to  its 
potential  competence.  More  than  doing  their  best  to  ensure  cooperation,  national 
courts should ensure a uniform application of the provision. One could thereby speak 
of an obligation of result, although only in the specific  Dior type circumstances of 
397 Hyett (2000: 250).
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potential  dual  application,  when  the  autonomy of  the  EC legal  order  is  at  stake. 
Outside  these  specific  circumstances,  the  application  of  the  duty  of  cooperation 
between the  Community  institutions  and the  Member  States  is  likely  to  be  more 
intense  in  a  situation  where  the  mixed  agreement  contains  elements  which  are 
“inextricably interlinked”. 
What remains to be examined is whether,  and if  so how, the duty of cooperation 
applies in situations where Member States and Community act independently from 
one another, although in the context of a mixed agreement. The following section will 
argue that the duty of cooperation may also apply in those situations as well, although 
with a different intensity.
3.2.2. The application of the duty of cooperation where Member States 
and Community exercise their competences independently
Where the Community is exclusively competent, it is well established that Member 
States  cannot  act  on  the  area  covered  by  this  exclusive  competence,398 unless 
authorised  by  the  Community.  By  contrast,  in  areas  of  Member  States’  reserved 
competence, Member States may still be affected by the application of Community 
law. Whether it might be the case for the duty of cooperation is subject to different 
views. 
In  general,  McLeod  et  al consider  that  “in  respect  of  matters  exclusively  within 
Member States’ competence, the Community Treaties have in principle nothing to 
say,  although the provisions of Titles V and VI might be relevant”.399 To take an 
example, with respect to a mixed agreement containing provisions on the CCP, on the 
one hand, and defence, on the other, Community law has in principle no relevance 
whatever  as  regards  the  negotiation,  conclusion  and  implementation  of  the  latter 
provisions.
Contrasting this view, Ami Barav, for instance, considers that “Member States are 
bound by certain duties and obligations imposed by the [EC] Treaty, even in the fields 
398 Case 22/70 Commission v Council (AETR).
399 McLeod et al (1996: 149).
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in  which  they  retained  reserved  powers”.400 To  take  the  hypothetical  example 
mentioned above, Member States’ negotiation, conclusion and implementation of the 
defence parts of the agreement could still be influenced by principles and obligations 
of a Community law nature. 
It is submitted that although acting on the basis of their reserved competences in the 
context  of  a  mixed  agreement,  Member  States  may  indeed  be  bound  by  several 
obligations, notably as they derive from Community law,401 and in particular from the 
duty  of  cooperation.402 In  other  words,  mixed  agreements  which  do  not  involve 
inextricably linked aspects can still involve the application of the duty of cooperation 
between the Community institutions and the Member States, albeit not in the same 
imperative  fashion  as  in  the  situations  discussed  in  the  previous  section.  Various 
arguments seem to support such a proposition.
First of all, the case-law of the Court of Justice does not seem to exclude it. To start 
with, in all the pronouncements of the Court, the element triggering the application of 
the duty of cooperation is broadly formulated, namely “where it is apparent that the 
subject matter of an agreement or convention falls in part within the competence of 
the  Community  and  in  part  within  that  of  the  Member  States”.403 The  duty  of 
cooperation thus appears  to  apply irrespective of  whether  the competences  of  the 
Community and that of the Member State, respectively, are “co-existent” (the mixed 
agreement  contains  provisions  on  both  trade  and  defence,  for  example)  or 
“concurrent” (such as agreements in the field of trade in services).404 The type of 
400 Barav  (1981),  “The  division  of  external  relations  power  between  the  European  Economic 
Community and the Member States in the case law of the Court of Justice” in Timmermans, C W A 
and Völker, E L M (eds.), Division of powers between the European Communities and their Member  
States in the field of external relations (Kluwer), p. 29 at 90, cited in Heliskoski (2001: 233), footnote 
82.   
401 Alan Dashwood (1996b: 114) has pointed out that the application of Community law and the scope 
of Community competence should be distinguished.
402 On the application of Art. 10 EC beyond the scope of Community competence, Blanquet (1994: 
306).
403 See e.g. Ruling 1/78, paras 34-36, Opinion 2/91, para. 36, Opinion 1/94, para. 108 and Opinion 2/00, 
para. 18.
404 On different forms of mixed agreements: see e.g. Schermers (1983), Rosas (1998: 128-133, 2000: 
206), Dolmans (1985: 39-42) and Allott (1983: 118-119).
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mixity only matters when it comes to the  intensity of the obligation of cooperation 
involved in the duty of cooperation. 
The Court’s case law also supports the proposition that Member States are bound to 
observe  Community  law,  including  their  duty  to  facilitate  the  achievement  of 
Community’s tasks, while they act in the sphere of their own powers. In particular, 
the Court held in the Centro-Com case that:
the powers retained by the Member States must  be exercised in  a  manner 
consistent with Community law… [W]hile it is for the Member States to adopt 
measures  of  foreign  and  security  policy  in  the  exercise  of  their  national 
competence, those measures must nevertheless respect the provisions adopted 
by the Community in the field of the common commercial policy (emphasis 
added).405 
While  the  Court  initially  used  the  expression  “consistent”,406 the  italicised  term 
“respect” could be understood as more than simply absence of legal contradiction. 
Arguably, it may also involve, in fulfilment of the duty of cooperation based on the 
principle of loyal  cooperation,  that the Member States refrain from taking actions 
which would undermine the Community CCP. As Marise Cremona pointed out, the 
Court’s pronouncement reflects the general loyalty obligation enshrined in Article 10 
EC, an obligation to  facilitate  achievement  of the Community’s tasks and abstain 
from  measures  which  could  jeopardize  the  attainment  of  the  Community’s 
objectives.407 One could  also  mention  in  this  sense  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of 
Justice in Annunziata Matteuci,408 where it was held that:
Article [10 EC] provides that the Member States must take all  appropriate 
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations 
arising  out  of  the  Treaty.  If,  therefore,  the  application  of  a  provision  of 
Community law is liable to be impeded by a measure adopted pursuant to the 
implementation  of  a  bilateral  agreement,  even  where  the  agreement  falls 
outside the field of application of the Treaty, every Member State is under a 
405 Case C-124/95 The Queen v HM Treasury and Bank of England, ex parte Centro-Com Srl, paras. 25 
and 27. Further: Koutrakos (2001: 138-139) and case-note of Vedder and Folz (1998). 
406 The Court also held that “[e]ven if  a matter falls within the power of the Member States,  the fact 
remains  that  the  latter  must  exercise  that  power  consistently  with  Community  law” in  Case  466/98 
Commission v UK,  para. 41; also in Case C-221/89  Factortame and Others, para. 14 and Case C-
264/96 ICI v Colmer, para. 19.
407 Cremona (1999a: 170). See also Opinion of AG Jacobs in the Centro-Com case, paras 40-44.
408 Case 235/87 Annunziata Matteuci v Communauté française de Belgique, para. 19.
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duty to facilitate the application of the provision and, to that end, to assist 
every other Member State which is under an obligation under Community law.
Secondly, in relation to their non-EC related obligations under a mixed agreement, the 
actions or inactions of Member States may interfere with the implementation of a 
mixed agreement in general, and affect the rights and obligations of the Community in 
particular.  The  interference  of  Member States’  action with Community rights  and 
obligations under the agreement could occur even where such action does not prima 
facie breach Community law. 
In principle, a clear division of competence between the Community and the Member 
States, known in advance by the partner concerned, could help it determine who, of 
the Community or the Member State(s),  is liable on the Community side for non-
compliance with obligations set out in a mixed agreement. In effect, only those parts 
of  the  agreement  that  are  based  on  EC  competences  would  be  binding  on  the 
institutions  and  the  Member  States  (Article  300(7)  EC),409 and  thus  entail  their 
liability  in  case  of  non-compliance;  the  remainder  being  binding  on  the  Member 
States only.410 
However  the  practice  of  the  institutions  and  Member  States  has  been,  with  the 
blessing of the Court of Justice, not to allocate powers and obligations in advance.411 
Indeed, it has been suggested that mixity is often used precisely to avoid having to 
divide the competences in the context of a particular agreement.412 Such a reluctance 
409 Article 300(7) EC states that Agreements concluded under the conditions set out in Article 300 EC, 
shall be binding on the institutions of the Community and on Member States. As settled in the case law, 
both Member States and Community are thus expected to implement the agreement and observe their 
obligations,  as a  matter  of  Community law (Case 104/81  Hauptzollamt  Mainz  v  Kupferberg).  The 
Court held that, in ensuring respects for commitments arising from an agreement concluded by the 
Community,  Member States fulfil  an obligation in relation to the Community,  which has assumed 
responsibility for the due performance of the agreement (Case 12/86 Demirel), para. 11).
410 Rosas (1998: 142), Kaddous (1998: 173-174), Groux and Manin (1984: 150).
411 Ruling 1/78 Draft Convention of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the physical protection  
of  nuclear  materials,  facilities  and  transports.  See  also  Opinion  of  Jacobs  AG  in  Case  C-29/99 
Commission v Council, paras 112-113.
412 Heliskoski (2001: 11 and 69). See also Schermers (1982: 170), who points out that “mixity is a 
problem shifter”.  Cp. Opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-53/96 Hermès, para. 14, footnote 13.
119
to allocate competences makes it difficult, particularly for the third party to a mixed 
agreement, to know who might be held responsible for potential non-compliance.413 In 
this situation, it has been suggested that the principle should be that Community and 
Member States are jointly liable.414 
Even if specific obligations were seen as binding upon Member States only, on the 
ground  that  internally,  the  subject  matter  falls  within  the  scope  of  their  own 
competences,  it  could  be  argued  that  breach  of  their  obligations  could  have 
implications for the Community, notwithstanding the latter’s “incompetence” in the 
field(s) where the breach arose.415 The violation of one particular obligation under a 
mixed agreement may affect the performance of some, if not all other obligations set 
forth by the instruments.  As convincingly shown by Joni Heliskoski,  the disputed 
conduct on the one hand and the consequences or implications thereof, on the other 
hand, might well fall within distinct spheres of legal authorities.416 The fact that the 
Community’s  rights  and  obligations  might  be  affected,  although  indirectly,  by  a 
Member  State  breach  of  a  mixed  agreement’s  provision  related  to  its  own 
competence,  may  be  a  case  for  taking  preventive  steps.  While  it  seems  legally 
difficult to envisage an enforcement procedure against a Member State on the ground 
that it does not fulfil its non EC-obligations under the mixed agreement,417 one could 
however  argue  that  the  duty  of  cooperation  should  nonetheless  apply  and  guide 
413 As Christian Tomuschat (1983: 130) pointed out, if the Community and its Member States wilfully 
and purportedly refrain from formally publicising their demarcation line between their respective areas 
of jurisdiction, their partners cannot be expected to make the necessary inquiries themselves.  
414 Opinion Jacobs AG in Case C-316/91  European Parliament  v  Council,  para 69, Case C-53/96 
Hermès, para. 24. Further: Tomuschat (1983: 125), Gaja (1983: 137ff) and Kovar (1975: 916-917).
415 Opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-53/96 Hermès, para. 20.
416 Heliskoski (2001: 211). Gaja (1983: 140) also points out that matters can be interlinked, even if 
apparently relating to clearly different legal authorities. 
417 Enforcement proceedings are available only in relation to the application of EC law, see the broad 
interpretation of  the  Court  in  Case  C-13/00  Commission  v  Ireland;  Case  C-239/03  Commission v 
France. Cp Ehlermann (1983: 21), who goes as far as to suggest that the Community should thus have 
the  right  to  take  preventive  steps  against  the  Member  State  whose  action  risks  engaging  the 
Community’s responsibility.  In particular,  he considers that  “it  would be unavoidable to allow the 
Community to use the infringement procedure in spite of the fact that the Member State acts within its 
sphere of competence.” 
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Member States’ conduct in the context of the whole agreement, irrespective of the fact 
that the Member States might be acting in areas of reserved competences.
Indeed, the influence of Member States’ actions on Community rights and obligations 
is  not  inconceivable  in  the  context  of  the  PCAs with  Russia  and  Ukraine.  Their 
provisions on retaliation in case of non-fulfilment of its obligations by one of the 
Parties states that:
[i]f either Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation 
under the Agreement, it may take appropriate measures. Before so doing, except 
in  cases  of  special  urgency,  it  shall  supply  the  Cooperation  Council  with  all 
relevant  information required for thorough examination of the situation with a 
view to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties.
In the selection of these measures, priority must be given to those which least 
disturb  the  functioning  of  the  Agreement.  These  measures  shall  be  notified 
immediately to the Cooperation Council if the other Party so request (emphasis 
added).418
The  PCAs  define  the  term  “Parties”  on  the  EU  side  as  “the  Community,  or  its 
Member States, or the Community and its Member States, in accordance with their 
respective powers”.419 This expression does not give the partner any indication on the 
allocation of powers between the Member States or the Community.  Furthermore, 
most  of  the  PCA provisions  use  the  word  “Parties”,  or  “the  Community  and  its 
Member States”.420 
However,  in  the  specific  context  of  the  procedure  for  dispute  resolution,  the 
Community and the Member States shall be deemed to be one Party to the dispute.421 
Arguably, this unity applies also in the context of the above provisions, as suggested 
by  the  wording  “either  Party”  v. “the  other  Party”,  in  the  singular  form.  These 
418 Art. 107(2) PCA Russia and Art. 102(2) PCA Ukraine. 
419 Art. 104 PCA Russia; Art. 99 PCA Ukraine.
420 The use of the term “Party” throughout the agreement contrasts with previous practice where the 
allocation  of  competence  was  hinted  at  by  the  use  of  “Community”,  or  “Member  States”,  or 
“Community and its Member States” in the provisions of the agreement, depending on the subject 
matter. In this regard, see Tomuschat  (1983: 128),  who cites the Lomé II Convention (OJ 1980 L 
347/1) as an example of this careful drafting.
421 Art. 101(3), last sentence, PCA Russia; Art. 96(3), last sentence, PCA Ukraine. 
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provisions imply that if Ukraine, for instance, considers that the Community and/or its 
Member State, as the other Party has failed to fulfil one of its obligations, it may take 
“appropriate measures” against the Community and Member States, together as the 
“other  Party” to  the PCA. The only conditions set  out by the PCA as regard the 
adoption of appropriate measures are first, that Ukraine should bring the matter to the 
Cooperation Council with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties.422 
Secondly, if the dispute is not solved by the Parties, the PCA requires that priority be 
given to those measures which least disturb the functioning of the Agreement, and 
thirdly, the measures have to be notified to the Cooperation Council. Provided they 
fulfil these conditions, appropriate measures against non-compliance, e.g. in the field 
of establishment, could involve measures concerning the PCA provisions on goods.423 
In other words,  retaliation against  a  breach attributable to one or several  Member 
States could have implications for the implementation of the PCA provisions falling 
under the CCP, which in principle is an exclusive competence of the Community.424 It 
could indeed be the other way round, namely a failure by the Community to fulfil its 
obligation could have consequences for Member States’ rights and obligations under 
the  Agreement.425 Member  States  and  Community  would  thus  be  required  to 
cooperate to solve the issue. 
This  example  involved  a  case  of  concurrent  Community’  and  Member  States’ 
competences. But, consider another hypothetical situation where Russia would allege 
that a violation of the rights of the Russian-speaking minority is taking place in one of 
the Member States,426 in contravention to the PCA human rights clause. In principle, 
as a breach of one of the essential elements of the Agreement, it is a matter of urgency 
422 Art. 107(2) PCA Russia and Art. 102(2) PCA Ukraine. See also the new rules of procedure for the 
settlement of disputes under the PCA with Russia; particularly Art. 6, paras 6-8, on “application of 
appropriate measures”. The new rules were adopted by the Council on 15 Dec. 2003 on the basis of a 
proposal from the Commission (European Commission, 2003c). 
423 Nothing in the PCA obliges the injured Party to adopt appropriate measures in the same subject-
matter. 
424 Opinion 1/75 Understanding on a local cost standard.
425 In this regard, one may recall that the Community behaviour may indeed have consequences for the 
Member States in terms of liability, for instance in the context of the WTO or the ECHR, further on the 
latter, e.g. Schermers (2001).
426 A claim that is regularly made by the Russian authorities, in relation to some of the Baltic States; 
notably by the Russian Duma; see RFE/RL Newsline, 14 October 2003; Maresceau (2001: 15; 2005).
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and Russia would be entitled to react without prior consultation.427 Its reaction could 
be to suspend parts, or the whole of the Agreement, as appropriate. It appears that 
while respect for the protection of minorities in the Member States falls outside the 
Community powers,428 its violation by one Member State could have implications for 
the Community as Party to the PCA. 
More precisely, Member States’ actions in the context of a mixed agreement may 
interfere  with  the  rights  and  obligations  of  the  Community  under  that  mixed 
agreement,  even  if  no  Community  law  has  been  prima  facie violated.  There  is 
therefore a strong case for suggesting that the duty of cooperation between Member 
States  and  Community  institutions  applies  systematically,  whatever  the  form  of 
mixity of the agreement, in order to guarantee its full implementation.429 
Incidentally, the PCAs themselves contain provisions stating that the Parties shall take 
any  general  or  specific  measures  required  to  fulfil  their  obligations  under  the 
Agreements, and they shall see to it that the objectives set out in the Agreement are 
attained.430 The term “Parties” could be said to refer, as in the context of the dispute 
resolution  to  the  Community  and  Member  States  as  one  Party,  and  the  Russian 
Federation, or Ukraine, as the other Party. Support for this proposition can be found in 
the use of Party, in singular, in the following paragraph of the same Article: “[i]f 
either  Party  considers  the  other  Party  has  failed  to  fulfil  an  obligation  under  the 
Agreement….”  If  this  holds  true,  the  above-mentioned  obligation  of  conduct  is 
addressed to Russia or Ukraine on the one hand, and the Community and the Member 
States as  one Party on the other hand. This arguably is another indication of their 
common  commitment  vis-à-vis  the  third  party  to  fulfil  their  obligations,  and 
conversely a tacit acknowledgment that they would be jointly liable in case either of 
them does not comply with its obligations.
427 Art. 107(2) PCA Russia and Art. 102(2) PCA Ukraine.
428 Further on the question of competence in the field of minority protection, see e.g. Hillion (2004a). 
429 On  the  necessity  of  coordination,  Henry  Schermers  (1983:  32)  suggested  that:  “as  partly  the 
Community and partly the Member States are responsible for the application of mixed agreements, 
coordination will often be necessary”.  
430 Art. 107(2) PCA Russia and Art. 102(2) PCA Ukraine.
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The  foregoing  further  supports  the  proposition  that,  in  the  context  of  a  mixed 
agreement, the duty of cooperation binds the Community institutions and Member 
States, even where the latter act in areas of retained powers. Not only should they 
refrain from acting inconsistently with the Community law aspects of the agreement, 
but more generally they should also abstain from actions that could impinge on the 
rights and obligations of the Community. It becomes apparent that Member States’ 
political choice to include, in a mixed agreement, provisions relating to their own 
powers carries with it a responsibility, if not a commitment, vis-à-vis the Community  
to comply with obligations derived from these provisions. They commit themselves 
not only to perform all their obligations in  bona fide vis-à-vis the third party as a 
matter  of  international  law,  but  they  also  commit  themselves  vis-à-vis  the 
Community,  jointly  liable  for  ensuring  full  compliance  with  the  Agreements 
obligations. This proposition may be said to build on the principle established by the 
Court  in  its  Kupferberg decision,  whereby  in  implementing  the  provisions  of  an 
Agreement,  Member States fulfil  an obligation of  Community law as well.431 The 
normative value of the duty of cooperation in the present context is limited however. 
Indeed, it is unlikely, and this is a euphemism, that it would open the way to legal 
proceedings, for instance in the form of an enforcement procedure based on Article 
226 EC against  the  Member  State  concerned,  on  the  ground that  it  infringes  the 
provisions of a mixed agreement.432 It nevertheless remains a principle  guiding the 
conduct of the Member States, in the context of a mixed agreement.
431 Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG, where the Court held in para. 13 
that “[i]n ensuring respect for commitments arising from an agreement concluded by the Community 
institutions, the Member States fulfil an obligation not only in relation to the non-member country 
concerned but also and above all in relation to the Community which has assumed responsibility for the 
due performance of the agreement.” Further: Cheyne (2000: 25) and Nolte (1988).  
432 Case C-13/00 Commission v Ireland. It should be noticed that, following Article 39 of the Act of 
Accession 2003 (OJ 2003 L236/33), the Commission is entitled to take safeguard measures outside the 
scope of Community law, in the “area of freedom, security and justice” against the ten new Member 
States  in  case  of  “serious  shortcomings  or  any  imminent  risks  of  such  shortcomings  in  the 
transposition,  state  of  implementation,  or  the application of  the framework decisions  or  any other 
relevant commitments, instruments of cooperation and decisions relating to mutual recognition in the 
area of criminal law under Title VI of the EU Treaty and Directives and Regulations relating to mutual 
recognition in civil matters under Title IV of the EC Treaty in a new Member State”.
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Such a Member States’ responsibility flows more generally from the requirement of 
solidarity embodied in the principle of loyal cooperation which, as suggested earlier, 
is the basis of the duty of cooperation.433 Moreover, it is motivated by the necessity to 
ensure the  full  application of  the Agreement  on the Community side  and thus  to 
forestall any liability which could involve the Community. Although acting in a field 
outside  the  scope  of  Community  law,  a  Member  State’s  action  affecting  the 
Community  could  be  considered  contrary  to  its  obligation  to  abstain  from  any 
measure which would jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the EC Treaty, 
and  to  take  appropriate  measures  to  “facilitate  the  achievement  of  Community’s 
tasks”, as more generally required by the principle of loyal cooperation.434 It could be 
added  that  ensuring  compliance  with  obligations  set  out  in  mixed  agreements 
contributes to ensuring consistency in the external activities of the Union.
Indeed, having established that the duty of cooperation applies where Member States 
exercise  their  reserved  competence,  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  fact  that 
Member States action is taken “in the framework of the Union” changes the situation. 
The next section will examine this question, and argue that, in such a situation, the 
application of the duty of cooperation may be nuanced.
3.2.3. The application of the duty of cooperation in the context of the EU
The Centro-Com case evoked above emphasised that Member States have to respect 
the CCP provisions when they adopt measures of foreign policy in the exercise of 
their national competence. As it was pointed out in chapter 2, as Parties to a mixed 
agreement, Member States may also act “in the framework of the EU”. As such, they 
are bound not only by obligations of a Community law nature including the duty of 
cooperation, they also have to take into account the obligations flowing from the non-
433 See above, section 3.1.1.
434 This partly echoes the views of Ehlermann mentioned above. It should be added that the Community 
is also under a duty of cooperation with the Member States, inasmuch as it should not act in a way that 
could lead to the liability of Member States. 
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EC provisions  of  the  TEU,  such  as  the  general  objectives  of  the  Union,  and  the 
specific aims, provisions and instruments of Title V on CFSP.435 
Title V contains several provisions supporting the binding nature of CFSP measures. 
In  particular,  Member  States  are  expected  to  ensure  that  their  national  positions 
conform to common positions adopted in the context of the CFSP, and to uphold the 
common  position  in  international  organisations  and  conferences.  Similarly,  joint 
actions “commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of 
their activity”.436 Moreover, Title V includes what could be regarded as a principle of 
loyal cooperation. It is encapsulated in Article 11(2) TEU which provides that: 
The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively 
and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.
The Member  States  shall  work  together  to  enhance  and develop  their  mutual 
political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the 
interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in 
international relations.
These  provisions  establish  a  broad  principle  of  loyalty  in  relation  to  the  Union’s 
foreign and security policy as a whole. Not only the secondary CFSP instruments, but 
also  the  objectives  of  the  CFSP  bind  the  Member  States  in  terms  of  public 
international law, despite the fact that these provisions are not judicially enforceable 
before the European Court of Justice.437 Such a CFSP principle of loyalty involves 
435 On the legal effects of CFSP acts, see e.g.: Koskenniemi (1998: 27), Wessel (1999: 150ff), Eeckhout 
(2004: 138ff), Denza (2002: esp. chaps. 2, 4 and 9), Hendry et al (1996: 412), Koutrakos (2001: 44), 
Eaton (1994: 215), Weiler (1993: 53), Willaert and Marquéz-Ruiz (1995) and Jacqué (2001: 512-516). 
436 See Arts. 15 (ex-J.5) and 14(3) (ex-J.4) TEU, respectively. Further: McLeod et al (1996: 412ff). It 
has been suggested that the International Court of Justice could adjudicate on Member States disputes 
on compliance with CFSP obligations (….), although this option has also been assessed as not very 
realistic in practice (Denza, 2002: 322; Eaton, 1994: 222; Lenaerts and van Nuffel, 1999: 672).
437 See e.g. Denza (2002: 311-312), Monar (1993: 144), Wessel (1999: 104) and Weiler (1993: 54ff).
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both negative (“refrain from”) and positive (“shall support”) obligations438 which to a 
certain extent remind of the provisions of Article 10 EC.439 
In the case of mixed agreements such as the PCAs, Member States and Community 
institutions are bound to cooperate, notably to ensure the full implementation of the 
Agreement.  At  the  same  time,  Member  States,  “acting  in  the  framework  of  the 
Union”, are expected to support the Union’s foreign and security policy actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. This is particularly the case in 
the  context  of  the  political  dialogues,  where  Member  States,  represented  by  the 
Presidency, in principle have to promote the objectives of the European Union, under 
the supervision of the Council.440 This second level of loyalty of Member States acting 
in the framework of the Union has to be combined with their Community duty of 
cooperation.
 
The presence of the two levels of Member States’ loyalty raises the question of how 
potential tensions or incompatibilities between provisions of the two loyalties are to 
be resolved. It is submitted that while conflict should be solved to the benefit of the 
Community,  CFSP  rules  may  nevertheless  affect  EC  rules,  without  violating 
Community law.
To begin with, a conflict between Member States’ actions and Community law should 
be resolved by the principle of supremacy of EC law as developed by the Court.441 
Indeed, as pointed out above, the Court has emphasised on several occasions that the 
powers retained by the Member States must be exercised in a manner consistent with 
Community  law.442 Member  States  thus  have  to  give  way  to  the  application  of 
438 Loyalty is also formulated in Article 14(7) TEU (ex J.3(7)) concerning Joint Actions: “Should there 
be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State shall refer them to the Council 
which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the 
objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.” For a critical assessment of this obligation of 
loyalty, see Koskenniemi (1998).
439 Fink-Hooijer (1994: 177). 
440 Art. 11(2), second indent [ex Art. J.1(4)] TUE. Wessel (1997: 119ff). 
441 Case 6/64 Costa (Flaminio) v ENEL; Case 106/77 Simmenthal v Amministrazione delle finanze.
442 Case C-124/95 The Queen v HM Treasury and Bank of England, ex parte Centro-Com Srl. 
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Community law in case of conflict with their national rules.443 Arguably, the same 
applies in situations of conflict between EC law and CFSP commitments. In principle, 
Member States should not be able to rely on CFSP to disengage themselves from their 
Community obligations. Save in certain limited circumstances, they cannot adopt a 
CFSP measure that contradicts EC law, including any EC external agreements, be 
they  Community  or  mixed agreements.444 Indeed,  the  Commission  would  be  in  a 
position to sue the Member State on the basis of Article 226 EC if the latter acted, or 
failed to act, in breach of a Community obligation derived from an external agreement 
to which the Community is party. This primacy of EC law over conflicting national 
norms tends to be confirmed by other provisions of the TEU, as it will be seen in the 
next chapter.445 
The difficulty appears where a CFSP measure adopted in relation to a third party 
affects rights and obligations of the Community, although without involving a breach 
of Community law. That could be the case in a situation where the CFSP instrument 
revisits the provisions of a pre-existing mixed agreement where such provisions fall 
outside the scope of Community law. It would be the case if Member States were to 
reinforce the political conditionality through a CFSP measure. At first sight, such a 
CFSP measure would neither concern nor indeed infringe Community law, given that 
the CFSP-inspired provisions of the mixed agreement have not become part of the 
Community legal order.446 Moreover, as a matter of Union law, Member States should 
indeed be free to adopt CFSP measures, provided they do not affect the EC Treaty or 
acts supplementing it. 
In the light of the analysis of the previous section however, the Community rights and 
obligations  under  the  mixed  agreement,  may  be  affected  by  the  CFSP  decision 
concerned, to the same extent as its rights and obligations could be altered by the 
action of Member States, acting in their own rights.447 In particular, the effect of the 
CFSP measure on the terms of the Agreement may lead the other party to react by 
443 Unless Member States act on the basis of the derogatory provisions of the EC Treaty, e.g. Art. 297 
EC, see case C-120/94 Commission v Greece. Further: Koutrakos (2000) and Emiliou (1996). 
444 Article 47 TEU, see section 4.1 below.
445 Case C-13/00 Commission v Ireland. Further, see Weiler (1993).
446 Case 13/00 Commission v Ireland.
447 See above, section 3.2.2.
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adopting “appropriate measures”, on the ground that it allegedly constitutes a breach 
of the agreement. As suggested earlier, the third party is not necessarily deprived, in 
this context, of the possibility to cross-retaliate particularly if the allocation of powers 
is not known. For instance it can decide to suspend the provisions relating to trade in 
goods.448 The Community could thereby be indirectly affected by a CFSP decision.449 
As  also  submitted  above,  the  duty  of  cooperation  developed by  the  Court  in  the 
Community context entails that Member States should take all measures necessary to 
ensure  cooperation  with  the  Community  institutions  in  order  to  guarantee  full 
implementation  of  mixed  agreements.450 In  particular,  Member  States  have  a 
responsibility  vis-à-vis  the  Community  to  fulfil  all their  obligations  under  the 
agreement, as a means to facilitate Community’s compliance with its obligations. It 
implies that Member States should in particular refrain from acting in a  way that 
would be detrimental to the Community.451 Adopting a CFSP measure which involves 
negative consequences for the Community could thus be deemed incompatible with 
the duty of cooperation. 
At the same time, Member States are bound by CFSP objectives and measures, which 
also contribute to fulfil the general objective of asserting the Union’s identity on the 
international scene. They are indeed bound by the CFSP principle of loyalty. It is 
difficult to envisage the development of a genuine foreign policy if it were to remain 
subject, in any case, to existing Community trade commitments. Adapting the CFSP, 
which arguably covers all  aspects  of foreign policy,452 to EC law could make the 
448 Without prejudice to the provisions of GATT, although in the case of Russia and Ukraine it would 
not be too much of a concern, given they are not members yet. Further on the WTO dimension of 
sanctions, see Brandtner and Rosas (1999: 699).
449 If the Member States decided to suspend the application of the Agreement, such a suspension would 
still need to be compatible with the UN Charter and GATT/WTO law. The Community is bound by the 
two instruments, it would thus be affected by a Member States action.
450 As per Opinion 2/91. Bogdandy and Nettesheim (1996: 283) suggest that this cooperation might 
indeed involve that when examining national implementation acts of Title V or Title VI decisions, the 
national  courts  can  ask  the  ECJ  –  following  the  procedure  of  Article  234-  whether  the  national 
measure, issued to implement a Council decision under a competence of Title V or VI TEU, violates 
Article 10 EC. 
451 See above, section 3.2.2.
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CFSP objectives and provisions become nugatory.453 Indeed, as suggested above, the 
duty  of  cooperation  also  binds  the  Community  institutions  vis-à-vis  the  Member 
States.
Arguably,  the  Court’s  pronouncement  in  Centro-Com whereby  Member  States’ 
foreign policy measures must “respect the provisions adopted by the Community in 
the field of the common commercial  policy”454 has to be nuanced, where Member 
States act in the framework of the Union. Indeed, the TEU foresees the possibility for 
Member States to act under Title V to establish sanctions against a third state,455 with 
subsequent obligations for the Community institutions to take measures in the context 
of  the  EC  Treaty.456 In  the  same  vein,  human  rights  clauses  inserted  in  mixed 
agreements, imply the possibility for the EU to review Community commitments vis-
à-vis  a third country in consideration of a  change in the political  situation.  CFSP 
actions can affect Community law, without being considered to be violating EC law. 
It  would  be  inconceivable  that  the  trade  commitments  of  the  Community  would 
prevent the Member States, acting in the framework of the Union, from reviewing the 
trade regime even where the other party violates principles promoted by the EU.
3.3. Conclusion 
Based on the constitutional principle of loyal cooperation, the duty of cooperation is a 
key  principle  governing  the  interaction  between the  Community  and the  Member 
452 Council (1994): Avis du Service Juridique: “Une position commune définie par le Conseil sur la 
base de l’Article J.2 du Traité sur l’Union européenne et qui est destinée à établir une approche globale 
de la  politique à  mener par l’Union européenne à l’égard d’un pays tiers peut-elle  tenir compte et 
mentionner les aspects (notamment économiques) des relations avec le pays tiers en cause à propos 
desquels la Communauté serait compétente pour adopter des mesures concrètes”. Fink-Hooijer (1994). 
453 Art. 13 TEU points out that the Council shall ensure the “unity, consistency and  effectiveness of 
action of the Union.”  
454 Case C-124/95 The Queen v HM Treasury and Bank of England, ex parte Centro-Com Srl. 
455 Art. 301 EC. Further: e.g. Koutrakos (2001:  67ff).
456 See  also  the  provisions  of  Article  20  TEU which  provide  that  “[t]he  diplomatic  and  consular 
missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international 
conferences, and their representations to international organisations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the 
common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented.”
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States in the context of mixed agreements.  It  aims at  ensuring a smooth interplay 
between them, with a view to ensuring the effectiveness of the Community external 
action, and incidentally of the overall EU external relations, particularly given the 
specific function of mixity, examined in the previous chapter. As such the duty of 
cooperation is a key principle underpinning the system of EU external relations.
In legal terms, the duty of cooperation entails an obligation of conduct which may 
vary depending on the nature of the mixity of the agreement concerned. It can imply 
uniformity in the application of provisions of a mixed agreement,  where they are 
capable of applying at national and Community levels. Moreover, its application also 
concerns Member States exercising their retained competences. The application of the 
duty of cooperation should however be nuanced in the context of a mixed agreement 
where Member States act in the framework of the Union, as in the case of the PCAs. 
In  particular,  the  duty  of  cooperation  has  to  be  reconciled  with  other  rules  and 
principles of the Union. On the one hand, Member States’ decision to include non-EC 
provisions in a mixed agreement entails, as a result of the duty of cooperation, their 
responsibility vis-à-vis the Community to implement all the provisions fully, in order 
to forestall any risk of liability on the side of the Community. On the other hand, 
Member States acting in the framework of the Union operate in consideration of the 
CFSP  objectives,  principles  and  rules,  as  emphasised  by  the  CFSP  principle  of 
loyalty. As the next chapter will show, other principles underpinning the system of 
EU external relations also come into play to organise these interactions.
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CHAPTER 4
PRINCIPLES ORGANISING INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE SUB-
ORDERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Alongside the principles governing the interactions between the EU sub-orders and 
the  Member  States,  the  system  of  EU  external  relations  is  also  underpinned  by 
principles organising the interactions between the sub-orders of the Union. Article 3 
TEU, included in the Common Positions of the Treaty, provides that:
The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure 
the consistency and continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its 
objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire.
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a 
whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development 
policies…
This chapter examines the three key principles, contained in these provisions: first, the 
duty to maintain and build upon the acquis communautaire (4.1); secondly, the duty 
of  consistency  between the various external activities of the European Union (4.2), 
and  thirdly,  the  singleness  of  the  Union  institutional  framework  as  an  additional 
aspect of consistency (4.3). 
4.1. The principle of preservation and development of the acquis 
communautaire
The  interactions  between  the  different  sub-orders  of  the  EU  in  general,  and  the 
interplay between the EC external relations and the CFSP/JHA in particular, are first 
governed by the principle that the acquis communautaire should be preserved in full 
and built upon.457 This principle, enounced in Article 2 (ex B) TEU, is also one of the 
Union’s  objectives.  Indeed,  Article  3  (ex  Article  C)  TEU  emphasises  that  the 
institutions “should ensure the consistency and the continuity of the Union’s activities 
457 On the notion of acquis communautaire, see e.g. Delcourt (2001), Curti Gialdino (1995), Weatherill 
(1998).  
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in  order  to  attain  its  objectives  while  respecting  and  building  upon  the  acquis  
communautaire” (emphasis added). This section will show the hierarchy this principle 
establishes between the EU-sub-orders (4.1.1), the role of the Court in upholding it 
(4.1.2.) and the limits to the principle (4.1.3). 
4.1.1. A principle establishing a hierarchy among the EU sub-orders
The TEU appears to establish a hierarchical superiority of the acquis communautaire 
over the rules of the other EU sub-orders.458 The emphasis put on the “continuity of 
the activities”, mentioned in Article 3 TEU, further expresses the prime importance of 
the acquis,459 and the  supplementary character of Titles V and VI suggested in the 
provisions  of  Article  1  TEU.  The  latter  defines  the  Union  as  “founded  on  the 
European  Communities,  supplemented  by  the  policies  and  forms  of  cooperation 
established  by  this  Treaty”.  Consequently,  as  argued  by  Wessel,  “any 
indistinctiveness in case of overlapping CFSP and EC objectives should always be 
solved to the benefit of the latter”.460 
Indeed, the rationale of the requirement encapsulated in Article 3 TEU is to ensure 
that  Community  norms  and  method  are  not  “contaminated”  by  other  non-EC 
instruments  adopted  in  the  context  of  either  of  the  two  other  sub-orders  of  the 
Union,461 following a less “integrationist” methodology.462 In effect, it is designed to 
458 The provisions of ex Article B on the maintenance of the acquis also provided that the Union should 
build upon with a view to considering, through the procedure referred to Article N(2) [establishing the 
procedure for revising the TEU], to what extent the policies and forms of cooperation introduced by the 
TEU “may need to be revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the 
institutions of the Community”. These provisions were interpreted as further indication of the primacy 
of the Community acquis over the other forms of cooperation, deemed to be transitional, and of the 
possibility to increase Community powers; see e.g. Demaret (1993a: 42-43, 1993b: 6-7) and Willaert 
and Marqués-Ruiz (1995: 37).
459 Constantinesco et al (1995: 73).
460 Wessel (1999, 2000b: 1147).
461 Timmermans (1996), Eeckhout (2004: 146), Cloos et al (1993: 117).
462 Weiler (1993: 54).
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preserve the autonomy of the Community463 in the EU constitutional order.464 The 
express inclusion in the Treaty of the duty to maintain the acquis was encouraged by 
several  Member  States  supported  by  the  Commission  to  counter-balance  the 
introduction of alternative methods of cooperation within the framework of the TEU. 
Placed in the Common Provisions of the Treaty, this conservatory principle guides the 
conduct of both institutions and Member States while acting in the framework of the 
TEU in general, and informs the functioning of the system of EU external relations, in 
particular.465
Indeed, it is reinforced by the provisions of Article 47 (ex Article M) included in the 
Final Provisions of the TEU. This Article stipulates that “[s]ubject to the provisions 
amending the [EEC Treaty] with a view to establishing the European Community, the 
[ECSC Treaty and the EAEC Treaty], and to [the TEU] final provisions,  nothing in  
[the TEU] shall affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities or the  
subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them” (emphasis added).466 
Piet  Eeckhout  considers  this  provision  as  being  aimed  at  creating  watertight 
compartments in the EU vessel between the Community, on the one hand, and Title V 
and Title VI, on the other.467 The particular significance of these provisions in the EU 
463 On the autonomy of the Community legal order, see Lenaerts and van Nuffel (1999: 666). 
464 Transposing  Alan  Dashwood’s  dialectic  “conservatory/constitutionalising”  elements  in  the 
perspective  of  the  relationship  between  EU’s  sub-orders,  one  could  regard  that  requirement  as 
belonging  to  the  category  of  “conservatory”  elements  of  the  EU  constitutional  order.  Dashwood 
(1998c: 201)  calls the “conservatory elements” of the European Union's constitutional order,  those 
elements that are designed to preserve the position of the Member States. The author distinguishes them 
from “constitutionalising elements” such as direct effect, the primacy of Community law and the set of 
fundamental  values  expressed  by  what  the  Court  of  Justice  calls  “the  general  principles  of  law”, 
including the protection of fundamental rights.  
465 See in this regard, Report of the Reflection Group IGC (1995), Edwards (1994) and Koutrakos 
(2001: 44).
466 Article 32 of the Single European Act already provided that “nothing in this Act shall affect the 
Treaties establishing the European Communities or any subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or 
supplementing them”.
467 Eeckhout (2004: 146). One could also mention the provisions of Article 29 TEU which stipulate that 
Title  VI  cooperation  should  be  carried  out  “without  prejudice  to  the  powers  of  the  European 
Community”.
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constitutional order stems from their inclusion within the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice, in contrast to the provisions of Article 2 TEU.468 
4.1.2. A principle guaranteed by the European Court of Justice
Article 46 TEU (ex L) provides in its subparagraph c) that the Court has jurisdiction 
to ensure that the requirement of primacy of Community law over the norms of other 
EU sub-orders, set out in Article 47, is observed.469 It has been suggested that these 
provisions were designed specifically to ensure that the jurisdiction of the Court over 
the Community Treaties would not be limited by the initial “non-justiciability” of the 
CFSP and JHA.470
The  Court’s  constitutional  control  over  the  distribution  of  powers  between  the 
different  sub-orders  of  the  Union was  exercised  for  the  first  time  in  the  Airport  
Transit  Visa  case.471 The  Commission,  supported  by  the  European  Parliament, 
challenged  the  legality  of  a  Council  Joint  Action  concerning  airport  transit 
arrangements, which was adopted on the basis of then Article K.3(2)(b) (now Article 
31) TEU.472 According to the second recital of the Preamble, the contentious Joint 
Action aimed at harmonising Member States’ policies as regards the requirement of 
an airport  transit  visa.  It  also sought  to  “improve control  of the air  route,  which, 
particularly when applications for entry or de facto entry are involved in the course of 
airport transit, represents a significant way in with a view in particular to illegally 
taking  up  residence  within  the  territory  of  the  Member  States”.  The  Commission 
468 See the order of the Court in Case C-167/94 Criminal proceedings against Juan Carlos Grau Gomis  
and others, where the Court held that, “[b]y virtue of [ex] Article L of the Treaty on European Union, a 
national court may not refer to the Court a question on [ex] Article B of the Treaty on European Union in 
application of [ex] Article 177 of the Treaty. The Court therefore clearly has no jurisdiction to interpret that 
article in the context of such proceedings.”
469 Denza (2002: 319).
470 Dewost (1993: 64).  See in this regard, T-338/02 Segi and others v Council, order of 7th June 2004, 
n.y.r. Again, the provisions of Article 46 are not new as Article 31 SEA which limited the Court’s 
jurisdiction to the provisions of Title II nevertheless extended it to the provisions of Article 32 SEA.
471 Case C-170/96 Commission v Council. See also Oliveira (1999) and Koutrakos (2001: 159-161). 
472 Joint Action 96/197/JHA (OJ 1996 L 63/8).
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considered that by adopting the measure on the basis of ex Article K.3 TEU, the 
Council had acted in breach of ex Article 100c EC. It argued that the latter Article 
was the correct legal basis for adopting such a measure, for it gives the Community 
the power to determine the third country whose nationals must be in possession of a 
visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States.473 
The Court was thus given the opportunity to consider its jurisdiction to adjudicate 
upon the distribution of powers between the different suborders of the Union. It was 
also an occasion to shed light on the duty to maintain the acquis, as articulated in 
Article 47 TEU. 
The  Court’s  jurisdiction  was  contested  by  the  United  Kingdom.  The  British 
Government relied on the provisions of ex-Article L TEU which, then, excluded the 
Court from the framework of Title VI TEU. In particular, it was submitted that since 
the Act  was adopted on the basis  of ex-Article K.3(2) TEU, it  belonged to those 
measures which could not be annulled by the Court pursuant to ex-Article 173 (now 
Article 230) EC. 
The Court brushed the British argument aside and, following the Opinion of Advocate 
General Fennelly,474 held that it was competent to review the Joint Action. It found 
that Articles 46 and 47 (ex-Articles L and M) TEU endow it with the task of ensuring 
that acts which according to the Council, fall within the scope of ex-Article K.3 TEU 
do not encroach on the powers conferred on the Community by the EC Treaty. The 
Court proceeded and reviewed the content of the Council measure in the light of ex-
473 Ex Article K.3 TEU gave the Council the power to adopt joint action in areas referred to Article K.1 
TEU. 
474 In his Opinion in the  Airport Transit Visa  case (C-170/96), Fennelly AG considered that: “[t]he 
Court must … be able to determine whether anything in ‘this Treaty’, being the Treaty on European 
Union, and including acts adopted thereunder, does ‘affect’ the Community Treaties. Indeed, in my 
view, Article M was inserted in the Treaty on European Union with the very purpose of ensuring that, 
in exercising their powers under Titles V and VI of that Treaty, the Council and the Member States do 
not encroach on the powers attributed to the Communities under the respective founding and amending 
Treaties”. He concluded that “the provisions of Title VI may not be applied so as to restrict in any way 
the scope of the provisions of the EC Treaty, interpreted in accordance with the normal canons of 
construction of Community law”.
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Article  100c  EC,  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  it  affected  the  powers  of  the 
Community under that EC provision. In casu, the Joint Action was held to be lawfully 
adopted in the basis of ex Article K.3 TEU. The Commission’s application was thus 
dismissed.475 
The Court thereby made it clear that it would police the distribution of power between 
the legal sub-orders of the EU, and ensure that the Member States and institutions 
would not use the non-EC frameworks to act in areas that fall under the scope of the 
EC Treaty.476 In other words, the Court appears to act as a guarantor of Community 
powers against unlawful EU encroachment. Its pronouncement implicitly indicates, 
contrary to what Denmark had contended in its observations,477 that the Council has 
no  discretion to  rely  on  Article  K.3  TEU if  the conditions  for  the application of 
Article 100c EC are fulfilled. Therefore, if a subject matter falls within the scope of 
the EC Treaty, the Member States and the Council cannot address this subject matter 
by relying on the provisions of Title VI of the TEU. Indeed, while in this case the 
dilemma was between the EC Treaty and Title VI, it can be suggested that the Court’s 
approach would be similar in a case involving the EC Treaty and Title V.478 
It becomes apparent that the duty to maintain and build upon the acquis organises, in 
several ways, the powers of the institutions and of the Member States acting in the 
framework of  the EU. First,  they are  forced to  ascertain  whether  they should act 
through the Community law-making procedures before they adopt any measure under 
Title V or IV. They may act in the latter context only if the EC route proves to be 
legally  unpractical,  notably because the planned action falls  outside the conferred 
powers of the Community.479 As suggested by Eeckhout, where the EC Treaty confers 
upon the Community powers for a specific form of foreign policy such as commercial 
475 Paras. 16-17.
476 The  Portugal case that was examined in Chapter 2 (C-268/94  Portugal v Council), also offers an 
illustration of the Court’s role in policing the demarcation between the Community framework and the 
third pillar. It may be recalled that the Court found that the Agreement’s provisions on drugs were not 
more than ancillary to the general objective of the agreement. As such they did not require a reference 
to the provisions of ex Article K, as argued by the Portuguese government. 
477 See also Opinion of AG Fennelly, para. 9.
478 See Peers (1998b). 
479 As provided in Article 5(1) EC.
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policy, those powers take precedence. These can be approached as a  lex specialis, 
although not confined by the TEU provisions on the CFSP.480 Secondly, the duty to 
maintain  and  build  upon  the  acquis  may  limit  the  scope of  measures  which  are 
adopted in the contexts of titles V and VI. The latter should not in principle impinge 
on the provisions of the EC Treaty. A fortiori, Title V and Title VI measures should 
not contradict Community norms. 
The  provisions  of  Article  47  TEU  can  be  used  before  the  Court  to  challenge  a 
measure which would violate the principle it encapsulates, but the latter principle also 
guides the action of the institutions in the context of the Union in general, and in the 
system of  EU external  relations  in  particular.481 As  with  the  duty  of  cooperation 
examined in the previous chapter, the obligation to maintain and develop the acquis 
stems from the requirement of Member States and institutions’ loyalty vis-à-vis the 
Community.482 In the context of a mixed agreement, the duty of cooperation aims at 
ensuring that mixity does not undermine the Community external action. Similarly, 
the duty to preserve the acquis is a guarantee that development of alternative methods 
of cooperation among the Member States in the context of the EU, do not duplicate 
and/or contradict actions of the Community or develop at the latter’s expense. The 
duties thus complement one another.  The provisions of the Treaty,  as well  as  the 
Court case law, suggest that, like the duty to maintain and build upon the acquis, the 
duty of cooperation has to be nuanced in the context of the EU constitutional order.
480 Eeckhout (2004: 151).
481 For  a  recent  illustration  of  the  guiding  role  of  Article  47  TEU,  see  Council  Joint  Action 
2004/551/CFSP  of 12 July  2004  on  the  establishment  of  the European  Defence  Agency  (OJ 2004 
L245/17), particularly Art. 1(2). 
482 Arguably, it also represents an additional element to guarantee the autonomy of the Community 
legal order, which had already been emphasised by the Court on several occasions, particularly in the 
context of external relations. See e.g. Opinion 1/76 Laying-up Fund, Opinion 1/91 EEA; Opinion 1/92; 
and  Opinion  1/00  ECAA;  where  the  Court  insists  on  the  preservation  of  the  autonomy  of  the 
Community legal order, from external interference. The Court held that “where an agreement more 
clearly separates the Community from the other Contracting Parties from an institutional point of view 
and no longer affects either the exercise by the Community and its institutions of their powers by 
changing the nature of those powers, or the interpretation of Community law, the autonomy of the 
Community legal order can be considered to be secure”.
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4.1.3. A  principle  qualified  by  other  fundamentals  of  the  EU 
constitutional order
The duty to maintain and build upon the acquis has to be considered in the more 
general context of the TEU, and notably in conjunction with the other principles of 
the Union’s constitutional order. 
First,  Article  2  provides  that  “the  objectives  of  the  Union  shall  be  achieved  as 
provided in the [TEU] and in accordance with the conditions and the timetable set out 
therein while respecting the principle of subsidiarity as defined in Article 5 [EC]”. 
According to the principle of subsidiarity, the Community will take action in areas 
which do not fall within its exclusive competence only and insofar as the objectives of 
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States.483 While 
Member  States  are  in  principle  precluded  from  acting  outside  the  Community 
framework in areas of Community exclusive competences,484 they can act in their own 
right,  alone  or  collectively,  including  meeting  qua states  within  the  Council  but 
outside the Community law framework, in spheres where the Community has non-
exclusive  competence.485 Member  States’  freedom  to  act  outside  the  Treaty 
framework in areas of shared competence has indeed been acknowledged by the Court 
of Justice, particularly in fields such as development cooperation, where Community 
and  Member  States  competences  are  complementary.486 Therefore,  the  duty  to 
483 For a demarcation between areas falling within Community exclusive competence and those falling 
outside, see Wyatt and Dashwood (2000: 158-159), cp. Toth (1994: 39-40).
484 Case 804/79 Commission v United Kingdom. See also Joined Cases 3/76, 4/76 and 6/76 Kramer and 
Others.
485 As suggested by Alan Dashwood (1996b: 115), the function of subsidiarity is to “guide the decision 
whether powers given to the Community should actually be used, in cases where the objective in 
question  can  also  be  pursued  by  the  Member  States  individually”.  Further  on  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity in the post-Maastricht context, see Cass (1992), Steiner (1994: 49), Emiliou (1994: 65) and 
Flaesch-Mougin (1993: 370ff). For more recent analysis: e.g. de Búrca (1998, 2001: 131), de Búrca 
and de Witte (2002: 201), Bermann (2002: 75) and Weatherill (2005 forthcoming). 
486 See  in  this  regard  Joined  Cases  C-181/91  &  248/91  Parliament  v  Council  and  Commission 
(Bangladesh); the Court held since  the Community does not have exclusive competence in the field of 
humanitarian aid, consequently the Member States are not precluded from exercising their competence in 
that regard collectively in the Council or outside it. In the same vein, see Case C-316/91 Parliament v  
Council (EDF).  See also Declaration No 10 on ex-Articles 109, 130r and 130y of the EC Treaty; 
attached to the Final Act of the Treaty of Maastricht. Further: Pernice and Thym (2002: 387). It should 
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maintain and build upon the acquis does not force the Member States to act in the 
context  of  the  Community  whenever  the  subject  matter  concerns  an  area  of  non-
exclusive competence of the Community. Instead, it implies that if they decide to act 
at  EU level  in  spheres  of  potential  Community  competence,  Member  States  and 
institutions, and notably the Council, are precluded from taking the route of Title V or 
VI.487 They have to observe the TEU constitutional distribution of decision-making 
authority, priority being given to the Community method, under the supervision of the 
Court. 
Secondly, and as evoked in the previous chapter, the EC Treaty provides for potential 
and sometimes mandatory CFSP interference with the functioning of the Community 
legal order. A case in point is the provision on the adoption of sanctions against third 
states. Article 301 EC (ex-228a) provides that: 
Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action adopted according 
to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union relating to the common foreign 
and security policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in 
part  or  completely,  economic  relations  with  one  or  more  third  countries,  the 
Council  shall  take  the  necessary urgent  measures.  The  Council  shall  act  by  a 
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.
The Community power to establish sanctions against a third state thus derives from 
the prior adoption of a CFSP common position or joint action, requiring action at the 
EC level.488 While the Commission remains in charge of the proposal to establish 
sanctions by the Community, the latter is determined by the CFSP act taken by the 
Council.489 Measures within the Community are based on Article 133 EC to restrict 
imports and exports of goods towards the state concerned,490 whereas restrictions on 
be recalled that the principle of subsidiarity applies not only in the EC context but more generally in 
the context of the other EU sub-orders; see in this respect: Fink-Hooijer (1994: 178). 
487 Eeckhout (2004: 150), see also Common Market Law Review (1995).
488 Further: e.g. Denza (2002: 296), Koutrakos (2001: 67), Wessel (1999: 175), Ryba (1995: 21-22), 
Fink-Hooijer (1994: 175). Also on the older practice of sanctions: Kuijper (1993: 387). 
489 One could also mention the specific regime on dual use goods until it was finally decided that it 
should be based on Art. 133 EC. Further: Koutrakos (2001), esp. chap. 5, Eeckhout (1994: chap. 7) and 
Denza (2002: 301-304).
490 For instance, EC Council Regulation 3274/93 (OJ 1993 L295/1) based on the previous Council 
common position with regard to the reduction of economic relations with Libya (OJ 1993 L 295/7). 
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capital and payment are established on the basis of Article 60 EC, and restrictions on 
the movement of persons, and particularly visas restrictions are adopted on the basis 
of Article 62 EC. 
The CFSP influence on the functions of Commission’s delegations abroad could also 
be mentioned as another example of interactions between the CFSP and the EC. In 
particular, the TEU provides that they shall cooperate with Member States’ diplomatic 
and consular missions in ensuring that the common positions and common measures 
adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented.491 
The  foregoing  shows  that  the  duty  to  maintain  the  acquis  has  to  be  nuanced. 
Interference from Title V with the EC legal order, in particular, is possible, if not 
sometimes required, for the Community to exercise its powers.492 If one elaborates on 
Eeckhout’s naval metaphor mentioned earlier, it appears that the compartments in the 
EU vessel between the Community, on the one hand, and Title V and Title VI, on the 
other, are not fully watertight.493 Leaks of CFSP into the EC compartment can and 
should occur to keep the boat afloat.494
Thirdly,  the  acquis  is  called  upon  to  evolve.  The  Community  legal  order  is  by 
definition  dynamic  and  it  is  inconceivable  that  maintaining  the  acquis  should  be 
understood as a legal/regulatory status quo. The duty of Article 2 TEU seems to imply 
that building upon the acquis has more to do with respecting and possibly widening 
the  application  of  the  Community  method,  than  simply  expanding  in  quantitative 
terms the substantive body of EC law.495 Indeed, the introduction of the principle of 
491 Art. 20 TEU (ex-Art. J.6 TEU – Maastricht version). Further: Fink-Hooijer (1994: 191).
492 Of  course,  the  role  of  the  European  Council  could  also  be  underlined  as  another  example  of 
significant extra Community influence on the development of EC law. The next chapter will come back 
to this point.  
493 Eeckhout (2004: 146).
494 See further below. Catherine Flaesch-Mougin (1993 : 374) considered that the Community decision 
to establish sanctions, on the basis of  a Council CFSP action “revient à une exécution des décisions 
politiques plus qu’à une véritable recherche de cohérence et fait de la Communauté le bras séculier de 
la PESC”.
495 To be sure, it could be recalled that the duty to maintain and build on the acquis was formulated 
from the outset in Article B (and then in Article 2) as follows: “with a view to considering… to what 
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subsidiarity mentioned earlier has had the effect of stimulating the revision of existing 
EC legislation, or even sometimes the withdrawal of legislative proposals.496 In other 
words, the Community method could be used also to revisit and update the acquis,497 
particularly in the light of the objectives of the Union. 
To sum up, the duty to maintain and build upon the acquis communautaire guides the 
institutions and Member States when they operate in the framework of the Union in 
general, and as they act within the system of EU external relations in particular. They 
have to refrain from acting in  breach of  the Community acquis in its  substantive 
aspects,  but  they must also observe the acquis in methodological  and institutional 
terms, in the sense of favouring the Community method wherever possible, under the 
supervision of the Court. As with the duty of cooperation, the duty to maintain and 
develop the acquis stems from the need to establish an underlying sense of allegiance 
of Member States and institutions towards the Community. They both ensure, under 
the supervision of the Court, that Member States and institutions act with a view to 
helping the Community fulfil its tasks. At the same time the Community’s tasks are to 
be  fulfilled  in  the  general  framework  of  the  Union,  taking  account  of  its  other 
fundamental principles, particularly the principle of consistency.
4.2. The principle of consistency in the external activities of the Union
While Member States and institutions have to cooperate in the specific context of 
mixed agreements, and favour Community external action wherever legally possible 
and politically desirable, they also have to ensure consistency of the external activities 
of the Union as a whole. The principle of consistency has a prominent place in the 
extent the policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be revised with the 
aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the Community” (emphasis 
added). Von Bogdandy and Nettesheim (1996: 277): Article 46 is a provision “intended to protect the 
substantial level of integration” (emphasis added). 
496 Consider,  in this regard,  the regular Better  Lawmaking reports of the Commission, e.g.  “Better 
Lawmaking  2002”  (European  Commission,  2002)  and  the  President  of  the  Commission’s  report 
concerning the Commission’s review of existing and proposed legislation in the light of the subsidiarity 
principle, submitted to the Edinburgh European Council in December 1992 (European Council, 1992b: 
12), esp. Annex 2 to Part A of the Conclusions of the Presidency, at p. 16.
497 Further: Curti Gialdino (1995: 1106).
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constitutional  order  of  the  Union  in  general,  and  in  the  system  of  EU  external 
relations in particular, given the co-existence of different bases and frameworks for 
elaborating  the  EU  external  dimensions.498 This  section  sheds  light  on  the 
constitutional foundations of the principle of consistency (4.2.1), its meaning as the 
pursuit  of coherence (4.2.2) and its application, likely to remain that of a guiding 
principle rather than a judicial concept (4.2.3). 
4.2.1. The constitutional foundations of the principle of consistency
The concept of consistency predates the TEU, and was first introduced by the Single 
European  Act  (SEA).  In  the  latter’s  Preamble,  reference  was  made  to  the 
“responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking ever increasingly with one 
voice and to act with consistency and solidarity in order more effectively to defend its 
common interests  and independence”.  Moreover  Article  30(5)  SEA stipulated that 
“the external policies of the European Community and the policies adopted by the 
European Political Cooperation must be consistent”.499
The TEU echoes and elaborates on the provisions of the SEA.500 The requirement of 
consistency appears already in Article 1 which foresees that the Union’s task shall be 
“to organise, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between 
the Member States and between their peoples”. Article 3 TEU refers three times to 
consistency.  Its  first  paragraph  states  that  the  Union  shall  be  served  by  a  single 
institutional  framework  which  shall  ensure  such  consistency.  Its  second  indent 
specifies that the Union shall  ensure the consistency of its external activities as a 
whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development 
policies. Finally, it endows the Commission and the Council with the responsibility to 
ensure such consistency, while the Council is charged with a specific responsibility 
498 See Report of Reflection Group IGC 1996 (1995). Further: e.g. Clapham (1999: 636ff). 
499 Further: Allen (1998: 48ff).
500 Unity and coherence were among the central  aims mentioned in the Conclusions of the Dublin 
meeting of the Heads of States or Government in April 1990 (European Council, 1990a). They were 
also mentioned among the priorities of the CFSP by the Brussels European Council of October 1993 
(European Council, 1993b).
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under Title V to “ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the 
Union”.501 Consistency is thus a recurring theme in the TEU. 
4.2.2. The principle of consistency understood as pursuit of coherence
The concept of consistency is ambiguous in the EU context. Indeed, various observers 
have  noted  that  the  different  linguistic  versions  of  the  Treaty  contribute  to  this 
haziness. For instance, the French version refers to the term “cohérence”, which, it 
has  been  submitted,  differs  in  meaning  from the  word  “consistency”  in  English. 
Similar differences also exist between the English version and other versions, notably 
the German text which also includes the concept of “Kohärenz”.502 
Commentators  mostly  submit  that  the  term  consistency  means  absence  of 
contradiction,  whereas  coherence  rather  implies  “positive  connections”503 or  “the 
construction of a united whole”.504 Consistency is said to encapsulate the ideas of 
compatibility and of making good sense, whereas coherence relates more to synergy 
and adding value.505 Indeed, coherence in law would be a matter of degree, whereas 
consistency would be a static concept. Concepts of law can be more or less coherent 
but cannot be more or less consistent. They are either consistent or not.506 In view of 
this ambiguity, the question has been raised as to what the correct meaning of the 
Treaty expression should be,507 even if, as pointed out by Eileen Denza,508 the whole 
debate tends to overlook the fact that in English “coherence” has the primary meaning 
501 Last sentence of Art. 13(3) TEU. 
502 Further  on  this  point,  see  Koutrakos  (2001:  39-44),  Tietje  (1997:  211),  Neuwahl  (1994:  227), 
Timmermans (1996: 66), Krenzler and Schneider (1997: 133).
503 Tietje (1997: 212).
504 Koutrakos (2001: 39).
505 Missiroli (2001: 182). 
506 Tietje (1997: 211), citing W. Van der Velden (1992), “Coherence in law: a deductive and a semantic 
explication of coherence” in B. Brouwer  et al (eds.),  Coherence and Conflict in Law, (Kluwer) 257. 
For  a  Spanish  approach,  see  Torrent  (1998),  also  available  in  French  at: 
http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/chap10.pdf .
507 Although, as a matter of principle, each and every official version of the Treaty is authentic; see Art. 
314 EC. 
508 Denza (2002: 289-290).
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of  “making  sense”,  as  opposed  to  “incoherence”.  In  the  English  language, 
“consistency”  can  indeed  be  used  to  indicate  degrees  of  interconnection. Panos 
Koutrakos,  among  others,  proposes  a  broad  understanding  of  consistency  which 
implies more than simply absence of contradiction between different instruments and 
actions.  He  uses  the  provisions  of  Article  301  EC  on  sanctions  to  support  the 
proposition that the interaction between the sub-orders of the Union should not be 
merely envisaged as a non-contradictory one. Instead, it  should be conceived as a 
relationship based on synergy.509 
Although  there  is  no  system  of  linguistic  majority  in  EU  law,510 an  additional 
indication for understanding consistency as “coherence” lies in the fact that official 
versions of the TEU tend to refer more to the concept of “coherence” rather than 
“consistency”.511 Moreover, the use of “coherence” has become more systematic,512 
even  in  the  English  version  of  documents  relating  to  the  establishment  of  the 
European  Security  and  Defence  Policy,513 where  the  requirement  of  “inter-pillar 
coherence” has become critical.
509 Koutrakos (2001: 39).
510 As pointed out above, the rule is rather that each and every version is authentic. This has been 
confirmed by the Court of Justice, e.g. in Case 283/81  Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v  
Ministry of Health,  para. 18.  See Opinion of Stix Hackl AG in Case C-265/03  Igor Sumitenkov v 
Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol.
511 Wessel (2000b: 1135), Duke (1999: 4). 
512 The text submitted by the Irish Presidency to the December 1996 Dublin European Council as a 
general outline for a draft revision of the Treaties included a section entitled “An effective and coherent 
foreign policy” [The European Union today and tomorrow: adapting the European Union for the  
benefit of its peoples and preparing it for its future, CNF 2500/96, Part A, Section III].  
513 See notably the Presidency Progress Report to the 1999 Helsinki European Council on Common 
European Policy on Security and Defence, where it is stated that: “[t]he Council decides upon policy 
relevant to Union involvement in all phases and aspects of crisis management, including decisions to 
carry out Petersberg tasks in accordance with Article 23 of the EU Treaty.  Taken within the single 
institutional framework, decisions will respect European Community competences and ensure inter-
pillar coherence in conformity with Article 3 of the EU Treaty” (emphasis added) (European Council, 
1999d).  More  recently  the “Action Plan for  Civilian Aspects  of  ESDP” adopted by the  European 
Council  on  17-18  June  2004,  insists  under  the  heading  “synergies”  on  the  “complementarity  and 
coherence”  between all  the  instruments  it  has  at  his  disposal  (European  Council,  2004a).  Indeed, 
“coherence” is also used by the legal service of the Council (2000).
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Perhaps more importantly, there is a legal argument to support the proposition that the 
TEU principle of consistency relates to the pursuit of coherence. Simply, the principle 
set out in Article 3 TEU would be deprived of any raison d’être if it were merely to 
prevent  legal  contradictions  between  measures  taken  by  institutions  and  Member 
States. As it was pointed out above, the TEU foresees other devices to tackle such 
legal  contradictions,  under  judicial  supervision.  First,  the  principle  of  supremacy 
ensures that Member States measures conflicting with Community law give way to 
the application of the latter. Secondly, the duty of Article 47 TEU to maintain and 
build on the acquis guarantees the primacy of EC law over Titles V and VI norms. 
Thirdly, in case a CFSP measure is adopted to fulfil the objectives of the EU, the EC 
may,  in  certain  circumstances,  consequently  have  to  act  accordingly  as  suggested 
earlier. 
The  foregoing  argument  supports  the  view  that  the  principle  of  “consistency” 
established by the TEU should be viewed as the pursuit of coherence in the external 
activities  of  the  Union  based  on  synergy  and  thus  integration  of  the  different 
components  of  the  EU  external  relations,  rather  than  simply  absence  of  legal 
contradiction. 514 
4.2.3. The principle of consistency as a guiding principle for EU external 
action
The requirement of consistency established in the Common Provisions of the TEU has 
a  wide  scope  of  application.  While  Article  1  TEU tends  to  focus  on  its  internal 
application, both Article 3 TEU and Article 13(3) TEU concern the external activities 
of the Union “as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic 
and development policies” (emphasis added). Placed at the beginning of the TEU, it 
guides the activities of the EU as a whole. Both institutions and Member States are 
expected to take account of the requirement of consistency.515 
514 Cremona (1999a: 169). Pascal Gauttier (2004: 26). 
515 Consistency equally concerns each of the institutions. The requirement of consistency is equally 
relevant in the relationship between the different Directorate-Generals in the Commission, or indeed 
within the Council, see in this regard the Final Report of the Working Group VII “External Action”, 
established in the context of the European Convention on the Future of Europe (European Convention, 
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In more practical terms, the Council and the Commission are made responsible for 
ensuring such consistency.516 The Treaty of Amsterdam reinforced this provision by 
establishing an obligation upon them to “cooperate to this end” (Article 3 TEU), thus 
mirroring  the  duty  of  cooperation  between  the  Member  States  and  Community 
institutions.517 In reality, the institutional cooperation might be more difficult than it 
seems,518 as it will become apparent in the next chapter. By contrast, the role of the 
Court is minimal, as it does not have jurisdiction over the Common Provisions of the 
TEU.519 It ensures that the law of Article 47 TEU is observed, notably by ensuring 
that the right legal basis (EC/CFSP/PJCCM) is chosen for EU acts.520 As pointed out 
earlier, the case law on this issue is hitherto scarce,521 and limited to the control of 
consistency in the restrictive sense (absence of contradiction between the different 
external  actions),  by  opposition  to  a  control  of  coherence  (complementarity  and 
synergy of these actions) which would imply a political assessment, which is arguably 
better left to the decision-making entities. 
In  relation  to  the  other  principles  and  duties  pointed  out  above,  the  principle  of 
consistency appears to  complement the duty of cooperation between Member States 
and institutions in the context of mixed agreement, and the duty of loyalty in the 
(2002b: 17), and further below, section 6.2.  
516 Art. 3(2) TEU. 
517 Eeckhout (2004: 154, footnote 60).
518 Further: Allen (1998: 48ff).
519 In accordance with Article 46 TEU, the Court does not have jurisdiction on the Common Provisions. 
The only exceptions concern first, “Article 6(2) with regard to actions of the institutions, insofar as the 
Court  has  jurisdiction  under  the  Treaties  establishing  the  European  Communities  and  under  this 
Treaty”; and second “the purely procedural stipulations in Article 7, with the Court acting at the request 
of the Member State concerned…”. The limits to the Court’s jurisdiction, particularly to interpret the 
TEU Common Provisions,  was  recalled  by  the  Court  of  Justice  itself  in  case  C-167/94  Criminal 
proceedings against Juan Carlos Grau Gomis and others, para. 6. Further: Neuwahl (1994: 235ff). 
520 The Court is to assess the true nature of the contested measure in order to determine its relevant 
legal basis, along the lines of its Titanium Dioxyde jurisprudence: Wessel (2000b: footnote 88).
521 The intervention of the Court under the heading consistency could also occur in situations of conflict 
between EC rules and national rules implementing an EU measure based on title V or VI. The issue 
here would be of supremacy of EC law, and the Court of Justice could ask the national court to set 
aside the contested national measure.
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context of CFSP.522 Rather than being devices to guarantee the multifarious division 
of competences, these duties of cooperation, loyalty and consistency, in principle, aim 
at moderating the implications of such division.523
4.3. The Union’s single institutional framework as factor of consistency
It has been seen that the system of EU external relations is underpinned by, first, the 
duty to  cooperate  between Member States and Community,  complemented by the 
CFSP principle of loyalty, secondly, the duty to maintain and build upon the acquis, 
and thirdly, the principle of consistency. In addition, the Treaty on European Union 
provides in its Article 3 that:
The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure 
the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its 
objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire. 
Also  included  in  the  Common Provisions  of  the  TEU,  Article  5  states  that  “the 
European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Court 
of Auditors shall exercise their powers  under the conditions and for the purposes  
provided for,  on the  one  hand,  by the  provisions  of  the  Treaties  establishing  the 
European  Communities  and  of  the  subsequent  Treaties  and  Acts  modifying  and 
supplementing  them and,  on  the  other  hand,  by  other  provisions  of  this  Treaty” 
(emphasis added). The TEU thus establishes a single institutional framework, as a 
factor of  consistency in  the Union’s activities  (4.3.1),  but  involving differentiated 
forms of interaction between the institutions (4.3.2). 
4.3.1. A single set of institutions for the EU
522 As indicated in chapter 3, this complementary character has been pointed out by Frid (1995: 149). 
Heliskoski (2001: 64) has also highlighted the link between the duty of cooperation and Art. 3 TEU.
523 Willaert and Marquéz-Ruiz (1995: 39). Piet Eeckhout (2004: 153) has a more cynical approach to 
the principle of consistency suggesting that “the constitutional emphasis on consistency is something of 
a subterfuge, an attempt to cover up inter-institutional strife, to throw a constitutional blanket on the 
struggles between the Council and the Commission, not to mention the Parliament”.  
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Each of the institutions evoked in Article 5 TEU is equally mentioned in the specific 
context of the EC Treaty, in Article 7, and extensively dealt with in its Part V. Title V 
and Title  VI of the TEU refer to several  provisions notably of Part  V of the EC 
Treaty. For instance, Article 41 (ex K.13) TEU provides that “Articles 189, 190, 195, 
196 to  199,  203,  204,  205(3),  206 to  209,  213 to  219,  255 and 290 of  the [EC] 
Treaty… shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title”. 
This cross-referencing confirms that  the institutions of the Union are  the same as 
those  of  the  Community,524 established  by  the  Treaties  of  Paris  and  Rome,  and 
thereafter merged on the basis of the Merger Treaty.525 The “loan”,526 or “sharing”527 
of the Community institutions to serve the Union in the context of Titles V and VI, 
can contribute to the continuity that Article 5 TEU refers to and calls upon.  
4.3.2. A  single  framework  involving  differentiated  institutional 
interactions
While the institutional framework is single in terms of the institutions it involves, it is 
however  plural  in  terms  of  the  interactions  taking  place  within  it.  The  interplay 
between  the  institutions  takes  different  forms,  for  the  powers  and  role  of  each 
524 In case C-176/96  Jyri Lehtonen v Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL, para. 33, the Court 
referred  to  the  “institutions  of  the  European  Union”.  Also  Article  51(1)  of  the  EU  Charter  of 
Fundamental rights states that its provisions are “addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union” 
(OJ 2000 C364/01).
525 Treaty establishing a  Single  Council  and a  Single  Commission of  the  European  Communities, 
signed in Brussels on 8 April 1965.
526 Expression used by Curtin (1993: 67). 
527 The glossary of  the European Convention on the future of  Europe’s website  defines  the single 
institutional  framework  as  follows:  “The  single  institutional  framework  means  the  Union  acting 
through  shared  institutions,  whatever  its  area  of  action,  in  order  to  ensure  the  consistency  and 
continuity of that action. This applies equally to differentiated integration operations which do not 
involve all Member States.”
149
institution vary, depending on the EU sub-order in which it act,528 and on the subject-
matter of the action within each of these sub-orders. 
There is no need to recall each and every subtle difference in institutions’ powers 
under and within the various sub-orders in the context of the TEU.529 Suffice to say 
that, first, the Council invariably enjoys the same role in each sub-order as it is the 
essential  decision-making  body  in  the  Union  as  a  whole.530 Secondly,  the  other 
institutions, particularly the Parliament, the Commission and the Court have different 
roles according to the matter in question. For instance, in the context of Title V, the 
Commission is “fully associated” with the work carried out in the CFSP field,531 and 
together with the Presidency in the Union’s representation and in the implementation 
of decisions taken under Title V.532 Furthermore, it shares a power of initiative with 
the Member States,533 and is responsible, together with the Council, of ensuring the 
consistency of the Union’s external activities.534 As regards the European Parliament, 
it has to be consulted by the Presidency on the main aspects and the basic choices of 
528Art. 28(1) TEU (Title V) provides that the provisions of Articles 189, 190, 196 to 199, 203, 204, 206 
to 209, 213 to 219, 255 and 290 of the EC Treaty shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas 
referred to in… title [V]”. Article 41(1) TEU (Title VI) also states that “Articles 189, 190, 195, 196 to 
199, 203, 204, 205(3), 206 to 209, 213 to 219, 255 and 290 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community  shall  apply  to  the  provisions  relating  to  the  areas  referred  to  in  this  title.  Hence  the 
provisions of the EC concerning the institutions apply only in a selective fashion in the context of the 
other  sub-orders.  The  provisions  of  Articles  195  (on  the  Ombudsman)  and  205(3)  (constructive 
abstention within the Council) EC apply in the context of Title VI, but not in the context of Title V.
529 Further on this point: Cremona (1994: 255ff), Flaesch-Mougin (1993: 388ff), Macrae (1994: 171), 
van Solinge (1993: 113) and Fink-Hooijer (1994: 186ff).
530 This unvarying function partly explains why it sees itself as an institution of the Union. Just a few 
days after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the Council renamed itself “Council of the 
European Union”. Council Decision 93/591 of 8 November 1993 (OJ 1993 L281/18) concerning the 
name to be given to the Council following the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union states 
that: “[t]he Council shall henceforth be called the ‘Council of the European Union’ and shall be so 
designated, in particular in all the acts which it adopts, including those adopted under Titles V and VI 
of the Treaty on European Union; political declarations which the Council adopts under the common 
foreign and security policy will thus be made in the name of ‘the European Union”.
531 Art. 27 TEU.
532 Art. 18(4) TEU.
533 Art. 22(1) TEU.
534 Art. 3(2) TEU.
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the CFSP. Its views should be duly taken into consideration. It should also be kept 
regularly informed, by the Presidency and the Commission, of the development of the 
Union’s foreign and security policy. It may also ask questions to the Council or make 
recommendations to it.535 Indeed, the Parliament, through its budgetary powers, has 
influence on the financial aspects of Title V.536 Finally, with respect to the Court, the 
CFSP falls outside the scope of its jurisdiction altogether.537 As suggested above, it 
can only review a CFSP measure on the basis of Article 230 EC on the ground that it 
has been adopted in breach of the EC Treaty.538 
The differentiated roles and powers of the institutions, albeit acting within a single 
framework,  have  led  to  the  view that  the  Treaty  establishes  a  single  institutional 
framework  en  trompe  l’oeil.539 It  has  indeed  generated  numerous  turf-battles  as 
regards the respective roles and competences of the different institutions. This state of 
affairs has contributed to increased fragmentation of EU external relations, rather than 
to consistency and coherence, as it shall be seen in the next chapter.540 At the same 
time, differentiation in the roles and powers of the institutions can be as significant 
within a  sub-order,  notably the EC Treaty,  as in the context of the TEU, without 
questioning the existence of a Community institutional framework.541 
The single institutional framework and the consistency to which it contributes, is also 
underpinned by the interactions between each institutions’ administrations and civil 
servants.542 The entry into force of the TEU generated widespread restructuring within 
each institution in order to give more content to the concept of single institutional 
535 Art. 21 TEU.
536 See  Commission  report  on  the  functioning  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  (European 
Commission,  1995e: note 157).
537 Art. 46 TEU. Case T-201/99 Royal Olympic Cruises and Others v Council and Commission. 
538 See the Court’s ruling in Case 170/96 Airport Transit Visa, and discussion above.
539 Timmermans (communication au Colloque de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles, L’Union européenne 
après Maastricht (Bruxelles, 1992), cited in Flaesch-Mougin (1993: 376). Deirdre Curtin (1993 27-30) 
speaks of a “fiction”. See also Weiler (1993: 58ff), von Bogdandy and Nettesheim (1996).
540 Schwalz (1998: 427), Allen (1998: 41).
541 Weiler (1993: 58ff). See also von Bogdandy and Nettesheim (1996) and evidence of J-C. Piris 
before the Working Group III (Legal personality) of the European Convention 26 June 2002 (Piris, 
2002: 9-10). 
542 Further: Koutrakos (2001: 38ff), Pernice and Thym (2002: 386ff).
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framework.543 Moreover, the unity of orientation of the institutional framework is also 
stimulated by the enhanced role of the European Council. Although not considered an 
institution stricto sensu,544 the European Council has become increasingly involved in 
the activities of the EU, as will become particularly evident in the next Part of this 
study.545 Indeed, its composition gives it a particular influence on all the activities of 
the Union, Community activities included. In particular, the presence of the President 
of  the  Commission  entails  that  the  latter  becomes  in  effect  committed  by  its 
orientations,546 which subsequently influence the Commission’s power of initiative.547 
To recapitulate, the single institutional framework foreseen by the TEU is conceived 
as  an  additional  factor  of  consistency  in  the  activities  of  the  European Union  in 
general.548 Commissioners,  Parliamentarians  and  Ministers  may  have  several  hats, 
they only have one head.549 Unlike the duty of cooperation, the duty to maintain the 
acquis and the principle of consistency, the single institutional framework is not, in 
itself, a principle guiding the action of the Community and the Member States in the 
framework of the Union. Instead, it is a procedural and organisational device to foster 
the  overall  consistency  of  Union’s  activities.  Moreover,  it  does  not  concern  the 
relationship between the Member States and the Community and Union, but relates to, 
and partly attenuate, the distribution of competences between the EU sub-orders.  
4.4. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the principles contained in the TEU which govern and 
organise the interactions between the Union’s sub-orders in the system of EU external 
relations. These principles have different functions and a distinct nature. The duty to 
543 See Fink-Hooijer (1994: 190) on the revised role of the Political Committee, the COREPER and the 
working groups.
544 In particular the European Council is not understood as one of the institutions whose decisions can 
be challenged before the Court of Justice. See order of the Court in Case C-253/94P Olivier Roujansky 
v Council of the European Union, confirming the findings of the CFI in Case T-584/93 Roujansky v  
Council of the European Union.
545 Further: Dashwood (2000a), de Schoutheete and Wallace (2002) and Neuwahl (1994: 239).
546 Dashwood (1998a: 1031).
547 See further developments on Chapter 4 of this study.
548 Jacqué (2001: 169). 
549 To paraphrase Sir Alec Douglas Home, former British Foreign Minister, cited in Allen (1998: 53).
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maintain and build upon the acquis communautaire entrenches the division of powers 
between the Community and the non-Community aspects of EU external relations. 
Interactions  between  them  are  determined  by  this  division  whose  respect  is 
guaranteed by the Court of Justice. By contrast, the principle of consistency aims at 
fostering synergy and coherence in the external activities of the Union. It is supported 
by the single institutional framework, but not guaranteed by the Court of Justice. As 
such it essentially has a guiding role, and its effectiveness is highly dependent on 
good will. Together with the duty of cooperation examined in the previous chapter, 
these principles underpin the system of EU external relations. They aim at ensuring 
the  coherence  of  the  EU external  action.  The  next  part  will  examine  how these 
principles  have  influenced,  if  at  all,  the  institutional  practice  as  evidenced in  the 
development of the Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine.
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PART III
AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS TESTED
IN THE PARTNERSHIPS WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE
The second chapter of this study drew attention to the proto cross-pillar aspects of the 
PCAs.  It  was  seen  that  the  Agreements  cover  not  only  areas  of  EC  external 
competence, they also enclose provisions which relate to Titles V and VI of the TEU. 
The connection  between the  PCAs and the  non-EC aspects  of  the EU was made 
possible, in particular, thanks to the participation of the Member States “acting in the 
framework  of  the  Union”.  In  the  absence  of  EU  legal  personality,  the  mixity 
embodied by the Agreements was found to be conducive to  the projection of  the 
Union  in  its  various  facets,  thus  remedying  its  inability  to  conclude  external 
agreements. 
The previous part underlined that the modalities of this projection are governed by the 
principles which underpin the system of EU external relations, namely the duty of 
cooperation,  the  maintenance  of  the  acquis  and  the  requirement  of  consistency, 
fostered by a single institutional framework. The combination of these devices aims to 
ensure the coherence of the external action of the Union, thus ultimately contributing 
to the TEU objective of asserting its identity on the international scene. 
The present Part looks at the contribution of institutional practice as evidenced in the 
Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine against this conceptual background, and in the 
context of rapid constitutional evolution in the EU. Chapter 5 focuses on the effects of 
Treaty changes on the development of the Partnerships, contrasting the pre-and the 
post-Amsterdam periods, in the system of EU external relations. It will be seen that 
institutional practice has oscillated between the orthodox respect for the constitutional 
distribution of powers, and the quest for coherence, through informal arrangements 
between institutions. Chapter 6 argues that the enlargement process epitomises such 
informal arrangements, and that the Partnerships integrate some of the elements of the 
specific  enlargement  methodology,  anticipating  various  changes  included  in  the 
Constitutional Treaty.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR COHERENT PARTNERSHIPS IN AN 
INCREASINGLY POLARISED SYSTEM OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS
In  the aftermath of  the entry into force of the TEU signed in  Maastricht,  several 
complementary measures were adopted by the EU institutions towards Russia and 
Ukraine. While some of these initiatives were specifically foreseen by the PCAs,550 
other  non-EC  measures  have  mushroomed  with  the  stated  aim  to  invigorate  the 
Partnerships (5.1). 
The  constitutional  reforms  brought  about  by  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam,  and 
consolidated by the Treaty of Nice, catalysed the development of non-EC external 
dimensions of the EU. Indeed, several new initiatives were launched by the Union in 
the context of the Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine on the basis of Titles V and 
VI  TEU.  Such  additional  measures  arguably  had  the  effect  of  introducing  the 
entrenched  pillar  structure  of  the  EU therein,  thereby  complicating  the  quest  for 
coherent Partnerships (5.2).
550 As regards Russia, e.g. Agreement on cooperation in science and technology between the European 
Community and the Government of the Russian Federation (OJ 2000 L299/15), renewed in 2003 for a 
period of five years, by a Council Decision of 5 June 2003 concerning the conclusion of an Agreement 
aimed at renewing the Agreement on cooperation in science and technology between the European 
Community and the Government of the Russian Federation (OJ 2003 L299/20); Agreement between 
the European Community and the Russian Federation on trade in textile products (OJ 1998 L222/2); 
Agreement between the European Coal and Steel Community and the Government of the Russian 
Federation on trade in certain steel products (OJ 2002 L195/55), amended by Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1386/2004 of 26 July 2004 OJ 2004 L255/1.  As regards Ukraine,  e.g.  Agreement between the 
European  Economic  Community  and  Ukraine  on  trade  in  textile  products  (OJ  1994  L123/718), 
extended and amended by an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European 
Community and Ukraine  concerning the extension and amendment  of  the  Agreement  between the 
European Economic Community and Ukraine on trade in textile products initialled on 5 May 1993, as 
last amended by the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters initialled on 15 October 1999 
(OJ  2001  L16/3);  Agreement  on  cooperation  in  science  and  technology  between  the  European 
Community  and  Ukraine  (OJ  2003 L36/32)  renewed by  Council  Decision  of  22  September  2003 
concerning the conclusion of an Agreement renewing the Agreement on cooperation in science and 
technology between the European Community and Ukraine (OJ 2003 L267/24).
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The  adoption  of  several  non-EC  instruments  to  foster  the  development  of  the 
Partnerships  begs the question of  their  relation with the PCAs.  This question has 
broader ramifications. It concerns the interface between EC based instruments and EU 
based instruments. It therefore puts the principles examined in the previous Part of 
this discussion to the test. 
5.1. EU instruments developed towards Russia and Ukraine post-
Maastricht 
Following the entry into force of the TEU various instruments have been adopted by 
EU institutions, with the recurrent aim of ensuring a coherent development of the 
Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine. One of these instruments is provided by the 
TEU,  namely  the  Common  Position  (CP)  (5.1.1),  while  others,  such  as  “Action 
Plans”, are more informal instruments with no specific legal basis (5.1.2). 
It will be argued that the former encompasses the inherent tension between the EU 
sub-orders, and set in motion the constitutional principles governing their interaction. 
By  contrast,  the  latter  instruments  result  from  ad  hoc  interactions  that  are  not 
specifically anchored in one sub-order. Such informal interactions tend to supersede 
“pillar politics”, thanks to the political endorsement of the European Council.
5.1.1. The EU Common Position towards Ukraine: a CFSP instrument 
igniting institutional tension 
On the occasion of the signature of the PCA in Corfu in 1994, the European Council 
asked the Council to continue formulating a strategy towards Ukraine.551 It is in this 
551 European Council (1994a). Pt. I of the conclusions read as follows: 
The European Council invites the Council to continue its work on the formulation of an overall policy 
towards Ukraine. In elaborating such a policy, drawing on the full range of instruments available under 
the  Treaty  on  European  Union,  including  possible  joint  actions,  the  Council  should  follow these 
general guidelines: 
- sustained support for the consolidation of democratic institutions, for respect for human rights and for 
the achievement of market oriented economic reforms;
- the promotion of good neighbourly relations between Ukraine and its neighbours;
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context that a Common Position was adopted by the Council. Ukraine was thereby the 
first post-Soviet country to be the subject of such a formalised expression of political 
interest on the part of the Union.552 The CP covers the same substantive aspects as the 
PCA (5.1.1.1), thus raising the question of the interface between the two instruments, 
particularly from an institutional point of view (5.1.1.2). 
5.1.1.1. The substantive overlaps between the Common Position 
and the PCA 
The CP was adopted by the Council on 28 November 1994,553 a few months after the 
signature of the PCA with Ukraine. It was based on ex Article J.2 TEU and defined 
the EU objectives towards Ukraine in the following terms:
A. The European Union shall pursue the following objectives and priorities in its 
relations with Ukraine:
1.  To  develop  a  strong  political  relationship  with  Ukraine  and  increase 
cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union. The European Union will 
continue  to  support  the  independence,  territorial  integrity  and  sovereignty  of 
Ukraine.
2.  To support  democratic  development  in Ukraine,  through offering advice on 
legislation  and  practical  assistance  in  establishing  democratic  institutions,  and 
through contacts between Ukrainian and European officials, parliamentarians and 
non-governmental organizations at different levels.
3. To support economic stabilization and reform based on the agreement with the 
IMF and support from the IFIS, considering that the establishment of a market 
economy is a prerequisite for economic development and would enhance political 
- cooperation with Ukraine in multilateral fora in support of regional and international stability and the 
peaceful settlement of disputes;
- support for the full implementation of nuclear and conventional disarmament agreements;
- acceptance by Ukraine of internationally accepted nuclear safety standards within an overall energy 
policy.
552 Verrue (1995), “Ukraine and European Security - outline of intervention” in Gnauk ans Sachs (eds.), 
Die Ukraine und die europäische Sicherheit. Bericht über eine Konferenz des Aspens Instituts (Berlin, 
8-10 April 1995), cited in Alexandrova (1998: 160).
553 Common Position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European 
Union on the objectives and priorities of the European Union towards Ukraine (OJ 1994 L313/1). The 
adoption of the CP was welcome by the 1994 Essen European Council (European Council, 1994b). 
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and social stability. The early entry into force of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement is important in this context.
To support the integration of Ukraine into the world economic order. 
4. To continue to provide assistance for the process of nuclear disarmament, while 
attaching, in the context of its cooperation with Ukraine, the greatest importance 
to the implementation of Ukraine's obligations regarding nuclear disarmament and 
accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons State at the 
earliest possible time, which would free the way for the full implementation of the 
Start  I  and Start  II  agreements and while valuing the progress made so far  in 
nuclear disarmament. 
To promote Ukraine's cooperation as a neighbouring country in the Stability Pact, 
support  the  active  membership  in  NACC  and  the  rapid  development  of  a 
Partnership for Peace programme, and encourage the development of dialogue and 
cooperation with the WEU. 
To support  also  CSCE efforts  to  offer  assistance  in  resolving  tensions  in  the 
Crimea, within the context of Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty.
To promote  good neighbourly  relations  between  Ukraine  and  its  neighbours.  
5. To promote early implementation of the EU/G7 action plan on nuclear safety 
and reform of the energy sector, which, in particular, would lead to the closure of 
Chernobyl.
On various accounts, the multifaceted aims of the CP echo the objectives already set 
out in the PCA, thereby illustrating a substantive correspondence between the two 
instruments.  First,  point 1 above relates to the PCA objective of “[establishing] a 
framework  for  the  political  dialogue  allowing  the  development  of  close  relations 
between the Parties in this field”.554 Secondly, support for the independence, territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the Ukraine is clearly spelled out in the PCA.555 Thirdly, 
objective 2 echoes the human rights principles enshrined in the Agreement. Fourthly, 
the support towards Ukraine’s integration in the world economic order mentioned in 
the CP is also referred to in the PCA.556 
While it brings the security element of Title V into the Partnership, the CP appears to 
cover  the  same grounds  as  the  PCA by  recalling  and  reiterating  its  political  and 
economic  objectives.  On  the  one  hand,  the  CP  re-affirmation  of  the  political 
554 Art. 1 PCA.
555 Seventh indent of the Preamble.
556 Preamble, 15th indent.
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objectives of the Agreement may be regarded as an implementation of the duty of 
cooperation. In effect, through the CP, the Member States reiterate their commitment 
to  fulfil  the  non-EC  objectives  of  the  PCA,  thereby  facilitating  the  full-
implementation  of  the  Agreement.  On  the  other  hand,  recalling  the  economic 
objectives of the Partnership set out in the PCA means that the CP covers areas which 
relate more to the sphere of EC external relations. This overlap raises the question of 
the  interface  between  the  two  instruments,  and  more  generally  of  the  interaction 
between two of the Union’s sub-orders.
5.1.1.2. The contentious interface between the Common Position and 
EC law 
The CP inserts  the previous Community measures and programmes, including the 
PCA, into a global EU policy towards Ukraine. One of the recitals of the CP points 
out that account is taken of “the measures and programmes that the Community has 
undertaken with regard to Ukraine”. Moreover, the operative part expressly calls on 
the Member States to ensure the PCA early entry into force, to help achieving the 
objectives and priorities stated in the CP. The Agreement is thereby presented as a 
means to achieving the objectives of the EU towards Ukraine, as articulated in the CP.
Indeed, the CP includes, in its operative part, a section concerning its effects on the 
Member States and on the EU sub-orders. It  recalls that the CP is binding on the 
Member  States557 which  shall  ensure  that  their  national  policies  conform to  it.558 
Moreover, the CP states that:
The Council notes that  the Commission will direct its action towards achieving 
the objectives and priorities of this common position by appropriate Community  
measures (emphasis added).559
 
557 Further on the legal aspects of Common Positions, see Wessel (1999: 170-182).
558 They shall  also uphold the common position in  international  organizations  and at  international 
conferences, Art. J.2 (3) TEU.
559 Pt. B. It also provided that “[t]he Council will undertake the necessary measures to promote the 
abovementioned objectives and priorities, where appropriate on the basis of Commission proposals.”
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The terms of the CP are clear as regards the latter’s implications for the Community. 
The Commission is expected to act in the EC context with a view to fulfilling the 
objectives of the CP. While this approach may foster coherence in the overall EU 
approach towards Ukraine,560 it was not unanimously welcome. In particular, some 
observers,  including  from  the  legal  service  of  the  Commission,  felt  that  the 
terminology used notably in the CP suggested that the monopoly of initiative of the 
Commission in the context of the EC Treaty was being trespassed by the Council, 
acting on the basis of Title V. In other words, the compatibility of the CP with the 
constitutional duty to maintain the acquis, provided in Article 2 TEU was doubtful. In 
particular, Christiaan Timmermans has considered that instructions to act directed at 
the Commission, which are contained  in the operative parts of Common Positions, 
encroach on the Community competences. Such encroachment breaches the decision-
making procedures foreseen in the TEU. In Timmermans’ words, this phenomenon is 
symptomatic of a “constitutional erosion”.561  
The Council’s position in this debate was reflected in a legal opinion given by its 
legal service concerning the scope of a similar CP towards Rwanda, and in particular 
on its interface with EC law.562 Here, the legal service pointed out that a common 
position not only can, but  must take into account economic and other aspects of the 
EU relations with a third country. It found that it would be unconceivable for a global 
policy covering “all  areas  of  foreign and security  policy” to  ignore the economic 
aspect  of  the  relations  with  third  countries.563 Furthermore,  the  principle  of 
560 In this regard, the Preamble explicitly mentions the provisions of ex-Article C TEU, according to 
which  the  Council  and  the  Commission  are  responsible  for  ensuring  consistency  in  the  external 
activities of the Union. 
561 Timmermans (1996: 61), Koutrakos (2001: 45).
562 Council (1994): Avis du Service Juridique: “Une position commune définie par le Conseil sur la 
base de l’Article J.2 du Traité sur l’Union européenne et qui est destinée à établir une approche globale 
de la  politique à  mener par l’Union européenne à l’égard d’un pays tiers peut-elle  tenir compte et 
mentionner les aspects (notamment économiques) des relations avec le pays tiers en cause à propos 
desquels la Communauté serait compétente pour adopter des mesures concrètes”. 
563 The legal service relies on the provisions of Art. 11(1) TEU (ex Art. J.1), which envisage a common 
foreign and security policy “covering all areas of foreign and security policy”, to reject the exclusion 
from its ambit of aspects relating to Community external relations.
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consistency articulated in Article 13(3) TEU (ex Article J.8)564 and Article 3 TEU, 
which  also  refers  to  the  single  institutional  framework,  aims  at  ensuring  that  the 
different external dimensions of the Union are consistent and coordinated to ensure 
the development of a true foreign policy of the Union, and the assertion of its identity 
on the international scene, as foreseen in Article 2 TEU.
In  view  of  these  arguments,  the  legal  service  considered  that  common  positions 
should mention the objective and priorities  of the EU foreign policy towards that 
country in general terms, even if specific measures were to be eventually adopted by 
one of the Union components, such as one or more Member States or the Community. 
Indeed, limits to this approach were highlighted, in view of the duty to maintain the 
acquis communautaire enshrined in Article 2 TEU. In particular, the CFSP measure 
cannot  impose  any obligation  on  the  European Communities  or  their  institutions. 
They remain empowered to propose, adopt and implement Community measures in 
accordance with their respective powers and in compliance with the applicable rules 
and procedures.
This  legal  opinion  was  followed  by  the  establishment  of  an  unpublished  mode 
d’emploi endorsed by the Council in agreement with the Commission. It was agreed 
that common positions may refer to the Union’s external activities as a whole. It was 
also emphasised that the “power specific to [Unions’] institutions shall be preserved at 
any stage”, and that “[c]are shall be taken to ensure that the power of initiative held 
by the Commission under the Treaties is preserved”. Timmermans has noted that the 
mode d’emploi may have reconciled “the ambition to allow the CFSP to potentially 
cover the full scope of external action of the Union with the orthodoxy of decision-
making procedures, as clearly distinct between pillars”. He also pointed out that the 
decision-making  practice  following  the  adoption  of  the  mode  d’emploi  has 
nevertheless not been as considered.565
It  is  noteworthy  that  in  a  later  Communication  on  “future  EU-Russia  relations” 
proposing the adoption of a Common Position on Russia, the Commission gave its 
564 According to Art. 13(3), last indent, of the TEU: “The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency 
and effectiveness of action by the Union.”
565 Timmermans, (1996: 63).
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own version of what the implications of a CP should be.  As regards the Member 
States, Part B of the proposed CP simply recalled the TEU provisions that they should 
ensure that their national policies conform to the CP. Part C concerns the implications 
of the CP for the Community. Much more elaborate than the CP with Ukraine on this 
point, the proposed CP on Russia is drafted as follows: 
“The  Council  notes  that  the  Community  on  the  basis  of  the  Commission’s 
initiatives  will  contribute  to  the  above  objectives  and  priorities  in  particular 
through: 
1. the taking of all necessary steps to ensure, at such time as the criteria laid 
down by the European Union have been substantially fulfilled, the prompt 
signature of the Interim Agreement and early ratification of the [PCA];
2. the  pursuit  of  the  dialogue  with  the  Russian  Federation  concerning  its 
application for Membership of international organisations,  including the 
current application to WTO;
3. implementation of programmes in support of the democratic process and 
establishment of human rights in the Russian Federation, on the basis of 
among others, the EU’s Democracy Programme and in cooperation with 
the  relevant  programmes  of  the  Member  States,  and  support  for  other 
forms of cooperation at various levels between the Russian and European 
opinion-leaders, parliamentarians and representatives of governmental and 
non-governmental organisations, both at the centre and in the regions
4. continuing  to  refine  and  develop  its  technical  assistance  programmes, 
while  working  towards  more  effective  coordination  between  donor 
organisations implementing programmes with the Russian Federation, an 
in particular to ensure that the new TACIS regulation is adopted in due 
time, before the end of 1995;
5. working  with the  Russian  Federation  to  promote  European cooperation 
aimed  at  ensuring  the  rational  and  equitable  exploitation  of  energy 
resources, within the framework of the European Energy Charter;
6. reconsidering the question of the Russian Federation eventual access to 
certain of the European Union’s financial instruments, particularly in the 
context of the Trans-European Networks;
7. continuing to provided humanitarian assistance where necessary;
8. continuing  to  cooperate  with  the  Russian  Federation  in  the  filed  of 
education  and  training,  environmental  protection  and  nuclear  safety, 
industrial  cooperation,  information  technology  and  telecommunications, 
transport, science and research;
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9. implementation  of  new  information  actions  to  ensure  among  opinion 
leaders and public in the Russian Federation a deeper knowledge of the 
European Union and its concerns.
The measures and programmes evoked by the Commission relate to the  Community 
activities  in  relation  to  Russia.  It  is  a  non-exhaustive  list  of  measures  that  the 
Community may take “to contribute to the… objectives and priorities [of the CP]”. It 
indicates  that  on  these  issues,  the  Community  would  act  on  the  basis  of  the 
“Commission’s initiatives”. 
This formulation of the CP implications for the Community, and more particularly 
with regards to the Commission’s involvement in fulfilling the objectives of the CP, 
contrasts strikingly with the expression used by the  Council in the CP on Ukraine, 
mentioned above.  While  the  Council’s  CP contains  a  short  statement  establishing 
what appears to be an obligation of conduct (“the Commission  will direct its action 
towards achieving the objectives and priorities” – emphasis added), the Commission’s 
proposal includes a different formula which tends to emphasise its discretion (“the 
Community on the basis of the Commission’s initiatives will contribute to the above 
objectives  and  priorities”).  Through  the  latter  expression,  the  Commission 
acknowledges its obligations under Article 3 TEU, to ensure the consistency of the 
EU external action, but clearly underlines the idea that it  does not regard itself as 
being  directly  bound  by  the  Council’s  measure.  The  words  “initiatives”  and 
“contribute” seem particularly significant in this respect.
To recapitulate, the Common Position establishing the priorities and objectives of the 
EU towards Ukraine is a global instrument which covers the same grounds as the 
PCA. It potentially fosters coordination between the EU and the Member States by 
recalling the latter’s commitments under the PCA. The overlap between the scope of 
the CP and EC scope of competence however sparked an institutional battle between 
the Council and Commission, as regards the interface between CFSP measures and 
the Community legal order. The provisional outcome of the battle, expressed in the 
mode d’emploi,  suggests  that,  in  the  name of  coherence,  Common Positions  may 
cover all aspects of the external policy of the Union. However, they may not impose 
detailed obligations  on  Community  institutions  which  could  have  the  effect  of 
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limiting the discretionary power of the Commission, in breach of the duty to maintain 
the acquis, enshrined in Articles 2 and 47 TEU. 
Through this first illustration of the constitutional principles at work, it appears that 
the quest for coherence allows a certain flexibility as regards the orthodoxy of the 
decision-making procedures. It confirms that the compartments of the EU vessel are 
not watertight. 
5.1.2. The  burgeoning  of  all-encompassing  instruments  involving  the 
European Council
Following the entry into force of the TEU, the practice of including references to the 
different  elements  of  the  EU  policy  towards  a  third  country  within  the  same 
comprehensive  EU foreign policy document  became commonplace.  Alongside the 
Common Position on Ukraine, the EU adopted several such measures with the general 
ambition to develop the Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine. In contrast to the CP 
on Ukraine however, these measures were not formally based on the provisions of the 
TEU. They did not therefore openly raise concern about their interface with existing 
instruments  and  more  generally  with the  EC legal  order.  Indeed,  it  is  as  if  these 
measures  had  been  elevated  above  “pillar-politics”.  First,  they  were  elaborated 
through an ad hoc interaction between the Council and the Commission, detached 
from  the  procedural  rules  of  any  specific  sub-order.  Secondly,  they  reveal  an 
increased involvement of the European Council, working in tandem with the Council 
in the conduct of the Partnerships. It will thus be argued that institutional practice has 
tended to supersede constitutional provisions when it comes to ensuring coherence in 
external activities of the EU in general, and in the partnerships in particular. 
This tendency is apparent both in the 1996 EU Action Plan for Russia (5.1.2.1), and 
the EU Action Plan on Ukraine, adopted the same year (5.1.2.2). 
5.1.2.1. The  EU  Action  Plan  for  Russia:  elevating  the  Partnership  
above “pillar-politics”
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A EU Action Plan for Russia, adopted by the Council on 13 May 1996,566 exemplifies 
the  tendency  for  EU  institutions  to  adopt  sui  generis measures  to  define  all-
encompassing  policies  towards  Ukraine  and  Russia,567 thereby  developing  more 
pragmatic methods to ensure coherence.
The process leading to the adoption of the AP epitomises the development of ad hoc 
institutional  interactions between the Commission and Council,  involving also the 
European Council. This process started at the end of May 1995 when the Commission 
published the communication, mentioned in the previous section, and entitled “the 
European Union and Russia: the future relationship”.568 It proposed the adoption of a 
Common Position on the basis of Title V TEU on CFSP,569 with a view to defining the 
objectives and priorities of the Union in its relations with the Russian Federation.570 
The Communication points  out  that  it  was  “announced”  at  an informal  (so-called 
“Gymnich”)571 meeting of the EU Foreign Ministers in Carcassonne in March 1995.572 
The  expression  “announced”  would  tend  to  suggest  that  the  Commission 
566 General Affairs Council (1996).  
567 The AP establishes a long list  of measures and initiatives under five themes. The first foresees 
measures that underpin the EU “contribution to Russia’s democratic reforms”, mentioning in particular 
election monitoring, support for contacts between parliaments, support also for the development of 
regional and local administration and legal training. The second entitled “economic cooperation” is 
itself  divided in subsections on “development of  trade relations and integration of  Russia  into the 
international economy”, “regional cooperation”, “nuclear energy and nuclear safety”, “environment”, 
“modernisation of the production system” and “humanitarian aid”, all foreseeing measures of support 
and encouragement. Section III focuses on the “cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs”, 
and foresees actions to combat organised crime, particularly drug-related crime, money laundering, 
terrorism, actions to combat illegal immigration and cooperation on asylum and readmission policy. 
The fourth section deals with “security in Europe”, underlining initiatives to develop contacts within 
the frameworks of existing mechanisms to exchange expertise on disarmament, non proliferation, arms 
export  controls,  conflict  prevention  and  management,  and  “continued  promotion  of  information 
activities”.  Finally,  section  V  deals  with  “foreign  policy”  which  recommends,  inter  alia,  the 
strengthening of the political dialogue with Russia, “in accordance with the provisions of the PCA”.
568 European Commission (1995a).       
569 Further on the Commission’s Strategy, see Haukkala (2001: 28-30).
570 Part A of the CP.
571 The name “Gymnich” was given to this informal gathering of the EU Foreign Ministers after the 
first meeting of this kind held in 1974 in Schloss Gymnich near Bonn, Germany. There is no formal 
agenda, official press release or conclusions.
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spontaneously  decided  to  prepare  it.  Had  it  followed  a  Ministers’  invitation,  the 
Commission  would  probably  have  mentioned  it  in  the  introduction  of  its 
Communication. 
Such an initiative could be related to the general ambition of EU Member States and 
institutions to instil a new momentum in the EU relations with Russia following the 
Union’s  enlargement,  and  amid  concerns  over  Russia’s  political  and  economic 
development.573 In terms of objectives, the communication recommended to deepen 
and  expand  the  Union’s  relationship  with  Russia,  with  the  aim  of  achieving 
partnership while respecting democratic principles and human rights. To achieve this 
aim, three main tasks were set out for the Union, in cooperation with its principal 
partners. First, the Union was to reinforce the political, social and economic stability 
in Russia and the countries of the region. Secondly, it had to work towards improving 
living  standards  for  the  Russian  population,  and  thirdly,  it  had  to  enhance 
“cooperation in addressing the major regional and global issues of concern”.574 The 
572 It  has  been  reported  that  the  Communication  sprang  from  the  request  from  this  Carcassonne 
meeting; see Euro-East No 34 – June 1995, 14.
573 In  its  introduction,  the  Communication  points  out  that  “it  will  take  many  years  for  Russia  to 
overcome the Soviet legacy, and no certain prediction can be made about the road Russia will follow 
towards political and economic reform”. It also underlines that “it is time that the European Union and 
Russia recognized their historical vocation as the two principals European powers and in, the common 
interest,  sought  to  develop  the  close  and  mutually  enriching  partnership”  (European  Commission, 
1995a: 1-2).
574 Five priorities were envisaged in order to tackle these different tasks. A first priority was to involve 
Russia further in the development of the European security architecture, with the “overriding aim to 
avoid  new divisions  in  Europe”.  A second priority  was to  develop  further  the  democratic  norms, 
institutions and practices, the respect for human rights, individual liberties and the rule of law. Further 
progress towards economic reform and encouragement of EU/Russia economic interaction was the 
third priority, with the aim to ensure Russia’s economic liberalisation and establishment of the market 
economy, while taking account of the need to mitigate the social consequences of economic reform, 
and its gradual participation into a wider European economic zone of prosperity. A fourth priority was 
to intensify cooperation in other fields, inter alia the field of crisis prevention and management. The 
fifth and final priority was to extend open and constructive dialogue at different levels and in various 
fora, covering all matters of common interest, in particular, security, European integration, support for 
political and economic reform in the Russian Federation and the prevention and resolution of crises so 
that  the  views  of  the  European  Union  and  the  Russian  Federation  are  heard  in  due  time  and  at 
appropriate level. In this context, the political dialogue was to be developed.
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document proposed by the Commission is thus all-encompassing, dealing with foreign 
and security issues, as well as social and economic reform. 
There  may  also  be  an  institutional  rationale  underlying  this  proposal.  It  is  not 
improbable  that  the  Commission  wanted  fully  to  use  and  exercise  the  powers 
bestowed on it  by Title  V of  the TEU, and assert  its  role  in  CFSP matters.  It  is 
noticeable in this regard that it also published two other communications on the future 
EU relations with the three Trans-Caucasian Republics575 and with the Republics of 
Central Asia.576 Proposing CFSP measures towards these regions was probably the 
best way for the Commission to make itself useful.577 These Communications were 
presented to  the General  Affairs  Council  meeting in  June 1995.578 The latter  then 
instructed  the  COREPER  and  the  “relevant  working  group”  to  examine  what  it 
referred to as “major” Communications. The European Council thereafter took “note” 
of the Commission’s Communication on Russia in its meeting in Cannes, in June 
1995.579 It indeed confirmed the EU commitment to developing the European Union's 
relations with Russia, “a process which is essential to the stability of the European 
continent”.  Particularly,  it  reiterated  “the  European Union's  resolve  to  establish  a 
substantive  partnership  with  Russia,  on  the  basis  of  the  strategy  adopted  in  
Carcassonne  in  March 1995”  (emphasis  added).  While  taking  note  of  the 
Commission Communication, the European Council thus made it clear that when it 
comes to the strategic orientations of the EU Partnership with Russia, it would turn to 
the Ministers rather than to the Commission. 
The Commission Communication was not forgotten however. Having recalled what 
the Cannes European Council had agreed,580 the General Affairs Council, meeting in 
July 1995, pointed out that the Communication had been examined within its services, 
575 European Commission (1995g). 
576 European Commission (1995f). 
577 See the conclusions of the June 1992 Lisbon European Council (European Council, 1992a) and 
conclusions of the Brussels extraordinary European Council of 29 October 1993 (European Council, 
1993b). Further: Fink-Hooijer (1994: 184), Willaert and Marquéz-Ruiz (1995: 66) and Denza (2002: 
95).
578 General Affairs Council (1995a).
579 European Council (2000a: pt. II.3). 
580 General Affairs Council (1995b). 
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but considered it “necessary to study a number of questions in detail in the coming 
months so as, in due course, to have practical guidelines available for future relations 
between the European Union and Russia, which might, if need be, take the form of a 
common  position”  (emphasis  added).  The  Council  thereby  emphasised  the  entire 
discretion it enjoyed as regards the form and expediency of any new instrument.581 
Indeed, the General Affairs  Council  eventually adopted a “Strategy on EU-Russia 
Relations”, in November 1995. It is noticeable that the Strategy does not foresee the 
adoption  of  a  Common Position  proposed  by  the  Commission.  It  is  essentially  a 
political text without legal basis, which cannot immediately be related to any of the 
Union’s pillars. Officially, it finds its origins in the Carcassonne “gymnich” meeting, 
being thereafter formulated by the General Affairs Council. It was finally endorsed by 
the European Council in Madrid in December of the same year. Indeed, the European 
Council  “confirmed the  European Union's  overall  political  approach to  its  future 
relations  with  Russia,  as  formulated  by  the  General  Affairs  Council  on  
20 November 1995”  (emphasis  added).582 While  the  Commission proposal  was  not 
mentioned at all, the Strategy and the Communication have several common elements 
which tend to suggest that the latter was not ignored.
It was on the basis of the Strategy that the Council eventually adopted the AP for 
Russia on 13 May 1996,583 thereafter “welcomed” by the Florence European Council 
of June 1996. In the words of the European Council, “[t]his Action Plan… [would] be 
implemented promptly and efficiently in full cooperation with the Russian authorities. 
581 The Council added that the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs scheduled for the beginning of 
September 1995 would enable the Council's conclusions to be supplemented in preparation for the 
high-level  meeting  between  the  EU  and  Russia  on  13 September 1995.  It  then  instructed  the 
COREPER to summarize the proceedings of the various competent bodies and report back in time for 
its meeting on 2 October 1995. The Council thus suggests that its own services were in really in charge 
of matter. Then, the GAC took stock of the work done in accordance with its decision of 17 July 
regarding future relations with Russia. It held an exchange of views in the light of the outcome of the 
EU-Russia Summit held on 7 September 1995. The Council agreed to adopt its conclusions concerning 
relations with Russia at its meeting in November (General Affairs Council, 1995c).  
582 European Council (1995b: pt. B), see also Annex 8.
583 The last point of the Council’s document stipulates that “on the basis of the [Strategy’s] objectives 
and priorities, the Council [would] decide upon an action-programme, establishing in detail short and 
long-term measures which could be taken.” 
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It  provides  the  basis  for  continuing  fruitful  cooperation  and  the  strengthening  of 
relations between the European Union and Russia.”584 
This foregoing description of the process leading to the adoption of the AP hints at the 
development of ad hoc interactions between the Council, the European Council and 
the Commission. What is also noticeable is the use of informal instruments, despite 
the fact that Title V of the TEU on CFSP had just established specific instruments. 
While they appear to be of a foreign policy nature, it is noteworthy that the Council 
and European Council  decided not  to  use the instruments provided thereunder,  as 
proposed by the Commission.585 Rather, sui generis instruments with no express legal 
basis in the Treaty such a strategy and action plan were favoured. This disconnection 
between  the  instruments  and  Title  V  suggests  that  the  policy  towards  Russia  is 
extracted from the pillar structure. 
5.1.2.2. The EU Action Plan for Ukraine: embedding the Partnership  
in a broader political perspective
Like  the  Partnership  with  Russia,  the  EU  Partnership  with  Ukraine  has  been 
supplemented by a variety of non-EC instruments, set out soon after the entry into 
force of the TEU. In addition to the CP evoked above, an Action Plan was established 
to identify the priorities for action to develop the EU Partnership with Ukraine. The 
AP was adopted on 6 December by the General Affairs Council.586
Like the AP for Russia, it is an all-encompassing instrument. It identifies the priority 
actions  that  the  Union can  contribute  to  the  process  of  democratic  and economic 
reform of Ukraine and foster sustainable development in country. Point 5 of the AP 
stipulates that:
[t]hese actions fall into several broad areas of the relations between the Union and 
Ukraine
(a) Support for democratic reform and development of civil society 
584 Declaration  by  the  European  Union  on  Russia,  annexed  to  the  Florence  European  Council 
Conclusions (European Council, 1996b). 
585 Catherine  Flaesch  Mougin  (1998:  82)  has  pointed  out  the  legal  uncertainty  and  the  lack  of 
transparency of this type of instrument. 
586 General Affairs Council (1996).
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(b) Support for economic reform, development of trade and economic cooperation 
(c) Reinforcement of political dialogue and support for Ukrainian participation in 
European security architecture 
(d) Support for regional cooperation 
(e) Consolidation of contractual relations, in particular through the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement 
(f) Reform of the energy sector
On a number of accounts, the AP’s objectives mirror those of the PCA,587 as well as 
those of the 1994 Common Position. Indeed, the Council expressly referred to them as 
still “valid”.588 The AP thus built on the previous instruments, drawing in particular on 
an  earlier  Commission  communication,  which  proposed  the  adoption  of  such  an 
Action Plan.589 The list of the AP objectives is basically the same as the list of six 
directions  proposed  by  the  Commission  to  support  Ukraine’s  transformation.590 
Similarly, the concrete actions envisaged to meet the objectives of the AP echo to a 
large  extent  the  actions  advocated  by  the  Commission.  The  connection  with  the 
Commission’s document is clearly underlined by the Council itself, which “takes note 
of and welcomes the Commission’s very comprehensive Communication”, seen as “a 
significant contribution to the achievement of the aim of developing relations with 
Ukraine and also to  the elaboration of an Action Plan”.  The Council  adds that  it 
“regards the paper as an important aid and tool to the EU’s activities with regard to 
Ukraine  during  the  upcoming  years.591 As  in  the  case  of  the  AP for  Russia,  the 
587 The connection with the PCA is further articulated in pt. 6 of the AP which states that ratification of 
the Agreement “will establish a new basis for cooperation and partnership. The development of the full 
potential of the contractual relation provided by the PCA should lead to progressive developments in 
most areas of economic cooperation and harmonisation of laws. The PCA also represents a framework 
for sustained cooperation in the key areas of social transformation: education, transport, or of direct 
concern for the anchoring of Ukraine in Europe: protection of the environment, custom cooperation, 
control of illegal immigration, drug trafficking and money laundering”. 
588 Pt. 2, Introduction, AP.
589 European Commission (1996a). 
590 See section “EU objectives and actions guidelines” in the Commission’s communication (European 
Commission, 1996a).
591 Pt.  4,  Introduction, AP. In  a  report  on the Commission Communication on an Action Plan for 
Ukraine, the European Parliament made a more direct connection between the Communication and the 
Action Plan. On page 12 of its report it states that the AP was “adopted by the Commission on 20 
November 1996 (pt 10)… This [AP]… was approved by the General Affairs Council on 6 December 
1996” (European Parliament, 1998a).
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Commission  thus  appears  to  play  a  significant  role  in  providing  the  background 
orientations for the Council’s eventual decision. The latter nonetheless retains full 
control of the expediency of such decision.
The AP for Ukraine was elaborated through ad hoc interactions between the Council 
and the Commission, and eventually welcomed by the Dublin European Council of 
December 1996.592 As with the EU measures adopted in relation to Russia, the AP 
appears to be elevated above pillar-politics. Indeed, it contains provisions whereby the 
actions it proposes would need to be developed “through the implementation of  all  
instruments at the Community and Member State's disposal, in particular through the 
maximum  possible  use  of  the  possibilities  afforded  by  the  contractual  relations 
between the Union and Ukraine, including the Interim Agreement. The AP was thus 
clear that it commits not only the Member States but also the Community and thus the 
Commission. Indeed, the Commission itself pointed out the transversal character of 
the Action Plan. It considered in its Communication that:
whilst the Union’s strategy with regard to Ukraine constitutes a coherent whole, 
the legal  bases  of  the concrete  initiatives  are  various.  The projects  mentioned 
could  give  rise  to  (i)  assistance  initiatives  under  the  responsibility  of  the 
Community,  covered  by  the  TACIS  regulation,  (ii)  initiatives  under  the 
responsibility of the Community in implementation of the Interim Agreement, (iii) 
initiatives under joint responsibility in implementation of the PCA when this has 
been ratified,  (iv) initiatives under Titles V and VI of the TEU, (v) initiatives 
under the exclusive responsibility of the Member States for which the latter will 
take any decisions.593 
To recapitulate, since the entry into force of Maastricht Treaty, the EU Partnerships 
with Russia and Ukraine, established on the basis of the PCAs, have been developed 
through the adoption of various instruments. In the first place, the Council relied on 
Title V to supplement the Partnerships, which at times generated tensions between the 
Commission and the Council on the potential scope of CFSP instruments, and more 
generally  on  the  interpretation  of  the  constitutional  principles  governing  the 
interactions between sub-orders of the Union. The institutional battle concerning the 
effects of the Common Position on the Community legal order is a case in point.
592 European Council (1996c).
593 Section “Available Documents”.
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Instruments of a soft law nature were also adopted, as exemplified by the APs on 
Russia  and  Ukraine  respectively.  These  instruments  were  elaborated  through 
interactions between the Council and the Commission acting outside specific Treaty 
procedures,  under  the  overall  supervision  of  the  European  Council,  which 
progressively emerges as an important actor in the development of the Partnerships. It 
may be wondered why such sui generis instruments were favoured. First, it could be 
suggested that the Member States felt it more appropriate and less intrusive in their 
own  foreign  policy  choices  to  agree  on  this  type  of  non-committal  instruments. 
Secondly, it was easier to give them an all-encompassing scope. Had they been based 
on Title V, they would have to be more restricted and perhaps more contentious. The 
informal character and the comprehensive scope allowed the APs to be elaborated 
without being determined by pillar-politics.
5.2. EU instruments towards Russia and Ukraine post-Amsterdam 
The  Treaty  of  Amsterdam had  a  profound  impact  on  the  system of  EU external 
relations. In the garb of asserting the identity of the Union on the international scene, 
the  treaty  introduced  a  plethora  of  new  devices  of  EU  external  relations, 
predominantly in Title V of the TEU. In particular, it brought in a new instrument 
labelled “common strategies”, to be adopted by the European Council, with the aim, 
inter alia, to strengthen coherence in EU external relations. This new device was used 
for the first time in relation to Russia and Ukraine. 
It  will  be argued that the introduction of new CFSP mechanisms strengthened the 
“pillar”  structure  established  by  the  TEU594 which  in  turn  added  strain  on  the 
coherence of its external action (5.2.1). Indeed, while aimed at promoting integration 
594 The third EU/Russia Summit, 18 February 1999, pointed out that the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam would “have considerable implications for the development of a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.” (EU/Russia Summit, 1999a). The fourth Summit, 22 October 1999, stated: “based on 
the  preparatory work  done by  the  EU Foreign Ministers  Troika  meeting  with Foreign  Minister  I. 
Ivanov in Moscow on 7 October, the Parties reached an agreement on measures to enhance EU/Russia 
political dialogue in order to make it more flexible and efficient. In particular, new possibilities opened 
up with the development of the CFSP and the appointment of the Secretary General of the EU Council 
and the High Representative of the CFSP will be considered (EU/Russia Summit, 1999b).
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and complementarity of the external activities of the Union, the common strategies 
towards Russia and Ukraine may themselves be viewed as a source of incoherence in 
relation to already existing instruments, inter alia the PCAs (5.2.2).
5.2.1. A plethora of new CFSP devices adding strain on the coherence of 
EU external activities
New mechanisms of EU external relations were added to the TEU by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, aimed at enhancing efficiency and consistency of the Union’s external 
activities.595 The most significant changes concerned Title V although changes were 
also introduced in the EC Treaty.596 With respect to Title V, the Maastricht provisions 
were replaced by an entirely revamped set of provisions. The external dimensions of 
the  EU did  not  however  replace  the  external  relations  of  the  EC.  The  need  to 
coordinate  the  two henceforth  became more  pressing,  and  contentious,  than  ever. 
Three  particular  devices  are  worth  pointing  out  in  the  context  of  the  present 
discussion: first, the introduction in Title V (and VI) of a procedure to establish EU 
contractual  relations  with  third  countries  and  international  organisations  (5.2.1.1); 
secondly, the creation of a High Representative for CFSP (5.2.1.2) and thirdly, the 
introduction of “common strategies” (5.2.1.3). 
5.2.1.1. Differentiating  the  EU  external  contractual  relations:  the  
procedure of Article 24 TEU
595 Further: Dashwood (1998a) and des Nerviens (1997). 
596 As regards EC external relations, Art. 113, renumbered 133 EC, was extended by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam with a fifth paragraph enabling the Council to widen the scope of the CCP to the fields of 
services  and  intellectual  property  not  already  contained  therein,  thereby  possibly  undoing  the 
consequences of Opinion 1/94. Further: Cremona (1999b: 225). Art. 133 was then further amended by 
the Nice Treaty to include, at least to certain extent, these subject matters within the scope of the CCP 
(Cremona, 2001b: 61; Grard, 2000: 378-385). In addition, the Treaty of Amsterdam elaborated on the 
procedural provisions of Art. 228, renumbered Art. 300 EC, to include procedures on the provisional 
application and suspension of Community external agreements. New provisions were also introduced 
to determine the procedure for establishing the Community position to be defended in decision making 
bodies set up by external agreements (Dashwood, 1998a: 1025; des Nerviens, 1997: 804).
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Already a bone of contention in the context of the Maastricht Treaty,597 the issue of 
granting the Union legal personality was also contentious also during the 1996 Inter-
Governmental  Conference  leading  to  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam.598 Then,  the  EU 
Heads of State or Government eventually agreed not to include an express conferral 
of  the  international  legal  personality  to  the  European  Union.599 The  Treaty  of 
Amsterdam  nonetheless  introduced  a  procedure  for  negotiating  and  concluding 
agreements on behalf of the European Union in the fields covered by Title V and Title 
VI. 
Article 24 TEU provides:
When  it  is  necessary  to  conclude  an  agreement  with  one  or  more  States  or 
international  organisations  in  implementation  of  this  Title,  the Council,  acting 
unanimously,  may  authorise  the  Presidency,  assisted  by  the  Commission  as 
appropriate,  to  open  negotiations  to  that  effect.  Such  agreements  shall  be 
concluded by  the  Council  acting  unanimously  on  a  recommendation  from the 
Presidency.  No  agreement  shall  be  binding  on  a  Member  State  whose 
representative in the Council states that it has to comply with the requirements of 
its own constitutional procedure; the other members of the Council may agree that 
the agreement shall apply provisionally to them. 
The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling under Title VI.600
The issue of whether or not this procedure involved an implicit  recognition of an 
international capacity for the European Union has been widely debated.601 Subsequent 
institutional practice and the Nice Treaty partly settled the issue. Without being more 
successful  than the  previous one on introducing an express reference to  the legal 
personality of the EU, the 2000 IGC revisited the terminology of Article 24 TEU in a 
sense  which  supports  the  view that  the  EU implicitly  has  legal  personality.602 In 
particular, it introduced the possibility that an Article 24-agreement be provisionally 
597 Federal  Constitutional  Court  Decision  Concerning  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  33  I.L.M.  388,  411 
(BVerfG 1994). Denza (2002: 162), McLeod et al. (1996: 25), Cloos et al (1993). 
598 A text of the Irish Presidency submitted by the Irish Presidency to the European Council in Dublin 
in  December  1996  proposed  to  establish  the  legal  personality  of  the  EU  alongside  that  of  each 
Community (European Council, 1996a). 
599 Marquardt (2001: 331).
600 Art. 38 TEU.
601 Wessel (1997: 109), des Nerviens (1997: 801), Dashwood (1998a: 1019). 
602 Common Market Law Review (2001: 825), Grard (2000: 375-378), Wessel (2000a: 507). 
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applicable to the whole of the Union, pending ratification in a Member State which 
has indicated that such ratification is necessary. Moreover, the new provision makes it 
clear that agreements concluded in accordance with Article 24 TEU are binding on 
the Union’s institutions, including Members of the Council.603
The introduction of such a procedure has meant that it is henceforth possible to give 
an external contractual dimension to Title V and Title VI of the TEU. Consequently, 
adding non-EC aspects to Community agreements may turn out not to be as necessary 
as previously. It was suggested in chapter 2 that mixed agreements, such as the PCAs, 
were used by default as a medium of EU external relations, to ensure the projection of 
the Union as whole. Article 24-agreements have made it possible, at least in principle, 
to reduce instances of cross-pillar mixity by allowing all provisions relating to Title V 
and Title VI to be dealt with separately, in specific EU agreements, and severed from 
mixed agreements.604 At the same time, it increases the polarisation of the system of 
EU external relations. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Commission has resisted 
the development of Article 24 TEU agreements, promoting instead the use of mixed 
agreements such as the PCAs, to keep the Community involved in non-EC subject-
matters.
5.2.1.2. Incarnating  the  polarisation  of  the  system  of  EU  external  
relations: the High Representative for CFSP
The increasing importance of the external dimension of the Union, distinct from EC 
external  relations,  was  also  underscored  by  the  creation  of  the  post  of  High 
Representative (HR) for CFSP. The rationale behind this creation was to give more 
visibility to the CFSP. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced an Article 26 TEU which 
provides:
The  Secretary-General  of  the  Council,  High  Representative  for  the  common 
foreign and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the 
scope  of  the  common  foreign  and  security  policy,  in  particular  through 
contributing  to  the  formulation,  preparation  and  implementation  of  policy 
603 Piris (2000: 27). See also the IGC Legal Adviser’s “Comments on the draft amendments to Article 
24 TEU” (Intergovernmental Conference, 2000).
604 Given the Council’s interpretation of the scope of the CFSP, the fear has been in the Commission 
that Art. 24 Agreements could cover the whole breadth of external policy.  
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decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request 
of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties.605
The  function  of  the  HR  is  thus  combined  with  that  of  Secretary-General  of  the 
Council. His or her tasks have been to assist the Presidency in charge of representing 
the Union in CFSP issues. S/he also assists the Council particularly by contributing to 
the shaping and implementation of the CFSP, with the help of a “policy planning and 
early warning unit”.606 Also,  s/he leads the political dialogues with third countries 
under instructions from the Council.
The creation of the post of HR for CFSP undoubtedly enhanced the visibility of the 
EU  foreign  policy,  based  on  Title  V.  However,  the  post  incarnates  further 
institutionalisation  of  the  distinction  between  the  various  strands  of  EU  external 
relations, thereby entrenching pillar-politics in the system. Indeed, the presence of two 
official EU figures in charge of external policy with no clear division of tasks, and 
acting  within  different  institutional  logics,  potentially  leads  to  competition  and 
overlaps, thus increasing the strain on the institutional coherence of the system of EU 
external relations.
5.2.1.3. Introducing a new CFSP instrument: the common strategy
In  addition  to  Joint  Actions  and  Common  Positions  envisaged  by  the  Treaty  of 
Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam foresaw the creation of a new instrument, with 
the particular aim to foster efficiency in the CFSP, notably by introducing qualified 
majority voting in this policy area.607 Article 13 (ex J.3) TEU provides that:
The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by 
the  Union  in  areas  where  the  Member  States  have  important  interests  in 
common” (emphasis added). 
605 Art. 207(2) EC provides that the HR/SG is appointed by the Council by qualified majority voting.
606 Marquardt (2001: 331). On the policy Unit, see also Declaration 6 of the Amsterdam Treaty, “on the 
establishment  of  a  policy  planning  and  early  warning  unit”  within  the  Secretariat  General  of  the 
Council. 
607 On the background of the CS, see Haukkala (2001: 33ff).
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The Council of the EU shall recommend the Common Strategies (CS) to the European 
Council,608 following the principles and general guidelines previously defined by the 
latter.609 As pointed out above, the Commission is entitled by the TEU to be “fully 
associated” with the work carried out in the CFSP. This involvement may include a 
role in defining and implementing the CS.610 The European Parliament may equally 
make recommendations to the Council and it shall also be consulted by the Presidency 
of the Union on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP; its views shall be 
duly taken into consideration.611 
While aimed at ensuring coherence, the CSs also epitomised further polarisation in 
EU external relations. This is well illustrated by the implementation of the first CSs 
that were adopted in relation to Russia and Ukraine.
5.2.2. The  Common  Strategies  on  Russia  and  Ukraine:  a  limited 
contribution to furthering coherence
The adoption of CSs in relation to Russia and Ukraine consolidated the practice of 
establishing all-encompassing instruments to develop the Partnerships. It also reflects 
the increasing involvement of the European Council in EU external relations (5.2.2.1). 
While  the  aim  of  the  CSs  is  to  foster  coherence,  their  implementation  has 
paradoxically catalysed the fragmentation of the Partnerships (5.2.2.2).
5.2.2.1. A  codification  of  the  decision-making  role  of  the  European  
Council in EU external relations
608 Second subpara. of Art. 13(3) TEU.
609 Art. 13(1) TEU. Marc Maresceau (2004: 181) wrote that the purpose of Art. 13 TEU seemingly was 
not to create, through the new Common Strategies, a new category of legally binding instrument. Alan 
Dashwood (1998a: 1019) on the other hand, considers that Art. 13 TEU is a novelty in so far as it  
endows the European Council with a power to take legally binding decisions. The three CSs that were 
adopted  hitherto  were  indeed  published  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the  EU,  series  Legislation.  In 
hindsight, the legal character of the CSs is being confirmed by the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe. Art. III-293 talks about “decisions” of the European Council, which are defined as non-
legislative act, binding in their entirety (Art. I-33(1), 5th subpara. TCE). See further section 6.2.3.2.
610 Art. 22 (ex J.12) TEU.
611 Art. 21 (ex J.11) TEU. 
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The European  Council  meeting  in  Cologne  decided  on  the  Common Strategy  on 
Russia in June 1999.612 The CS on Ukraine was adopted at the Helsinki European 
Council in December same year.613 Both CSs were established for an initial duration 
of  four  years  with  the  possibility  of  being  prolonged,  reviewed  and  if  necessary 
adapted by the European Council, on the recommendation of the Council.614 
So far as their objectives are concerned, the CSs towards Russia and Ukraine were 
conceived by the  EU,  first  and foremost,  as  means to  strengthening  its  “strategic 
partnership[s]” with the two countries.615 They are based on the “strategic goals” of 
the EU and determined by its “vision of the partnership” with respect to each of the 
two addressees. In the case of Russia, the EU seeks a “stable, open and pluralistic 
democracy […], governed by the rule of law and underpinning a prosperous market 
economy benefiting alike all the people of Russia and of the EU”. In addition, the 
Union  wishes  “to  maintain  European  stability  promoting  global  security  and 
responding to the common challenges of the continent through intensified cooperation 
with Russia”. 
As for Ukraine, the Union wants “to contribute to the emergence of a stable, open and 
pluralistic  democracy,  governed  by  the  rule  of  law  and  underpinning  a  stable 
functioning  market  economy  which  will  benefit  all  the  people  of  Ukraine;  to 
cooperate with Ukraine in the maintenance of stability and security in Europe and the 
wider world,  also in  finding effective responses to  common challenges facing the 
612 European Council (1999a: pt. 78). 
613 European Council (1999c: pt. 56). 
614 They were renewed in 2003 for another year. Common strategy 2003/471/CFSP of the European 
Council of 20 June 2003 amending Common Strategy 1999/414/CFSP on Russia in order to extend the 
period  of  its  application  (OJ  2003  L157/68);  Common Strategy  2003/897/CFSP  of  the  European 
Council of 12 December 2003 amending Common Strategy 1999/877/CFSP on Ukraine in order to 
extend the period of its application (OJ 2003 L333/96).
615 Para. 4 of Part I (“Vision of the EU for its Partnership with Russia”) in the CS on Russia, and the 
para. 7 of Part I (“Vision of the EU for its Partnership with Ukraine”) in the CS on Ukraine; see also 
European Council (1999a: pt. 78).
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continent”, and finally “to increase economic political and cultural cooperation with 
Ukraine as well as cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs”.616 
As provided by the TEU under Title V, the tandem European Council  -  Council, 
representing the Member States, had a major role in elaborating the CSs. Already 
before the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Vienna European Council 
invited  the  Council,  following the  latter’s  recommendations,617 to  prepare  CSs  on 
Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean region, as well as on the Western Balkans, on the 
understanding that the first CS would be on Russia.618 The recommendations made by 
the Council underlined that the first CSs “should focus on the neighbouring regions of 
the EU. Not least in the context of enlargement and the development of the acquis; it 
is there that the EU has the greatest long term common interests and the greatest need 
for coherence and effectiveness”.619 The Council underlined that the CSs should add 
weight and coherence in the external relations of the EU, making full use of all the 
means  and  instruments  available  to  it.  It  thereby  underlined  its  all-encompassing 
character.
With respect to the procedural arrangements upstream, the report of the Council to the 
Vienna European Council  had pointed out  that “the COREPER was to ensure,  in 
conformity with Article 151 of the TEU (sic), that all preparatory bodies contribute in 
a coordinated manner to the elaboration of these Common Strategies, respecting the 
decision-making procedures foreseen by the Treaties and in conformity with Article 
M”.620 The Vienna report also added that “the Commission would contribute fully to 
the Council’s work in this context”. As a matter of fact, each presidency associated 
the Commission to the work, in accordance with the TEU.621 In particular, its services 
616 The draft of the CS on Ukraine stated exactly the same “strategic goals” as the one set out in the CS 
on Russia.
617 Document submitted to the Vienna European Council, December 1998 (European Council, 1998).  
618 European Council (1998: pt. 74).  
619 Document submitted to the Vienna European Council, December 1998 (European Council, 1998).. 
620 Indeed,  the  draft  CS  was  introduced  on  the  agenda  of  the  GAC  meeting  on  17/5/1999  for 
approbation, after consensus had finally emerged at the level of both the Committee of the Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) and the Political Committee (Doc. Europe No 7465, 15 May 1999, 8).
621 The involvement of the European Commission in the drafting of the CSs was confirmed in the 
course of several interviews the author conducted with members of the legal services of the Council 
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were solicited on various occasions during the drafting. Moreover, as evoked in the 
previous section, the Commission had prepared, already before Amsterdam, the draft 
of  a  “Common  Position  on  European  Union  -  Russia  relations”  included  in  a 
Communication “on the future relations between the European Union and Russia”.622 
Another Communication containing the draft of “an Action Plan for Ukraine” was 
presented to the Council in 1996.623 These texts had an influence on the drafts of the 
APs on Russia and Ukraine in the mid-nineties. A brief comparison of the provisions 
of the Commission and Council documents, respectively, provides evidence of this 
substantive correspondence. Similarly, the provisions of the CSs draw on the previous 
all-encompassing initiatives.624
As to the European Parliament, it had adopted several resolutions,625 one of which 
preceded the adoption by the European Council of the CS on Russia. Complaining 
about  the  lack  of  consideration  accorded  to  its  work  the  EP  asked,  in  a 
recommendation to the Council, to be formally consulted on CSs, arguing that the 
latter constitute “a basic choice of the CFSP”. 626 It also called for such consultation on 
and of the Commission, respectively.
622 European Commission (1995a). 
623 European Commission (1996a). 
624 Although there was no EU obligation to discuss the CS with its  addressee,  it  was nonetheless 
presented to Russian officials during the second EU-Russia Summit on 18 February 1999 (there was 
also  an  “exchange  of  information”  on  the  CS towards  Ukraine  and  on  the  Ukraine’s  strategy  of 
integration with the EU at the EU-Ukraine Summit on 23 July 1999 (EU/Ukraine Summit, 1999: para 
4). The same day as it was introduced on the agenda of the GAC of 17 May 1999, the EU briefed 
Russian authorities on the CS within the Cooperation Council (EU/Russia Cooperation Council, 1999). 
625 See for instance Report of 12 February 1998 on the Commission Communication “The future of 
relations between the European Union and Russia” and the Action Plan “The European Union and 
Russia – the future relationship” (European Parliament, 1998b), Report of 11 February 1998 on the 
Communication  from the  Commission  to  the  Council  on  an  Action  Plan  for  Ukraine  (European 
Parliament,  1998a),  Report  of  19  February  1999 on  the  Commission  Communication  “Towards  a 
European  Union  strategy   for  relations  with  the  Independent  States  of  Central  Asia”  (European 
Parliament, 1999c) and Report of 13 September 1996 on the Commission Communication “Towards a 
European  Union  strategy  for  relations  with  the  Transcaucasian  Republics”  (European  Parliament, 
1996).
626 The EP claimed that “the provisions of Art. J.11 (new Art. 21 TEU), already in the Maastricht 
Treaty, have never been applied, despite [its] repeated calls… notably during the annual debate on the 
CFSP” (italics added). See Report containing a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation to 
the Council on the common strategy towards the Russian Federation (European Parliament, 1999b).  
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CSs to be made “the subject of an inter-institutional agreement which spells out the 
respective responsibilities and commitment of Parliament, the Commission and the 
Council (in particular of its Presidency and High Representative for the CFSP)”.627
By involving the EU single institutional framework, and through its wide scope, the 
CSs potentially  foster  the  coherence of  EU external  activities.  Indeed,  the  CS on 
Ukraine states that “the EU and its  Member States will  develop the coordination, 
coherence and complementarity of all aspects of their policy towards Ukraine. The 
Union, the Community and its Member States will also work together with and within 
regional and other organisations and with like-minded partners to meet the objectives 
set out in the PCA and in this Common Strategy”.628 In other words, the aim is to 
promote smooth interactions between the EU, the EC and the Member States.
The granting of decision-making power in external relations to the European Council, 
“the  only  institution  which  has  an  overall  competence  covering  all  Union 
activities”,629 is however not unproblematic. The fact that this decision-making power 
is  intrinsically  linked  to  one  sub-order,  namely  Title  V,  tends  to  upset  the 
constitutional balance introduced by the TEU. It suggests that CFSP instruments can 
prevail over EC instruments, a prevalence which sits uncomfortably with the duty to 
maintain  the  acquis  communautaire.  Moreover,  while  having  an  all-encompassing 
scope, the CSs have catalysed a fragmented,630 if not “pillarised” development of the 
Partnerships, as will be argued below.
5.2.2.2. A catalyst for the fragmentation of the Partnerships
The scope of the CSs embraces the whole breadth of EU external relations. In terms 
of  its  effects  on  existing  instruments,  the  CSs  recognise  that  “the  core  of  the 
relationship between the Union and Russia remains the PCA”631 and that “the legal 
627 Ibid. 
628 Para. 8 of Part I of the CS on Ukraine. Part I of the CS on Russia contains the same provisions 
except that it refers only to the objectives of the CS but not to “the objectives of the PCA”.
629 Timmermans (1996: 68).
630 On fragmentation, see Weatherill (2000), Curtin and Dekker (1999: 83).
631 Para. 5, Part I of the CS on Russia. 
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basis of the relationship between the EU and Ukraine is the PCA”.632 However, both 
CSs call on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to review, according 
to their powers and capacities, existing actions, programmes, instruments and policies 
to ensure their consistency with the CSs.633 They shall also make full and appropriate 
use  of  existing  instruments  and  means,  in  particular  the  PCAs,  to  implement  the 
Strategies.634 It  appears  therefore  that  in  adopting  CSs,  the  European  Council 
mobilises all existing and future EU instruments and institutions, as well as Member 
States,  to achieve the objectives set  out therein.635 In that  sense,  the CSs are of a 
“cross-pillar” nature.636 
Paradoxically however, the  implementation of the CSs has seemingly catalysed the 
fragmentation of the Partnerships. 637 The provisions of the CSs on Russia and Ukraine, 
respectively, state that they shall be implemented in accordance with the applicable 
procedures of the Treaties. A Declaration of the European Council attached to both 
CSs clarifies the procedural aspects of their implementation.638 It underlines that the 
632 Para. 7, Part I of the CS on Ukraine. 
633 pt. 41 in “Instruments and Means” of the CS on Ukraine; pt. 2 of “Instruments and Means” in the CS 
on  Russia.  Moreover,  the  CS on  Ukraine  requires  the  positions  taken  by  the  Community  and  its 
Member States in all relevant fora to conform to the CS, see pt. 8 of Part I of the CS on Ukraine. In that  
sense, the CS on Ukraine goes further than the CS on Russia which obliges only the Member States to 
conform their positions to the CS in all relevant fora, not the Community; see para. 5 of Part I.
634 ibid.
635 One may recall that the Council, in its report submitted to the Vienna European Council, pointed out 
that the CSs should add weight and coherence in the external relations of the EU, making full use of all 
the means and instruments available to it. It also added that the GAC would be responsible for ensuring 
coherence in the Common Strategies on all aspects of the EU external relations.
636 The Finnish Presidency’s Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Strategy of the EU 
on  Russia  and  the  Presidency  Work  Plan,  submitted  to  the  Helsinki  European  Council,  clearly 
recognised the “cross-pillar” feature of the CS (European Council, 1999e). In its Report on the CS 
towards the Russian Federation, the EP considers that “the purpose of the common strategy should be 
both to add value to the existing partnership and to ensure the coherence and consistency of the EU’s 
relationship with the Russian Federation,  both within and between each of the pillars of  the EU’s  
activities (“cross-pillar approach”) (emphasis added)” (European Parliament, 1999a). 
637 Art. 13 TEU provides that the CSs are “implemented by the Union” and adds that the Council takes 
the  decisions  necessary  for  implementing  the  CS,  through  instruments  such  as  joint  actions  and 
common positions (Art. 23 TEU). 
638 “European Council Declaration on the Common Strategy on Russia” attached to the CS Russia; and 
“European Council Declaration on the Common Strategy on Ukraine” attached to the CS Ukraine. 
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Council acts by qualified majority when adopting joint actions, common positions or 
any other decisions within the scope of Title V of the TEU, on the basis of the CS. 
However, “acts adopted outside the scope of Title V of the TEU shall continue to be 
adopted according to  the  appropriate  decision-making procedures  provided by the 
relevant provisions of the Treaties, including the Treaty establishing the European 
Community and Title VI of the Treaty on European Union” (italics added).639 
For  instance,  two  EU  measures  adopted  to  implement  the  CS  on  Russia  offer  a 
contrasting  picture  of  the  contribution  of  the  CS  to  the  overall  coherence  of  the 
Partnership. The first  measure is a Council  Joint Action (JA) that was adopted in 
December 1999, establishing a EU cooperation programme for non-proliferation and 
disarmament  in  the Russian Federation.640 It  is  based on Article  14 (ex J.4)  TEU 
which is the legal basis for the adoption of Joint Actions, and Article 23 (2) (ex J.13) 
TEU allowing the use of qualified majority voting within the Council when adopting 
Joint Actions on the basis of a CS.641 The JA also conspicuously states in its Preamble 
that  it  derives  from  the  CS  on  Russia.  The  Programme  established  by  the  JA 
establishes  aims  at  supporting  Russia  in  its  efforts  towards  arms  control  and 
disarmament, in line with the “strategic goals” and the “specific initiatives” included 
in the CS. In addition,  the Preamble specifies that the JA also corresponds to the 
objectives of the PCA, as it promotes “inter alia an increasing convergence of Parties’ 
positions  on  international  issues  of  mutual  concern  thus  increasing  security  and 
stability”. 
The combination of these references underlines the ambition of the Council to ensure 
coherence  in  the  Partnership  with  Russia.  Indeed,  the  Preamble  stressed  that  the 
activities  covered  by  the  programme  would  take  place  in  parallel  with  activities 
carried out by the EC and the Member States, implying co-ordination to the greatest 
extent possible to avoid unnecessary duplication. Furthermore, the provisions of the 
639 Para. 2 of the Declaration.
640 Council  Joint  Action  1999/878/CFSP  of  17  December  1999  establishing  an  EU  cooperation 
programme for non-proliferation and disarmament in the Russian Federation (OJ 1999 L331/11).
641 Art.  23 TEU provides that, by derogation from the rule applying in the field of CFSP, namely 
decisions being taken by unanimity at the Council, “the Council shall act by qualified majority when 
adopting joint  actions,  common positions  or  taking any other  decision on the  basis  of  a  common 
strategy”.
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JA underline that the latter is subject to bilateral consultations with Russia and other 
partners within the framework of existing political meetings, i.e. including within the 
institutional framework established by the PCA. The JA also recalls the Council and 
Commission’s  general  obligation to  ensure co-ordination between the programme, 
Community assistance and the bilateral assistance provided by the Member States. 
Overall,  the  JA tends  to  show that  the  implementation  of  the  CS is  done  in  co-
ordination with existing frameworks in order not to impede the coherent development 
of the Partnership.642
A second measure, the EU Action Plan (AP) “on Common Action for the Russian 
Federation on combating organised crime”, was adopted by the Council in 2000 “in 
fulfilment of the EU Common Strategy on Russia as adopted by the European Council 
in Cologne”.643 The specificity of the AP is that in principle, it touches upon all three 
pillars of the Union. It should therefore embody a high level of co-ordination. It is a 
measure implementing the CS on Russia adopted on the basis of Title V (CFSP),644 it 
concerns  criminal  matters  referred to  in  Article  29 TEU (Title  VI,  on Police and 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters),645 and also covers issues such as money 
laundering dealt with in the EC framework.646
642 This is impression is further supported by the subsequent Council CFSP decision implementing the 
JA. Based on the Joint Action it  entrusted the Commission with the task of supervision the proper 
implementation of the projects envisaged by the Decision (OJ 2001 L180/2).
643 OJ 2000 C106/5. 
644 Pt. 4 of the “Areas of Action” in the CS on Russia provides that the EU will cooperate with Russia 
in  inter  alia,  fight  against  organised  crime,  money laundering  and  illicit  traffic  in  human beings. 
Moreover, the “Specific Initiatives” include provisions on fight against organised crime whereby the 
Union is “proposing to set up a plan focused on common action with Russia to fight against organised, 
including actions to fight corruption, money laundering, trafficking in drugs, human beings and illegal 
immigration”.
645 Art. 29 (ex K.1) TEU, para. 2 states that the objective linked to the police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters shall be achieved by “preventing and combating crime, organised or otherwise, in 
particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit  drug trafficking and 
illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud”.
646 Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for 
the purpose of money laundering (OJ 1991 L166/77) was adopted on the basis of Art. 47(2) (ex 57(2)) 
EC, included in free movement of persons, services and capital, and Art. 95 (ex 100a) EC, thus dealing 
with  the  internal  market.  At  the  time  of  adoption,  a  new  proposal  had  been  prepared  by  the 
Commission  for  a  EP  and  Council  Directive  amending  Council  Directive  91/308/EEC (European 
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It should also be recalled that the AP deals with a subject covered by the fields of 
cooperation  included  the  PCA.  Although  the  Agreement  with  Russia  does  not 
explicitly mention the concept of “organised crime”, it does contain, provisions on the 
prevention of illegal activities (Title VIII), drug trafficking (Article 82) and money 
laundering (Article  81),  which,  as  discussed  in  chapter  2,647 relate  the  judicial 
cooperation  in  criminal  matters  mentioned  in  Article  29(2)  (ex  K.1)  TEU. 
Furthermore, the field of Justice and Home Affairs was included from the outset in 
the PCA work programme approved by the Parties,648 and has been a key area of 
cooperation ever since.649 
To be fair, the AP mentions the PCA. Its Preamble “takes into account” the fact that it 
“entered into force”. 650 It also recalls the “reference” of the PCA to the cooperation 
against  illegal  activities  including  money  laundering  and  drug  trafficking,  and 
acknowledges  the  “work  on  organised  crime  undertaken  by  the  relevant  sub-
committee established under the PCA”.651 
This being said, the provisions of the AP do not seem to use the PCA as a basis for 
promoting such cooperation. They rather envisage a cooperation based on the third 
pillar  of  the  TEU  as  defined  by  the  Amsterdam  Treaty,  and  following  “the 
commitment  of  the  Cologne  European  Council  to  set  a  durable  and  effective 
Commission, 1999b). Since then: Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 4 December 2001 amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purpose of money laundering (OJ 2001 L344/76).
647 Section 2.1.2.
648 See Annex in press releases of the first meetings of the EU-Russia Cooperation Council (1998b), 
and of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (1998).
649 It  is  a  recurrent  theme  of  the  Cooperation  Councils  and  Summit  meetings.  Indeed,  a  specific 
framework  was  set  up  at  ministerial  level,  in  the  context  of  the  PCAs,  to  discuss  and  develop 
cooperation in the field of JHA; see e.g. Meeting on Justice and Home Affairs between the Troika of 
the European Union and Ukraine Brussels, 29 March 2004 (EU Troika/Ukraine, 2004b). 
650 Fifth indent, Preamble of the AP.
651 The Presidency also underlines that concerning cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, the “PCA 
Sub-Committee 6 (dealing, inter alia, with fight against  crime) is a central  common institution for 
dialogue in this area”. (European Council, 1999e).  
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cooperation with Russia in the area of Justice and Home Affairs”.652 In the light of the 
Tampere  European  Council,  the  AP  is  also  conceived  as  a  EU  external  action 
contributing  to  the  establishment  of  an  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice.653 
Finally, the General Principles (Part III) of the Plan mention that “account should be 
taken of related work already pursued by individual Member States or carried out in  
other international forums and of the possible need for coordination in that regard” 
(italics added). 
The AP thus introduces a new development in the EU-Russia relations by establishing 
a specific framework for cooperation in one area of justice and home affairs.654 It does 
so by disconnecting the matter from the PCA. In concrete terms, Part D of the AP 
dealing with the “implementation of the Action Plan” underlines the EU’s ambition 
“urgently [to] consider the question of developing an agreement under Article 38 TEU 
with the Russian Federation for the purpose of implementing this Action Plan”.655 
Article 38 TEU, which is the only reference the AP makes to the TEU and more 
652 Before any reference to the PCA, the Preamble of the AP refers to the Common Strategy on Russia 
endorsed  by  the  1999  Cologne  European  Council  and  to  Russia’s  “Medium-term  strategy  for 
development  of  relations  between  the  Russian  Federation  and  the  EU  (2000  to  2010)”(Russian 
Federation, 1999), then to the Union’s Action Plan on organised crime (Council, 1997),  endorsed by 
the Amsterdam European Council in 1997 and to the EU drug strategy (2000-2004) (Council, 1999), 
endorsed by the Helsinki European Council in 1999.
653 The AP refers to para. 56 of the Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, requiring “all 
competences and instruments, particularly external relations to be used in an integrated and consistent  
way to build an area of freedom, security and justice”(italics added) (European Council, 1999b). 
654 The JHA Action Plan on organised crime was drafted by the DG JHA in the Council Secretariat 
General, without coordination with DG External Relations (interviews, Council legal service). 
655 The overall approach follows the “Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to 
implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice”, 
adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 3 December 1998 (Council, 1998a). Part E of the 
Plan’s  introductory  part  states  that  “the  advances  introduced  by  the  Amsterdam Treaty  will  also 
enhance the Union’s role as a player and partner on the international stage (...), this external aspect of 
the Union’s action can be expected to take on a new and more demanding dimension. Full use will 
need to be made of new instruments available under the Treaty (...). In those subjects which remain in 
Title  VI of the TEU, the Union can also make use of the possibility for  the Council  to conclude 
international agreements in matters relating to Title VI of the Treaty, as well as for the Presidency, 
assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council and in full association with the Commission, to 
represent the Union in these areas”. 
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precisely to Title VI, provides for the possibility to conclude EU agreements, with one 
or  more  states  or  international  organisations  in  the  framework  of  Title  VI,  by 
reference to the new mechanism of Article 24 (Title V) TEU.656
The  implementation  of  the  AP,  as  foreseen  therein,  illustrates  that  following  the 
Amsterdam Treaty and catalysed by the CS, the distinct modes of decision-making of 
the EU pillars have further penetrated the Partnership with Russia. While the CS may 
have  created  a  new  momentum  for  strengthening  the  Partnership  when  it  was 
adopted,657 it however had a limited added value in terms of enhancing coherence in 
the EU relations with Russia and Ukraine,658 fostering instead fragmentation of the 
Partnerships.
5.3. Conclusion
The adoption of additional instruments to further the Partnerships has at times proven 
to be problematic, particularly in view of the constitutional principles underpinning 
the interaction between the EU sub-orders. A case in point is the Common Position on 
Ukraine which sparked tension between the Council and the Commission as to the 
scope of CFSP instruments and their impact on the EC legal order. Arguably, this 
tension is intrinsic in the constitutional order established by the TEU. In this context, 
the Action Plans may be interpreted as a  pragmatic response to  pillar  politics.  In 
particular  the  APs  foreshadow  the  enhanced  role  of  the  European  Council  as 
guarantor of coherence, alongside institutions constitutionally endowed with this task. 
656 See above, section 5.2.1.1.
657 In a speech given on 29 May 2000 at Maly Manege in Moscow, Romano Prodi, President of the 
Commission, explained why the CS had been adopted: “It was essential to bring our partnership into 
line with the new emerging dimensions of the EU – the introduction of the Euro and the significant 
headway made in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs and of our Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. Russia was the obvious choice for our very first Common Strategy, which is a new foreign 
policy tool under the Amsterdam Treaty” (Prodi, 2000).
658 The CS, as instrument,  has been strongly criticised,  particularly by the High Representative for 
CFSP Javier Solana (High Representative for CFSP, 2000). See also the criticism of the CS by the UK 
government as exposed in the Twenty-Seventh Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on 
European Scrutiny (House of Commons (2003). Further: Maresceau (2004), Pernice and Thym (2002: 
375), de Spiegeleire (2001: 81). 
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Institutional practice thus tended to supersede constitutional provisions in the quest 
for coherence in the development of the Partnerships. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam codified the strengthened role of the European Council in 
EU external relations, but paradoxically by granting it a decision making power in the 
CFSP title. Moreover, it brought about several new mechanisms which developed the 
non-EC external dimensions of the EU and further entrenched the polarisation in the 
system of EU external relations. Given this new constitutional context, the quest for 
coherence has become an uphill battle which the common strategies, introduced as 
device  for  coherence,  coordination  and  complementarity,  only  partly  managed  to 
address. 
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CHAPTER 6
THE PARTNERSHIPS AFTER ENLARGEMENT: TOWARDS AN 
INTEGRATED FORMULA OF EU EXTERNAL ACTION 
While the EU Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine have evolved as a result of Treaty 
changes,  and  ensuing  institutional  practice,  they  have  also  been  affected  by  the 
decision of the Union to enlarge to central, eastern and southern Europe. In particular, 
it meant that the PCAs had to be “enlarged” to the new Member States, in the sense 
that the latter had to become parties to the Agreements,659 alongside the other Member 
States.660 Furthermore,  the  new Member  States  now have  direct  influence  on  the 
elaboration of the EU external relations,  including on the development of the EU 
Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine, which are the direct neighbours of many of the 
newcomers.661 Indeed, enlargement has entailed the establishment of new EU eastern 
borders  with  Russia  and  Ukraine,662 which  has  notably  complicated  the  transit  of 
persons and goods between the Russian Oblast of Kaliningrad and mainland Russia,663 
and included Russian-speaking minorities within the European Union.664 The Russian 
659 Art. 6 of the Act of Accession 2003 (OJ 2003 L236/33). See also Protocol on the Partnership and 
Cooperation  Agreement  establishing  a  partnership  between  the  European  Communities  and  their 
Member States on the one part and the Russian Federation on the other part to take account of the 
accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of 
Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of 
Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic to the European 
Union (Council, 2004). Further: Hillion (2004c: 607).
660 If need be, the new Member States also had to adjust the international agreements they may have 
concluded  with  Russia  and  Ukraine  prior  to  their  accession;  Case  812/79  Burgoa;  Case  C-62/98 
Commission v  Portugal;  Case  C-84/98  Commission  v  Portugal.  On  the  external  implications  of 
enlargement, see in particular Cremona (2003b) and Hillion (2002b). 
661 Sjursen (1998). 
662 For an overview of the issue, see Amato and Batt (1999), Grabbe (2000), Anderson and Bort (2001: 
ch. 6), Hill (2000). 
663 See e.g. Vinokurov (2004), van Elsuwege (2002a), Fairlie and Sergounin (2001), also the various 
contributions in Baxendale et al (2000).  
664 Further:  van  Elsuwege  (2004),  Hillion  (2004a),  Minority  Rights  Group  (2003),  Open  Society 
Institute (2002), Dorodnova (2000).
189
and Ukrainian authorities have also pointed out the potentially negative repercussions 
of accession on their trade relations with the CEECs.665 
These multifarious implications which highlight that the Partnerships and enlargement 
are intimately linked,666 have made it more pressing for the EU to tackle the external 
effects  of  its  own expansion.667 It  is  in this  context  that  the Union has set  out  to 
develop  a  new global  policy  towards  its  neighbours,  in  the  shape  of  a  European 
Neighbourhood Policy with respect to Ukraine, and the establishment of “Common 
Spaces” with Russia. These initiatives are to some extent based on the same premises, 
in that they both find their raison d’être in the Union expansion to central and eastern 
Europe.  More  significantly,  the  modalities  of  such  initiatives  are  inspired  by  the 
specific methodology of the EU enlargement policy.668 
Enlargement policy is  par excellence an  EU policy, in that it  encompasses all the 
Union’s  substantive  and  institutional  facets.  As  such,  it  constitutes  an  instructive 
precedent of institutional and substantive coherence in the conduct of a EU policy in 
relation to third parties. In this chapter, it will be argued that some elements of this 
policy are being transplanted to the context of the Partnerships, with the potential 
effect  that  the polarisation highlighted in the previous chapter could be overcome 
(6.1). This trend towards better substantive and institutional coherence in the conduct 
of  the EU external  action,  as  lately  evidenced by  the Partnerships,  appears  to  be 
consolidated by the provisions of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
signed in Rome in October 2004 (6.2).669 
6.1. EU enlargement policy: a model for integrating the Partnerships
665 “Chernomyrdin says EU enlargement must not damage Russia” Interfax News Agency, 23/1/1998. 
Closer to the actual accession of ten new states, the Russian authorities sent to the EU a list of 14 
concerns related to the trade and economic, as well as political implications of enlargement; Financial  
Times, 2/2/2004; EUobserver, 4/2/2004. See in this regard, Winters (2000). 
666 Maresceau (2001: 21).
667 Dehaene (2001), Reflection Group IGC 1996 (1995), Maresceau (2004: 216). 
668  On the concept of enlargement “policy”, see Hillion (2004b: 13).
669 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 2004 C310).
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Through enlargement, the EU projects itself as a whole, and the state that aspires to 
become member of the Union has to embrace it as such, in the sense of accepting the 
EU norms and principles in their entirety. Indeed, the development of mechanisms to 
ascertain  that  the  candidates  fully take  on  the  EU  acquis  is  one  of  the  many 
specificities of the Union’s enlargement to the east. Through a sophisticated policy, 
the  so-called  “pre-accession  strategy”  (6.1.1),  the  EU  has  closely  monitored  the 
accession preparation of candidates. Perceived as a successful policy, the institutional 
routines  which  were  established  in  the  context  of  this  pre-accession  seem 
progressively to penetrate the system of EU external relations, as evidenced in the 
latest developments of the Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine (6.1.2). 
6.1.1. The  pre-accession  methodology:  the  promotion  of  a  fully 
integrated EU on the international plane
The pre-accession methodology consists of two key elements. In the first  place, it 
involves the promotion of the EU acquis as a whole towards the candidates, through a 
system of conditionality (6.1.1.1). Secondly, it entails novel interactions between EU 
institutions in the conduct of a policy which is addressed to third countries, namely 
the candidate states (6.1.1.2). 
6.1.1.1. The promotion of the acquis as a whole towards third states
The Treaty provisions concerning accession are rather meagre.  Article 49(1) TEU 
states that:
Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may 
apply to become a Member of the Union. It shall address its application to the 
Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after 
receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute 
majority of its component members.
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In order to be eligible, a state has to meet two constitutional conditions. First, it must 
be a European state670 and secondly, it must respect the political principles set out in 
Article 6(1) TEU.671 
In practice, accession to the European Union is also subject to the acceptance of the 
acquis communautaire by the candidate.672 While it has always been a prerequisite for 
accession,673 acceptance of the acquis was particularly accentuated in the context of 
the accession of the CEECs. The 1993 Copenhagen European Council which defined 
the  so-called  “Copenhagen  [accession]  criteria”  insisted  on  the  obligation  of  the 
candidates “to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims 
of political,  economic and monetary union”.674 Although the requirement has been 
understood as the candidate’s acceptance of the acquis  communautaire, it however 
relates  more  broadly  to  the  whole  corpus of  the  Union’s  norms  and  aims.  The 
applicant state should not only accept and be ready to observe EC rules, it should also 
take on the provisions of the other sub-orders of the EU, namely CFSP principles and 
measures, as well as all the norms related to the JHA/PJCCM. 
It becomes apparent that the division of the EU in sub-orders does not matter in the 
accession process. The latter is all-encompassing by definition. Indeed, the place of 
Article 49 TEU in the system of the Treaty, namely under the Final Provisions of the 
TEU, suggests that it is not directly connected to any specific EU sub-order. It rather 
belongs  to  its  “pediment”,  like  other  common  and  final  provisions  of  the  TEU 
concerning e.g. the Union’s obligation to respect fundamental rights, or the procedure 
to revise the TEU.
670 On the definition of “European”, see the Commission report to the 1992 Lisbon European Council 
European Commission (1992e: 11).
671 According to Article 6(1) TEU: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common 
to the Member States”. Further: de Witte and Toggenburg (2004: 59).
672 On accession conditionality: Cremona (2001a), Hoffmeister (2002: 90-91), Smith (2003: 105). 
673 The Hague Conference of the Heads of State or Government, Dec. 1969, Bull. EEC 1/1970, 16. 
Preston (1995: 452).
674 Hillion (2004b: 3). 
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The comprehensive character of the enlargement policy has been further articulated 
by the “pre-accession strategy”.675 The latter was launched by the Essen European 
Council with a view to ensuring that the candidates would be as prepared as possible 
to enter the Union.676 Various mechanisms were put in place by the EU institutions to 
support and guide the adaptation of the candidates to the requirements of membership. 
To start with, the Europe Agreements were turned into full pre-accession instruments. 
Such  political  “re-orientation”  of  the  EAs  led  notably  to  a  hardening  of  their 
provisions  on  legal  approximation,677 while  the  institutional  system  they  set  up 
became  instrumental  to  the  management  of  the  pre-accession  strategy.678 The 
European Council also agreed to consolidate the political dialogue with the candidates 
in  the  form  of  a  “structured  dialogue”,  to  allow  the  candidates  to  become 
progressively familiar with the various activities of the Union.679 The pre-accession 
strategy thus widened and deepened the existing relationships between the Union and 
the CEECs, based on the EAs, progressively to encompass the whole range of EU 
activities.680 
Consolidated after the Commission had rendered its first Opinions on the CEECs’ 
applications for membership,681 the pre-accession strategy, re-branded “enhanced pre-
accession  strategy”,682 relied  particularly  on  a  new  instrument,  the  “Accession 
Partnership” (AP).683 Adopted as a Council regulation based on Article 308 EC, the 
675 For an exhaustive analysis of the pre-accession strategy, see Maresceau (2001: 3, 2003: 9).
676 The  Conclusions  of  the  1994  Essen  European  Council  state  that:  “The  European  Council  has 
decided on a comprehensive strategy submitted by the Council and the Commission at the request of 
the European Council in Corfu for preparing these countries for accession to the European Union”. 
Annex IV of the conclusions contained the Report from the Council on a strategy to prepare for the 
accession of the associated Central and Eastern European countries (European Council, 1994b).  
677 Inglis (2000: 1173)
678 Maresceau (2003: 17).
679 Maresceau (2003: 20), Lippert and Becker (1998: 341).
680 As countries associated to the Community, the CEECs already took part, at least to a certain extent, 
in the Community system, Case 12/86 Demirel, para. 9, see discussion in chapter 1.
681 European Commission (1997a). 
682 Reinforcing the pre-accession strategy was articulated by the European Commission (1997a) in its 
Agenda 2000, see pt III.2 of Part II “The challenge of enlargement”.
683 Council Regulation No 622/98 on assistance to the applicant States in the framework of the pre-
accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of Accession Partnerships (OJ 1998 L85/1). 
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AP established a system whereby the adaptation of the candidates to all EU standards 
was guided, monitored and assessed by the EU institutions.684 Indeed, the Justice and 
Home Affairs dimension was particularly prominent in this enhanced strategy.685 
The all-embracing feature of the pre-accession strategy is further underscored by the 
EU monitoring of the progress made by the applicant to meet the Copenhagen criteria. 
The  Commission  evaluated  each  candidate’s  progress  in  meeting  the  various 
objectives and priorities set out in the APs, including in non-EC areas. Its findings 
were recorded in Annual Reports, whose scope equally goes well beyond EC law.686 
For  instance,  the  Commission  2000 Report  on Poland contained a  section on the 
ability  of  the  candidate  to  assume the  obligations  of  Membership.  It  includes  an 
assessment  of  Poland’s  progress  in  aligning  itself  to  the  requirements  of  EC 
competition law, to the standards of EU cooperation in the field of justice and home 
affairs, or to the EU foreign and security policy.687  In other words, the pre-accession 
strategy transcends the boundaries of EC law.688 
684 On Accession Partnership, see Grabbe (1999), Inglis (2002: 103), Raux (2001: 42), Hillion (1998b, 
2002a: 416). 
685 The 1999 Accession partnership with Poland (European Commission, 1999a) contained among the 
“short term” priorities and intermediate objectives, (section 4.2) a sub-section on Justice and Home 
Affairs according to which Poland had to: 
“– adopt and implement national integrated inter-agency border management strategy with particular 
attention to the budgetary requirements of the Eastern Border.
– strengthen national co-ordination body for all law enforcement services at central, regional and local 
level. 
– upgrade institutional capacity regarding the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking. 
– implement an anti-corruption and anti-fraud programme (particularly customs service,  police and 
judiciary); strengthen capacities to deal with money laundering; ratify the Council of Europe 1990 
Convention on Laundering Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the proceeds of Crime, the European 
Criminal Convention on Corruption and the OECD Convention on Bribery.”   
686 Maresceau (2003: 32).
687 Regular  Report  from  the  Commission  on  Poland’s  progress  towards  accession,  8  Nov.  2000 
(European Commission, 2000c). 
688 Indeed  the  pre-accession strategy goes  well  beyond the  Commission  1995 White  paper  on the 
integration of the CEECs into the internal market of the Union which laid down a specific programme 
of legal approximation (European Commission, 1995h). Further: Gaudissart and Sinnaeve (1997: 41).
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Finally,  the comprehensive nature of the enlargement  process is evidenced by the 
accession  negotiations.689 The  Union’s  acquis  was  divided  in  31  chapters,  and 
negotiations  took  place  chapter  by  chapter,  following  similar  arrangements, 
irrespective  of  the  Community  or  non-Community  character  of  the  matter.  For 
instance, chapter one concerned the free movement of goods, chapter 24 was about 
the cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, while chapter 27 dealt with the 
common foreign and security policy. Each and every chapter was negotiated in the 
same overall framework. indeed, leading to one single and comprehensive Treaty of 
accession to the European Union.690
6.1.1.2. A methodology based on an integrated functioning of the EU 
institutional framework
While  the  whole  body  of  EU  norms  is  projected  towards  the  candidate  states, 
irrespective of the distinction between sub-orders, the methodology underlying this 
projection involved novel interactions between the EU institutions. Such interactions 
are noticeable in that they seem less determined by pillar-politics than in the “normal” 
functioning of the EU, as particularly evidenced by the last chapter. 
In principle, the enlargement procedure, as established by the Treaty, only foresees a 
limited contribution from the institutions. According to Article 49 TEU:
689 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/index.htm 
690 See e.g. Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian 
Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, 
the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the European Union) and the Czech Republic, 
the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, the 
Slovak  Republic  concerning  the  accession  of  the  Czech  Republic,  the  Republic  of  Estonia,  the 
Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the 
Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the 
European Union” (OJ 2003 L236).
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… [the candidate] shall  address its application to the Council,  which shall  act 
unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the 
European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component 
members.  The conditions of  admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on 
which the Union is founded which such admission entails shall be the subject of 
an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. The agreement 
shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements.691
In  practice  however,  institutions  have  played  significant  roles,  particularly  the 
Commission and the European Council,  working in tandem with the Council.  The 
involvement  of  these  institutions  involvement  has  developed  in  an  incremental 
fashion, through ad hoc arrangements. It has evolved in consideration of the particular 
needs  of  the  process,  and  to  a  great  extent  outside Treaty  provisions.  The  new 
interactions between the institutions are apparent in the elaboration of the accession 
conditions, the establishment and management of the pre-accession strategy, and the 
accession negotiations.
The development of additional institutional arrangements started at the level of the 
definition of the accession criteria, in particular at the Copenhagen European Council 
in  1993.  The  Heads  of  State  or  Government,  together  with  the  President  of  the 
Commission,  established  the  so-called  Copenhagen  criteria,  following  earlier 
suggestions  from  the  European  Commission.692 Thereby,  the  European  Council 
supplemented the general provisions of Article 49 TEU and refined the constitutional 
framework for enlarging the European Union. It further elaborated these conditions, 
notably at its meetings in Madrid in 1995, and in Helsinki in 1999.693 The European 
Council  thus established itself,  as  the key player in defining,  with the help of the 
Commission,694 the overall framework for conducting the enlargement policy.
Indeed,  following the  formulation of  the  accession criteria,  the  European Council 
endorsed the pre-accession strategy at its Essen meeting, previously adopted by the 
Council on the basis of a Commission’s proposal.695 This strategy not only involved 
691 Case 93/75 Mattheus v Doego.
692 Mayhew (1997: 25); Smith (1999: 113), Maresceau (2005).
693 Hillion (2004b: 17). 
694 Maresceau (2005).
695 European Council (1994b). 
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the projection of the whole body of EU norms, as pointed out above, it also entailed 
the  establishment  of  an  institutional  cooperation  between  the  Commission,  the 
Council  and European Council  in the definition of the enlargement policy and its 
management, through a system of compliance control and sanctions.696 
A case in point is the management of the Accession Partnership. As evoked above, the 
AP endowed the Commission with a remarkable power to monitor the preparation for 
membership of the applicant states. In particular, on the basis of the AP regulation, 
the Commission drafted individual accession partnerships, in consultation with each 
the candidates, containing a list of principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and 
conditions  on  which  the  adaptation  of  the  candidate  should  focus  to  meet  the 
Copenhagen criteria. The accession partnerships were then presented to the Council 
for adoption by qualified majority voting, and then to the candidates, in the context of 
the institutional framework of the EAs.697 On the request of the European Council,698 
the Commission produced detailed evaluations on each candidate’s performance in 
implementing  the  APs,  through  the  publication  of  annual  reports.  This  regular 
reporting  on  candidates’  progress  contrasts  with  previous  accession  procedures  in 
which  only  two  opinions  were  given  by  the  Commission  on  the  membership 
application of third European states. Furthermore, it is noticeable that the Commission 
provided  an  assessment  of  the  progress  of  the  candidates  in  meeting  all the 
Copenhagen accession criteria, including the political conditions, such as protection 
of minorities.699 Thereby, the Commission, with the political blessing of the European 
696 Having established the criteria,  the 1993 Copenhagen European Council  declared that  it  would 
“continue to follow closely progress in each associated country towards fulfilling the conditions of 
accession to the Union and draw the appropriate conclusions” (European Council, 1993a).
697 Art. 2 of Council Regulation 622/98 (OJ 1998 L85/1). 
698 The 1997 Luxembourg European Council decided that “[f]rom the end of 1998, the Commission 
will make regular reports to the Council, together with any necessary recommendations for opening 
bilateral intergovernmental conferences, reviewing the progress of each Central and Eastern European 
applicant State towards accession in the light of the Copenhagen criteria, in particular the rate at which 
it is adopting the Union acquis … The Commission’s reports will serve as the basis for taking, in the 
Council context, the necessary decisions on the conduct of the accession negotiations or their extension 
to other applicants. In that context, the Commission will continue to follow the method adopted by 
Agenda  2000  in  evaluating  applicant  States’  ability  to  meet  the  economic  criteria  and  fulfil  the 
obligations deriving from accession” (European Council, 1997b: pt. 29).
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Council,  was  granted  a  pivotal  function  as  a  “screening  actor”  on  behalf  of  the 
Union.700 By  promoting  and  controlling  the  progressive  application  of  the  wider 
Union’s  acquis  in  relation  to  potential  future  members,  it  acted  well  beyond  its 
traditional  role  of  “guardian  of  the  [EC]  Treaty”  vis-à-vis  the  current  Member 
States.701 On the basis of the Commission annual reports, the Council determined the 
pace of negotiations, and the allocation of pre-accession financial assistance. Indeed, 
the accession partnership established a system whereby the Council, on a proposal 
from the Commission, could review the pre-accession financial assistance, if progress 
in  meeting  the  Copenhagen  criteria  was  found  insufficient.702 The  Council  then 
reported to the European Council, acting as the final political arbiter.703
Summing  up,  the  management  of  the  accession  partnership  exemplifies  the 
development of new roles for the institutions, and new forms of interactions between 
them. In the framework of the EU enlargement policy, the Commission has become 
de facto the guardian and promoter of the EU acquis vis-à-vis the candidate states, 
and a monitor of the latter’s progress in observing the acquis. As to the Council, it 
decides, on the basis of the Commission’s assessment, the development of the policy. 
It  is  also  empowered  to  sanction  deficiencies  in  the  adaptation  process  of  the 
candidates. Doing so, it works in tandem with the European Council, which acts as 
699 As regards more particularly the scrutiny of the political conditionality, see Williams (2000: 609), 
Smith (2003: 105). 
700 Everson and Krenzler (1998), esp. section III. 1. On the “screening” process, see Maresceau (2003: 
30).  
701 The Commission also supervises  the progress  made by the candidate in adopting the acquis  in 
Justice and Home Affairs, and CFSP; see chapters 24 and 27 of the regular reports for each candidate 
country.
702 Art. 4 of Council Regulation 622/98.
703 For instance, at its meeting on 9 November 1998, the General Affairs Council,  “took note of a 
presentation by the Commission of its first regular reports on progress towards accession by Cyprus, 
the ten candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe, and Turkey, in line with the conclusions of the 
European Council at its meetings in Luxembourg and Cardiff. In a broad exchange of views, Ministers 
made preliminary comments on the Commission's progress reports. The Council asked the Permanent 
Representatives Committee to examine the documents submitted by the Commission and to present a 
report  to  the  Council  for  its  meeting  on  7 December 1998,  with  a  view to  preparing  the  Vienna 
European Council” (General Affairs Council, 1998b).
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the ultimate judge on the pace of the accession process, on behalf of the Member 
States.704 
The involvement of the EU institutional framework in the enlargement policy has also 
materialised  at  the  level  of  accession  negotiations.  While  the  Treaty  provisions 
suggest that the process essentially concerns the Member States, on the one hand, and 
the applicant state, on the other, in practice institutions have been directly involved in 
the conduct of these negotiations. To start with, the common position presented by the 
Presidency in accession conferences, was first unanimously agreed within the General 
Affairs Council, on the basis of drafts prepared by the Commission on each of the 31 
chapters,705 for each of the candidates.706 
Another  illustration  of  the  institutions’  role  in  accession  negotiations  is  the 
establishment  of  so-called  “roadmaps”.  Based  on  a  Commission  “enlargement 
strategy paper”,707 the roadmaps were  devised to  speed up accession negotiations. 
They were welcomed by the Council, as “a framework, which is both ambitious and 
realistic, for continuing accession negotiations”,708 and “a frame of reference which 
reflect[ed] the Union's commitment, for its part, to tackling problems raised by the 
negotiations,  including  requests  for  transitional  arrangements,  and  to  adopting 
negotiating positions on chapters of the acquis based on a given timetable, with a 
view to the provisional closure of the various chapters once the conditions are met”. 
The  European  Council,  meeting  in  Nice,  thereafter  “endorsed”  the  Council 
conclusions.709 It  thus  appears  that  the  cooperation  between  the  Commission  – 
Council  –  European  Council  was  pivotal  in  determining  the  framework of 
negotiations, on behalf of the Member States. 710
704 Maresceau (2001: 3).
705 See  the  Guide  to  the  Negotiations  prepared  by  the  Directorate  General  Enlargement  (DG 
Enlargement 2004), Maurer (2002: 113), Brandtner (2002).
706 Indeed, the accession process and the definition of common positions are closely related to the pre-
accession strategy, in so far as progress in implementing the AP determines the pace of negotiations, as 
reflected in the annual progress reports prepared by the Commission.
707 European Commission (2000b). Further: Maurer (2002: 126). 
708 General Affairs Council (2000b). 
709 See conclusions of the Nice European Council (European Council, 2000b). 
710 Further on this involvement: Puissochet (1974).
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Moreover, the Commission maintained close contacts with the candidate countries to 
envisage solutions to problems arisen in the context of accession negotiations. The 
Directorate General for Enlargement was particularly active in this regard. Also, the 
Secretariat General of the Council provided secretarial support of the negotiations on 
the EU side.  The  European Parliament  was kept  informed,711 and  made its  views 
known through  the  adoption  of  regular  reports  following the  Commission  annual 
progress  assessment  of  the  candidates.  Indeed,  its  views  could  not  be  ignored  in 
practice, considering that it has to give its assent to the eventual Accession Treaty.712 
 
The foregoing illustrates that the EU enlargement policy involves a close cooperation 
among the institutions of the European Union, and between the institutions and the 
Member States.  As demonstrated above,  such cooperation is  clearly  visible  at  the 
level  of  the  definition  of  accession  conditions,  the  establishment  of  the  specific 
framework  to  guide  their  fulfilment  by  the  candidates,  and  also  at  the  level  of 
accession negotiations. 
More generally, the EU enlargement process entails the projection, and eventually the 
expansion of  the Union order  in  its  entirety,  with no distinction between its  sub-
orders. Accession is a package deal, and the candidates have to accept the Union’s 
acquis  as  a  whole.  Candidates’  adaptation  and  accession  negotiations  are  not 
segmented in terms of inter-governmental/Community aspects. Such a projection is 
managed and monitored through an integrated cooperation between the institutions. 
As a result, there does not seem to be competition between different instruments, or 
between  the  different  institutions,  as  appears  in  the  context  of  the  Partnerships, 
particularly post-Amsterdam, as suggested in the last chapter.
Put  differently,  the  enlargement  process  is  underpinned  by  a  high  level  of 
coordination among EU sub-orders. Enlargement involves, a de facto modus vivendi 
for conducting what is essentially an EU policy in relation to third states, even though 
the latter are destined to enter the Union. As such the conduct of enlargement may be 
711 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/index.htm 
712 OJ 2003 L236.
200
attractive as a model for an integrated conduct of EU external policies in general, and 
of the Partnerships in particular.
6.1.2. A methodology penetrating the Partnerships with Russia and 
Ukraine 
The enlargement  methodology has  inspired  developments  in  other  spheres  of  EU 
external relations,713 in particular the EU relations towards its neighbours.714 In the 
case  of  Russia,  the  Union  aims  at  developing  the  concept  of  “common  spaces” 
(6.1.2.2),  while Ukraine is included in a wider “European Neighbourhood Policy” 
(6.1.2.1). 
6.1.2.1. Fostering  the  integration  of  the  Partnership  with  Ukraine  
through the European Neighbourhood Policy
The  methodology  of  the  enlargement  policy  appears  to  have  penetrated  the  EU 
partnership with Ukraine, through the emerging European Neighbourhood Policy of 
the Union. The latter embeds the PCA in a new policy framework, which involves the 
key  characteristics  of  the  pre-accession  strategy,  notably  the  all-encompassing 
projection  of  the  European  Union  towards  the  neighbours,  underpinned  by  an 
integrated and “de-pillarised” participation of the EU institutions.
Before turning to the substantive and institutional implications of the ENP for the 
Partnership, its origins and objectives should be briefly recalled. For present purposes, 
suffice  to  note  that,  following  the  2002  Copenhagen  European  Council,715 the 
Commission  published  a  policy  paper  on  “Wider  Europe”716 which  launched  the 
713 See for instance the development of the relations with the western Balkans: Pippan (2004), Cremona 
(2000).
714 Indeed the enlargement policy has been regarded as “the most successful act of foreign policy that 
the EU has ever made” (Kok, 2003). For commentary on these views, see Cremona (2004a). 
715 Conclusions Copenhagen European Council, 12-13 December 2002 (European Council, 2002). 
716 European Commission (2003b). It followed a seminal speech by then Commission President Prodi 
“A Wider  Europe  -  A Proximity Policy as  the  key  to  stability”,  given  at  the  Sixth ECSA-World 
Conference, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002 (Prodi, 2002). It itself follows various initiatives developed 
201
“European Neighbourhood Policy”. Further articulated in a Strategy Paper of 2004,717 
this  new  framework  policy  covers  the  countries  on  the  eastern  and  the  southern 
borders of the enlarged EU,718 and aims at drawing them into an increasingly close 
relationship with the Union, offering them “the chance to participate in various EU 
activities, through greater cooperation on political, security, and economic issues as 
well as culture and education”.719 In the east, this policy framework covers inter alia 
Ukraine, Russia being treated differently.720 
Although not designed to prepare membership, the ENP implants key features of the 
enlargement  methodology in the context of the Partnership. In effect, to paraphrase 
Maresceau and Montaguti,721 it sparks a “political re-orientation” of the Partnership. 
Without being formally renegotiated, the terms of the Agreement have been further 
articulated to fit in the overall policy framework set out by the ENP. The latter also 
relies  on  the  institutional  framework  established  by  the  PCA in  the  conduct  and 
management of the new policy, while involving the ad hoc institutional arrangements 
specific to the pre-accession strategy. In methodological terms, the ENP thus has an 
impact  on  the  Partnership  which  mirrors  the  implications  that  the  pre-accession 
strategy had on the EAs with the CEECs.722 
in relations to the neighbours, involving both the Commission and the SG/HR for CFSP. The General 
Affairs Council  had already made suggestions to promote the establishment of  new links with the 
neighbours, followed by a joint letter of HR for CSFP Solana and Commissioner Patten addressed to 
the Danish Presidency (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/_0130163334_001_en.pdf). 
On the background of the ENP, see Cremona (2004b), Lannon and van Elsuwege (2003: 21), Attinà 
and Rossi (2004). 
717 European Commission (2004c: 6).
718 The so-called “western NIS” (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine); the “southern Mediterranean countries” 
(Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia). While 
Russia was initially covered by the Wider Europe Communication, the 2004 strategy paper mentions 
that “together, Russia and the EU have decided to develop further their strategic partnership through 
the  creation  of  four  common spaces.  The  southern  Caucasian  countries  were  added  to  the  list  of 
“neighbours” covered by the ENP.
719 European Commission (2004a: 2).
720 See below.
721 Maresceau and Montaguti (1995: 1327).
722 See above section 6.1.1.
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In substantive terms, the ENP promotes the projection of EU principles, norms and 
standards towards Ukraine. Such projection does not only concern the Community but 
involves the Union as a whole. Indeed, the Commission has emphasised that the ENP 
is “a comprehensive policy integrating related components from all three ‘pillars’ of 
the Union’s present structure”.723 It offers “a means for an enhanced and more focused 
policy approach of the EU towards its neighbourhood, bringing together the principal  
instruments at the disposal of the Union and its member States. It will contribute to 
further  advancing  and  supporting  the  EU’s  foreign  policy  objectives”  (emphasis 
added).724 The Commission also pointed out the full accordance of the ENP with the 
goals of the European Security Strategy, proposed by High Representative for CFSP 
Javier Solana, and endorsed by the European Council in December 2003.725 
The  projection  of  the  Union as  an  integrated  whole  towards  Ukraine  is  not  only 
illustrated by the list of objectives of the ENP.726 It is also evidenced in the so-called 
“action  plans”  (APs),  which  constitute  the  key  element  of  the  European 
723 European Commission (2004c: 6).
724 European Commission (2004c: 8).
725 According to the Security Strategy: “Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It 
is  in  the  European  interest  that  countries  on  our  borders  are  well-governed.  Neighbours  who  are 
engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or 
exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe. The integration of acceding 
states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a 
ring  of  well  governed  countries  to  the  East  of  the  European  Union  and  on  the  borders  of  the 
Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations”  (High Representative of 
CFSP, 2003) The strategy was approved by the European Council in Brussels, 12 December 2003 
(European Council,  2003) and drafted under the responsibilities of  EU High Representative Javier 
Solana. 
726 First, emphasis is put on the neighbours’ commitment to shared values in the field of fundamental 
rights (political and social), as advocated by the Union, and derived from various international norms to 
which the Member States are committed. The ENP also promotes a more effective political dialogue 
with the partners, inspired by CFSP objectives and principles. It also foresees possible involvement of 
the partner countries in aspects of CFSP and ESDP, and participation in EU-led-crisis management 
operations. With respect to trade, economic and social policies, the ENP “offers [the partner countries] 
… the prospect of a stake in the internal market”, subject to legislative and regulatory approximation 
by the partner country to EU standards. On Justice and Home Affairs, the ENP promotes effective 
functioning of public administration, ensuring high standards of administrative efficiency, particularly 
as regards border management (European Commission, 2004c).
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neighbourhood policy.727 The APs contain a set of priorities “whose fulfilment will 
bring  [the  neighbour]  closer  to  the  European  Union”.  They  are  comprehensive, 
covering “political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing the partner for 
gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s Internal Market;  justice and home affairs; 
energy transport, information society, environment and research and innovation, and 
social policy and people-to-people contacts”.728 These priorities were set out by the 
EU, particularly the Commission, in consultation with the authorities of the countries 
concerned,729 taking account of prior “country reports”, compiled by the Commission 
services.730 Such country reports provided an assessment of bilateral relations between 
the  EU and  each  of  the  neighbours  concerned,  and  included  an  overview of  the 
political, economic, social and legislative situation. In the case of Ukraine, the report 
assessed the progress made in implementing the PCA, and “describe[d] the current 
situation in selected areas of particular interest for this partnership”.731 
The  AP  seeks  to  support  and  stimulate  Ukraine’s  fulfilment  of  its  obligations 
established by the PCA, which remains a “valid basis of EU-Ukraine cooperation”, 
but in the all-encompassing perspective of the neighbourhood policy.732 It  sets out 
727 European Commission (2004c: 3).
728 European Commission (2004a: 2). 
729 Within the Commission, the “Wider Europe” task force is in charge of establishing the AP. It draws 
on officials from both the external relations Directorate General, and DG enlargement.  It is headed by 
the  Deputy  Director  General  of  DG  external  relations: 
(http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/task_force_en.htm).
730 Commission Staff Working Paper “European Neighbourhood Policy  - Country Report – Ukraine” 
(European Commission, 2004d). 
731 Namely,  “the  development  of  political  institutions  based  on  the  values…  underlined  in  the 
Agreement, regional stability and cooperation in justice and home affairs, and economic and social 
reforms… and further  liberalisation  of  trade  and for  gradual  participation  in  the Internal  Market” 
(European Commission, 2004d)
732 Legally, the AP is not a binding instrument. An earlier version of the AP on Ukraine envisaged by 
the Commission contained a proposal for a Council Decision on the “position to be adopted by the 
Community and its Member States within the cooperation Council established by the [PCA]… with 
regard to the adoption of a Recommendation on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan” 
(European Commission, 2004f). With respect to its legal basis, the proposal first mentioned Art. 2(2) of 
the Council and Commission decision on the conclusion of the PCA, and also refers to Art. 15 TEU on 
CFSP Common positions. It thereby confirms its cross-pillar dimension. The draft decision contains a 
single article which provides that the position to be adopted by the Communities and their Member 
States within the Cooperation Council shall be based on the draft Recommendation of the Cooperation 
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concrete  steps,  targets and priorities  “covering a number of key areas for specific 
action”733 with  a  view  to  giving  practical  guidance  to  Ukraine  to  further  its 
compliance with the rules of the Agreement. Indeed, more than recalling the terms of 
the  PCA,  the  AP  appears  to  elaborate  and  build  upon  some of  the  Agreement’s 
provisions, in view of the objectives of the neighbourhood policy. 
In  particular,  the  section  of  the  AP  entitled  economic  and  social  reform  and 
development contains a sub-section on “functioning market economy”, followed by a 
section  on  trade,  market  and  regulatory  reform.  Here,  trade  and  economic 
commitments contained in the PCA are being partially reformulated. For instance, 
with respect to the provisions on movement of workers mentioned in chapter 1, the 
AP not only calls for the fulfilment of the PCA commitments, it also elucidates what 
the commitment is and how it should be fulfilled. More precisely, the AP foresees that 
to  comply  with  the  PCA  labour  provisions,  the  partners  have  to  “ensure  full 
application of the “best endeavours” clause by abolishing all discriminatory measures 
based on nationality which affect migrant workers, as regards working conditions, 
remuneration and dismissal”. In legal terms, a “best endeavours” clause, such as the 
one included in the PCA provisions on workers,734 does not, by definition, establish an 
obligation  of  result.  The  AP nevertheless  says  otherwise  when  requiring  that  all 
discriminatory  measures  should  be  abolished.  Notwithstanding  the  apparent 
contradiction in  terms of  these provisions,  the latter  seem to suggest  that  the AP 
hardens up some of the PCA obligations.735 Moreover, the CFSP dimension of the 
Council, which is annexed to the Decision. The recommendation is based on Art. 85 PCA establishing 
the Cooperation Council. It contains a sole Article whereby the Cooperation Council recommends that 
the Parties implement the AP annexed, insofar as such implementation is directed towards attainment 
of the objectives of the PCA. Art. 85 PCA Ukraine provides that “A cooperation is hereby established 
which shall supervise the implementation of this Agreement. It shall meet at ministerial level once a 
year and when circumstances require. It shall examine any major issues arising within the framework 
of the Agreement and any other bilateral or international issues of mutual interest for the purpose of 
attaining  the  objectives  of  this  Agreement.  The  Cooperation  Council  may  also  make  appropriate 
recommendations, by agreement between the Parties.” 
733 European Commission (2004c: 3). 
734 See further section 1.2.
735 Pt. 2.3.4. AP. The AP also seeks “full implementation of PCA commitments in the sphere of trade in 
goods” (pt. 2.3.1. AP). Equally, with respect to the conditions affecting establishment and operation of 
companies, the AP calls for “the full implementation of title IV, chapter II of the PCA, and in particular 
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Partnership,  as  well  as  the  JHA  dimension,736 have  also  been  developed  and 
strengthened,737 in line with the ambitions set out in the ENP.738 
The  foregoing  suggests  that  the  ENP  embeds  the  Partnership  into  a  new  policy 
framework within which the Union further projects its trade, economic, social and 
political  standards  and principles.  Furthermore,  the  AP which articulates the ENP 
reformulates the commitments contained in the PCA with a view to ensuring their 
fulfilment by the Ukrainian authorities. It appears that under the guise of explanation, 
the content of the Agreement is partly revisited to fit in the new policy framework. 
This development is reminiscent of the one that took place in the context of the pre-
accession strategy, particularly in relation to the Europe Agreements with the CEECs. 
In  addition,  as  the  Accession  Partnership  did  in  the  context  of  the  pre-accession 
strategy, the AP introduces further conditionality in the relationship. In this sense, the 
ENP suggests that once the AP priorities are fulfilled, the PCA could be replaced by a 
of the most favoured nation and national treatment principles” (pt. 2.3.2. AP).
736 Pt. 2.4. AP. A specific action plan on Justice and Home Affairs with Ukraine had been set out on 10 
December 2001, and cooperation in this field will continue to be based on this specific AP and will be 
complemented by the ENP AP. See in this regard the press release following the meeting on JHA of the 
EU Troika and Ukraine, 29 March 2004 (EU/Ukraine Cooperation Committee, 2001). 
737 Pt. 2.1. AP.
738 For instance, the AP with Ukraine starts off by a section on political dialogue and reform, which 
comprises a sub-section on democracy, rule of law human rights and fundamental freedoms. It also 
includes a sub-section on cooperation on foreign and security policy, weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) non-proliferation and disarmament, conflict prevention and crisis management. Furthermore, 
the AP provides that Ukraine should continue administrative reform and strengthening of local self-
government, through appropriate legislation, particularly in line with the standards contained in the 
European Charter on Local Self Government. Equally, Ukraine should ensure implementation of recent 
reforms  of  civil,  criminal  and  administrative  codes  and  codes  of  procedure  based  on  European 
standards; and continue the reform of the prosecution system in accordance with the relevant Council 
of Europe Action Plan (pt. 2.1. AP).
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new  contractual  framework,739 as  indeed  often  requested  by  the  Ukrainian 
authorities.740 
In institutional terms, the definition and the conduct of the ENP are reminiscent of the 
ad hoc interactions developed between the Commission and the Council in the context 
of the enlargement policy. In contrast to the latter however, the HR for CFSP has a 
significant role in the ENP. As regards the definition of the EU policy towards the 
new neighbours, the April 2002 General Affairs Council, following suggestions from 
some Member States,741 “held an exchange of views on relations between the future 
enlarged EU and its eastern neighbours” under the heading: “Wider Europe: relations 
between  the  future  enlarged  EU  and  its  eastern  neighbours”.742 A  joint  letter  of 
External  Relations  Commissioner  Patten  and  the  HR  for  CFSP  Solana,  entitled 
739 The ENP Strategy Paper evokes the establishment of a “European Neighbourhood Agreement” that 
would replace the present  generation of bilateral  agreements (European Commission, 2004c: 5).  It 
however remains elliptic as to what this new Agreement would be in terms of content and objectives. It 
only points out that “its scope would be defined in the light of progress in meeting the priorities set out 
in the AP” (European Commission, 2004c: 4) and “the overall evolution of EU-Ukraine relations” (pt. 
1 (Introduction) AP). The nature of this new type of agreement is no less unclear. It is particularly 
uncertain whether it  would be an association-type agreement based on Article 310 EC, involving a 
privileged relationship.  The  terminology  used  in  the  introductory  section  of  the  AP  hints  at  the 
progressive establishment of a relationship that includes various features of association as defined by 
the European Court of Justice’s Demirel judgment [Case 12/86] at para. 9: an “association agreement 
creat[es] special, privileged links with a non-member country which must, at least to a certain extent, 
take part in the Community system”. In particular, the AP mentions the perspective of moving beyond 
cooperation  to  a  significant  degree  of  integration… and the  possibility  for  Ukraine  to  participate 
progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes. This seems to echo the formula used by 
the Court.
740 Alexandrova (1998: 160).
741 That was particularly the case of the UK and Sweden (EUobserver 17/04/2002). Jack Straw sent a 
letter  to the then Spanish Presidency of  the EU calling for “special  neighbour status” to  Ukraine, 
Belarus and Moldova, meaning “free trade rights with the EU and a close relationship on border, 
justice, home affairs, security and defence issues” (The Independent, 16/04/2002; The Financial Times, 
15/04/2002).  The  first  signs  of  the  willingness  to  address  the  EU  relationship  with  the  future 
neighbours appeared in 1997 in the Commission’s Agenda 2000, which timidly pointed out the need to 
address the external implications of enlargement (European Commission, 1997a: pt IV.2, Part I “the 
policies of the Union”).
742 General Affairs Council (2002). 
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“Wider Europe” was sent thereafter to the EU Presidency.743 In preparation of the 
Copenhagen European Council of December 2002, the General Affairs Council stated 
that: 
the EU wishes to put in place further conditions which would allow it to enhance 
its relations with its Eastern European neighbours: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. 
There is a  need for the EU to formulate an ambitious, long-term and integrated  
approach  towards  each  of  these  countries,  with  the  objective  of  promoting 
democratic  and  economic  reforms,  sustainable  development  and  trade,  thus 
helping to ensure greater stability and prosperity at and beyond the new borders of 
the Union (emphasis added). 
This statement was echoed thereafter by the European Council.744 Subsequently, the 
Commission  published  its  Communication  on  “Wider  Europe”,745 together  with 
contributions from the HR for CFSP, which were “welcomed” by the General Affairs 
Council, in March and June 2003.746 
The emerging EU Wider Europe policy is not based on specific Treaty provisions. 
Rather,  the  foregoing  shows  that  the  policy  initiative  is  the  product  of  informal 
interactions between the Commission and the Council  together with the European 
Council. It is also noticeable that the External Relations Commissioner and the HR for 
CFSP have played a significant part in formulating this policy, from its very inception 
onwards. 
The informal interactions between the EU institutions are also at work in the conduct 
of the policy, and particularly as regards the elaboration and suivi of the APs. In the 
case  of  Ukraine,  the Commission  started  the elaboration of  the  AP,  following its 
country report,747 “in close coordination with the Member States”. The Commission 
Communication on the AP emphasises that the successive presidencies, the Council 
Secretariat  and representatives of HR Solana participated in all  consultations with 
743 Joint letter by EU Commissioner Chris Patten and the EU High Representative for the Common 
Foreign  and  Security  Policy  on  Wider  Europe.  7  August  2002. 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/_0130163334_001_en.pdf  
744 European Council (2002). 
745 European Commission (2003b). 
746 General Affairs Council (2003a, 2003b). 
747 European Commission (2004d).
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partners.748 In particular, the representative for the HR was involved on all discussions 
“regarding the political dialogue and cooperation, and CFSP issues”.749 Once adopted 
by the Commission,750 the AP was swiftly endorsed by the Council,751 before its final 
presentation to the Cooperation Council of the PCA for approval.752 
As regards the suivi, the ENP foresees that it is the responsibility of the Commission 
to  draw  up  periodic  progress  reports,  on  the  implementation  of  the  AP,753 in 
cooperation  with  the  HR  for  CFSP  on  issues  related  to  political  dialogue  and 
cooperation, and the CFSP.754 These reports are then transmitted to the Council which 
decides,  in  tandem  with  the  European  Council,755 on  the  development  of  the 
748 European Commission (2004a: 3).
749 This participation is recurrently emphasised in all policy documents of the Commission related to 
the ENP. It follows the formula envisaged by the Council.
750 See the press-conference given by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner on the launch of the first seven 
APs under the ENP,  Brussels, 9 December 2004 (Ferrero-Waldner, 2004). 
751 The  Council  adopted  the  AP  on  13  December  (General  Affairs  Council,  2004),  after  the 
Commission had adopted them on 9 December. This swift adoption by the Council can be taken as 
evidence  of  his  earlier  involvement.  The  APs  were  transmitted  to  the  European  Parliament,  the 
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the region for information.
752 The Council invited the Committee of Permanent Representatives to prepare the necessary decisions 
enabling the Co-operation Councils with the respective ENP partners to confirm these action plans and 
to launch their implementation. As pointed out by the Council, it is only a confirmation. The APs were 
in practice already “agreed” with the partner countries concerned even before the Commission, as a 
college, had formally adopted them on 9 December 2004. 
753 It should be noted that 2003 Accession Treaty has partly maintained this extraordinary role for the 
Commission, by endowing it with the power to adopt specific safeguard measures in the field of Justice 
and Home affairs, with no equivalent in the context of the TEU; see Art. 39 of the Act of Accession 
(OJ 2003 L236/33). Further: Inglis (2004: 77), Hillion (2004c: 583). 
754 At its meeting on 13 Dec. 2004, the GAER Council recalled its intention to undertake a first review 
of the implementation of the action plans at the latest two years from their adoption, on the basis of 
assessment reports to be prepared by the Commission, in close co-operation with the Presidency and 
the SG/HR on issues related to political cooperation and the CFSP, and with the contribution of ENP 
partners  (General  Affairs  Council,  2004).  At  its  meeting  on  16/17  December  2004,  the  European 
Council  also invited the Commission and the  High Representative to  report  regularly  on progress 
accomplished (European Council, 2004b). This joint exercise by the Commission and the HR, which 
contrasts with the enlargement policy, seemingly prefigures the “double-hatting” system introduced by 
the Constitutional Treaty; see further below, section 6.2.3.2.
755 It should be pointed out that the Cooperation Council, Committee and sub-committees are endowed 
with the monitoring of the implementation of the AP. Such use of the institutional framework of the 
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Partnership,  and  as  the  case  may  be,  on  opening  negotiations  with  a  view  to 
establishing a “European Neighbourhood Agreement”.
It becomes apparent that the methodology that the ENP introduces in the Partnership 
heavily draws on the techniques developed in the context of the enlargement policy. 
First,  through the ENP,  the Partnership involves the projection of the Union as a 
whole. It is a policy aimed at handling the multi-faceted external implications of the 
2004 enlargement, itself an all-encompassing process. Secondly, the development of 
the  relationship  is  made  conditional  upon Ukraine’s  ability  to  meet  the  priorities 
defined in the AP, and thus relies heavily on benchmarking and monitoring, which 
were so typical of the enlargement methodology. Thirdly, in institutional terms, the 
ENP introduces ad hoc interactions between the EU institutions in the Partnership. 
These interactions draw on the institutional arrangements developed in the context of 
the enlargement policy, which are detached from the constitutional requirements of 
the TEU. 
One of the spin-offs of the accession process has therefore been to inspire and instil 
new methodological arrangements in the conduct of the Partnership with Ukraine. 
These  arrangements  appear,  at  this  stage,  to  bring  to  a  standstill  the  increasing 
fragmentation of the Partnerships, highlighted in the previous chapter. 
6.1.2.2. New concepts for an all-encompassing EU cooperation with 
Russia: the “Common Spaces”
While  being  the  main  neighbour  of  the  enlarged  Union,  Russia  is  not  formally 
covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy. Instead, a new approach has been 
envisaged, which involves the creation of four “common spaces” between the EU and 
Russia,  namely a  common European economic space (CEES),  supplemented by a 
common  space  of  freedom,  security  and  justice  (CSFSJ),  a  common  space  of 
cooperation in the field  of external  security (CSES),  and a  space of  research and 
Agreement again draws on the enlargement methodology; see Council Regulation 622/98 establishing 
the Accession Partnership which emphasises that “the role played by the bodies set up by the EAs is 
central to ensuring the proper implementation and follow up of these action plans”, see 11th Recital of 
the Preamble (OJ 1998 L85/1).
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education,  including cultural  aspects  (CSRE).756 These spaces are  to be developed 
gradually “in the framework of the PCA”.757 
The creation of the common spaces appears, at this stage, to be a tidying-up exercise. 
They integrate the different strands of the Partnership,758 which have been developed 
according to the procedures and logics of the different EU sub-orders, particularly 
following the adoption of the 1999 Common Strategy.759 The following will focus on 
the first of the common spaces, namely the CEES, hitherto the most articulated of the 
four. It will become apparent that elements of the enlargement methodology can be 
depicted in the new initiative, although in a more diffuse and implicit fashion than is 
the case in the ENP. This is particularly the case with regard to the significance of 
legislative approximation in the Partnership.  At  the same time, it  appears that the 
integrated interaction of the EU institutions, typified by the ENP and the enlargement 
policy, has had difficulties penetrating the Partnership with Russia. 
To start with, legislative convergence is envisaged as a critical means to foster greater 
economic  integration  between  Russia  and  the  EU,  which  is  the  very  aim  of  the 
CEES.760 This  was  emphasised  by  the  joint  high-level  group  (HLG),  established 
756 It  was a  decision of  the St  Petersburg Summit  on 31 May 2003,  on the occasion of  the  300th 
anniversary of the city, to supplement the CEES with three other common spaces (EU/Russia Summit, 
2003a). 
757 The idea was further worked out at the EU-Russia Summit in Rome in November 2003. The Joint 
Statement mentions each of the four spaces. Under the CEES, the Joint Statement includes the Parties 
discussions on Kaliningrad, Russia’s accession to the WTO, Energy Dialogue, Transport networks, and 
environmental challenges. Under the CSFSJ, discussions on visa free-travel, EU-Russia readmission 
agreement and action plan on organised crime, as well as the signature of the EUROPOL – Russian 
Federation agreement.  Under the CSES, the Parties foresee the development of  their dialogue and 
cooperation  on  political  and  security  matters.  They  mention  their  ambition  to  explore  possible 
cooperation in the field of civil protection and long-haul air transport for crisis management. Finally, 
under the heading CSRE, the Joint Statement covers the renewal of the agreement on Science and 
Technology Cooperation,  the accession of  Russia  in  the Bologna Process,  and the participation of 
Russia in the EU Erasmus Mundus programme (EU/Russia Summit 2003b).
758 The  combination  of  the  common  spaces  has  indeed  been  characterised  as  a  “comprehensive” 
initiative  by the  Parties,  the four  spaces  forming part  of  a  “single package”,  which integrates  the 
different facets of the Partnership with Russia (EU/Russia Summit 2004a). 
759 See section 5.2.2.
760 EU/Russia Summit (2001b). 
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within the framework of the PCA by the EU-Russia Summit in 2001761 to elaborate 
the concept of CEES.762 In its second report,763 the HLG emphasised that the overall 
aim of the CEES is “to link the EU and Russia in a privileged relationship, focusing 
on  regulatory  and  legislative  convergence  and  trade  and  investment  facilitation” 
(emphasis  added).764 The Group confirmed that  “the broad objective of regulatory 
convergence is in itself a desirable goal that should bring substantial benefits to both 
the EU and Russia,  not  least  in  permitting economic agents to  operate  subject  to 
common rules and conditions” (emphasis added). 
761 The HLG was established by the Brussels EU-Russia Summit of October 2001 (EU/Russia Summit, 
2001b), in accordance with Art. 93 of the PCA. Meeting twice a year, the HLG was co-chaired by 
representatives of the Russian Federation and of the EU. In practice, vice-Prime Minister Khristenko 
and External Relations Commissioner Patten, later replaced by Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen, 
chaired the HLG. The decision to establish the HLG was taken by the Russia-EU Summit meeting in 
Moscow in May 2001 (EU/Russia Summit, 2001a) following a meeting in Stockholm in March 2001 
between the Heads of State and Government of the EU and the President of the Russian Federation, 
where the idea of CEES was reinvigorated. 
762 The PCA with Russia already included the objective of integrating Russia into a wider zone of 
cooperation in Europe. The 12th recital of the Preamble of the PCA states “the utility of the Agreement 
in favouring a gradual rapprochement between Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe and 
neighbouring regions”. Indeed, one of the objectives of the Partnership as provided in Art. 1 of the 
Agreement is “to provide an appropriate framework for the gradual integration between Russia and a 
wider area of cooperation in Europe”. Furthermore, the 1999 Common Strategy also mentioned the 
“integration  of  Russia  into  a  common  European  economic  and  social  space”  as  one  of  Union’s 
“Principal objectives” (Pt. 2), and as one of its “Areas of Action” under the CS (OJ 1999 L157/1). 
763 A first report was submitted to the May 2002 EU-Russia Summit. It endorsed the work plan for the 
CEES established by the HLG, and its approach in defining ultimate objectives. A list of key issues for 
work was agreed, with possible objectives and practical steps to achieve regulatory approximation, 
including sectors where cooperation is expected to boost trade and investment and where the trade 
interest of the EU and Russia is strong. The list was said to “reflect the achievements and experience of 
integration in the EU”. It also considered that in terms of timing, a first stage should be devoted to 
prepare the ground for work to achieve regulatory approximation.  
764 The second Report of the HLG was presented at the EU-Russia Summit in November 2002. It was 
established in view of studies it had commissioned from research institutes in order to assess the impact 
of economic integration. Again, particular consideration was devoted to regulatory convergence, the 
HLG  noting  that  particular  emphasis  was  placed  by  the  studies  on  the  relevance  of  regulatory 
approximation (EU/Russia High Level Group, 2002; EU/Russia Summit, 2002: 9).
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Indeed, in a so-called “Concept Paper”, submitted to the Rome EU-Russia Summit of 
November 2003,765 the HLG defined the CEES as “an  open and integrated market  
between the EU and Russia, based on implementation of common and compatible  
rules and regulations,  including compatible administrative practices, as a basis for 
synergies and economies of scale associated with a higher degree of competition in 
bigger markets. It shall ultimately cover substantially all sectors of the economy”. In 
particular,  the  HLG foresees  that  the  framework  for  cross-border  trade  in  goods, 
covering  substantially  all  industrial  and  agricultural  goods,  should  include  “the 
necessary  rules  -  whether  set  by  standards,  technical  specifications  or  other  
regulatory and legal requirements – organisational structures and procedures; while 
ensuring  that  these  do  not  create  unnecessary  obstacles  to  trade,  and  promoting 
equivalent levels of the protection of safety, health and the environment” (emphasis 
added).766 The Report also emphasised that “Cooperation… particularly  with regard 
to legislative approximation is an essential  element in order to promote trade and 
investment between the EU and Russia”.767
The foregoing  overview of  the  conceptual  elaboration  of  the  CEES by the  HLG 
demonstrates the pivotal role that legislative approximation is expected to play in the 
establishment of the Common European Economic Space. It should be noted that such 
an approximation is limited, compared to the one envisaged in the ENP, and a fortiori 
in the context of the pre-accession strategy. In particular, the language used by the 
HLG  does  not  directly  refer  to  EU  standards  when  dealing  with  approximation, 
thereby  avoiding  giving  the  impression  that  the  Union  is  imposing  its  norms  on 
Russia.768 Indeed,  the  HLG  reports  carefully  chose  references  to  concepts  of 
“approximation”, “convergence”, or even “compatibility”. A speech given by (then) 
External Relations Commissioner Patten uses a language that is even weaker, pointing 
out that “co-operation with Russia should promote coherence between our respective 
legislative standards based on studies of the likely benefits for Russian industries” 
(emphasis added).769 
765 EU/Russia Summit (2003b). Further Vinokurov (2004). 
766 EU/Russia High Level Group (2003: pt. 18).  
767 Ibid., pt. 19.
768 Pursiainen (2004). 
769 Patten (2002).  
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Despite  the  rhetoric  however,  the  convergence  envisioned  in  the  CEES  arguably 
implies that the burden of legislative adaptation falls essentially on Russia.770 It does 
not seem to entail that the Union envisages a potential revision of its own acquis. 
Support for this interpretation can be found in the concept paper itself, whose section 
“guiding principles” [of the CEES] establishes that the latter will be based on existing 
and future commitments of the Parties in the PCA and WTO. On may recall, in this 
respect, that the PCA provisions include a specific article on legislative cooperation 
whereby Russia endeavours to ensure that its future legislation is compatible with 
Community law.771 Nowhere is it envisaged in the Agreement that the EU should do 
the same with respect to Russia’s legislation. It appears therefore that, albeit more 
subtly formulated than in the case of the ENP, the legal approximation envisaged by 
the CEES essentially involves a projection of norms and standards of the EU towards 
Russia, on the basis of the PCA.772 
While  legislative  approximation  is  reminiscent  of  the  ENP,  the  institutional 
dimension  of  the  common spaces  appears  to  give  more  room to  joint  and  equal 
participation  of  the  Partners.  Moreover,  the  development  of  the  new  framework 
remains tightly controlled by the Presidency and the European Council, leaving less 
margin of manoeuvre for the Commission and the HR.773  Arguably the relations with 
Russia are too sensitive to be included in the ENP and managed by its integrated 
institutional  framework,  where Member States seem less directly  influential.  As a 
result, the penetration of the enlargement methodology in the EU-Russia relations has 
770 Shemiatenkov (2002). 
771 The PCA contains in its Art. 55, provisions on legislative cooperation by reference to the acquis, in 
the particular fields of company law, banking law, company account and taxes, protection of workers at 
he work place, financial services, rules on competition, public procurement, protection of health and 
life of humans, animals and plants, the environment, consumer protection, indirect taxation, customs 
law, technical rules and standards, nuclear laws and regulation, transport.
772 Indeed, the concept paper mentions the elaboration of action plans for making the concept of CEES 
operational, and particularly to transform the objectives of the CEES into specific goals and actions 
(EU/Russia High Level Group, 2003: pt. 22).
773 Even if,  from the outset,  the Commission has attempted to include Russia in its Wider Europe 
initiative/ENP, see European Commission (2003b, 2004b).  
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been less evident than in the Partnership with Ukraine774 As pointed out above, the 
ENP was first and foremost conceived in the services of the Commission and of the 
HR  for  CFSP,  respectively,  and  then  presented  to  the  country  concerned,  after 
approval by the Council.775 By contrast, the creation of the CEES does not appear to 
be based on policy papers of the Commission and the HR for CFSP, at least not to the 
same degree. It was the HLG, appointed jointly by the Parties, that was instrumental 
in establishing what the CEES should be.776 Indeed, the Group has already suggested 
that it could play a role in the establishment of action plans for making the concept of 
CEES more operational.777 Its activities have also been monitored by the common 
institutions of the PCA, particularly the EU-Russia Summits which have played a 
pivotal role in the development of the Partnership. In other words, the Parties have 
emphasised  the  joint character  of  the  initiative  to  create  common  spaces,  which 
contrasts with the essentially unilateral feature of the ENP. Illustrating the point, the 
EU-Russia Summit pointed out that the process of creating the common spaces “is to 
be approached in a systematic way and on an equal footing, with specific targets and 
reciprocal  arrangements in  each  space,  with  roadmaps  being  elaborated  where 
appropriate” (emphasis added).778 Through the HLG, it appears that the development 
of the common spaces is based on a concern to establish a shared agenda.779 
To  recapitulate,  although  less  evident  in  institutional  terms,  the  enlargement 
methodology subtly influences the development of the EU relationship with Russia. 
Through the proposed CEES, it is apparent that the EU attempts to project its norms 
774 The  only  reference  to  the  CEES  in  the  Council  conclusions  concerns  the  reports  on  the 
implementation of the Common Strategy with Russia, whereas the press releases of the EU-Russia 
Summits, and the Conclusions of the European Council deal with the CEES in an extensive manner. 
See for instance European Council (2003: pt. 66).
775 A  formula  which  has  nonetheless  been  branded  “joint  ownership”,  see  European  Commission, 
2004c: 8). 
776 It is recalled that it was co-chaired by External relations Commissioner Patten, thereafter replaced 
by Enlargement  Commissioner  Verheugen,  thereby suggesting that  the Commission was indirectly 
influential in determining the positions taken by the HLG.
777 EU/Russia High Level Group (2003: pt. 22).
778 EU/Russia Summit (2003b). 
779 This is also a noticeable feature of the so-called “Northern Dimension” initiative, which involves 
Russia  (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/index.htm#4),  see  Leshukov 
(2001: 135).
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and standards, in the garb of regulatory convergence, through ad hoc mechanisms and 
sui generis institutional arrangements. As already alluded to, inserting elements of the 
enlargement methodology in the Partnerships, may improve interactions within the 
system of EU external relations thereby fostering coherence of the Union’s external 
action in the context of the Partnerships. Indeed, the core of this methodology consists 
of  promoting  the  EU  principles,  standards  and  norms,  relying  on  a  de-pillarised 
institutional framework. 
Nevertheless, this transplant of pre-accession elements in the Partnerships may raise 
various  concerns.  First,  it  may carry  with  it  the  deficiencies  of  the  pre-accession 
strategy itself. In particular, the discrepancy which has appeared between what the EU 
promotes  in  terms  of  values  and  principles  vis-à-vis  the  candidates  and  what  it 
requires  from  the  Member  States,  might  contaminate  its  approach  towards  the 
neighbours,  and  be  detrimental  to  its  credibility.780 Secondly,  while  it  might  help 
integrating  the  Partnership,  the  methodology  might  be  inappropriate  given  the 
different  premises  and  objectives  of  the  respective  policy  frameworks,  namely 
preparation  of  accession  on  the  one  hand,  and  hypothetical  upgrading  of  the 
Partnership, on the other hand. Importing the enlargement methodology within the 
Partnerships,  does  not  obliterate  its  essential  quality,  namely  to  prepare  for 
accession.781 
6.2. The Constitutional Treaty: a partial consolidation of the system of EU 
external relations as evidenced in the Partnerships with Russia and 
Ukraine
It has been argued that enlargement has instilled new methodological routines in the 
management of the Partnerships. It has also catalysed a debate on the constitutional 
design of the Union, which led to the eventual signing of the Treaty establishing a 
780 On double standards: see Hillion (2004a). 
781 Prodi (2002). Further: Hillion (2004b).  
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Constitution  for  Europe  (TCE),782 based  on  a  blueprint  drafted  by  the  European 
Convention.783 
While the TCE enshrines for the first time “Partnership” in the constitutional law of 
EU external relations,784 it also affects the tendances lourdes of the evolving system of 
EU external relations785 evidenced in the EU Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine. In 
the following and concluding section,  it  will  be  seen that  instances  of  mixity,  as 
incarnated by the PCAs, are likely to be reduced in the new constitutional framework, 
although not disappearing altogether (6.2.1). The constitutional principles organising 
interactions within the system of EU external relations will thus keep their relevance 
in ensuring the overall coherence in the conduct of EU external relations in general, 
and of the Partnerships in particular (6.2.2). Finally, it appears that the TCE confirms 
and builds upon the institutional practice developed in the context of the enlargements 
policy and translated in the Partnerships,  notably by strengthening mechanisms of 
external projection of EU norms and “values” (6.2.3).
6.2.1. Reviewing the new formula of mixity illustrated by the PCAs
In the first part of this study, it was argued that the PCAs illustrate a new formula of 
mixity, resulting from the judicial fine-tuning of Community external competence, 
inspired by the new EU constitutional order. It was also argued that the PCAs include 
782 Treaty  establishing a  Constitution for  Europe  (OJ 2004 C310).  On the  connection between the 
constitutional reform and enlargement, see e.g. Edwards (2004: 23).
783 For  commentaries  of  the  text  drafted by the European Convention,  see  for  instance  Dashwood 
(2002c: 395, 2004a: 45), Dougan (2003: 763, 2003), Temple-Lang (2004: 544). 
784 Article III-292(1), subparagraph 2, provides that “[t]he Union shall seek to develop relations and 
build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share 
the principles referred to in the first subparagraph [e.g. democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of 
equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law]…”
785 For a  more comprehensive analysis of the constitutional external  relations regime based on the 
Conventions’ draft, see Cremona (2003a: 1347), de Witte (2004: 95), Denza (2004: 259), Herrmann 
(2004: 291), Griller (2003: 133). 
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provisions relating to the non-EC pillars of the Union, thereby giving the Agreements 
a proto-cross pillar nature, enhancing the projection of the EU in all its facets.
In the following section, it will be seen that the TCE reviews this complex formula of 
mixity. First,  the new constitutional framework should reduce causes of mixity by 
widening the scope of Union’s exclusive external competence (6.2.1.1). Secondly, the 
TCE appears to abolish the formula of cross-pillar mixity altogether, in view of the 
so-called “de-pillarisation” of the EU, and the express recognition of its single legal 
personality (6.2.1.2).
6.2.1.1. The widening of the Union’s exclusive external powers under 
the Constitution
The TCE increases the list of exclusive external powers of the Union in two ways. 
First, it widens the scope of a priori exclusive external powers, notably by expanding 
the ambit of the common commercial policy, and secondly, it appears to facilitate the 
acquisition of  external  exclusive  powers  by  the  Union,  by  reformulating  the 
conditions of such an acquisition.
Article I-13 TCE provides in its first paragraph that the common commercial policy 
(CCP) belongs to the Union exclusive competence defined in Article I-12 TCE as 
areas “where only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member 
States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the 
implementation of Union acts”.  While this provision is unexceptionable given the 
well-established  case  law  of  the  Court  of  Justice  concerning  the  CCP,786 it  is 
nevertheless significant when read jointly with the provisions of Article III-315 TCE. 
The latter Article stipulates in its first paragraph that the CCP includes the conclusion 
of  agreements  on  trade  in  goods,  services,  the  commercial  aspects  of  intellectual 
property and foreign direct investment. Intended to reflect the remit of the WTO,787 
786 Opinion 1/75 Local Cost Standard.
787 Eeckhout (2004: 54). Although the expression “commercial” in “commercial aspects of intellectual 
property”  is  different  from “trade aspects  of  intellectual  property”  to  which WTO law refers;  see 
further on this difference the remarks of Cremona (2002: 70), cf. Heliskoski (2002: 6), Hermann (2002: 
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the TCE thus considerably extends the scope of the CCP, by comparison to Article 
133 EC.788 The extension of the CCP has the effect of widening the scope of a priori 
exclusivity of Union external trade powers, and conversely of decreasing causes of 
mixity,  at  least  in  trade  policy.  In  addition,  it  should  also  be  assumed to  replace 
instances  of  exclusivity  acquired  through  the  ERTA effect,789 thus  reducing  the 
influence of Member States in the fields concerned. 
With respect to the exclusive external powers acquired by the Union, Article I-13 
TCE stipulates in its second paragraph that “[t]he Union shall also have exclusive 
competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is 
provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to 
exercise its internal competence, or insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules 
or alter their scope.” While it appears to be an attempt to codify the case law of the 
European Court of Justice on exclusive external Community powers,790 the formula 
used  by  the  TCE has  been  characterised  as  partly  “inaccurate”,  “misguided”  and 
“misleading”,791 in  so  far  as  it  represents  an  inept  rendering  of  the  principles 
established  by  the  case  law.792 It  appears  that,  by  loosening  the  conditions  for 
18-19).
788 The Nice Treaty already modified the scope of the CCP by including agreements on trade in certain 
services and on commercial aspects of intellectual property therein, thus partially revisiting the Court 
conclusions in Opinion 1/94. On the complicated Nice version of the CCP, e.g. Cremona (2002: 61), 
Herrmann (2002: 7), Krenzler and Pitschas (2001: 291), Grard (2000: 378).
789 Indeed, some of the subject matters included in the Constitution’s version of the CCP have hitherto 
fallen outside the scope of the CCP, but have been partly or wholly governed by common rules, thereby 
precluding  Member  States  from  taking  autonomous  measures  in  the  fields  covered.  While  this 
exclusivity could be revisited by a common decision to repeal the common rules, this will not be the 
case any longer if the Constitution enters into force. Member States will be precluded from acting 
without authorisation, regardless of whether the Union has acted or not.
790 As indeed suggested by the TCE, particularly in Art. IV-438(4). On the case law concerned, see 
Dutheil de la Rochère and Slot (2003: 697), Holdgaard (2003: 365), Dashwood and Heliskoski (2000: 
3). 
791 Dougan (2003: 770), Cremona (2003a: 1362), Arnull (2004: 527).
792 Dashwood (2004b: 372), referring first to the principle of “necessity” established by the Court in 
Opinion 1/76 draft Agreement establishing a European laying up fund for inland waterways vessels, as 
clarified by Opinion 1/94 WTO; and the principle of Case 22/70 Commission v Council.
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acquiring such powers, this new formulation could in effect lead to a considerable 
extension of the scope of exclusive external powers of the Union.793 
The combination of the widening of the scope of the CCP exclusivity and the new 
formulation of acquired exclusive external powers, should have the effect of reducing 
recourse to mixed agreements in EU external relations, if the TCE enters into force.794 
Indeed, it suggests that the legal bases of agreements such as the PCAs would be 
streamlined  and  several  provisions  to  which  they  refer  would  not  need  to  be 
mentioned any longer in future similar agreements.795 For instance, the provisions on 
establishment  and  trade  in  services  would  arguably  be  covered  by  the  exclusive 
competence  of  the  Union  under  Article  III-315  TCE,  on  the  CCP. As  to  the 
multidimensional cooperation established by the PCAs,796 it could be based on Article 
III-319 TCE,797 which should replace the provisions of current Article 181A EC.798 
More generally, the invigorated formula of mixity post-Opinion 1/94, already partly 
revisited by the Treaty of Nice, is further reviewed by the Constitutional Treaty. The 
latter gives the Union the power to deal with international partners on its own, in a 
broader range of areas concerning particularly trade and economic issues. However, 
mixity is not likely to disappear from the system of EU external relations altogether, 
even if the doctrine of mixity is still not formally codified in the Constitution.799 First, 
793 De Witte (2003: 100-101). On necessity, see also Dutheil de la Rochère and Slot (2003: 697).
794 The text of Art. I-12 proposed by the Convention did not contain the word “insofar” in its last limb. 
The Convention’s text instead stated “or affects an internal Union act”, which led Alan Dashwood 
(2004b: 371) to consider that this formulation would render the recourse to “the mixed agreement” 
formula practically impossible.
795 That was partly the case after the Treaty of Nice. 
796 See Section 1.1.2.2. above.
797 Thus, if the Union was to conclude the proposed PCA with Belarus after an eventual entry into force 
of the Treaty establishing the Constitution, it could be done on the basis of Articles III-315 and III-319 
TCE.
798 See Communication from the Commission on the effects of the entry into force of the Nice Treaty 
on current legislative procedures (European Commission, 2003a: 61), where the Commission indicated 
that future PCAs (e.g. with Belarus; COM(1995) 150) could be based on Arts 133 and 181A EC, the 
latter replacing Art. 308 EC.
799 It  is  noticeable  that,  although  significantly  affected  by  TCE,  the  doctrine  of  mixity  was  not 
extensively discussed in the Working Group VII on external action. Indeed, it is practically absent from 
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the principle of conferred powers remains a key principle of the Union constitutional 
order (Article I-11 TCE), which means that Member States remain full-fledged actors 
on  the  international  stage.  Secondly,  albeit  extended  by  the  TCE,  instances  of 
exclusive  external  powers  of  the  Union  are  still  limited,800 while  several  subject 
matters  fall  within  the  ambit  of  shared  or  complementary  competence,  the  latter 
excluding  exclusivity  altogether.801 An  agreement  including  provisions  in  fields 
falling  outside  Union  exclusive  powers,  or  Union  powers  altogether,  should 
consequently continue to require the participation of the Member States, unless those 
provisions are ancillary to the main purpose of that agreement.802 
6.2.1.2. The formal “de-pillarisation” and express recognition of the  
single legal personality of the EU
It was suggested in chapter 1 of this study that the mixity of the PCAs partly results 
from the trade and economic provisions of the Agreements, in view of the case law of 
the Court of Justice. Chapter 2 emphasised that the mixity of the PCAs also stems 
from  the  non-EC  provisions  included  therein,  notably  the  political  dialogue  and, 
arguably  the  specific  human  rights  conditionality.  Going  beyond  the  scope  of 
Community competence, these provisions, insofar as they were not ancillary to the 
main objectives of the Agreements, could only be inserted in the PCAs thanks to the 
participation of the Member States. It was nonetheless argued that such participation 
was  guided  by  the  provisions  of  the  TEU.  When  negotiating,  concluding  and 
implementing the PCAs alongside the Community, Member States have also acted in 
its final report (European Convention, 2002b). By contrast, the doctrine of implied powers is codified. 
The TCE provides in its Article III -323 that “[t]he Union may conclude an agreement with one or 
more third countries or international organisations not only where the Constitution so provides, but also 
where first, the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of 
the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Constitution, secondly where it is provided 
for in a legally binding Union act, thirdly where it is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.”
800 Dashwood (2004b: 370).
801 See Arts I-14 and I-17 TCE, in combination with the provisions of Art. I-12 (2) and (5) TCE.
802 Indeed Article III-315 TCE emphasises in its sixth paragraph that “[t]he exercise of the competences 
conferred by this Article in the field of the common commercial policy shall not affect the delimitation 
of competences between the Union and the Member States, and shall not lead to harmonisation of 
legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States insofar as the Constitution excludes such 
harmonisation”.
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the framework of the Union, and arguably on its behalf, given the latter’s incapacity to 
be party itself  to the Agreements. Concluded by the Community and the Member 
States acting in the framework of the EU, the PCAs could also include dimensions 
which relate to the other sub-orders of the Union, such as the political dialogue which 
relates to the CFSP. The correspondence of the PCAs with the other EU sub-orders 
led to the conclusion that the Agreements are proto cross-pillar agreements. 
This specific aspect of mixity is also likely to be affected by the TCE. Not only does it 
explicitly endow the Union with a legal personality, but also and more significantly, it 
“demolishes” the three-pillar structure of the Union,803 whose “external action” should 
be more integrated as a result.
Article I-7 TCE provides that the “Union shall have legal personality”. It is a short 
provision which consolidates practice already developing under the TEU.804 Since the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in particular, the Union has become Party, on its own, to several 
international  agreements,805 including  in  relation  to  Russia  and  Ukraine, 
respectively.806 Conferring the legal personality on the Union does not in itself affect 
the distribution of competence between the Member States and the Union. Indeed, the 
TCE is clear on the point that endowing the Union with a legal personality should be 
disconnected from the question of competence.807 
What is more significant in terms of the conduct of EU external relations is that the 
Union is established as a single legal personality.808 It replaces the other existing legal 
803 The expression is borrowed from Eeckhout (2004: 162).
804 The specific Working Group on legal personality, set up in the context of the European Convention, 
unanimously supported the explicit conferral of the legal personality to the European Union (European 
Convention, 2002a: pt. 8). 
805 E.g. Dashwood (2002a: 17). See also references in the previous chapter, under section 5.2.1.
806 E.g. Agreement between the European Union and the Russian Federation on the participation of the 
Russian Federation in the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 
(OJ 2003 L 197/38);  Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine on the participation of 
Ukraine in the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (OJ 2003 
L239/38).
807 As pointed by Arnull (2004: 526). See also Duke (2003: 5).  
808 There was a broad consensus in favour of this option in WG III on legal personality.
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personalities, namely those of the Communities.809 The latter are abolished and the 
TCE obliterates  the pillar  structure altogether.  Community powers  should thus  be 
transferred to the Union,810 and all external agreements will henceforth be concluded 
by the Union,811 and if need be together with the Member States. In the context of the 
Partnerships,  the  Parties  to  the  PCAs  will  include  the  Union,  which  will  thus 
expressly become Partner of Russia and Ukraine, replacing the Community.
It also means that the potential for cross-pillar mixed agreements should vanish.812 
Rather, external agreements should all be agreements of the Union. Indeed, the TCE 
provides  for  a  single  provision  on  the  negotiation  and  conclusion  of  external 
agreements, in Article III-325 TCE.813 The Commission, or the Union Minister for 
Foreign Affairs814 “where the agreement envisaged relates exclusively or principally 
to the common foreign and security policy”, shall  submit recommendations to the 
Council.  The  Council  authorises  the  opening  of  negotiations,  adopts  negotiating 
directives if need be, and authorises the signing of agreements and concludes them. 
Except where agreements relate exclusively to CFSP matters, the Council shall adopt 
a  European decision concluding the Agreement  after  obtaining the  consent  of  the 
European  Parliament,  or  after  consulting  it,  depending  on  the  nature  and  subject 
809 Art. IV-437 TCE on repeal of earlier treaties.
810 Art. III-438 TCE on succession and legal continuity.
811 Para 3 of Art. III-438 TCE. 
812 It should be recalled that the Union could hitherto be party to external agreements on the basis of 
Article 24 and/or 38 TEU. Although it hardly occurred in practice, this EU legal basis could be used in 
combination with EC legal bases to conclude an Agreement that would include both CFSP and EC 
matters,  neither  of  which  being  ancillary  to  the  other.  Following  the  Court  of  Justice  case  law 
concerning the choice of legal basis in the EC context (e.g. Case C-336/00  Huber;  Case C-281/01 
Commission v Council; Opinion 2/00), it could be argued that the Agreement should be based on the 
two EC and CFSP provisions, with the result that it would be fully “cross-pillar”. On the other hand, 
relying on the “Titanium dioxide” case law (Case C-300/89 Commission v Council), the Community 
procedure may arguably have to be favoured (i.e. classical mixity rather than full cross-pillar mixity) as 
it indeed seems to have been, in view of the constitutional duty to maintain the acquis. Be it as it may, 
the  TCE  disposes  of  this  potential  scenario  of  cross-pillar  mixity  by  abolishing  the  Community 
altogether.
813 The TCE provides for specific provisions which derogate from the standard procedure in relation to 
the common commercial policy (Art. III-315 TCE) and to monetary matters (Art. III-326 TCE).
814 See further below, section 6.2.3.2
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matter of the Agreement.815 The Council should in principle act by QMV throughout 
the procedure, although the TCE also provides that “it shall act unanimously when the 
agreement covers a field for which unanimity is required for the adoption of a Union 
act as well as for association agreements and the agreements referred to in Article III-
319  with  the  States  which  are  candidates  for  accession.”816 The  foregoing 
arrangements indicate that the constitutional distinction between the mechanism of 
Article 24/38 TEU and Article 300 EC, and conversely, the distinction between EC 
external  agreements and EU external  agreements,  formally disappears.  It  confirms 
that full-fledged cross-pillar mixed agreements, based on both Article 300 EC and 
Article 24/38 TEU, will not exist under the Constitution. One will thus only speak of 
EU external agreements. 
In practical terms, the combination of the EU legal personality and the collapsing of 
the pillar structure should permit the inclusion of a political dialogue in a EU external 
agreement without the participation of the Member States being required. Arguably, 
the Union should be able to do so by itself.817 Indeed,  the inclusion of a political 
dialogue  is  to  be  proposed  by  the  newly  established  Union  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs (UMFA), as foreseen by the procedure of Article III-325 TCE, and decided 
upon by the Council. Furthermore, the political conditionality which, as suggested in 
chapter 2, could be a case for mixity, should no longer require the participation of the 
Member States under the TCE either. Several provisions of the Constitutional Treaty 
relate to the protection of fundamental rights confirming the Union’s objectives to 
pursue their protection on the international stage.818 The Union itself should thus be 
able to introduce strong human rights clauses such as the one included in the PCAs. 
As  regards  the  suspension  procedure,  the  TCE  stipulates  that  the  Council,  on  a 
815 According to Art. III-325 (6) TCE, the consent of the Parliament is required in the following cases 
(i)  association agreements;  (ii)  Union accession to  the European Convention for  the  Protection of 
Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms;  (iii)  agreements  establishing  a  specific  institutional 
framework  by  organising  cooperation  procedures;  (iv)  agreements  with  important  budgetary 
implications for  the Union;  (v)  agreements  covering fields  to  which either  the ordinary legislative 
procedure applies, or the special legislative procedure where consent by the European Parliament is 
required.
816 Art. III-325(8) TCE.
817 This is also the view of Eeckhout (2004: 224).
818 Further: Dutheil de la Rochère (2004: 345). 
224
proposal  from  the  Commission  or  the  UMFA,  shall  adopt  a  European  decision 
suspending application of an agreement.819 While confirming the dual nature of the 
suspension procedure of an external agreement, this revamped modus operandi could 
solve some of the difficulties highlighted in chapter 2,820 although it remains to be 
seen whether its use will thereby be facilitated.821
On the  whole,  a  single  personality  of  the  Union  and the  collapsing  of  the  pillar 
structure should reduce the causes for mixity in the system of EU external relations. 
Indeed,  in  the  specific  case  of  the  Partnerships,  mixity  would  appear  to  be 
unnecessary  under  the  new  regime.  This  development  should  facilitate  the 
management of the PCAs, which already included the different facets of the Union, 
but  whose implementation became more difficult  with the entrenchment  of pillar-
politics.
It should however be pointed out that while the TCE appears to “de-pillarise” the 
Union, the specificity of the CFSP (and of the Common Security and Defence Policy) 
has survived the transmutation of the Union’s constitutional order. Article I-16 TCE 
deals specifically with the common foreign and security policy, stipulating in its first 
paragraph that “[t]he Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security 
policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's 
security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might 
lead to a common defence.” This Article, situated between the provisions on shared 
competence and the “areas  of  supporting,  coordinating or  complementary action”, 
illustrates that the CFSP does not fit in any of the categories of competence envisaged 
by the TCE in Article I-12 TCE. Indeed, the differentiated procedural arrangements of 
the CFSP are maintained, including the exclusion of some EU institutions from the 
process.822 The  remaining  dualism  in  external  relations  is  also  inherent  in  the 
819 Art. III-325(9) TCE.
820 Section 2.2.1.
821 See also the provisions of Art. III-322 TCE on “restrictive measures” involving a joint proposal 
from the UMFA and the Commission.
822 See Part III, Title V, Chapter II of the TCE. With regard to the institutions, the limited role of the 
European Parliament  and  the  quasi-exclusion of  the  European  Court  of  Justice remain.  As to  the 
instruments, only “decisions” are to be used. They are defined in Art. I-33(1) TCE as “a non-legislative 
act, binding in its entirety.” In the context of CFSP, they are to be adopted by the Council or European 
Council. Further: de Witte (2004: 98).
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streamlined  procedure  for  the  conclusion  of  EU external  agreements  provided  in 
Article  III-325 TCE, evoked above.  A procedural  differentiation remains  between 
agreements dealing essentially with CFSP matters and agreements dealing with other 
EU matters.823 The former will imply a proposal from the UMFA, while the latter will 
require a proposal from the Commission. In other words, although the pillar structure 
may  be  badly  damaged,  it  is  not  entirely  demolished,  and  the  second  pillar  is 
seemingly still standing, alongside the other standard procedure for organising the EU 
external relations.824
To recapitulate,  the  TCE reduces  instances  of  mixity  by  actually  and  potentially 
widening  the  scope  of  Union’s  exclusive  external  powers.  In  particular,  the  new 
constitutional arrangement finishes the job of undoing Opinion 1/94 for the conduct of 
EU external trade Agreements. Moreover, the quasi obliteration of the pillar structure 
and the establishment of a single legal personality able to conclude agreements on the 
whole range of EU activities eradicate the future of cross-pillar mixity as we know it. 
It was however pointed out that mixity may still be required in law in view of the list 
of shared, complementary powers contained in the TCE, or indeed desired in practice 
by the Member States. Moreover, strong substantive and procedural differentiation 
has not entirely disappeared. Hence the key principles underpinning the system of EU 
external relations, to manage such plurality and ensure coherence, are likely to remain 
significant. 
6.2.2. The  continued  significance  of  the  principles  underpinning  the 
system of EU external relations envisaged in the Constitution
Part II of the present study attempted to articulate the key principles which guide and 
inform the  conduct  of  the  multifarious  EU  external  relations  under  the  TEU,  as 
evidenced in  the  PCAs.  The  aim of  such principles  is  to  promote coherence  and 
efficiency of the Union’s external action, and ultimately to assert its identity on the 
international stage. It was seen that the duty of cooperation obliges the Member States 
and the Community to cooperate, in the context of mixed agreements. This obligation 
stems  from the  principle  of  loyal  cooperation  enshrined  in  Article  10  EC,  which 
823 See further below.
824 Cremona (2003a: 1354), Nuttall (2004). 
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forces  the  Member  States  and  the  institutions  to  ensure  the  fulfilment  of  the 
Community’s tasks and objectives, and which co-exist with the CFSP principle of 
loyalty.  In  combination  with  this  duty  of  cooperation,  it  was  seen  that  the  TEU 
contains constitutional principles which guide the interactions between the various EU 
sub-orders, namely the duty to maintain the acquis communautaire, and the principle 
of consistency supported by the Union’s single institutional framework.
While the de-pillarisation and the establishment of the single EU legal personality 
contribute, in themselves, to furthering the coherence of EU external relations, the 
TCE also confirms and builds upon the constitutional principles and devices.825 They 
remain particularly significant in view of the maintained procedural differentiation in 
the  EU  external  relations  (6.2.2.2),  and  considering  the  room  left  for  joint 
participation of EU and Member States in the external action of the Union (6.2.2.1).
6.2.2.1. The consolidation of the principles governing the interactions  
between the EU and its Member States
While instances of mixity should be reduced under the TCE, it has been suggested 
above that mixed agreements are not likely to disappear altogether. Indeed, the Union, 
endowed with conferred powers,826 does not replace the Member States which remain 
full-fledged actors on the international stage. Outside the field of  a priori exclusive 
external competence, the Member States will still be entitled to act in an area where, 
and for as long as the Union has not legislated internally. They should thus remain 
empowered to participate to the negotiation and conclusion of an agreement which 
covers the area concerned. Although not codified as such, the duty of cooperation 
examined in chapter 3 of this  study is  thus likely to persist  as a key principle  to 
organise the interactions between the Union and the Member States. 
825 Indeed, the quest for coherence in the EU external action was one of the main preoccupations of the 
Working  Group  on  External  Action,  as  suggested  by  its  Final  Report,  esp.  Part  V  (European 
Convention, 2002b).  
826 Art. I-11 TCE.
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As in the context of the EC Treaty, the duty of cooperation should be related to the 
general  principle  of  loyal  cooperation,  which  has  been  re-branded  “sincere 
cooperation” in the TCE and provided in its Article I-5(2):
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States 
shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow 
from the Constitution.
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Constitution or resulting 
from the acts of the institutions of the Union.
The  Member  States  shall  facilitate  the  achievement  of  the  Union's  tasks  and 
refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's 
objectives.
It is noticeable that in the de-pillarised Union, the principle of sincere cooperation 
operates between the Member States and the  Union, and thus appears to cover the 
relationship between them on the whole of Union’s activities. Yet, the TCE does not 
suppress the principle of loyalty specific to the CFSP, provided in Article 11 TEU. 
Article I-16 TCE provides in its second paragraph that 
Member  States  shall  actively  and  unreservedly  support  the  Union's  common 
foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall 
comply  with  the  Union's  action  in  this  area.  They  shall  refrain  from  action 
contrary to the Union's interests or likely to impair its effectiveness.
As with the current “Community” principle of loyalty, the CFSP loyalty has therefore 
found its place in the new constitutional framework. The dualism is astonishing and 
somewhat confusing considering the “de-pillarisation” of the EU. While it confirms 
the remaining differentiation between the CFSP and other EU provisions, the two 
principles do not seem necessary given the formulation of the principle of sincere 
cooperation.827 As suggested earlier, the latter principle covers the relation between 
the  Member  States  and  the  EU,  and  should  therefore  apply  also  where  a  EU 
agreement deals with CFSP. 
6.2.2.2. The  consolidation  of  the  principles  governing  interactions  
between sub-orders
827 For a more streamlined approach to the principle of loyalty, see Dashwood et al (2003: 12).
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As pointed out above, the procedural differentiation within the EU has survived in the 
Constitutional Treaty, particularly as regards the external action of the Union. The 
principles guiding the interactions between the EU sub-orders will thus remain, at 
least in principle, important guides for the conduct of EU external activities. Indeed, 
like differentiation, they have a place in the Constitution.
First, Article III-308 TCE stipulates that: 
The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the 
application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid 
down by the Constitution for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in 
Articles I-13 to I-15 and I-17. Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed 
in those Articles shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of 
the powers of the institutions laid down by the Constitution for the exercise of the 
Union competences under this Chapter.
This is a reminiscence of Article 47 TEU. The presence of the above provisions in the 
TCE confirms, in itself, the remaining differentiation between CFSP and other EU 
external  powers.828 These  provisions  aim  at  preventing  the  application  of  CFSP 
specific  procedures  where  the  standard  EU procedures  should  be  used,  the  latter 
providing  notably  for  full  involvement  of  the  European  Parliament  and  judicial 
control.829 While  the  Constitution  entrenches  the  principle  of  single  institutional 
framework, the different roles of the institutions, depending on the sphere of action, 
remain. The Court, which keeps its jurisdiction for policing the boundaries between 
CFSP matters and other EU matters, is thus expected to play an important role in 
supervising the new distribution of powers.830
828 Another spectre of pillar-politics appears in Art. I-1 TCE which provides that: “The Union shall 
coordinate the policies by which the Member States aim to achieve these objectives, and shall exercise 
on a Community basis the competences they confer on it” (emphasis added).
829 Article  III-376  provides  that:  “The  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  shall  not  have 
jurisdiction with respect to Articles I-40 and I-41 and the provisions of Chapter II of Title V concerning 
the common foreign and security policy and Article III-293 insofar as it concerns the common foreign 
and security policy. However, the Court shall have jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article III-
308 and to rule on proceedings, brought in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article III-
365(4), reviewing the legality of European decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural 
or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter II of Title V.”
830 This might be particularly significant in the case of external agreements. The EP, excluded from 
CFSP agreements, could well consider that an agreement, alleged to be of a CFSP nature by the UMFA 
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Secondly, the principle of consistency, as notably provided in Article 3 TEU, is re-
affirmed on several occasions in the Constitution. In particular, Article III-115 TCE 
provides that “The Union shall ensure consistency between the policies and activities 
referred to in this Part, taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with 
the  principle  of  conferral  of  powers.”  This  provision  is  included  in  Title  I  that 
establishes “provisions of general application”, which as such inform the whole action 
of the Union.831 It confirms the inherent tension between coherence and division of 
competences. Indeed, the TCE provides for new devices for promoting coherence, 
arguably inspired by previous ad hoc institutional practices. 
6.2.3. Further substantive and institutional integration of the system of 
EU external relations 
Part III of the dissertation gleaned some insight into evolving institutional practices 
following treaty changes and enlargement. In particular, chapters 5 and 6 emphasised 
the  rising  role  of  the  European  Council  as  guarantor  of  coherence,  above  the 
institutional  battles  between  the  Commission  and  the  Council.  The  increasing 
tendency for  the Union to  project  itself  as  an integrated whole,  not  only through 
enlargement,  but  also  increasingly,  in  the  context  of  the  Partnerships,  was  also 
highlighted.
Arguably,  the  TCE  codifies  and  builds  upon  these  practices.  It  appears  that  the 
Constitutional Treaty carries the possibility of enhancing the coherence of the Union’s 
external  action  through  the  integration  of  the  latter’s  objectives  within  a  single 
provision, while upholding their more assertive promotion (6.2.3.1). Moreover, the 
TCE attempts to enhance coherence through institutional means. First, it consolidates 
the pivotal role of the European Council, and secondly it establishes a Union Minister 
for Foreign Affairs (6.2.3.2). 
6.2.3.1. Substantive integration 
and the Council, is in fact an EU agreement.
831 Further: Wessel (2004). 
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The TCE fosters the substantive integration of external relations of the EU through 
first, the streamlining of its objectives and principles, and secondly, by providing for a 
more assertive projection of its values, particularly towards its neighbourhood.
The value-promotion feature of the EU external relations is made more evident and 
strengthened.832  Article I-3 TCE sets out the objectives of the Union. It notably refers 
to the aim “to promote peace and its values”. The latter are set out in Article I-2 TCE, 
namely respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect  for  human rights,  including  the  rights  of  persons  belonging  to  minorities. 
Article I-2 also adds that “these values are common to the Member States in a society 
in  which  pluralism,  non-discrimination,  tolerance,  justice,  solidarity  and  equality 
between women and men prevail.” 
More  significantly  for  present  purposes,  Article  I-3  TCE  provides  in  its  fourth 
paragraph that “in its  relations with the wider world,  the Union shall  uphold and 
promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable 
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair 
trade,  eradication of  poverty and the protection of human rights,  in  particular the 
rights  of  the  child,  as  well  as  to  the  strict  observance  and  the  development  of 
international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter” 
(emphasis added).  
Part III of the TCE elaborates on this objective of upholding and promoting the values 
of  the  Union.  The  Constitution  captures,  in  one  provision  “having  general 
application” the objectives which should guide the whole of EU external relations, be 
they  trade  related,  development  oriented,  or  dealing  with  CFSP  matters.  This 
provision simplifies and clarifies the aims of the Union external action,833 some of 
which have hitherto been scattered around in various parts of the Treaty, others being 
mentioned explicitly for the first time in the Constitutional text. 
Article III-292 TCE states that  
832 Further: Cremona (2004c: 553), Leino (2002). 
833 Cremona (2003a: 1348), de Witte (2004: 100).  
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1. The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it 
seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality 
and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human 
dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter and international law. 
The  Union  shall  seek  to  develop  relations  and  build  partnerships  with  third 
countries,  and  international,  regional  or  global  organisations  which  share  the 
principles  referred  to  in  the  first  subparagraph.  It  shall  promote  multilateral 
solutions  to  common problems,  in  particular  in  the  framework  of  the  United 
Nations.
Integrating all objectives of EU external relations in a single and all-encompassing 
provision  further  enhances  the  coherence  of  the  Union’s  external  action.  The 
provision of Article II-292 codifies and develops the trend of including the EC and 
mixed  external  agreements  in  all-encompassing  policy  frameworks.  This  trend, 
developed  in  a  piecemeal  fashion  from  the  entry  into  force  of  the  TEU,  was 
exemplified by the PCAs and subsequent Action Plans. It has also been typified in the 
neighbourhood policy, which finds its inspiration in the methodology and principles 
of  the  enlargement  policy.  Through  these  policies,  the  Union  has  increasingly 
projected  itself,  as  a  whole,  towards  the  outside  world,  by  increasingly  making 
references to “values”.834 Indeed, it is noticeable that reference is made in Article III-
292 TCE to the principles which have inspired not only the Union’s creation but also 
its  enlargement. This may be interpreted as a confirmation of the observation made 
above that the enlargement principles have become a reference  for the EU external 
action. 
While  establishing a  single  list  of  objectives  and principles  which underscore  the 
Union’s external action, the TCE also contains an entire Title on the EU relations with 
its neighbourhood (“immediate environment”). 
Article I-57 on “The Union and its neighbours” stipulates that:
1.  The Union shall  develop a special  relationship with neighbouring countries, 
aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the 
values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on 
cooperation.
834 Cremona (2004d). 
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2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Union may conclude specific agreements 
with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal rights and 
obligations  as  well  as  the  possibility  of  undertaking  activities  jointly.  Their 
implementation shall be the subject of periodic consultation.
This provision is new and corresponds to an issue of growing importance while the 
European Convention was debating.  As  pointed out  by Bruno de  Witte,  it  is  not 
evident why this type of external relations deserves to be singled out,  rather than 
other, close long-standing, foreign links of the EU with countries that have concluded 
association agreements.835 Be it as it may, this provision appears to “constitutionalise” 
the ENP as a more assertive promotion of the Union as a whole towards its “near 
abroad”. It also appears to constitutionalise the differentiation introduced in the EU 
Ostpolitik. It prefigures the end of the enlargement process and policy, and contrasts 
with the call of the founding fathers made to all European peoples that share the ideals 
of the Community to join in their efforts.836 
6.2.3.2. Institutional integration 
Article  I-19  TCE  on  the  Union’s  institutions  stipulates  that  the  Union  has  an 
institutional  framework  which  shall  aim  to  promote  its  values.  Building  on  the 
existing institutional configuration of the EU, the Constitutional Treaty nevertheless 
introduces various noteworthy innovations.
One of the most celebrated institutional novelties brought about by the TCE is the 
merger of the functions of External Relations Commissioner with those of the High 
Representative for CFSP, the “Patana” formula.837 The result is the creation of the 
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.838 Article I-28 TCE provides that he or she shall 
be appointed by the European Council  acting by QMV. His or her  function is  to 
conduct the CFSP and CSDP of the Union, contributing through the submission of 
835 De Witte (2004: 98).
836 The preamble of the EEC Treaty signed in Rome in 1957, read “calling upon the other peoples of 
Europe  who  share  their  ideal  to  join  in  their  efforts”.  The  Schuman  Declaration  spoke  of  “une 
organisation ouverte à la participation des autres pays d'Europe” (Schuman, 1950).  
837 Cameron (2004), referring to the merger of former External Commissioner Patten and HR Solana.
838 Dashwood and Johnston (2004: 1481). 
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proposals to the development of those policies, which s/he carries out as mandated by 
the Council.839 
Institutionally, the UMFA presides over the Foreign Affairs Council.840 At the same 
time,  s/he  is  one  of  the  Vice-Presidents  of  the  Commission.  S/he  is  “responsible 
within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and 
for  coordinating  other  aspects  of  the  Union's  external  action.  In  exercising  these 
responsibilities  within  the  Commission,  and  only  for  these  responsibilities,  the 
[UMFA]  shall  be  bound  by  Commission  procedures  to  the  extent  that  this  is 
consistent with his or her other functions within the Council.”841 This arrangement has 
been referred to as “double-hatting”. 
The  creation  of  the  double-hatted  post  of  UMFA may  be  a  consolidation  of  the 
increased  symbiotic  cooperation  between  the  Commission  and  the  HR,  as  seen 
already in the framework of the ENP. With one foot in the Commission and the other 
in the Council, the Minister is expected to incarnate the consistency of the Union’s 
external action. Whether the pillar-politics between the Council and the Commission 
will turn into a schizophrenic double-hatted Minister remains to be seen.842 The hope 
of course is that with only one head, the UMFA will effectively provide a sense of 
direction to the EU external action. In this task, s/he is to be assisted by a European 
External Action Service (EEAS) that should work in cooperation with the diplomatic 
services  of  the  Member  States,843 thereby  fostering  the  interactions  between  the 
Member States and the Union. In addition to staff seconded from national diplomatic 
services  of  the Member States,  the EEAS is  also made of  officials  from relevant 
839 S/he shall conduct the political dialogues with third states, as provided in Article III-296 TCE, and 
the position to be that s/he would present would be decided by the Council. According to Art. III-
325(9) TCE, the Council on a proposal by the UMFA establishes the positions to be adopted on the 
Union’s behalf, in CFSP matters, in a body set up by an agreement, when that body is called upon to 
adopt acts having legal effects, with the exception of acts supplementing or amending the institutional 
framework of the agreement.
840 Art. III-296(1) TCE. This formula was seen by the WG on external action as advantageous from the 
point of view of continuity and consistency (European Convention, 2002b: pt. 26). 
841 Art. I-28(4) TCE.
842 On this point, see Crowe (2004). 
843 For a concise analysis of this EEAS, see Cameron (2004). See also Hill (2003).   
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departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission, thus 
hopefully enhancing cooperation between these two institutions.844 
The UMFA also takes part in the work of the European Council.845 This is thus likely 
to be a powerful figure, insofar as s/he will  have a say in all  the key institutions 
shaping the external action of the Union.846 It should be added that the President of the 
European Council should ensure the external representation of the Union on issues 
concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers 
of the UMFA.847 Given that the Minister is to share this role with the President of the 
European Council, it will be crucial that the division of tasks be clear. In practical 
terms, it means that in political dialogues, such as the ones established by the PCAs, 
the EU may be represented at Summit level by the President of the European Council, 
together  with  the  President  of  the  Commission  and  the  UMFA.  The  relationship 
between these powerful figures, not to mention with the President of the European 
Commission, may thus be critical.848 Moreover, loyalty and institutional logics will 
continue to be pivotal in the functioning of the system.849
While the TCE establishes the UMFA, integrating the former external relations foes, 
the  EU  institutional  framework  also  includes  the  European  Council  among  its 
institutions,  endowing  it  with  key  powers  with  respect  to  the  definition  of  the 
orientations of the Union’s external action. It shall identify in “European decisions” 
the strategic interests and objectives of the Union, on the basis of the principles and 
objectives of Article III-292 mentioned above. Article III-293 provides that:
European  decisions  of  the  European  Council  on  the  strategic  interests  and 
objectives of the Union shall relate to the common foreign and security policy and 
to other areas of the external action of the Union. Such decisions may concern the 
844 Art. III-296(3) TCE. The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service 
shall be established by a European decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from 
the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the 
consent of the Commission.
845 Art. I-21(2) TCE.
846 Arnull (2004: 524ff).
847 Art. I-22(2) TCE.
848 “New EU foreign minister to complicate institutional power balance” (EUobserver, 13.08.2004). 
849 Jacqué (2004).
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relations of the Union with a specific country or region or may be thematic in 
approach. They shall define their duration, and the means to be made available by 
the Union and the Member States.
The  European  Council  shall  act  unanimously  on  a  recommendation  from the 
Council, adopted by the latter under the arrangements laid down for each area. 
European decisions of the European Council shall be implemented in accordance 
with the procedures provided for in the Constitution.
2. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the area of common foreign and 
security  policy,  and  the  Commission,  for  other  areas  of  external  action,  may 
submit joint proposals to the Council.
The TCE thus  codifies  a  trend which appeared under  the TEU, particularly  post-
Amsterdam,  whereby  the  European  Council  defined  the  policy  framework  within 
which the EU relations with a third country had to be developed. In the case of the 
Partnerships, this trend was epitomised by the Common Strategies.850 While the latter 
disappear  as  CFSP  instruments,  the  method  they  embodied  has  seemingly  been 
generalised  by  the  TCE.  The  practice  of  inserting  agreements  of  the  Union  in  a 
broader strategic perspective defined by the European Council  and committing all 
institutions  and  Member  States  is  thus  consolidated.851 The  Constitution  thereby 
codifies the leading role of the European Council for the whole range of EU external 
relations,852 and fosters the “unity of policy design”.853
6.3. Conclusion
The extraordinary institutional practice developed in the context of the enlargement 
process epitomises new forms of interactions between the institutions and the Member 
States  in  shaping  the  Union’s  action  towards  third  countries.  These  interactions 
facilitate the projection of a fully integrated EU on the international stage, both in 
substantive and institutional terms. 
850 Hillion (2000: 1224, 2002c: 32).
851 Decisions are defined as “a non-legislative act, binding in its entirety” (Art. I-33(1), 5 th subpara. 
TCE).
852 It also defines the general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for 
matters with defence implications (Art. III-295 TCE).
853 De Witte (2004: 100).
236
The  Partnerships  exemplify  the  current  tendency  of  the  Union  to  transplant  this 
enlargement methodology in other frameworks of EU external relations. In particular, 
the development  of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Common Spaces 
introduces elements of the pre-accession strategy into EU relations with Russia and 
Ukraine, thereby potentially enhancing the coherence of the Union’s action towards 
these two partners. At the same time, it has become apparent that the methodology has 
not penetrated the two Partnerships to the same degree. Notably, the development of 
the EU relationship with Russia has remained governed by the formal division of 
competence between sub-orders and Member States, to a larger extent than the EU 
Partnership with Ukraine. 
The  coherence  of  the  EU action  in  the  context  of  the  Partnerships  may  also  be 
enhanced  by  the  new constitutional  framework  based  on  the  TCE,  which  indeed 
codifies certain elements of the institutional practice developed in the pre-accession 
strategy. For instance the substantive and institutional integration of the system of EU 
external relations could put on hold the fragmentation of the Partnerships that was 
observed in the aftermath of the Amsterdam Treaty. More generally the formal de-
pillarisation and the express legal personality of the EU will consolidate the Union as 
the Partner of Russia and Ukraine, thus replacing the Communities and their Member 
States acting in the framework of the Union. 
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CONCLUSION
Founded on the PCAs and supplemented by other EU instruments, the Partnerships 
with Russia and Ukraine have been chosen as case studies to decrypt the evolution of 
the system of  EU external  relations.  The  contours  of  this  system emerged in  the 
aftermath of the Treaty of Maastricht establishing the European Union and while the 
PCAs were being negotiated. It has evolved as a function of four main factors of 
change, as evidenced by the foregoing study of the Partnerships.
First  and  foremost,  EU  constitutional  law,  based  on  the  Treaties,  has  not  only 
established  the  foundations  of  the  system,  it  has  also  revised  and  adjusted  the 
parameters  of  interactions  between  the  EU,  the  EC and  the  Member  States.  The 
Partnerships exemplified the impact of such Treaty changes on the functioning of the 
system. A particularly significant evolution was the fragmentation of the Partnerships 
in the aftermath of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entrenched the pillar structure of 
the Union. Moreover, the development of the Partnerships has also been coloured by 
the tension inherent in the constitutional charter of the Union between the devices 
guaranteeing the division of competences and the principles promoting coherence in 
the EU external action.
Secondly,  and  as  a  result  of  this  tension,  the  institutional  practice  has  oscillated 
between the  utilisation of  orthodox decision making procedures  and the quest  for 
coherence. The Common Position on Ukraine typified the pillar-politics fuelled by the 
duty  to  maintain  the  acquis,  and  the  inability  of  the  system  to  get  rid  of  the 
competence obsession while functioning  within the framework of the Treaty.  It  is 
indeed symptomatic that the quest for coherence has been most successful outside the 
Treaty  framework,  through  the  adoption  of  informal  instruments  and  ad  hoc 
interactions between institutions, with the political blessing of the European Council. 
A case in point is the 1996 Action Plan on Ukraine. One could also mention, outside 
the  Partnership  framework,  the  “pre-accession  strategy”.  Indeed,  many  of  these 
institutional practices have thereafter been codified on the occasion of Treaty reforms, 
as  well  illustrated  by  the  growing  role  of  the  European  Council  in  defining  the 
orientations of the Union’s external action.
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Thirdly,  the  case  law of  the  European Court  of  Justice  has  been  instrumental  in 
articulating the system, essentially by clarifying the division of competences between 
the EU sub-orders, and between the Community and its Member States. For instance, 
in  Opinion  1/94,  the  Court  shed  further  light  on  the  boundaries  of  the  Common 
Commercial  Policy  and  clarified  the  conditions  for  the  Community  to  acquire 
exclusive external competence. It had the effect of stimulating the recourse to mixed 
agreements in the development of EC external relations. In this context, the Court also 
fleshed out the duty of cooperation between the EC and the Member States to ensure 
coherence in the external action of the Community, and incidentally of the Union. 
This  evolving  jurisprudence  had  a  direct  impact  on  the  conclusion  and 
implementation  of  the  PCAs,  which  were  the  first  agreements  to  incorporate  the 
implications of Opinion 1/94. 
Finally, the evolution of the system has been influenced by the Partners of the Union, 
and  the  latter’s  differentiated  objectives  towards  them.  A  case  in  point  is  the 
differentiated  Ostpolitik established  by  the  Union  at  the  dawn  of  the  nineties. 
Moreover, the adoption of EU action plans prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam, revealed 
a distinction between the EU approach towards Russia and Ukraine, respectively. In 
particular, the Council and the Member States were significantly more receptive to the 
proposals  of the Commission in relation to Ukraine than they were in  relation to 
Russia.  The  same  holds  true  with  respect  to  the  penetration  of  the  pre-accession 
methodology in the Partnerships, which has been more tangible in the relationship 
with Ukraine than with Russia.
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe announces profound changes in the 
system of EU external relations explored in this study, such as “de-pillarisation”, the 
extension of exclusive competence of the Union, and the creation of the post of Union 
Foreign Affairs  Minister.  Yet,  fundamental  features of  the system, and indeed its 
determinants,  remain.  In particular, the TCE encompasses the tension between the 
quest for coherence and the division of competences, a dialectic that will continue to 
define the EU capacity to assert itself on the international stage.
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